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| Speakers: | Luiz Felipe Lampreia, chairman, Board of Trustees, Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais |
|---|---|
| Michel Rocard, Former President of the Committee on Development & Cooperation, European Parliament | |
| Michael Elliot, Editor-at-large, "Time" Magazine | |
| Moderator: | Harold M. Evans, author, "The American Century" |
September 26, 2001
Council on Foreign Relations
Nancy Bodurtha: Good afternoon. May I have your attention for a moment. Before we turn to our panel this afternoon, I have a couple of announcements. As is already apparent, the Council is reorienting much of our programming over the next weeks and months- roundtables, taskforces, general meetings - both in Washington and New York, so that we can focus sustained attention on the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. We intend to raise difficult questions about the immediate as well as the far-reaching implications of terrorism for our society and our world. New roundtables and general meetings are being planned to discuss the geo-political and geo-economic ramifications, shifts and flash points between and among our allies and strategic competitors, the military response options, the economic implications, the intelligence failures and possible fixes, the tensions between civil liberties and societal protection, homeland defense, understanding the roots of Islamic extremism, and the role of international law and the United Nations.
A new task force on America’s responses to terrorism will provide critical analysis, eliminate points of agreements and disagreements among experts, and make policy recommendations. The best tool for staying abreast of what we are doing is the Council’s web site. There’s a brief refresher notice on the tables today explaining how to go to the site, use it, and register for late-breaking programs. If you’re interested in participating in studies roundtables, please call our Director of Studies, Larry Korb, at (212) 434-9630, or send him an e-mail to lkorb@cfr.org.
On a slightly different note, I need to ask those of you who might have a cell phone in your pocket or in your bag to please take a moment now and check it and make sure that you’ve turned it off. Thanks very much.
Harold Evans: Thank you, and good morning. I’d just like to start by quickly introducing the panel, just to identify them. Michel Rocard, the former prime minister of France, is on the far left. Luiz Lampreia, the foreign minister of Brazil until quite recently. Here we have Sergei Karaganov, who’s advised almost every Russian prime minister you can think of. And Michael Elliot, of course of Newsweek International, who happens to have the disqualification of being English, but I know this is a tolerate audience and you can forgive him for that. I would like to (Inaudible) affiliation.
We’re going to have very brief opening remarks from each speaker, and I hope we can have a lot of time for questions. In a sense, the nature of the topic today, “Terrorism and The New US Foreign Policy”, is sort of broad. Actually it presumes there is a new foreign policy for the United States. You could say that BT, before the terror, if you wanted to be provocative, you could say there was a kind of macho unilateralism in which allies did not count on the comprehensive test ban treaty, nuclear proliferation, and global warming, to name three obvious examples. And of now all that has changed and the United States has belatedly embraced multilateralism. You could say that. Whether our panelists will say it, I don’t know. And I’m going to start by asking the man who knows more about Russia than any of us…Sergei.
SK: Thank you very much. First of all, I mean, there is hope that at last the United States will embrace multilateralism, as a leader, but as a leader of a grand coalition. But we have to see what comes out of it. Second, it should not be a coalition only against terrorism, because terrorism is one of the few and not most mortal threats we are facing…I mean, this kind of terrorism. The old world order is progressively disintegrating. We have overslept the start of a disintegration of…and the nuclear regime we have created over the last 20 years. In ten or 15 years there will be more nuclear powers—this is (inaudible) clear. Asia is on the rise, and not only Islam. Asia is on the rise, and it will be challenging us. And not only in a negative sense, but we have to have common forces.
And that’s why I believe that if the United States at last takes, after this murderous attack, where it now has the moral right to have a coalition in addition to having a physical right…that is, its might…then I think, as almost everybody, including Russia, would join. Russian position would be —of course it has to be pronounced by Putin - we will be members of coalition, a grand coalition, but we would like to have some kind of an understanding where we are. A say in the decision making, because we will be the battle ground and probably a membership in the alliance, in the alliance with the big eight.
HE: Some people were surprised and pleased by the forthright way that Mr. Putin came out this week. Were you?
SK: I was not at all. I mean, because Putin was one of the leaders who are most often cited terrorism as the main threat. Because it was their main threat to Russian security. And we thought we were being criticized very harshly, an anti-terrorist - a very bloody and very unpleasant anti-terrorist war in Chechnya. The same will be happening unfortunately in Afghanistan, of course short of CNN coverage.
HE: Michel Rocard?
MR: Well, first of all, I agree with what Sergei just said. What I want to begin to say is that we had quiet peace time, some difficult life inside the alliance. Like in all families, disputes make all the noise and occupy all the territory. And you need some external shocks to discover how thin are the disputes and how thick and how important is the real solidarity. When the news of the strike of the first tower…on the two towers happened, I was chairing my committee in the European Parliament. The degree of emotions was absolute and absolutely unanimous. I am proud of the fact that the director of Le Monde, a journal…a newspaper which has not always been very nice to the United States, has found this title…“We Are All Americans.” And he did not deny at all the national feeling. We felt this way.
