home > by publication type > transcripts > Islamic Radicalism and Palestinian Politics
Email
November 20, 2002
Council on Foreign Relations
[Note: A transcript of this meeting is unavailable. The discussion is summarized below.]
Presider: Scott Lasensky, Council on Foreign Relations
Project Director: Henry Siegman, Council on Foreign Relations
Origins of the Current Intifada
The Palestinian “Intifada” that began in September 2000 should be viewed as a “social convulsion,” a grassroots phenomenon not unlike the first Intifada of the late 1980’s or the Palestinian violence in 1947-48. But unlike the earlier Intifada, the Palestinian leadership has been unable to exert control and direct events.
A principal cause of this convulsion is that the Oslo process led to great “quality of life” discrepancies. For Palestinians, the 1990’s brought more Israeli settlements, harsh Israeli-imposed restrictions on travel and work, and a more than 20 percent drop in living standards. During the same period, Israeli living standards rose nearly twenty-five percent.
As violence has continued to worsen over the past two years, leadership structures within the nationalist mainstream—such as the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)—and within the extremist Islamic groups have disintegrated. There is a growing disconnect between the leadership and “the street” – one reason why recent intra-Palestinian talks to reach a cease-fire are unlikely to succeed. Even though accommodation remains unlikely, do not expect a decisive PA crackdown on Palestinian radicals. There is little chance of confrontation between Palestinian factions – solidarity remains high and there is a strong sense of collective memory of intra-Palestinian fighting in 1948.
Despite a growing sense of fatigue and desperation among the Palestinian public, the Intifada still has “a long way to go.” However, in its present form it is “stuck” and “leaderless”; the violence of the Intifada has left Palestinians “stranded.”
Support for Hamas
Islamic radicalism has cultural and social underpinnings -- which is how to understand the rise of radical Palestinian Islamic groups. The present Intifada has brought with it a culture of “austerity” – which feeds into suicide bombings. Hamas has been able to make a virtue out of the austerity (even though Palestinians are not an austere people). This phenomenon of austerity can be seen in every facet of life. For example, even weddings (a traditional source of pride for Palestinian families, and typically ostentatious) are much more austere. Hamas has organized and sponsored many recent weddings, often marrying 10 or 12 couples at a time – these events are serious and somber.
Palestinian public opinion polls show a surge in support for Hamas. In the past, support was never more than 10-15 percent. But it now stands at about 30 percent. This increase has come at the expense of Arafat’s Fatah organization. A growing number of Palestinians are losing trust in Arafat and view him as presiding atop a corrupt structure. But Hamas (and, to a lesser extent, Islamic Jihad) are not able to translate their new support into political power because of political fragmentation.
Political Fragmentation and the case of the Al Aqsa Brigade
The current Intifada has caused political fragmentation throughout Palestinian society, especially within the extremist groups. This fragmentation has helped perpetuate the cycle of violence because decisions are being made at the local level, without consulting the leadership. Control is slipping fast, both within Arafat’s camp—the PLO, Fatah, and the PA—and among the extremist Islamic groups.
This is partly due to the effectiveness of Israeli military operations --- especially Israel’s policy of targeted killings, which has led to an increasing number of leaderless Palestinian factions. Israel’s re-occupation of most of the West Bank and its iron grip on Palestinian towns and cities contributes to rising atomization, creating an “enclave” environment.
The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a wing of the Fatah-affiliated Tanzim organization, is a localized phenomenon, not an organization in the traditional sense. A small group in Jenin may act independently from the Fatah or Tanzim leadership and groups of 30 or fewer people will operate locally with little or no control from above.
Why did Arafat reject the Clinton Plan?
The Clinton Plan remains the most promising initiative on the table. Arafat rejected the plan because he thought it could be improved through further negotiations – not because he rejected the idea of a negotiated settlement. Once the Intifada broke out, Arafat believed the violence could be used to put pressure on Israelis. This was his crucial mistake. Arafat thought Israelis lacked solidarity, when in fact the violence has united most Israelis and created a “bunker mentality.”
Looking Ahead
Political fragmentation and a devastated economy have created an atmosphere with little hope. Arafat may appear to be the captain of the ship, but he is certainly not at the helm. At least in the short term, militant groups will continue to act independently, conducting suicide bombings and other attacks, and thereby thwarting negotiations. The Israeli iron-fisted policy produces pessimism in the “short-term;” however, there is a glimmer of hope in the “middle-term,” with the prospect of the return of settlements.
In The Closing of the American Border, Edward Alden goes behind the scenes to tell the story of the Bush administration’s struggle to balance security and openness in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
In Termites in the Trading System, Jagdish Bhagwati reveals how the rapid spread of preferential trade agreements endangers the world trading system.
America Between the Wars explores how the decisions and debates of the years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Twin Towers shaped the events, arguments, and politics of the world we live in today.
Complete list of CFR Books.
This report argues that the United States must lead with domestic action on climate change and proposes a U.S. negotiating strategy for a global UN climate agreement that includes commitments from all major economies, while also promoting a less formal Partnership for Climate Cooperation that would focus the world's largest emitters on implementing aggressive emissions reductions.
This Task Force report examines changes in Latin America and in U.S. influence there, while taking account of the region's enduring importance to the United States. The Task Force offers an agenda for U.S. policy toward Latin America and identifies four critical areas that should provide the basis of a new U.S. approach.
About Independent Task Forces at CFR.
In this report, CFR Senior Fellow Michael A. Levi analyzes the potential use of deterrence in preventing terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons and recommends a new approach to U.S. declaratory policy, as well as ways to improve U.S. capabilities to determine the sources of terrorist attacks.
In this report, Bruce W. MacDonald illuminates the strategic landscape of military space competition between the United States and China and highlights the dangers and opportunities the United States confronts in space.
Complete list of Council Special Reports.
“ The Latter-Day Sultan:” Akbar Ganji says that blaming Iran's problems on President Ahmadinejad inaccurately suggests that Iran's problems will go away when Ahmadinejad does.
To order Task Force reports, Council Special Reports, and Critical Policy Choices, please call, fax, or order online from our distributor, the Brookings Institution Press: phone +1.800.537.5487, fax +1.410.516.6998.
For information on other reports that are not for sale, or for general publications information, please call +1-212-434-9516 or email publications@cfr.org.
To request permission to reuse Council materials, please email publications@cfr.org or fax +1.212.434.9859.
Please include the complete information of the requested work—author, title, sections/pages to be copied or reprinted, and number of copies to be made—along with a brief description of where and how you would like to reuse the work.
You may also request permission for Council material through Copyright Clearance Center. For more information, please click on the link below.
Copyright 2008 by the Council on Foreign Relations. All Rights Reserved.
