Washington, D.C.

Fouad Ajami [FA]: I’d like to welcome you all. I’m really honored to do this. As we welcome Ambassador Richard Haass, Dr. Richard Haass, Richard, for many of us, I want to make one initial announcement of importance. This speech is on the record. It is on the record. And so, but if you still feel like you want to call Bob Woodward and tell him about it, you’re more than welcome to try that as well. So, it’s on the record. I think most of us here know the distinguished career of Richard Haass and I’m not going to dwell on it at great length. He is the Director of Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. He has also been confirmed by the U.S. Senate to hold the rank of Ambassador. He is also the U.S. Government official in charge of support of the Northern Ireland peace process and as served as the coordinator for U.S. policy on Afghanistan.

And I think that when you introduce Richard at the Council, it’s almost like you’re introducing a member of the family. As you all know, he was director of Security Programs, National Security Programs at CFR. He is also Director of Foreign Policy Studies and a vice president at the Brookings Institution. It’s a remarkable career which has combined analysis and policy-making in the highest degree and with the greatest talent. He is a widely published author and he has written many books, including a very, very compelling book The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War. And I think that if you list all the things he’s done: he’s taught at Harrison College, he’s taught at the Kennedy School of Government and he brings to this discussion and to this assignment that he now has a record of great distinction.

The title of his talk today, obviously the issue of interest for us, is “Toward a Greater Democracy in the Muslim World.” And after Ambassador Haass, after Richard opens, we will then engage him in some Q&A and probe the question of democracy in the Muslim world.

Richard Haass [RNH]: I’m pleased; indeed, I’m honored to be here with you this evening. Be introduced by Professor Ajami, by Fouad, is about as good as it gets. Fouad is a wise man and I would describe him as a vivid wordsmith who makes clear in his books and in his articles and in his commentary what so often seems opaque. I’m doubly indebted to him for shifting the locale of his class tonight so that he could be out here in this room with us. Indeed, he actually brought his students here. (Laughter) That said, I figure he is indebted to me as well because he didn’t have to prepare any lecture tonight. (Laughter) All things being equal, I’d call it even.

I’m also pleased to be speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations. Given that I once worked here at the Council, I feel at home. The Council, as all of you know, remains the blue chip think tank in this field. And I can say this in all honesty, because when I worked next door at a fellow, some might even say rival, institution, we often measured our success by how many of our scholars appeared in the pages of Foreign Affairs or how many participated in council study groups and task forces. So again, I couldn’t be more pleased than to be here and I’m pleased to see so many of our friends and familiar faces out there.

I’m also pleased to have the opportunity tonight to talk about an important subject, which is the opportunity to strengthen democracy in the Muslim world. And let me just warn you at the beginning, I’m going to speak somewhat longer than I often do. I apologize in advance. And somewhat more formally. But again, I want to do this because I really do think this is one of the most important subjects facing the United States and the people and governments in the Muslim world today. So please bear with me. And then again, I look forward to an exchange with as many of you as possible.

Supporting and extending democracy has long been a centerpiece of American foreign policy. From Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points to the Marshall Plan, we have seen the expansion of freedom and democracy as a fundamental national interest. More recently, the United States encouraged countries as varied as South Korea, the Philippines, El Salvador, South Africa and Chile in their transitions to democracy.

We also played a leading role in the spread of democracy in the former communist countries throughout Europe. Democracy remains a focal point of American foreign policy today. And let me quote from a national security strategy of the United States: “America must stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the absolute power of the state, free speech, freedom of worship, equal justice, respect for women, religious and ethnic tolerance, and respect for private property.”

Why has the United States so often emphasized democracy? At the most fundamental level, we support democracy as a matter of principle. It’s at the very heart of what we are as a nation and who we are as a people. In receiving in Philadelphia the Liberty Medal on July Fourth of this year, my boss, the Secretary of State, spoke of, and I quote, “Our responsibility as citizens of the world’s greatest democracy to ensure that our country is a force for freedom all around the world. After all,” Secretary Powell went on to say, “unalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness were given by God to all humankind. They belong to every man, woman and child on this earth.”

As a result, the United States will assist other nations to achieve these basic human aspirations because they are universal. These values are not just lifestyles America thinks it ought to export. There are also practical reasons for the United States to promote democracy abroad, demonstrating that realism and idealism are complementary. Quite simply, we will prosper more as a people and as a nation in a world of democracies than in a world of authoritarian or chaotic regimes.

The democratic world is a more peaceful world. The pattern of established democracy is not going to war with one another is among the most demonstrable findings in the study of international relations. This does not mean, though, that we cannot have overlapping interests and fruitful cooperation with non-democracies. Nor does it mean that we will not have strong disagreements with fellow democracies. But the more established democracies there are, the larger the area in the world where nations will be more likely to sort out their differences through diplomacy.

Indeed, we see this most clearly in Europe today. Despite a long history of brutal wars culminating in two World Wars of immense human cost, Europe’s democracies do not even contemplate war with one another. To the contrary, Europeans are dedicated to ever greater integration. Germany and France, for example, went to war three times between 1870 and 1940. Today, when democratic France and democratic Germany have a dispute, they work it out over a conference table not a battlefield.