Another sign that we have (Inaudible) one minister whom I know quite well, who intended to be president of the republic on a sovereignty basis disputing the American leadership - he is completely silent, he will probably disappear. He has nothing more to say. The third element, Leslie will permit me to repeat myself- we had the other week a poll in Europe, in most of the significant countries…I think all, but I’m not sure…in which one of the questions was, Would you support the idea that your national government and the union follow and support the Americans in any military answer? And the answer is positively yes by two thirds in all of the Europe. The two countries which arrive at the top of this poll are Britain, naturally, but France two points behind…72 percent. This should surprise normally Americans. It did not surprise me, but it’s the fact that we lacked some occasions of expressing that.
Now to come to a few other elements. It’s true that the shock is on the United States. You are the leading power. You have been the target. You have to answer, with the friendship and the solidarity of your allies and friends. Who is the real target? It’s important to read the interview that bin Laden and some other Islamic terrorists, or so-called Islamic, have said the target is Jewish and Crusader civilization. You’ve read that. There are news according to which some targets were prepared in Europe. So even if by now the United States is the key piece and the key target, we have to understand that we’re all in this affair. And that’s the first issue.
The second…just to make.. you want me to be short? Well, this is difficult. And I’m not fluent enough in English to make it as a short as I would like.
HE: No, no, take your time, take your time.
MR: I am a bit worried on the fact that we all discuss with pertinence and precision and moderation and responsibility the consequences of what to do, etcetera. We devote little thinking on why. How can some people, extracted probably from a network of thousands, if not tens of thousands, ready to kill themselves through suicide in order to demolish this Crusader and Jewish civilization.
One of the most terrible news I had from my family (Inaudible) a few days ago is that in Cambodia…in Cambodia there is much money to build mosques. Now, there are no Muslims in Cambodia. There is a propaganda offensive to make Islam the support of the rejection of Western civilization. And that has frightened me. I think we should do as much time on how to answer where’s bin Laden and how to answer and to kill, as limited as possible anyways, in order not to have collateral effect. But I would devote much time on why, what is the reason of such humiliation and how many decades, but how can we treat such a level of humiliation capable to create such a reaction.
HE: Thank you. Well, allied to that is a question which underlines all the talks, really, which is that why is there resentment of America at all. I mean, we’ve come to that, Luiz.
LL: Well, to come back to your first question. I think that the Clinton Administration during the eight years was making a determined effort at going through a much more multilateral approach in trying to build alliances on such a number of matters, including trade, including economic area. And I believe that it is obvious for anyone to see that the Bush Administration reverted that considerably in its first few months.
It is now the question of whether the attacks on America on the 11th of September are going to be a watershed and are going to accentuate isolationism or unilateralism or are going to bring multilateralism more into focus again. I myself believe that the restraint and the kind of careful development of the strategy and the military and diplomatic and political that has been going on in the last week or so by the United States Government does point at the realization that has been achieved that this is not a war, not a situation that can be addressed by unilateral action. And that a lot of cooperative work will have to be developed if the matter is going to be successful and if the strategy is going to work.
And I think that this brings a very interesting opportunity that is there to be fully developed. And that I think has to do very much with the second question you are posing. I think that…I have lived here in the United States two times. The first time was in 1966 for two years. And I have never seen the question being asked of the important American audiences or institutions whether we are resented or hated or rejected at all. I mean, America has always had, and very much deservedly so, large self-confidence that prevented this question from being asked. But this is such an unprecedented, such an unexpected and terrible act that it has faced that it’s bringing that into focus.
And I think the answer will certainly go through more cooperation and engaging more people and giving less the feeling that America is prepared to go it alone and do what it thinks it has to do without caring for the opinion and involvement of other friends and countries.
HE: Michael Elliot. I was disturbed as an Englishman to read a few newspapers in Britain where Harold Pinter and others were using this is an occasion, lamentably, for anti-Americanism. I was very surprised indeed by that. They are not representative of British opinion at all, is it? Michael.
ME: No. I’ve read the same pieces as you, Harry, and had very much the same reaction. And I’ve been surprised by how many pieces like that I’ve read in the British press. But can I just say a couple of words on your first point. Let me raise a kind of slightly counter-intuitive question which is whether the policy response to September 11th represents a genuine rupture in American foreign policy or is likely to represent a genuine rupture in American foreign policy, or whether it is just a kind of particularly dramatic moment in a continuum of policy.
And I think you can make arguments both ways. I mean, the argument for the case that the terrorist attacks on September 11 are ruptural, if you like, are first of all the horrific nature of the event, the scale of the atrocity, the extent of civilian deaths. Secondly, the potential for reaching out to new allies, or perhaps more precisely put, to re-discovering old allies…Pakistan, possibly Iran. And, thirdly, the depths of the commitment, including the military option, which seem to be a part of the policy response. All of that argues, as I think someone’s already said, September 11th was a watershed.
