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| Speaker: | Gordon R. Sullivan |
|---|---|
| Moderator: | Eric P. Schwartz, Council on Foreign Relations |
| Speaker: | James R. Schlesinger |
March 12, 2003
Council on Foreign Relations
Washington, D.C.
Lee Feinstein [LF]:…the task force who are here today…many in our audience…and in particular our chairs, Dr. Schlesinger, and Ambassador Pickering, who are pulling together this report so quickly and so well. Today’s report builds on an earlier effort by the Council and the Baker Institute that provided some initial guiding principles for a post-Saddam transition. That report as well as—of this one are in the package you received today. And also available on our website. There was some debate about what to call today’s report, and the decision was made to call it “Iraq: The Day After.” But this is also, clearly, as the report states, a report about Iraq the moment after, because the second American and coalition forces cross into Iraq, the United States and its coalition partners will be responsible for the welfare of thousands and millions of Iraqis. And it’s also a report about Iraq in the months and years after, in light of the magnitude and the effort we face.
Let me turn the panel over to Eric Schwartz. Eric is the director of this task force. Eric was the Senior Director for Global and Humanitarian Affairs at the NSC. When he was at the NSC during the Clinton Administration, Eric was responsible for coordinating the U.S. Government’s responses to contingency operations in Haiti, in the Balkans, East Timor, and everywhere in between. Eric, I’ll turn it over to you.
Eric Schwartz [ES]: Well, first let me say, especially with Jim Dobbins in the audience, let me say that Lee has overstated my leverage of responsibilities in the Clinton administration. And I might not have said that if Jim wasn’t in the audience, but since he is, (Laughter) I was damned sure to say it. And thank you, Lee.
In the aftermath of the war in Iraq the U.S. government will confront enormously challenging post conflict transition and reconstruction issues, and for those reasons, the Council on Foreign Relations was extremely fortunate to have two distinguished Americans, James Schlesinger, and Thomas Pickering…to have them agree to serve as co-chairs of this task force on post conflict Iraq. Their experience, their perspectives, and I think maybe most importantly for my purposes, their willingness to devote considerable time and energy to this project, which is essential to the success of the overall effort.
We’re also extremely fortunate today to have with us General Gordon Sullivan, a task force member, and one of the foremost experts on the military’s role in post conflict peace stabilization. And I’m also very grateful that Jim Dobbins is with us today, a member of the task force. We were also joined by David Goldwyn, who was an observer on the task force. And if I’m missing any task force members, please raise your hand and let me know. I don’t think so. Good.
The task force included specialists on the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. On diplomatic and security issues. On the rule of law and accountability. On economics and energy, and on post conflict reconstruction, and the broad range of their contributions are reflected in the report.
As Lee said, the task force report builds upon the excellent work of the CFR-Baker Institute Project that was released in December on Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq. Let me briefly describe, or actually just state the four general themes of the report, and then turn it over to our two Chairs. The four major themes that the report addresses, and which our Chairs will address, were number one, the critical importance of a robust and sustained American political commitment to reconstruction, to the transition and reconstruction effort in Iraq. Number two, in the near term, and in the months thereafter, the essential importance of establishing and sustaining public security in Iraq.
Third, the value of sharing the burden for post conflict transition and reconstruction. And finally, the importance of making Iraqis stake-holders quickly in their own political future. The report also deals with other issue…rule of law, accountability, oil and energy, and regional security. With that preface, let me now turn the meeting over to Dr. Schlesinger.
James Schlesinger [JS]: Thank you Eric. And all of us on the task force owe a particular debt of gratitude to Eric for his compassionate treating of members of the task force, and for his ability to integrate what turns out to be a consensus document. Not all members of the task force needless to say agree, but they did come together on the major points at issue in that document.
First, as I go into a discussion of our political commitment, may I emphasize at the outset what a fateful decision this is for this country. We are dealing with the future of Iraq and in some ways the impression of the United States throughout the Middle East. The United States will acquire responsibility for what develops in Iraq. And all of our activities will be very carefully scrutinized. I should emphasize also that we do not know in detail what the situation will be inside of Iraq. There are many uncertainties, and we must recognize the uncertainties of the response in Iraq, and maintain adaptability as we uncover conditions within the country.