The sweep of democracy through Latin America, reaching almost all other regions, has also substantially reduced the prospects of war in our hemisphere. Coinciding with their democratic consolidation, Brazil and Argentina chose to abandon the pursuit of nuclear arms. When the OAS, the Organization of American States, democratic charter was signed in Lima, Peru, on the very day, on the same day, of the September 11th attacks just over a year ago, every country in the hemisphere, with the sole exception of Cuba, pledged to reinforce democracy at home and to come to the aid of its neighbors if democracy was to be threatened or faltering.

Democracy is also a link to prosperity. We in the foreign policy business often focus on how market-based economic development tends over time to usher in democracy. And to be sure, economic growth in South Korea, in Taiwan, and Chile help create a stronger foundation for democracy. Yet conversely, the transparent rule of law and the greater equality of opportunity founded democracy in turn helped spur economic growth and economic prosperity. Peaceful and predictable transfers of power, more openness and less corruption in a country like Mexico have established conditions under which more durable economic growth can flourish.

Before I go any further, though, let me define some terms. When I speak about democracy, I am not talking - again, I am not talking - simply about forms or institutions or elections. At its most fundamental level, democracy is based on a diffusion of power. A diffusion in government and in society. And the democratic government is distributed such that no one voice dominates unquestioned. National governments in a democracy require checks and balances, for instance, by a competition between legislative and executive branches as well as an independent judiciary. A strong government must as well face the check of an electable opposition. Checks and balances can also be introduced between different levels of government: national, regional, local. This is often the way by which multi-ethnic democracies survive.

Also central for the idea of democracy is that leaders must hand over their temporary power. John Adams was a great American President for many reasons. But arguably none was more important in his willingness to relinquish power peacefully after he lost a bitterly contested election to Thomas Jefferson. In a manner of speaking, democratic leaders “lease” their authority rather than “own” it. Because the grant of authority comes from the people. Democracy is indeed of the people, by the people, and for the people. And it depends on an active role of the people. After all, the “demos” in democracy.

Just as there needs to be some checks and balances within governments, there also needs to be checks and balances between government and society. Said another way, there is much more to democracy than governments. Power must be shared with the vital, pluralistic civil society, one which possesses the associational life, quote, unquote, de Tocqueville wrote about 170 years ago, namely, a wide array of private groups and private institutions. These include political parties, trade unions, business associations, schools, and media independent from one another and from state control. In addition, no ethnic group, gender, or class of people can be excluded from full participation in political life. Individual rights, including the freedom of speech and worship, need to be protected.

Understood this way, democracy has achieved some important successes in the last three decades. The wave of transitions to democracy which began in Portugal and Spain in the mid-1970s reached Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and crested, following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Samuel Huntington and Larry Diamond called this the Third Wave, since it is the third and most significant spike in the number of democracies after those following World War I and the post-World War II decolonization.

It is worth noting that 118 democracies were invited to the community of democracies ministerial posted by the Republic of Korea and Seoul on November 10-12 of this year. That is 118 nations exhibiting real foundations of democracy, plus another 21 nations who were invited as observers. Indeed, South Africa is itself one of the premiere success stories. Its president is a former dissident and now a freely elected leader preparing to step down following free and fair elections.

Let me turn now to the question of the Muslim world. The number of countries with Muslim majorities attended the community of democracies meeting in Seoul, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria, Qatar, Turkey and Yemen. These countries are either democracies or on the road to becoming more democratic.

The fact that so many democracies were invited to Seoul, either as mature democracies or as observers, reflects the fact that there are promising developments taking place throughout the Muslim world. Let me say at this point that I use the phrase “Muslim world” with some trepidation, recognizing the wide diversity of countries that this term covers as well as its geographic span from Morocco to Indonesia, from Kazakhstan to Chad.“ Yet within this diversity I would argue is also a certain commonality. Namely, when given the opportunities, Muslims are embracing democratic norms and choosing democracy.

President Bush spoke to just this point when he addressed graduating seniors at West Point on June 1 of this year. And I quote. ”When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic World. The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes.“ Dynamic reform experiments underway in many parts of the Muslim world demonstrate that democracy and Islam are compatible. I’d like to highlight a few, recognizing that what I’m going to give you is hardly an exhaustive list.

In Morocco this past September, citizens voted in the freest, fairest, and most transparent elections in the country’s history, creating a diverse new parliament. In October, Bahrainis cast votes for the first time in 30 years to elect a parliament. It was also the first time women ran for national office. Just last week, Oman Sultan Qaboos announced that he is expanding the vote for the consultative Shura Council to all his country’s adult citizens. Earlier this year, Qatar announced the new constitution in anticipation of upcoming parliamentary elections. Yemen now boasts not only a multi-party system and an elected parliament, but also directly elected municipal officials and since 1999, a directly elected president. Following the Gulf War Kuwait re-instated its directly elected national assembly. Kuwaitis are currently preparing for the next round of parliamentary elections slated to be held next summer.

Elsewhere, we see many dimensions and elements of democracy in Muslim majority states like Malaysia and Indonesia. We hear inspiring Muslim voices advocating pluralism and democracy. From Tunisia to half-a-world away in Indonesia, the world’s most populist Muslim country.

These are just a few of the examples of the democratic ferment taking place elsewhere in the Muslim world, from Albania to Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. These debates are nowhere close to being resolved, just as the experiments I’ve discussed have a long way to go before democracy is consolidated. But that should not obscure how much progress is being made.