But there are counter-arguments, I think. This is not the first terrorist attack on American soil and not the first terrorist attack that has killed a significant number of Americans, even though it of course dwarfs anything that has happened before. Osama bin Laden and Al Qaida have been a policy concern of American administrations for some time and have indeed already been the subject of attempted American military action. And moreover, the fight against terrorism that I would argue that the United States has been waging for some time is a fight that already is international in its scope and has required cooperation from friends and allies.
So I think you can argue both sides. The thing that would determine the argument one way or the other I think would be if we were now at war. I don’t think we are at war in the sense that we use the word “at war.” I think we’re engaged in a long twilight struggle, to use a phrase that we’ve heard frequently in the last few days, which will have political dimensions, intelligence dimensions, economic dimensions, in terms of economic development of certain parts of the world, religious dimensions, and certainly military dimensions.
It will be of indeterminate length. Just a the fight against domestic terrorism waged by Spain or by Britain has been of indeterminate length, and just as the campaign to abolish the Atlantic slave trade that the British Navy undertook in the 19th century was of indeterminate length…40 or 50 years. But I’m not sure that in the way in which we properly use the words “it’s a war.” And so without being able to say we’re at war, I find it hard myself to be sure that the policy response is a true rupture in terms of a step change from what’s come before.
Just two seconds on the unilateral/multilateral debate and whether we will see a change, as many people have said, in America’s foreign policy posture over the next few years. I think my answer to that would be that in practice the administration’s foreign policy before September 11 was more multilateral than often advertised ...
HE: You could have fooled me.
ME:…in terms of its trade policy, in terms of the posture that the United States took, particularly at the G-8 in Genoa, in terms of its Balkans policy. And per contra that it is likely to be less multilateral in the future than some people hope. And the reason for that is that the scale of the atrocity on September 11th was sufficiently great that American policy makers will think, and think rightly, that on occasions they have to take actions entirely on their own accord to protect what they see as their own national interests, without as it were, the confining chains of coalition building.
HE: Well, Sergei won’t like that. But anyone want to comment on that? Michael suggesting that America, because of the unforgivable crime committed against it, will be acknowledged to have more freedom of action rather than less.
SK: Well, first of all, in the initial stages of this war…and I agree that it will take decades and decades if not the whole century…because there are core sources for this war, the United States would have to do these things unilaterally. The question is of a larger threat. And that is the threat of proliferation, a proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction, the question of destablization of large areas of the world. The question is, of course, which countries are to be blamed for terrorism. You could unilaterally bomb Afghanistan until it goes into rubble or ...
HE: It’s already rubble.
SK: Yes, it’s already rubbles. But what next? I mean, you have to then create a system which prevents these kinds of things happening. And that you couldn’t do unilaterally. I mean, it’s an oxymoron. I am speaking about a common long-term strategy to counter the new challenges which we have overslept during ten sweet years. When we overslept proliferation, when we lost Russia…or half lost Russia as an ally, when we fought, I mean, false enemies, etcetera. And when we didn’t look at the real challenges. So that’s where I’m saying, I mean, if that would be…the direction would be go and hit there, there, there, it will be a failure of policy, it will not be a policy
HE: By the way, I should have announced at the beginning that this is on the record, not off the record. I would like to just widen it slightly. Because Sergei said it’s not just Afghanistan or the Taliban that’s engaged in terror. Mr. Rocard, how do you assess your relationship and America’s relationship with Iran, for instance? Because you’ve had a lot of experience in this area.
MR: Not so much.
HE: Well, as prime minister you did.
MR: For such a question, submit only to answer(?). It is clear that Pakistan, Iran, maybe even Turkey for other reasons and other dimensions, are living some sort of a crisis. It’s not evident for them to choose their camp in a way. And I would be afraid of excessively early judgments. But furthermore, to come on Pakistan precisely, but more generally on this issue of multi-lateralism or not. I do agree with what Michael Elliot just said. But I would add that most of the future American policy concerning unilaterialism or not will depend on what targets we give ourselves. Killing bin Laden is one objective immediate, short, difficult to reach, and which does make the solution at all. What else, what next?
How do we avoid the risk of a confrontation between Christian and Jews on one side and the whole of Islam, one billion people, with the demography growth on their side, most of them denying any connection. But the root is in common and we need a complicity with all of these people. And I’m not sure at all myself that the Bush Administration has already made its decision on, what else, what do we do without the objective? Some objectives might depend on military measures. Some others…diminishing the degree of inequalities in the world, understanding why most people in the underdeveloped countries feel humiliated and correcting (inaudible) symbols. Some of these objectives cannot depend on the unique decision of the American power, as strong as it is.