Now let me talk a bit about the political commitment. The task force recommends that the President build upon his previous statements, his earliest statements in support of U.S. engagement in Iraq, by making clear to the Congress and making clear to the American people that the United States is prepared to stay the course in Iraq. This is critical. We have of course vital interests in a post-Iraqi government that renounces weapons of mass destruction, renounces support for terrorism, and helps to support regional stability, and respects the basic rights of its own citizens.
The President will be explaining to the American people what our interests are in Iraq’s future, so that Americans will be willing to bear the cost of destabilization and reconstruction in the years ahead after officials have shifted their attention to other areas and to other crises. It is important that the Iraqis believe that the United States will not walk away after the military tasks are completed. And Americans need to know that the costs are likely to be considerable. The task force believes that the United States should announce a multi-billion dollar, multi-year, post conflict, reconstruction program, and seek formal Congressional endorsement. By announcing such a program, the President would give Iraqis confidence that we are committed to contribute meaningfully to the reconstruction of Iraq and would enable U.S. government agencies to plan more effectively for U.S. involvement whether it be short term or medium term.
The scale of American resources that will be required could amount to some 20 billion dollars per year. For several years. This figure assumes the deployment of 75,000 troops. The post conflict peace stabilization at about 17 billion dollars annually, as well as funding for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.
If the troop requirements are much larger than 75,000, a genuine possibility, the funding requirement would be much greater. For humanitarian and economic assistance, we believe an initial contribution in the neighborhood of at least three billion ought to be considered, with a readiness to provide additional funding as needs require. This number would not include funding for salaries of Iraqi civil servants or for food in the event that the oil-for-food program breaks down.
As a general proposition and Tom will cover this shortly, we expect that in the early years, the revenues from the oil industry will be insufficient to cover the costs of our actions. In those early years, the oil industry will require refurbishing. Later on, down the line, revenues from the oil industry should pick up responsibilities for raising the standard of living of the Iraqi people. It is important for the United States to be seen to be committed to the welfare of Iraqi citizens in the post-conflict era.
Which brings us to the second point. Protecting Iraqi citizens is a key to winning the peace. In the context of the conflict, and its immediate aftermath, Iraqis will be at considerable risk. Especially in areas that have been abandoned by Iraqi forces, but without a significant U.S. or coalition presence. From the outset of conflict, the U.S. military needs to deploy forces with a mission to establish public security and to provide humanitarian aid. This is distinct from the task generally assigned to combat troops. But it will be critical in preventing lawlessness, and reassuring Iraqis who might otherwise flee their homes.
The administration should sustain this public security focus throughout the transition. None of the other U.S. objectives in rebuilding Iraq would be realized in the absence of public security. If the administration were to fail to address this issue effectively, it would fuel the perception that the result of the U.S. intervention might be an increase in human suffering.
That means that we may take on a number of additional actions. The U.S. and the coalition partners should be ready to conduct rapid assessment of any weapons of mass destruction damage. WE should be prepared fro quick clean-up of chemical or biological weapons residues. WE should publicize the results of the assessments of any damage that has been done. We should provide information to Iraqis on how to mitigate the impact of weapons of mass destruction and provide assistance to alleviate the health effects of such exposure should it occur.
We need to seek to insure protection for displaced persons, and for refugees. We need for the time being to sustain the basic structure of the oil-for-food program of the United Nations. We should actively recruit international civil police and constabulary forces just as we had the American constabulary in Germany in the Post-World War II context. Constabulary units such as Italy’s Carabinieri have equipment, training, and organization that enable them to maintain public order and address civil unrest. In addition, international civil police could play an important role in vetting, training, and mentoring the forthcoming new police establishment in Iraq.
Thomas Pickering [TP]: Thank you, Jim, very much. I’d like to continue to discuss the international aspects of this, and the role of the Iraqis in a little more detail, adding to what Dr. Schlesinger has provided you. Before I do, I want to join Dr. Schlesinger in telling the panel, and particularly Eric, how much we appreciate all of their contributions and efforts. Without their work, and with Eric’s real leadership in putting this together, we could not have achieved the consensus and Jim, let me say what a pleasure it is to work with you again on an issue of importance, and thank you for your leadership.
Let me also emphasize that I agree with Dr. Schlesinger very much that responsibility and adaptability on the part of the United States are critical factors to the success of what is perhaps one of the most challenging endeavors we will have ever undertaken in the region. We believe the question of sharing the burden for post-conflict transition and reconstruction is an extremely important one, and needs to be thought through carefully. And we have the following thoughts in that area.