You must also recognize something else. Namely, that Muslims participate fully and actively in the civic life of democratic countries where they are not a majority. Some 40 percent of Muslims live as minorities, including several million here in the United States who are an important and active part of American democracy. In countries such as India, France and South Africa, Muslims put lie to the canard that Muslim life is somehow incompatible with democratic participation. We also recognize the potential for greater democracy elsewhere in the Muslim world.

Let me cite just three examples. Amongst the Palestinian people we hear the strong demand for democratic institutions. The United States is working, along with the European Union and Arab States, to help Palestinians create a new constitutional framework and a working democracy. President Bush noted that, and I quote, ”An end to occupation and a peaceful democratic Palestinian state may seen distant but America and our partners throughout the world stand ready to help, help you make them possible as soon as possible. If liberty can blossom in the rocky soil of the West Bank in Gaza, it will inspire millions of men and women around the globe who are equally weary of poverty and oppression, equally entitled to the benefits of democratic government.“

Let me turn to Iran where we see a widespread popular clamor for reform which will hopefully result in greater democracy and greater openness. The people of Iran seek the same freedoms, human rights, and opportunities as do people around the world. The Iranian people are struggling with difficult questions about how to build a modern 21st Century society that is at once Muslim, prosperous and free. In the last two Iranian presidential elections and in nearly a dozen parliamentary and local elections, the vast majority of the Iranian people voted for political and economic reform. Iraq. Iraq deserves mentioning in this context too. Our demands are directed only at the regime that enslaves them and threatens the rest of the world. Freed from the weight of oppression, Iraqis will be able to share in the progress and prosperity of our time. The United States and our allies are prepared to help the Iraqi people create the institutions of liberty in a free and in a unified Iraq.

But despite these encouraging signs, we must recognize that there is in fact a freedom deficit in many parts of the Muslim world and in the Arab world in particular. Freedom House’s, documents in that organization’s 2001, 2002 Survey of Freedom, and I quote, ”A democratic gap between the levels of freedom and democracy in the Islamic countries, particularly in their Arabic core and the rest of the world.“

The company gap between the Muslim world and the rest of the world is huge. Only one out of four countries with Muslim majorities have democratically elected governments. Moreover, the gap between Muslim countries and the rest of the world is widening. Over the past 20 years, democracy and freedom expanded in countries throughout Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia. In contrast, the Muslim world is still struggling. Indeed, by Freedom House’s standards, the number of so-called free countries around the world increased by nearly three dozen over the past 20 years, but not one of them was a Muslim majority state.

Some will suggest that these judgments I’ve just put forward are Western, and thus, unfair. To them, I would point to a document published this past summer by a team of more than 30 Arab scholars. The Arab Human Development Report, written on behalf of the U.N. Development Programme and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development portrays an Arab world that is lagging behind other regions in key measures, including individual freedom, women’s empowerment and economic and social development. It describes people who are neither prosperous nor free.

It also points to disturbing trends, such as a youth bulge, combined with youth unemployment reaching almost 40 percent in some places, thereby portending potentially explosive social conditions. The Arab world faces serious problems that can only be met by more flexible and more democratic political systems.

Muslims cannot blame the United States for their lack of democracy. Still, the United States does play a large role on the world stage and our efforts to promote democracy throughout the Muslim world have sometimes been halting and incomplete. Indeed, in many parts of the Muslim world, and particularly in the Arab world, success of U.S. administrations, republican and democratic alike, have not made democratization a sufficient priority. At times, the United States avoided scrutinizing the internal workings of countries in the interests of ensuring a steady flow of oil containing Soviet Iraqi and Iranian expansionism, addressing issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, resisting communism in East Asia or securing basing rights for our military.

Yet, by failing to help foster gradual paths to democratization in many of our important relationships, by creating what might be called a democratic exception, we missed an opportunity to help these countries become more stable, more prosperous, more peaceful, and more adaptable for the stresses of a globalizing world.

It is not in our interest, or that of the people living in the Muslim world, for the United States to continue this exception. U.S. policy will be more actively engaged in supporting democratic trends in the Muslim world than ever before. This is the clear message of the President’s National Security strategy. We do this in full knowledge of the fact that democracies are imperfect. They’re complicated. Indeed, leaders in some Muslim states contrast democratic systems to their own more orderly systems and point with dissatisfaction to the seeming stability that they provide. Yet, stability based on authority alone is illusory and ultimately impossible to maintain.

We saw this in Iran, Romania and Liberia. We saw what happens when the pressure cooker explodes. Rigid authoritarian systems cannot withstand the shocks of social, political or economic change, particularly of the kind or at the pace that characterizes the modern world.

The role that democracy plays in providing domestic stability was vividly illustrated by a conversation I had with a Muslim group recently when I was visiting India. They explained to me what lies behind the lack of terrorism emanating from India’s large Muslim community. Their explanation: India is a democratic country. Muslims participate fully. And on those occasions when they do not, they have full recourse to the judicial system.