So I think the problem now is to open the field of discussion between ourselves to define the what to do—the where of the crisis, and the rest will come. Your remark on more multilateralism than was thought before, and probably less after, is significant and in fact true, but contrary to the symbols we have. Now it is true that in the long list of world negotiations which we are at work and (unclear) between you have to add small arms, the biological weapons and the implementation, etcetera, in which the Bush Administration withdrew from the negotiation in the middle, a situation to which I was obliged to explain in France “be careful, don’t speak about the Americans, speak about one government which is elected by 50.00001 percent ...
HE: (Laughs) Not even.
MR:…and work with the other Americans. We are (Inaudible) There was great harm there. And there I’m sure Bush has to change and I expect that rather positively. But what to do, how to consider this crisis. Once again, they are building mosques in Cambodia to convince people who are not Muslim that Islam is the only answer.
HE: How far…you’d like to comment on that of course…how far does it seem from Latin America, from the wordly people, or the elites?
LL: Well, I would say that of course there is a tremendous amount of sympathy for the American people. And very much concern that this is going to unleash forces that are going to be ultimately negative for the whole world and for Latin America, too. I think that from the Latin American point of view, one of the main concerns probably is what effect this is going to have on the US economy and on world economy. I think that’s a very crucial—that and because the United States has been the importer of last resort and has been the main dynamic factor in world economy, and for most of Latin American countries, that plays true.
So I think it is going to be crucial, for example, to see if we are able to go ahead with the plans for launching a new trade round negotiation in the next meeting in Qatar in November next, and for open up new vistas, for trade and agriculture, trade and textiles, trading in so many things. This is going to give more hope. I think one of the dramatic features of the situation right now is that from the southern part of the world, globalization is not being perceived as creating many new opportunities or many new good things for the people. You see? And that I think plays very much into the hands of extremists and all sorts of negative things.
So I think that if there can be signs that can in one way or another recover the sense of opportunity and the sense of improvement in the picture, so much the better.
HE: Michael.
ME: Well, I mean, let me just pick up something that Mr. Rocard said, just to agree with it and to kind of use it as a way of amplifying my original remarks. I think the United States will reserve to itself the right to take unilateral military action in the short term. And I don’t think it is likely that we will see a coalition of many countries involved in that military action. I can think of one or two, one where I was born and, you know, you too, and maybe there will be a few more. But we’ve already been told in terms that this is not going to be something like the Gulf War coalition where you’re going to have 25 or whatever it is national battalions.
In the non-military field, I agree wholeheartedly with Michel Rocard. This war, a word I detest because I think it raises false expectations and simplifies a complex situation, the battlefield of this war will be in terms of international police cooperation, in the international criminal justice system, international customs cooperation, in international immigration cooperation…if there are any of our Canadian friends in the room, certainly our friendly neighbor to the north becomes a national security issue. In terms of intelligence, in terms of what one hears, in terms of working with moderate Islamic clerics. Certainly in terms of economic development. And I think the point that you made about the benefits of globalization is right on the money.
None of this is sexy, none of it will make the cover of Time Magazine, for which I now work, Harry, not Newsweek. What will make the cover of Time Magazine is bombs and special forces. But…sorry, I hope there’s no one who pays my salary in the room.
HE: Probably they all do.
ME: But that’s where this battle will be fought. We haven’t had in the past to think about the cooperation between justice ministries. The cooperation between justice ministries, the cooperation between customs and immigration officials worldwide is now the central battlefield. And Michel is absolutely right…that can’t be done on a unilateral basis.
SK: I think the main sense of the coalition is the coalition of wills, of major states to stand up to these new threats. And these are many. And I must say that I’m a little bit fearful and even skeptical as to whether this will will be shown. Because very recently under the attack of anti-globalists, we saw the general retreat of the developed world. Of course we could…I mean, I’m a member of the permanent advisory committee of the G-8, and I saw what was prepared for the G-8 and what came out of it because of these several hundred people who, by the way, represent maybe the new wave of terrorism in Europe. Because in Europe there will be also terrorism again. It is very clear the new left(?).
And the main thing is that the countries that unite stand united and of course help, I mean, those who need help, but contain and deter those who are unwilling to be helped or unable to be helped. And that is the main thing which America could contribute, the United States could contribute to the world exchange. It should, again, show nerve, first of all, to stand, and then show capacity to unite itself with countries which are willing to withstand. I must remind you that it is not, and myself, too, it’s not a fight against Islam. It’s a fight against those who are lagging behind and who are watching television. And so it is a fight between a billion, maybe a billion and a half if you count Russia and some other countries in, and a large part of humanity. And they will never be able to catch up.
As in history, by the way, the problem now is that everybody could watch, I mean, the life in this place on his black and white or color television. I mean, it is absolutely the same. The question is how to contain that kind of backlash which will be inevitable and will come in many, many forms.
HE: So you’re basically saying, underlying this extreme terrorism there is a sort of economic malaise, the swamp as it’s now called…is basically economic?