We believe the administration has an opportunity now to move rapidly to involve international organizations and other governments in the post-conflict transition and reconstruction process. This will obviously lighten the load of the U.S. military and civilian personnel associated with our participation. And it will help to diminish the impression that the United States and solely seeks to control post transition Iraq.
The administration needs to overcome any potential reluctance…especially early in the process in my view, to sacrifice unity of command. While that is extremely important, other governments may well turn out to be more than hesitant to participate in activities for which they have an opportunity to share little if any responsibility. We have felt that the administration should also work to reconcile this tension between our leadership which we feel strongly should be in place, and the participation of others by promoting a post-conflict security council resolution, or series of resolutions that will in the first place endorse UN’s leadership on security and interim civil administration in post- conflict Iraq. But also envisage a meaningful and important international participation for the purpose of sharing responsibility. For decision-making in important areas.
A resolution or series of resolutions could thus in our view have the WFP…the World Food Program…or another international humanitarian organization take the lead responsibility for humanitarian assistance and bring in the inevitable NGO partners in that process, and as well Iraqi civil society in the management and delivery of that humanitarian assistance.
A resolution might also indicate that the United Nations will take responsibility in organizing with U.S. support and assistance the political consultative process that must be undertaken to lead to effective transition to a new Iraqi government. The resolution should establish an oil oversight board for Iraq. To authorize the continuation of the UN’s oil-for-food program, and to deal with the plethora of difficult issues that will arise in the management of the Iraq’s oil resources.
A resolution should establish a consortium of donors in conjunction with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to consider Iraq’s reconstruction needs, as well as to get relief. And finally a resolution should indicate that responsibilities in other areas of support for post conflict Iraq and its reconstruction could be moved to the United Nations or indeed to other governments and organizations as conditions might permit that to happen.
Next, the critically important issue is the role and place of the Iraqi people in their own future. We believe that Iraqis should be stake holders throughout the process of transition in that country. It is clear that we should, as Dr. Schlesinger said, find ways to avoid the perception of American control over the process, and equally to promote the notion of Iraqi ownership as early as that can be possibly done, consistent with the circumstances…particularly the security circumstances in which we find the country. And indeed, as Dr. Schlesinger said, there are unknowables about how all of this will progress, and much of what will happen in the combat phase will determine much of what can be done in the early transition process. It goes without saying. But the administration should insure that Iraqis continue in whatever way they can, to play key roles, particularly in the administration of public institutions…always…and I emphasize this…subject to adequate vetting, for individuals who have criminal or other similar responsibility.
There needs to be continuity of basic services, and it will be essential that the thousands of Iraqis who serve in the civil administration of that country be able to continue to do their job in order to make that happen. In addition, an effort should be made early on to establish Iraqi consultative mechanisms on political and constitutional, judicial and legal issues, so that the period of interim governance can be limited and be characterized as well by Iraqi engagement, on the political as well as the administrative level.
The task force also has recommended that the administration encourage a geographically based federal system of government in Iraq. One hopefully that can be designed to be both democratic but represent and recognize the significant importance of maintaining the essential unity of Iraq while recognizing ethnic and religious differences that have always been prevalent in the country, and doing that in a way that does not lead to the break up of Iraq, internal tension, or indeed strife in the country, as it has done.
These are hugely difficult charges. While decisions on Iraq’s constitutional structure must be made by Iraqis, the task force also believed that a solution short of a federal system would risk conflict in a future Iraq, and U.S. officials would be well advised in our view to adopt this perspective, in their discussions and guidance with Iraqi counterparts, and with Iraq’s neighbors. In addition to these two big questions the task force addressed in some 30 separate recommendations the series of other issues to enhance the effort that the United States would be making with others in the post-conflict effort. Three of these are extremely important to me. And they include the fact that the promotion of the rule of law and accountability should be significant through legal and judicial reforms, through war crimes prosecution, and through attention to related issues.
Secondly, sustaining the UN oil-for-food program but also modifying it in a way better to meet Iraq’s post conflict needs. While also insuring that there is a significant Iraqi role and involvement in the decision-making process with respect to that important program and resource.