As we make democratization a higher priority in our dealings with the Muslim world, like medical doctors, we must above all obey the Hippocratic Oath and first do no harm. Unrestrained zeal to make the world a better place could make it worse. So, we must undertake this task with humility, understanding that the stakes for others are greater than they are for ourselves. As the countries and the peoples of the Muslim world move toward more open and democratic development, we must not only encourage them and help them, but we will need to listen to the people most directly affected.

People might well question the timing, and indeed, our motives for raising this issue right now. Some will point to the fact that my talk here tonight comes amidst heightened international efforts to bring Iraq into compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. Others might see talk of democratization either as an effort to disguise our interests in regime change in Iraq, or is somehow indicative as American hostility toward the people of the Muslim world. Indeed, some I expect will go so far as to argue that American talk of democratization is designed to overthrow regimes throughout the Middle East or to be used somehow as a punitive action against those who are perceived as anti-American.

So, allow me to address some of these concerns. First, there is no hidden agenda here. America’s rationale in promoting democratization in the Muslim world is both altruistic and self-interested. Greater democracy in Muslim majority countries is good for the people who live there. But it’s also good for the United States. Countries plagued by economic stagnation and lack of opportunity, closed political systems and burgeoning populations, fueled the alienation of their citizens. As we have learned the hard way, such societies can be breeding grounds for extremists and terrorists who target the United States for supporting the regimes under which they live.

Equally important, the growing gulf between many Muslim regimes and their citizens potentially compromises the ability of these governments to cooperate on issues of vital importance to the United States. These domestic pressures will increasingly limit the ability of many regimes in the Muslim world to provide assistance or even acquiesce to American efforts to combat terrorism or address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the past few months, I visited Egypt, Pakistan and many of the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, and had an opportunity to discuss these issues with people from a wide range of backgrounds and orientations. What struck me on these trips was how frustrated many of these people were with the United States for failing to speak out about democracy. To them, our silence is seen as tacit approval of the status quo. This is decidedly not the case. But my conversations show that when it comes to the conduct of foreign policy, the risk of inaction can be as dangerous as that of taking action.

Some will argue that the United States is prepared only to support electoral outcomes that please Washington. This is not so. The United States will support democratic processes even if those empowered do not choose policies to our liking. So let me clear on this point. U.S. relationships with governments, even governments that are fairly and freely elected will depend upon how these governments treat their own people and how they act on the international stage on issues ranging from terrorism to trade and from non-proliferation to narcotics.

In promoting democracy, we are well aware that a sudden move toward open elections in Muslim majority countries could well bring Islamist parties to power. The reason, however, is not because Islamist parties enjoy the overwhelming confidence of their population. But rather, it is because they are often the only organized opposition to a status quo, the growing numbers of people today find unacceptable. That said, let there be no misunderstanding. The United States is not opposed to Muslim parties just as we are not opposed to Christian, Jewish or Hindu parties in democracies with broad foundations.

Our receptivity to the outcome of last month’s election in Turkey clearly demonstrates this point. The new prime minister put it best when he said after taking the office, and I quote: ”We want to prove that a Muslim identity can be democratic, can be transparent, and can be compatible with the modern world.“ Americans are confident that the Turkish people can prove all of this and they want to help them make it so.

There will be those who argue that democratization is impossible in the Muslim world because it has little history or tradition of democracy. This too, I reject. After all until recently, only a part of the world had any experience with democracy. This argument reflects what President Bush refers to as the soft bigotry of low expectations. As a former Omani ambassador to Washington once remarked, it is neither an Arab particularity nor an article of the Islamic faith that freedom of speech be suffocated in our national experience. That our people be denied free elections. That our affairs be conducted without the benefit of consensus. And that peaceful political activity be forbidden to our masses.”

Let me turn to lessons that we have learned in this area. Let me begin with the basic statement first. The United States will work more energetically than ever before to promote democracy in partnership with the peoples and governments of the Muslim world. One mechanism for this will be a new partnership that will be announced in coming months by Secretary of State Powell. This new initiative will focus on encouraging development in three areas critical to progress in the Arab world: economic, educational and political reform.

We will also provide new resources for this effort in addition for the one billion dollars (Inaudible) we already spend annually in economic assistance to the Arab world. As we fund new projects meant to expand political participation, support civil society in the rule of law, we will be guided by eight lessons that we have learned in other parts of the world.

First, there are many models of democracy. The democratic process need not follow a single model. Indeed, there is no single democratic model to emulate. From constitutional monarchies to federal publics, to parliamentary systems of all stripes, history underscores the diversity of democracy. There is as well enormous diversity across the Muslim world and political systems must be adapted to suit their local environment.

Second, elections do not a democracy make. As we saw with the last elections where Saddam Hussein won 100 percent of the vote, the most brutal regimes often seek to legitimize their rule through sham elections. Hence, for elections to be a true reflection of the people, they must be embedded in societies where there are strong and mature civil institutions and a diffusion of power. Elections should accompany the development of civil society. Bahrain’s experience illustrates this point. Its recent elections were held only after it had taken steps to free political prisoners, remove arbitrary powers from the constitution, reform the judiciary, and allow the media to function independently. By contrast, Algeria’s 1991 experience highlights the dangers of holding elections in the absence of a pluralist society.