SK: It is largely economic. It is disguised partially in Islamic terms. But be aware that, I mean, Islam is not the most violent religion. Our beloved Christianity, in terms of (Inaudible) within the countries, also produced, as we all remember, I mean, centuries ago something like militant Islam. So it is not the production of Islam per se. So, I mean, the question is to create a new world order under which the countries, all the groups within the countries, which dislike this world order or unable to cope with it, would be contained at least.
HE: Well, can we have globalization without resentment?
SK: No.
HE: Can we have economic progress without globalization?
MR: I personally think that the more globalization is necessary rather than less. But I think that ways must be found to include more people in that. Of course it is a very difficult proposition, because I think Kofi Anan said once that globalization is a train that only stops at the stations where you have education, where you have preparedness. And of course the gap between those who have and have not this kind of preparedness is growing at this point. I think that’s the difference between, for example, a little boy in London and in Timbuktu is nowadays greater than it was 100 years ago.
HE: London and Timbuktu?
MR: Yeah. A hundred years ago ...
HE: Even 20 years ago.
(?): Sure, sure.
MR: And it’s getting worse all the time. I think that of course it is not easy to say that there is one simple solution and aid must be increased and so on and so forth. But I think that the trend must be established that makes people and nations feel more included with more opportunity. For example, nations that are efficient producers of agricultural goods to be able to export more of their agricultural goods ...
HE: Former agricultural minister there. (Laughs) Speak up, Mr. Agriculture (Inaudible) come on.
(?): I know he did it years ago.
MR: I agree what I hear there, but with some perplexity. It is true that the difference of standards of living between an African and a European which was three…one to three to four at the beginning of the century was one to 30 20 years ago, is one to 60 now. These are the figures. And they are creating humiliation. In spite of that, I don’t think economy is the real question by itself. I don’t think people judge their situation even in poverty only through economic values. I think misery is not the only question. Humiliation and human values are the question.
We are after all as materialist…the Marxist in Western countries. Our criterias are measure…the success of one’s life is in money, is in material success. And what is values, equality between man, non-merchant culture etcetera is outside the model. And my question now…I was a macro-economist as a profession at the beginning…is can we judge on this third world developing country (Inaudible) situation without accepting their economy must pursue some values. What is the acceptable degree of inequality? What is the acceptable degree of unilateralism in the decision making system?
Is it true that Maliv—the emperor of Timbuktu, which is a friendly country, very poor, nothing to develop there, has a well-vested interest to import what it cannot produce, or even if paying a bit more should we encourage them to produce a small (Inaudible) agriculture there. Which I do believe, that it’s not only a marginal calculation in terms of economy. So it’s another overlook we should have. We should question economists on the values which our system pursues.
The question was the radical Islamists there. But one more word. We have to give symbols at least on one key point, which we already have said that, it is not a war against Islam. First of all, I thank Michael, he said that. The word ”war“, or the word ”military,“ are dangerous not because they characterize the violence of the situation, but because they have implicitly the idea of territory and of population. And there is no territory and the population is very strictly limited. So the mental connections we have in mind must change. That word ”war“ is dangerous. That’s one thing. Second—.
HE: Campaign would be better.
MR: We should show by some example that we are concerned with human rights, struggling against any type of terrorism, being Muslim or not. I think it is necessary from now to include the LTT of Sri Lanka, to include probably some Northern Ireland or even some Basques in the objectives of eradicating terrorism in order to show that we don’t look at the individual signature on terrorism, we struggle against any choice of violence against innocents wherever it is. And we have to show it. It’s a bit (Inaudible) it’s the only way now, to begin with a symbol which doesn’t hit only on Islamic countries.
HE: Very good.
ME: And I think there is a huge opportunity to make that message internationally and in a way that will resonate not just in the United States or other rich countries or Russia or Eastern Europe, but throughout the world. I mean, Colin Powell has said over and over and over again, you know, that it was called the World Trade Center for a purpose. And 300 British died, many Pakistanis, many Iranians, many Chinese, what have you. I went down to the armory the evening after the attack, and just with my notebook kind of started jotting down names of people who were missing, and it was Quo, Chang, Garcia, Munuz, Shrinavaza and Garzani, Chan, Kampur. I mean, just an astonishing kind of global potpourri.
But there’s a very important point about the act of fascism that was committed by whoever it was who blew up the World Trade Center. And that’s this…up until that morning, up until that morning the principle victims of Al Qaida and the Muslim terrorists have not been Americans. They had not been Americans. They had been literally hundreds of Kenyans and Tanzanians, who were blown up when the American embassies were blown up in 1998, when the United States lost 12 people, but when Kenya and Tanzania lost numbers measured in the hundreds. So, I mean, this is a message that knows no geographical limits, that knows no religious boundaries, but is simply a message that goes out to men and women of good will wherever they live, whatever their faith, whatever God they pray to that certain things are unutterably evil. And that if it doesn’t visit you today, it will visit you tomorrow. And I think that message is a message that is heard through the same channels in the ear by rich and poor alike and that it needs to be said.