And finally encouraging regional security, through a regional security conference, or indeed organization. To examine regional confidence building measures, external security guarantees, and the importance that we all attach on non-proliferation. And some forum might be well established in the area to make that possible, consisting of Iraq, its neighbors, and outside interested states who have a commitment to and an interest in security and stability in the region.
And finally, in accordance with the recent statements of the President, most recently, in his AEI speech…members of the task force believe that it’s extremely important that the Arab Israeli peace issues be addressed urgently and expeditiously, perhaps with the possibility of beginning at least with the quartet and the quartet road map. But that there will be new and important opportunities as the President has envisaged, to take up those difficult and demanding issues, which will also, if resolved, make their own contribution to peace and stability in the region, and the Iraq effort on the part of the United States…and I hope other nations joining with it, can open the door to the process perhaps in a way analogous to the way the last Gulf War brought the process further along at the Madrid conference at Oslo and beyond. Thank you.
ES: Thank you very much, Tom, and with that, and before we open it up for questions, I want to invite General Sullivan to offer any comments of points that he might choose to do.
Gordon Sullivan [GS]: Thanks, Eric. Let me just reinforce what Dr. Schlesinger and Ambassador Pickering said. Thank Eric for his yeoman’s work on this report. And also I want to acknowledge the presence of these two national leaders who headed this study group. It was an honor for me to participate with both of them. Now I think Dr. Schlesinger said it very clearly. Winning the peace is task number two. Task number one is to create the conditions necessary for winning the peace, and I think that we can see in this report much discussion about the creation of those conditions and we’ll see how this plays out over the next couple of weeks. I just want to put in my own words something that both Ambassador Pickering and Dr. Schlesinger said, and of course Eric…security and well being are critical. Security for the Iraqi people, and the well-being of Iraqi people. You can rest assured that General Franks and his people are working in those areas right now to enable those tasks to be performed very quickly, and immediately, indeed almost simultaneously, on the battlefield.
Once security, or some form of security and well being are established, then I think clearly the involvement of the Iraqi people in their own reconstruction is…and I’m just reinforcing what the President said, and what these three gentlemen to my right have said, we must involve the Iraqi people, and they must buy in and have a piece of this action, along with the international community. At some point, and perhaps immediately, we will get into an issue that Ambassador Pickering raised, and that is the judicial system, the system of laws in Iraq. Indeed, that’s a challenge for them, and I’m sure we will have some role to play in that.
Who knows what the numbers will be of troops…the report says 75,000. There are other numbers out there. There will probably be in the neighborhood of 200,000 involved, at least, if you believe what you read in the newspapers. 200,000 involved initially. That will be scaled down. I think the number 75,000 looks about right to me. And costs will fluctuate. Regarding fluctuation, I think one of the…in fact I know one of the things it said in the report, which is worth reflecting on, and Dr. Schlesinger mentioned it, adaptability and creativity…uncertainty will require. Indeed modesty. We may not know all of the answers today. I don’t think anybody’s come out and said anybody knows all the answers on what’s going on inside of Iraq…about what we will find. A degree of modesty, adaptability, and creativity will be necessary in everybody involved.
And at some point, certainly civilian agencies, PBO’s, private volunteer organizations, non-governmental organizations, the United Nations, any number of other organizations, will come in and the military will start phasing out. Carabinieri, Guardia civil... civilian police…whatever. I don’t think anybody can set a time line on this, nor should we get too enthusiastic about what the numbers are. Whatever the numbers are and whatever the cost, once we get in, we have to win the peace. We have to win the peace. It’s too important for this country, and for the world, and for the Iraqi people.
ES: Thank you General Sullivan. With that, I think we can open it up now for questions. Dan O’Flaherty.
DO: I wonder if members of the panel could comment on the point at which you see U.S. and United Nations sanctions being lifted on Iraq, so that the private sector will become involved in the process you’ve described?
ES: Tom, do you want to take this?
TP: Having helped to put them on, I guess I may have to bear the burden of answering your question, Mr. O’Flaherty. After a victory in the field, the remaining sanctions in the non-military and civilian area probably ought to be lifted . As you know, those of us who dealt with this over the years have come to realize that a very large share, but not all of the sanctions related to non-military activities, have in one way or another been relieved, if I could put it that way, but the oil-for-food program, although it involves a somewhat cumbersome process in many cases for clearance, particularly of dual use items.