Third, democracy takes time. It takes time for ideas to sink in and for the political processes and institutions and traditions to develop. Democratization is best measured not in weeks, not in months, but in years, in decades, and even in generations. As National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, recently noted, “Because of our own history, the United States knows we must be patient and humble. Even if change is for the better, is often difficult and progress is often slow. Our own democracy is far from perfect and is always open to improvement as demonstrated by Amendments to our Constitution and steps taken to provide African-American and women the full rights of citizenry.”

Fourth, democracy rests on an informed and educated populace. Education enables people to know their rights and how to exercise them. An educated population, capable of making informed decisions helps democracy take root. Countries of the Muslim world have made remarkable progress promoting literacy but they have done a poorer job creating populations that are well-read. Muslim commentators note that educational systems are not necessarily preparing students to succeed in the 21st Century. Abd al-Hamid al-Ansari, the Dean of the Faculty of at Qatar University, identifies this problem quite directly, and I quote: “A significant part of our educational discourse is cut off from the modern sciences and is based on a uni-dimensional review, creating a closed mentality and an easy slide toward fanaticism. It plants misconceptions regarding women and religious or ethnic minorities. It is dominated by memorization and repetitive methods.” Close quote. Clearly, education needs much more than going to school. Thriving democracies require a tradition of questioning, not memorization.

Fifth, independent and responsible media are essential. The media has a critical role to play as a key element of civil society. In democracies, the media is free and not under state control. This allows for multiple views, ideas and perspectives to be had in the free marketplace of ideas. The best protection against the media, promulgating views that people do not agree with, is the (Inaudible) of more perspective, not the squelching of voices. At the same time, though, independent media, like governments and citizens, has responsibilities. They must uphold professional standards and insist on factual reporting. The media should educate not just advocate.

Sixth, women are vital to democracy. Countries cannot be successful democracies if more than half their population is denied basic democratic rights. The rights women enjoy is a key determinant of the overall vibrancy of any society. Patriarchal societies in which women play a subservient role to men are also societies in which men play subservient roles to men. And meritocracy takes a back seat to connections and cronyism.

Seventh, political and economic reform are mutually reinforcing. Market based economic modernization helps usher in elements of democracy: the rule of law, transparent decision-making, the free exchange of ideas. Yet it is just as true that these elements of democracy sustain and accelerate economic growth. This need not be a sequential battle, such as economic development followed by political liberalization. When political and economic freedom go hand in hand, they strengthen each other. Democratization will give the young a way to voice their aspirations. And equally importantly, democratization will reinforce economic growth, which can give the young hope by offering them a piece of the growing economic pie.

Eighth and last, while it can be encouraged from the outside, democracy is best built from within. Democratization is a process that is fundamentally driven by members of a society, by its citizens. Only they can promote a spirit and practice or tolerance so that the rights of minorities and individuals are respected. If the United States or anyone else tries to impose the trappings of democracy on any country, the result will be neither democratic nor durable. The only way a democracy can take root is if it is home grown.

My remarks tonight are obviously devoted to the question of democracy. Still, democratization can only be one aspect of U.S. policy. And while the long-term forces of democratization work their magic, we still need to deal with other critical issues that come across our desks everyday. We need, for example, to continue our work to end the festering conflicts between Israel and the Arab world by realizing President Bush’s vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security in less than three years.

Similarly, the United States will continue to work to ensure that Iraq is disarmed and the integrity of the United Nations is maintained. We will also continue to help Afghanistan and help the Afghan people now that their country’s been liberated. And we are prepared to help India and Pakistan. Between them, by the way, home to some 300 million Muslims, help them establish more normal relations, including a mutually acceptable solution to Kashmir.

Nor is promoting democracy in the Muslim world a task for the United States alone. We will work with democratic allies, such as those in Europe and Japan. In addition to what we can all do as governments, there’s a crucial role to be played by non-governmental organizations, by foundations, by individuals. There’s an equally important role to be played by the American business community which can have a huge positive impact through its investments, employment practices and support for education and for training.

Nor are we starting from scratch. The U.S. Government is deeply involved in many ways in helping many Muslim majority countries develop democratic institutions and the societal infrastructure necessary for democracy to take root. For years, we’ve promoted educational and cultural exchanges with peoples and institutions throughout the Muslim world to strengthen the components of civil society and participatory government, through teacher training programs as well as through our own work teaching English, we help students imagine new roles as citizens. We intend, though, to do even more. The United States is working energetically to promote economic prosperity as an engine of democratic change. Membership in the WTO, the World Trade Organization, promotes both economic and political liberalization. The United States is prepared to promote and support that integration process as well as consider free trade agreements like that we have completed with Jordan and are now discussing with Morocco. The United States is also working through a wide variety of programs, from the international visitor’s program to the provision of grants through local educational institutions to promote the development of democracy’s building blocks, including professional and balanced journalism free from state control, active non-governmental institutions and independent judiciaries.

The U.S. Government funded institutions, such as the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute while working in many Muslim majority countries to help foster democracy. Americans have served as observers throughout the democratizating world to help ensure free and fair elections. We also fund a significant portion of the activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the Muslim countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The road to democracy is long and it is up to the people involved to walk it for themselves. We have been at it for 220 years and we still haven’t reached our final destination of a perfected democracy. But every step, every step on the way to democracy brings benefits to citizens, to countries, to regions, and to the world. So far, too many Muslims have lagged behind. That must end. We for our part understand that the United States can and should do more promoting democracy, including in the Muslim world. And promoting democracy is a priority for President Bush and for Secretary Powell. We are examining what we are currently doing in order to better and more effectively help this process. And in the coming weeks and months we will be launching new programs like the U.S. and Middle East partnership initiative in their working with governments and peoples in the Muslim world.