HE: But when the press are on and on about America’s war, America’s war. And it’s not America’s war…it’s civilization’s war is the point you are making.
SK: Yes, and I think what we should also rethink is some of our basic values, which we have inherited from the recent past, like we support I mean liberation of all nations until they build their nation-state. That is a mistaken policy. Because now we have 182 states already in the end. If things go like they go and we don’t try to stop it…by the way, all of the Muslim states are actually future bedrocks of terrorism, because they are failed states.
HE: Unviable.
SK: Unviable. Most of them. And simple calculations show that in 20 years we’ll have 50 more. And that we have to then to rethink some of our basic values. We want to spread democracy. But spreading democracy to many of these states means one simple thing…loss of control over these territories by allegedly democratic governments. I mean, stability and peace should be probably our new slogan rather than simply supporting democracy.
HE: A good provocative point. We’ll invite the audience. Could you stand and identify yourself, please. Remember, this is on the record. I repeat, on the record. Yes, there.
Question: I want to ask the panel to focus specifically for a minute on the Middle Eastern talks. The Arab-Israeli conflict may not be the single root cause of what Arab feelings are and hatred for us, but surely it’s the most ongoing abrasion in this whole business over there. What, if we’re dealing with new adjustments in American foreign policy, do you see the events of September 11 doing? Are we going to now be forced to have a full-court press by this administration on opening up new avenues with the Arabs and Israelis in their talks? And what are going to do to persuade both sides, one, the Arabs to give permanent security to the Israelis, and for the Israelis to give some sense of hope to the Arabs for a permanent independent Arab-Palestinian state.
HE: Yes, good question. I’m glad you asked that. Let’s have a very brief response on the Arab-Israeli situation.
ME: I think it’s honestly too soon. I think it really, really is too soon. You know, no analogy is perfect. But, I mean, you can think back to 1991 where the war took place in February and March kind of into a little bit of April, and the Madrid peace talks, to which Israel was, as it were, front marched by the Bush Administration which won, opened in October? Something like that. But the analogy isn’t perfect. Because the quid pro quo Arab states’ participation in the coalition then was very obvious. Nothing is obvious in these circumstances.
It isn’t as if the United States is a demandeur in the Middle East peace protest. There are at least four players that need to be engaged…Israel, the United States, the Palestinians, and the other Arab states as well…who at some point have to give the Palestinians political cover. And I think it’s much too early to expect all those stars to be aligned.
MR: Once more I think Michael is right, with one restriction. I don’t think it is too soon for Arafat to discover that if Prime Minister Sharon succeeds in ...
(SIDE B)
MR:…is an absolute daily issue. First thing. Second, one of the things so difficult, the Palestinian Authority is in bad shape, but at least we all know that even if far away from the termination of the of that (inaudible) Arafat is the first Arab authority to have begun to create a secular republic, multiconfessional, in the Arab world. Which is intolerable to religious monarchies as well to dictator-run republics. And that is why he has culturally so much on his back. The drama in the Middle East, in Palestine and Israel, is that no leadership has legitimacy enough at home to sign the compromises on symbols. There is no majority to pay the symbolic price of peace, neither on one side nor on the other.
It becomes now very urgent that the international community makes the pressure including on the details of the negotiation, because they have no strength to do it themselves. And symbolically I’m more in a hurry than Michael Elliot, because I think that the presence of Arafat is a key for relations of the many other Arab countries in our coalition against terrorism, and we have to do this very firmly. Which means that for once I shall be cruel on my country, which has been my brother country for long…I have lived 15 years of my life with an Israeli girl…I don’t think Prime Minister Sharon helps humanity when he tries to make an analogy between bin Laden and Arafat.
That’s in a way a great political mistake, which (inaudible). Sorry to put it in this way. It’s the contrary of all civilized people who need the way to go now. But there is more an emergency that you see.
HE: You want to comment on it, or should I go back to it? The next question, please. Yes, madam.
Question: It’s maybe understood and therefore not mentioned that a lot of this began because the US in its ideological competition with the Russians decided to support radical Islamists in Afghanistan. And when I was in Pashawar in 1986 I was astonished to find out that the US money which was going from the CIA to the Pakistanis ended up going to the most fanatical group, Golbadeen Hech Macha (?) group. And those were the people that were the fathers that segued into what we’ve got now. The US seemed to think that it was unimportant what it was creating in that country.
HE: What’s the question?
Question: And it created what we have. So the question is, instead of just looking for the moment at who might be helping the US in its particular policy, should the US look a little further into trying to promote democratic and not fanatical and radical organizations. A lot of these people are angry because of the kind of fanatical Middle Eastern societies that the US has supported. And it seems to me that we’re doing the same thing and not looking into ...
HE: So the question is, Are we supporting ...