My own view would be that we should never remove limitations on WMD’s long range missile delivery vehicles, and associated dual use items. And that the question which we have begun to address…the task force of Iraqi armed forces, post conflict, would help, I think, to drive what should become the situation with respect to the trade and conventional military equipment. It would make no sense for example to size Iraqi armed forces to meet certain responsibilities in contingencies and then deprive them of the sources of military equipment to make those forces effective. At the same time, a tricky question will be right-sizing. Some missions, one could envisage a defensive Iraq. And I would hope they would be purely defensive forces, at least in the earliest possible days…might involve capabilities which would allow a mis-intentioned new Iraqi leader to become aggressive, and certainly we don’t want to go through all of this to end up in a situation analogous to where we started. So I would say that’s my own brief view of the sanctions…the earliest possible relief on the indubitably humanitarian and civilian side, and a slower more careful process gauged to the situation, on the conventional military and WMD side not at all.
ES: Yes, the gentlemen ...
Audience: My question goes to Ambassador Pickering. And it relates to the vetting of those Iraqis that we hope will take over the ministering of responsibility. Does your report go into the question of securing and obtaining the files of the Ba’ath(?) party? One of the big advantages we had in post-war Germany was that the files of the Nazi party were exclusively in the hands of the Americans, so we got an easy way of checking these people out. Is the provision being made to do that in the case of Iraq?
TP: Jerry, thanks. It’s nice to see so many of the old and usual suspects rounded up for this affair. (Laughter) I think that…and Eric can correct me if I’m wrong…that we did not enter in the report to the level of detail that a positive answer to your question would imply. But if I could say on my own, it would seem ludicrous not to do so, and apparently the Iraqis are extensive record keepers, even if in disarmament issues they have difficulty finding them. But I would hope that we would find…keep indexed, translate and understand as many of those records as possible, whether it would be for vetting, or those war crime trials that will take place, and we have a view that there should be. And in dealing with economic management, and the disarmament issues that are so critical.
JS: I think that the archives government as well as party will be very interesting reading, and we will turn to that early on. In addition to what Ambassador Pickering has mentioned, now there should be very interesting reading with regard to the international contracts of the regime…particularly over this last decade.
ES: Gentleman on the side with the beard.
RB: Thank you. Richard Bissell, with the National Academy of Sciences. Given the centrality of the weapons of mass destruction going into this conflict, there’s remarkably little in the text about coming out of the conflict, except to say they need to be destroyed. As I think all of you know, better than I do, there’s an equally pernicious problem in weapons of mass destruction which is not the things, but rather the knowledge in the minds of the scientists and engineers. And I wonder if the task force tried to address this issue. There’s obviously experience after World War II and in the last 10 years with Russia in terms of trying to convert the scientists and engineers to peaceful uses. Have you had a chance to discuss that? Think about some possibilities where we might learn from our prior experience?
ES: Well, I’ll take an initial stab on answering that question. Just in terms of the task force project, and then I’ll invite the Chairs and General Sullivan to comment as well. This is…there’s a lot that has been published on post-conflict Iraq, and a lot of it is very good. And a lot of it was drawn on for this report. But this is among the broader treatments of post-conflict Iraq. And in undertaking a broader treatment, we did it with an awareness that…and in a very short period of time…that it was going to be a very significant undertaking. And so necessarily there were issues that we didn’t address, and I would put that in the category of issues that weren’t addressed. And in part, our perspective on this was reflected in the report, and I’m going to read from this section if I may.
We generally avoided recommendations on issues where U.S. intentions were unambiguous, where there was broad and unquestioned consensus and in cases where our group perhaps could offer less comparative advantage than on other issues. And I would probably put the issue you raised in that category. We could have written even a broader document, but I think it would have taken a lot more time and effort.
JS: One must recognize that the hope is that the Iraqi economy would show the same kind of surge or revival after an initial period, and that this should absorb much of the talent and the technical and the scientific community. One of the things that must be done early on, and I think I should stress this. It is critical that we have food, medicine and clean water. And that we bring that into the country. But after a time, the Iraqis are quite capable of producing their own medications, and that for example much of the community that has in the past been devoted…we presume has been devoted to taking care of biological agents for nefarious purposes can be bent in the direction of creating within Iraq the capability of taking care of their own. Chemical…people in the chemical industry can be diverted once again into peaceful uses.