Still, at the end of the day, the decision to move along the path to democracy belongs to the people of the Muslim world. It is in both their and our interests that they do so. It is also the only way in which these societies, like all societies throughout the world, can best maximize the potential of their people and make real a future defined by greater freedom, greater peace and greater prosperity. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

FA: Thank you very much. You have seen and heard the kind of talent that have marked our speaker as one of the pre-eminent foreign policy intellectuals of his generation and you should also know that presiders are very strange creatures. They reign but do not rule. And they’re always told what to do. And so, I’ll tell you exactly what we are going to do in the time that is still allotted to us. I do have some questions for Richard, for Ambassador Haass, and then we will open it to the rest. I’m just eager…I mean, we have the war on terror and of course, the war on terror takes primacy in many ways. What is the relationship between the war on terror? We have to do business with the Syrians, we have to do business with Pakistan, we have to do business with Algeria. And indeed, this war on terror forces us into all kinds of relationships with regimes that are not particularly kind and oriented toward democracy.

Amnesty International, which suddenly has doubts whether we should actually talk about the human rights violation in Iraq, they changed their mind. All of a sudden, they don’t want to be quoted about what is going on in Iraq. But nevertheless, I will quote Amnesty International as they basically believe that this war on terror is degenerating, they say, into a dirty war toward (Inaudible) detention, executions. I mean, it’s interesting. We will set aside whether Amnesty International has its right or not.

But I just want to quote you a couple of things and then by way of illustrating this tension between the war on terror and this new democratic impulse, this new democratic message.

And the first quotation is from Secretary of State Powell. And this is shortly in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11th. He is talking about Egypt. And he says “Egypt, as all of us know, is really ahead of us on this issue. On the issue of the war on terror. They’ve had to deal with acts of terrorism in recent years in the course of their history. And we have much to learn from them. And there is much we can do together.” This is our Secretary of State. Now, terribly excited, the Egyptian President answered him and indeed, stepped into this open possibility, this invitation. And he said “There is no doubt…” this is now President Mubarak “... that the events of September 11th created a new concept of democracy.” A new concept - I like that. “The difference from the concept of the Western state, defended before these events, especially in regard to the freedom of the individual.” In regard to the freedom of the individual. So we have this new Wilsonian drive, if you will, into the Islamic world.

But we do have this war on terror and it has its imperatives. We have to do business with all kinds of people in the shadows. How do you reconcile this war on terror with this new Wilsonian claim, if you will, and this new activism that, in many ways, as you said, in a slightly soft mea culpa. That we now have to break with the pattern that allows us, if you will, and encourages us to live with authoritarianism in the Muslim world.

RNH: Surprisingly enough, I’m glad you asked me that. (Laughter) Let me answer it initially this way. It’s important to see what I’ve been talking about here in this idea of the United States more actively promoting democracy as something we do with the peoples in governments in the Middle East, not to the peoples and governments in the Middle East. This is not some punitive action on our part. This is not some sanction. To the contrary, this is something positive that we think is good for them and good for ourselves. As I said, there’s a humanitarian dimension of this. It’s a matter of principle. But it’s also a matter of policy.

And when one looks at the lessons I talked about, the idea of doing it gradually, of not insisting on any single model, of not imposing it from the outside. Again, this is a cooperative endeavor that I’m laying out here.

Second of all, we’re not inventing this. I mean that in two ways. We’re not inventing it in the sense that this is not something that this will be an American idea. This is an international idea. Again, 118 countries are there as democracies in Seoul just last month. Also, there’s democratic ferment going on in these societies. It’s not as though we are entering, what, arid soil here. What was fascinating…I’ve been going to the Islamic world, I guess now, for almost 30 years to various countries of it, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia. And the conversations I had over meals this time were fundamentally different. This debate is there.

At the end of the day, I think countries will only be good partners in the world in the war against terrorism if they are flexible, robust societies that enjoy the support of their people. And these things that people don’t grow up in these societies filling alienated. They’ve got to have political and economic opportunity. So in the long run, promoting democracy, promoting economic reform and educational reform, I would actually say that they’re…these are tools in this larger effort to impart against terrorism. So they make sense in their own right. But I actually think at the end of the day, we’re not going to win the war on terrorism with military might. We have got to win the war of ideas as well and we’ve got to help these countries where people want to seek support rather than attack. That’s why I think this is so complementary.

FA: I have one final question before I invite the rest. Actually, when I pre-empt myself because we are running out of time and much of…there’s almost an irresistible question I have for you. I shall resist the impulse and call on people who have some questions in the audience. And please, even though I know everyone here, when you stand up, please identify yourself and your institution. Bob?

Bob Lieber [BL]: Bob Lieber, Georgetown University. Richard, your talk was admirable, nuanced, and appropriately complex about democracy. However, I want to push you a little harder than Fouad’s very delicate question did. Specifically, you yourself noted that these things have to be home grown and it’s a complex layered kind of thing. My question is, to what extent can the U.S. be effective and influential from outside. In other words, what specifically can the U.S. strive to do to produce these more desirable outcomes? But as part of that, I’d also offer the observation about a specific. One might say that one of the barometers of the health of a society is the degree of how it treats its minorities.