Question: Do we have to establish our own .. go by our stated ideals in supporting groups and countries in this region instead of supporting fanatics as we did, and then it ends up coming back as blow-back.
HE: (Inaudible) I got the question. We’re supporting the young people, we’re not promoting democratic values. Right? And here’s a man who can comment on that.
SK: First of all, I think it’s not only the United States who supported the wrong people. I know some other countries, including myself, who supported a lot of them. And, second, and it’s only that now it…I mean, now Afghanistan is on everybody’s mind. But let me remind you that what we did in Africa against each other in Ethiopia, Somalia and elsewhere. So what we need actually is to change our forces, so that to understand that we are the one world and the main task is stability and peace. As to the democracy, I’m sorry, but I could not think of a democratic Afghanistan. And I could not think of a democratic Pakistan, because (Inaudible) There is no, I mean, political culture, economic conditions for any kind of a sensible democracy.
So, I mean, if we stop, I mean, playing big games like we used to play, by the way, Russia and the United States are not only to be…the only countries to be blamed…smaller countries did the same. So, I mean, it should be a different policy, and the policy should be at peace.
HE: Okay. (Inaudible) come back to you, sir. Is that Bill Luers, is it? Okay, give him the microphone.
Question: A number of the consequences will be what will we do to build this coalition. In the case of Russia, presumably we will do a lot of things that Russia wanted us to do before Russia went along with this. What is in it for Russia, in addition to its own self-interest, with regard to terrorism? And secondly, how will our stationing of troops in Uzbekistan affect not only Uzbekistan but the region and Russian foreign policy toward that region?
HE: Okay. Sergei, again.
SK: I’m sorry for eliminating the (Inaudible) First, what is it for Russia. Well, we need to belong strategically somewhere. (Laughs)
MR: You need to belong ...
HE: Strategically somewhere.
SK: The battlefield of civilization or the poor and the rich. Because we are exactly sitting on the fence. I mean, on several fences. And it’s no better. Which is very unpleasant, I must say. (Laughs) So what we would like…I would like to guess for that, probably a membership in some political, at least political if not military guarantees. Because we already know that NATO does not provide military guarantees, I mean, unless one’s a member. And then probably we’re already having good relationship with China. So it would create some kind of a northern tier of stability together. And of course we would like to play a role in stabilizing the Russia-American…Chinese-American relations. Because what has been done there is a very dangerous thing.
HE: You, sir. And then you, sir. This young fellow here in the middle table.
Question: I see no change in the thinking, at least in the defense department, on the issues of missile defense, CBD, nuclear testing, global warming. If anything, the Congress will be going along with the administration on the missile defense program. Do you think this will have any long-term effects on the coalition or any effect at all, or do you believe in fact there will be changes. And I think I’d be interested in European, because it’s in the European opposition to missile defense that has been strong at the moment.
HE: I’d like Luis to answer that.
LL: Well, I think so, yes. I believe very much like Michael said that this kind of broad coalition has to be organized. Not of course in conducting the immediate business of striking right now, but in the longer term. And in the longer term I think that the Bush Administration will have to accommodate the feelings, strong feelings of many of its allies and friends all over the world. I’m not sure in which field they will be more prepared to accommodate.
I would guess that the global warming, the Kyoto Accord might be one. I don’t think that in missile defense issue there will be any change in the American position. But I believe that the Kyoto agreement, although it was certainly not perfect, was something that so many countries and so many people care strongly about that, the compromise, that it will be revisited I think at some point by the US administration, at least in a measure of being willing to consider re-opening discussions of certain points and trying to find a common ground later that will be different from the blank note it has been given then as ...
HE: What about the nuclear proliferation, comprehensive test ban treaty.
LL: Well, I think nuclear proliferation is going to be one of the areas (Inaudible) worked myself in that since the MPT(?) in the ’60s. And I think this is going to be one of the key areas to watch (Inaudible)
HE: (Inaudible)
LL:…at this point with Pakistan and with India having been, let us say, de-sanctioned because of that. You have a whole new issue and a whole new approach will have to be found to address the question of non-proliferation.
HE: Right. Michel, then Michael. Then we’re going to come back over there. Yes.
MR: To say it quickly, I think we cannot isolate the problem of the CTBT and nuclear missile defense from the whole issue of arms control. In terms of climate, the refusal by the administration of any compulsory engagement in the small arms conference last July, and the withdrawal of the meeting, of the negotiatiosn concerning the implementation of the entire biological weapons, are of the same category. And we come to the main question of all the friends of the United States. I’m not speaking for the others, I’m speaking for the friends of the United States.
The difficulty we have is cultural. The United States has never made really their mind on this fact, which is terrible…what is our force usable for? Is it primarily to defend unilaterally however our national American interest, or is it to contribute to set rules of the game worldwide which will not be unfavorable to the United States…we’re the biggest, we made the rules…but once they are in place, they should implement to us. And we your friends are not worried not only on the fact that this issue is not made but on some American unpredictability on that.