ES: Yes?
PH: Priscilla Huff, Channel News, Asia. That’s okay. You are advocating a federal government based on a democracy. How are the Iraqi people going to learn about what a democracy means? After 35 years of an authoritarian government, I mean it sounds like a significant cultural and societal change for Iraqis to go from Saddam Hussein to a U.S. Congress, or something like that.
JS: I think it has to be carefully fostered, and it will take, as your question implies, a considerable period. There are those who think of this as an instantaneous transformation into Jeffersonian democracy. That will not be the case. It will take some years and slow development at the local level, working up towards the national level, and that that is a process that we can encourage, but we should not presume will be instantly successful.
ES: Dr. Schlesinger’s views on this are, I think, widely shared by all of us. But the educational system is critical for the future of Iraq. And much of what happens there has to be worked out in my view between Iraqis and others who know something about where and how future governance and a whole set of other critical issues can be adopted and adapted. We watched in the past in other times and in other eras this process followed in Germany and Japan. And indeed in the post-Communist world if I could put it that way, there are struggles going on over these same set of issues. So we should be able to draw on some lessons and experience. But Iraq is quite different than the other examples we need to be carefully conscious of that.
JS: Some transitions will be shorter than other transitions. This will not be one of the shorter transitions.
TP: I think the language of the report implies this long term commitment. American political commitment to the future of Iraq, and it’s not a short period of time.
ES: David Goldwyn.
DG: Thank you. David Goldwyn. Goldwyn International Strategies. It seems that the key point of leverage on the table is who controls Iraq’s economy? Would it not make sense to tell Iraqis clear benchmarks for when they get control of their own economy? Self government, disarmament, bringing to justice people who committed war crimes. But wouldn’t it also make sense for the UN, which, absent a new resolution, will continue to control the bank account for Iraqi revenues. That those revenues will not go to the United States and will not be available for reconstruction unless there is a new resolution, which involves the international community, and the administration of Iraq.
ES: Let me take an initial stab. And express my own views. Because the…let me start with what the report says. And I think the report doesn’t preclude by any means the suggestion that you’re making, because the report reaches the same conclusion that you identified, which is there is an international structure for the management of Iraq’s oil revenues, and that will have to be modified both in the short term, and over time. And that’s gotta be a process that includes certainly the United States, our counterparts in the Security Council, and Iraqis. And one would…sort of the watch words in the report and the discussions, transparency, accountability, and an evolution to over time a process that Iraqis have control over. So I don’t think that any of that which is in the report precludes the kind of benchmarks that you’re talking about, and I think it would be something that would be worth considering.
I don’t know if my colleagues on the panel have any thoughts on that?
Unknown: No, I would say that the uncertainties that we have emphasized David are sufficiently broad for U.S. not to want to take on that level of detail at the present time, but I think we have, as Eric said, set the framework for that happening. And hopefully the day after will be clearer than the day before about how and in what way to deal with those issues, but we can never be sure. And given that range of uncertainty, the precise prescription for various times and transition arrangements, or even maybe some of the circumstances that might obtain, we’ve left to the next report. (Laughs)
M: Let me ...
JS: Justice Stewart defined pornography. He didn’t know exactly what it was, but he knew it when he saw it. We will know the points when we see them. And we can probably generalize, but the conditions in country are sufficiently uncertain that we cannot prescribe precisely when we will be able to turn things over. Starting from a large base, because much of the local economy…much of the local civil activities is going to be run by Iraqis at the outset.
ES: One of the…a previous question about how do you promote democracy in a society like Iraq immediately made me think that we should turn to our task force members in the audience who might address this and any other issue that he feels is worth addressing, but if there’s anyone who has focused more time on the question that was asked about how to promote democracy in an environment which doesn’t have much of an experience of it, if there’s anyone who’s worked more on that than Jim Dobbins, I don’t know who that might be. So Jim, would you like to say a few words about that issue? Or anything else as a member of the task force?
JD: Thank you. I think that both of the last questions illustrate some of the major turning points that the administration will face in handling the post-Iraqi…or post conflict Iraq. One is the transition of U.S. authority to Iraqi authority. And the other is the transition of U.S. authority to international authority. And the points at which these might come, are among the major issues that were debated within the task force. And the fact that you could get a consensus on that was notable, but nevertheless if you read the additional statements at the end you’ll see that the consensus wasn’t complete, and that there are divisions on both of those points.