On the issue of anti-Semitism is usually a pretty good indicator. The worst the anti-Semitism, the worse off the society. What is extremely troubling in the region now is not only the point that Fouad raised of sorts, but specifically, the exceptionally virulent demonic kind of anti-Semitism now evident, not only in places like Iraq and Syria, where it’s been a staple of discourse, but among countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. And my question is, to what extent can the administration, or has the administration, been able to raise that issue as part of this overall thing because the issues of democratization, freedom, education, knowledge and so are connected to it. Thank you.

[RNH]: The way we promote this is lots of ways. Educational assistance. For example, we’re working with Pakistan on that. Aid programs, trade. I think the WTO is a powerful tool for encouraging, not narrow economic reform, but rule of law transparency. When American firms go places…now think about other parts of the world, South Africa and Northern Ireland, Central America, American firms have had a tremendous impact in establishing standards and providing models for local employment. So I think there are things that can be done there. Exchange programs, getting high school kids over here. They come, they live with an American family, it can be a wonderful experience, learning about our society. Getting Americans over there and telling our story.

So I think there are lots of things we can do. And I think words matter. When we have the kinds of things I quoted from the National Security strategy, that contribute to debates. One of the positive sides of globalization is that ideas travel. And borders can’t keep out ideas. And so, I think there’s lots of things by what we say and what we do, and not simply is government. One of the points I try to make that I think what American foundations or groups like this can do, is also important.

In terms of anti-Semitism, it’s not what I was addressing today. I’m not quite sure how to respond. But let me just say that one of the reasons one wants to see media proliferate in this part of the world is by and large, competition is good. And if we can have a more competitive environment, I think that’s healthy where journalists can challenge other journalists and say “Where are your facts? Where are your standards?” It’s important that governments not be providing funds to journalistic outlets that are essentially spreading hate and venom. I think governments have a responsibility there too.

But at the end of the day, my hunch is that as societies become more democratic and more participant in a democratic world, you’ll see improvement in the quality of political discourse.

(Background Conversation)

Bob Pastor [BP]: Bob Pastor from American University. Richard, I also want to congratulate you. I think it’s a statement on policy toward democracy in the Middle East that’s been too long in coming. And I think it’s an important one. And I think you addressed a lot of the tough questions. I’d like to press two areas.

The first, you correctly said that pre-requisites to democracy, such as culture and religion, perhaps even economic development, were incorrect. And in fact, any culture, any religion, any country level or economic development could be democratic. But you then introduced a fourth pre-requisite that I’d like to press you on. And that was the importance of civil institutions and checks and balances. I certainly agree that elections can’t be genuine, people can’t choose their leaders except in a free environment. But if you really look for a complete check and balance system, for example, Latin America would not be democratic at all right now. And so, I want to ask what you specifically meant by that. And the second question, you ...

FA: Maybe just one.

BP: You correctly said that the U.S. needs to support the process of democracy and that process…but often, the U.S. didn’t support the outcome. And we know that’s where U.S. policy has foundered in the past. And in the June 24th speech by President Bush, he seems to be supporting the process of democracy in the West Bank and Gaza, but at the same time saying that a particular outcome would not be amenable to the United States. So if you could explain that.

FA: May I just attach a rider on this very good compelling second question. The first one we’ll just leave for future posterity, but would we be talking to Arafat about democracy if he had fought terror? I mean, Shimon Perez said it very honestly, that we have now held the question of democracy over Arafat’s head because he didn’t fight terror. Had he fought terror, would we have raised the question of democracy with him?

RNH: Quite simply, yes. I think one of the messages I tried to say tonight is narrowly based relationships based on simply agreeing upon specific, what you might call traditional foreign policy overlaps is not enough. We need to introduce this dimension into our policy. So even if we had not had the terrorism issue with Arafat, this would still apply. And even today, where we have political military cooperation or economic cooperation with certain governments, again I’m saying this needs to be factored in. Let me respond, if I might, to Bob Paster’s…When you said it was too long in coming, I thought you were going to say it was too long in delivery. So, thank you. (Laughter)

I actually am going to answer your first question because I think it’s an important issue. No one should misunderstand what I said to mean that everything has to be totally set before you can have elections. I don’t want anyone to construe this as an excuse to postpone elections indefinitely. But I also want to avoid the other extreme: where one has elections without any checks and balances in a society. One needs to have a certain degree of civic institution, some degree of a diffusion of political power so you don’t have one vote that also becomes the last vote.

You want to ensure that if people get in there are enough pockets of power in this society that places limits on what those who win the election can do. if they turn out to be users of democracy rather than those who are genuinely committed. One of the ways, by the way, you can help build this in is that your early elections in the process don’t have to be for complete political power. One could have elections early on in a democratization power for parliaments of limited authority, whether at local level or the international level, but for certain areas of control over life. Democracy need not be a switch. There is a rheostat here. And one can introduce gradualism.