One treaty (Inaudible) Versailles. We owe the Second World War to the non-ratification of Versailles unilaterally, in a way. We all worry on what will be the follow-up in the United States. There are culturally three demands for leaders of the world. One is Chinese, the other one is Islamic, the third one is American. I am pro-American, vested pro-American, declared such in my country. But you have to help your friends. And leadership of the world is creating world rules. And I think even before the CTBT, or the national missile defense, that will be in the heart of the definition of the objectives first and the means of the global coalition on terrorism.
I think missile proliferation is even more dangerous than national missile…than nuclear proliferation. But it’s your…you will (Inaudible) million dollars. But if you do the international missile defense, okay, but then what about the non-nuclear nations based treaty, the nuclearization of the oceans treaty, and the ABM? Can you withdraw unilaterally? That will create some damage. But it’s up to you. We are your followers, happy that it’s you rather than the Chinese or the Islamics who direct the world. We still believe. But help us ...
HE: Over there. That chap in back there. Yes. You, you, sir. Yes. Take the microphone.
Question: Following up on the suggestion that Russia is looking for a strategic place to be. Is this not a new opportunity in the world for countries like Russia, like Brazil, like France to exercise the leadership that they have not in fact exercised in the past several years? Is this a watershed for your countries as well as for the United States?
HE: Michael.
ME: Why are you asking me?
HE: Well, at least you’re from Britain. Go on. Let Michel..
ME: I’m still thinking.
MR: France is a country which (inaudible) very badly, the lack of leadership which was worldwide three centuries ago. And the look of some pride or some arrogance of the re-building of the former colonial empire has (Inaudible) war and the rest, we were speaking about the Iraqi, you know, all this. I’m fed up with all that. The problem of France is to diminish its degree of visible arrogance, which is not exactly the culture of the Quay D’Orsay as you know, and was (Laughs) (Inaudible) proposed by the (Inaudible). But I pray you to guess that France is becoming…progressively a normal country.
HE: You’re on the record, you know.
MR: And what is a normal country? It cannot be the United States. It’s a country which has no pretension of world leadership. You see? And my answer to your question is leadership can only be collective and discussed. And according to our values, it’s losing time, losing some efficiency. But I think it’s well invested capital in time to lose such time in order to produce consensus and common rules.
HE: You see, we ask for courage, I give you Michel Rocard. Because this is on the record. Yes, sir. (Laughs)
HE: Give the microphone to that young chap.
Question: I just would like to have someone, preferably from Russia and…Russian interests and France, address the issue of Iraq. Because we’re concerned about bin Laden, but I think we’re missing the boat. If we think after watching Iraq avoid any kind of inspection for a number of years, knowing what this man is about, that this is one of our major problems, and we haven’t even addressed it here today.
HE: Sergei or Luiz?
SK: First of all, I have no sympathy towards the Iraqi regime. Second, we should install, of course, inspections there by the common strategy of all the new coalition. And that will not be a problem. There are more or less technical problems and the fact that we were working and suspicious of each other, we, Russians, the United States ...
HE: You were?
SK: We were. And the French were as suspicious as we were.
HE: Yes.
SK: If I remember correctly. I mean, and it was exactly in the previous world. If we want to have a new world, a new world order, I mean, then we have to combine our effort and to force Baghdad to take this inspection. But then there was another problem, and which could ruin this coalition like the previous coalition which was formed by father Bush was ruined in the early Yugoslavian conflict. And that is that you don’t know…there is obviously a third country behind bin Laden, somebody…there is a country. And you don’t find this country and you instead start to bomb Iraq. And it will be…and then, I mean, the coalition will start to fall apart almost immediately instead of being built. If Iraq is clearly behind the bombing, it should be bombed.
HE: Michael, I’m going to give you the last word.
ME: Well, I think actually what Sergei has just said is…now, for those of you from the press…the news nugget of the event. Because if, as you suggest, and I could see Michel Rocard nodding his head in agreement, if as you suggest a proximate result of September 11th is that the negotiations on smart sanctions on Iraq, which stalled in the spring, cannot not only re-start, but proceed at a galloping pace with agreement from Russia and France and everyone else, that’s real news. I mean, and that would be a clear and measurable sign of, as it were, a new world order, a new set of arrangements. So I think that would be an extremely interesting development. I think I’ll start reporting that now that you’ve given me this bit.
HE: Okay. Yes, madam, in the back. And then somebody over here. Give her the microphone.
Question: My question goes to Mr. Lampreia. Why can Mohammed bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s brother, why he was nominated to Brazil an honorary counsel in Saudi Arabia. What was the ...
HE: Because he (Inaudible)
LL: I really don’t know about that. I really don’t know about that. But I am told that he has about 200 brothers, so there must be some good and some bad.
HE: He has 200 brothers is the answer. Look, I think I’m going to call this up. I want to thank the panel for being exquisitely with it. Thank you very much.
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