On the issue of democracy, the quicker you turn authority over to the Iraqis the less likely it is you’re going to get a thorough-going democracy, but the more likely it is that you’ll be able to get out earlier, and at a lower cost. The more you postpone transition to full Iraqi authority, the more you retain responsibility for holding local and then national elections, turning authority only over once you have a government that’s fully legitimized, the more likely it is that you’ll have an enduring transformation of the society of the sort we had in Germany and Japan. On the other hand, we can look back, you know, nostalgically at those occupations 45 years ago, but they did take five years or more. And it’s not clear that we’re going to want to invest that much time in the Iraqis.
So that’s one of the turning points. The other is the transition from a national occupation to an internationally promoted transformation. And there are those who want to emphasize unity of command and unity of responsibility. But when the United States transformed Japan and Germany, it represented 50 percent of the world’s GNP. It could afford to do it alone. In fact it was the only country that had the resources to do it in any case. Today we represent 20 percent of the world’s GNP and through the 1990’s we developed a number of instrumentalities, institutions, competencies, and capabilities to bring about these transformations in a multilateral way, in which the United States was a minority contributor, rather than a majority contributor, but could still exercise sufficient leadership. And one of the big questions before the administration is whether it relies solely on the models of the 1940’s…the national models…or whether it also draws upon the lessons of the 1990’s…the multinational, international models, and how quickly it makes a transformation to some of those instrumentalities and capabilities.
ES: Thanks, Jim. Let me also commend the audience to the section in the report that addresses that issue in some detail on the structure of transitional administration. Did I notice…I think I noticed another task force member in the audience, and I want to note that as well. I think I see Ellen Laipson in the back, and Ellen, if you have the urge to say anything, please just raise your hand and we’ll recognize you. And you do! (Laughs) No, no, please.
EL: (Inaudible)
ES: No, no, please.
EL: I think there’s one issue that hasn’t come up yet that maybe it deserves a... Iraq’s neighbors during this transition period. I know that one of the things when we went into Afghanistan that we were most concerned about was making sure that the immediate neighbors did not try to fill the vacuum or develop kind of relations with sub-national groups that would affect the stability of the country. It does seem to me that our report, or at least the next iteration of the Council’s work on Iraq may want to look at little more carefully in particular since we already have some evidence that both Turkey and Iran have plans to establish some kind of a presence in country. It seems to me that that’s going to be one of the issues the United States has to watch very, very carefully. Not just watch, but manage actively. Thanks.
(Background Conversation)
ES: Yeah, indeed, the…Ellen is correct. This wasn’t a major issue in the report, but indeed El-…and Ellen contributed... to the extent the report does address it, Ellen’s contributions were extremely important. There is a section in the report that Tom mentioned that encourages a regional forum for security issues in which a range of the sorts of issues that Ellen addresses could be considered. Non-proliferation. Confidence building. The issue of regional security guarantees. What will be expected of the United States and the United States military in circumstances where we have just completed, or are in the process of working on a down-sizing of the Iraqi military, and relations with other governments in the region. So some work on that is reflected in the report, but I think it’s correct that more work should be done. Now let me turn to...
JS: We have been engaged, I think it is no secret, that we have been engaged for months in not entirely completed conversations with the Turks on this issue. Our conversations with the Iranians have been skimpier. I think that the point that was just raised…we are going to have to be quite meticulous in watching whether or not there is an attempt by the government in Teheran to make use of either clandestine groups, or established military groups, or to organize within the Shiite population. And that will have to be very carefully watched. And it is a subject that once again is veiled with uncertainties. We do not know to what extent that may take place. But the question that has been raised goes right to the heart…I think that our issues with the Turks are largely with regard to the degree of autonomy, with the perspective, the Kurds in the North and the questions of control of the oil fields in the North, and I think that those will be adequately resolved.
One should point out in addition that there is Syria to the West, and that there are some unresolved questions with regard to the government in Damascus, and particularly activities ongoing in the Bakar Valley, and I think that those will be under scrutiny too.