Then there was the second question now? Well as I said, I mean we support free elections. On the other hand, it doesn’t mean that we’re not going to apply other foreign policy standards to how we relate to whomever wins that election. So if someone wins a free and fair election in country X, Muslim or non-Muslim and suddenly supports terrorism or proliferates weapons of mass destruction or carries out a policy that we perceive to be inimitable to our values…That’s one of the words you should never use in front of a group. (Laughter)

FA: It’s all right. You’re among friends.

RNH: Right up there with ombudsman. If anyone ever in any country decides to pursue policies that run contrary to our interests and values, we will react accordingly. That’s what foreign policy is about. I’m not saying foreign policy is only about elections and after you win a free and fair election we close the State Department and give you a blank check. But what I am saying that it ought to be and it is and important consideration.

FA: Here in the front.

David Apgar [DA]: David Apgar, Corporate Executive Board. Mr. Haass, the one problem with an open-ended argument for a democratization process, even one as robust and nuanced as the one that you sketched out, is that it’s not clear what would constitute the success. And while this might not be critical, just from a government perspective, you’ve argued, for example, that the process alone is immensely value. Some sense of what would constitute success would be critical for businesses to contribute. Do you have a specific example, I would think that any business contemplating how involved they want to get in Uzbekistan would want to know what kind of future tradeoffs the U.S. would make between support for a President who helps secure a critical air base and democratization in that country. So the question is, can you imagine what it would take, and whether it would even be possible, to articulate clear metrics for democratization and how much we would value progress against those metrics?

RHN: I’m a little bit uneasy with trying to grade progress. And indeed, what I suggested here is it’s almost better understood as a verb rather than a noun. It’s a process of democratization and we notice it when we see it but we can look at the amount of civil society. We can look at the degree of government involvement in an economy. We can look at the rights that women and minorities enjoy. Now, Freedom House and others put together a metrics and they rate countries every year. The U.S. Government puts out human rights reports and other similar things. But I would simply say what I’m most interested in is not so much a plateau as I am a process. And what we want to do is support the gradual political opening and you know, businesses are going to have to decide whether they believe that they’ve got a context of sufficient stability given the trajectory they see the country on.

FA: I will take…this is real abuse of authority on my part because Bob has motioned me to wrap it up. But I will take one question from the back because I’ve been accused of favoring the people sitting up front. And so, a quick question with a quick answer.

Eli Lake [EL]: Eli Lake with United Press International. It’s a very quick question but what is America’s focus on democracy going to mean in countries that are for regimes that are facing an immediate crisis, such as what we’re possibly seeing in Iran right now? And could you speak…and at point will the United States choose between the government and the people who are demonstrating in the streets? And what is your view at this point of Iran? Do you think that the U.S. does need to choose?

RHN: In the case of Iran, I think the President and other senior members of this administration have been about as forthright as members of governments everyday in speaking out and expressing their sympathy for the kinds of goals that are expressed by people who want to see dramatic political and economic change in Iran. And it’s something that we obviously want to see come about. And I’m not sure what else to add.

FA: Please.

Barbara Slavin [BS]: Barbara Slavin at USA Today. Thanks, Richard. You said this is a cooperative venture. What do you do if a government does not cooperate? What do you do if an Egypt decides, it wants to give power to his son without benefit of very much consultation with the people if he wants to throw Saudi bin Ibrahim in jail and now he’s let him out, that’s wonderful. But he’ll throw him back in, say. What do we do then? Do we insist or do we simply say “Well, too bad. We’ll wait for another 20 years.”

RHN: It’s always a mistake taking that one last question. (Laughter) And of Barbara, really. I think what I’d try to…I can’t, as you might expect, get into scenarios that if countries do certain things, how we would react. You can appreciate that. Indeed, what I’m hoping is the arguments I’ve put out here will be somewhat persuasive. And the societies…and I don’t want to single out Egypt, but societies in the region will see that it’s in their own interest if they’re interested in long-term stability, economic success, to make themselves gradually more open. If countries become gradually more closed, we will have to decide how it is we want to respond in the totality of our relationship. And coming back to what I tried to say tonight, I’m not saying that we’re going to have a one-dimensional foreign policy called democracy. What I’m basically saying is we’re going to have a foreign policy in which the dimension of democracy is going to get greater emphasis than it’s had in the past. But how in particular circumstances we are going to weigh our promotion of democracy against our other interests, I don’t know any other way to answer it except it depends. And ultimately, foreign policy is about trade-offs.

And secondly, you’ve got to ask yourself also about tools. Where you encounter frustration and whether it’s with the promotion of democracy or any other foreign policy, you’ve got to ask yourself what is the best tool? Is it incentives? Is it some other approach? What’s the mix? Is it things you say? Is it things you do? And again, you don’t end up with a one-size-fits-all prescription.

So this is all my elegant way of avoiding - what I hope is an elegant way of avoiding your question. But quite honestly, Barbara, it’s impossible to answer in the abstract. And in a funny sort of way you’re asking what do you do when a foreign policy goal is frustrated? And in that sense, this is no different than any other foreign policy goal when you’ve got to ask yourself what’s the totality of the stakes and what’s the full range of tools and how do I want to respond in this particular situation? And one of the things I would say is we’re not going to have a one-size-fits-all response. I think part of the message here is that an effective democratization policy has to be tailored and it’s got to reflect the specifics of individual situations.

FA: Thanks very much. On behalf of everyone, Richard, I just want to express our gratitude.