TP: Eric, maybe I just could add…because I think Ellen quite wisely asked the question…we’ve talked a little bit about Turkey. Dr. Schlesinger mentioned Iran. As we know there are newspaper reports that some forces have already moved from Iran into Kurdistan(?). We were concerned obviously about this set of issues. In the end of one of the recommendations included the idea that there should be a regional forum, maybe based on the Afghanistan’s six plus two, and obviously Iranian involvement has a great deal to do with…or non-involvement…with future stability. Jim might want to comment a little bit, because you faced a similar question in Afghanistan, and the six plus two, and in the close relationships between Iran and the Northern Alliance, and particularly with the Czars and others. If you care to comment, Jim, a little bit on how that’s been handled, and whether in fact that is being handled in the Afghan context, and from your experience, whether it has different possibilities in Iraq or not, I think the audience will be interested.
JS: Let me observe, however, before I comment, that 200,000 troops in country is somewhat different from 9,000 troops in country.
TP: I think that’s true, but I also think it’s true that one of the reasons that we’ve been able to get away with having less than 10,000 troops in Afghanistan, and still retain the relatively benign and quiescent situation there, is because of the success of American diplomacy in persuading all of Afghanistan’s neighbors that they had a self-interest in a moderate, modernizing, non-threatening Afghanistan, as a result of which Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia, the countries that had torn Afghanistan apart for two decades, all supported the Karzai administration, and all continue to do so. And it was the ability to talk to all of these, to build a relationship with confidence, at least as regards Afghanistan, with them, including with the Iranians, but also with the others, that has held that situation together.
And I don’t believe anybody can build a nation if that nation’s neighbors are dedicated to pulling it apart. So I don’t believe that we will have, no matter how many troops we put in Iraq, success in rebuilding the nation and getting out unless we give all of its neighbors a stake in the success of that enterprise. And that does mean communicating with them all, and giving them all a share of the responsibility, without dividing the country up, a la Germany, which took 50 years to put back together again once we let it be divided.
So it does need to be a unified administration, but it does have to be one in which all the neighbors feel a stake, and an ability to project influence in a legitimate fashion.
ES: Well, not to belabor this issue, but let me just commend the audience to page 46 of the report where this issue on the regional forum is discussed, and where we make clear that Iran has made clear that it will seek to promote its interests in Iraq and involvement in a post war involvement in a post war environment could have implications…its involvement in a post war environment could have implications for security…we also discuss other countries in the region.
Gentleman with the glasses in the back…in the middle…yes?
JF: John Fransen, with Gannett News Service. I’d like to follow up on some comments that Mr. Dobbins made earlier when he asked…given the discord in New York right now, and the likelihood that we may go into Iraq without UN approval, what’s the likelihood of the administration giving up the unity of command that you’re speaking about in inviting a substantial UN or International role?
ES: Why don’t we go the panel first, and then Jim, if you have any—we can (Inaudible).
JS: Unity of command will be established by the United States. The question of support for the humanitarian ventures at the outset, and later on, other aspects of governance in Iraq depends of course on the willingness of others to join in a coalition of the willing…and that given the disunity that has been displayed in New York, underscores the reason that we seek…we demand…unity of command at the outset. We do not want to have a disputatious regime at the top.
ES: Let me just go back to…on this issue…let me go back to the report and we see how the task force dealt with what is frankly a difficult issue, where there is a tension. And what the task force has recommended was that the administration address this dilemma by promoting resolutions that endorse leadership on security and interim civil administration in a post-conflict Iraq, but also envisions meaningful international participation in the sharing of responsibility in a range of areas that Ambassador Pickering described, including international responsibility in organizing with U.S. support and assistance, the political consultative process. It doesn’t foreclose over time additional transfer of decision-making authority. On this issue of civil administration, let me also say that it’s going to be an enormous initial responsibility and you may recall in Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, who actually drafted the Secretary General’s Blue Ribbon Panel Report on peace keeping, in that report, he urged that the United Nations be careful about taking on responsibilities that just would overwhelm the organization, and in the Afghanistan context, there was no great enthusiasm for especially initially the UN taking responsibility for civil administration. So what we’ve tried to do in this report, and again, I commend you to the words in the report, we’ve tried to strike a very careful balance between the desire for unity of effort on the part of the United States, the capacities of international organizations, yet the need to share burdens. And share burdens in a meaningful way, where others have real responsibility.
ES: Gentleman in the…I’m sorry. J-
Audience: I just want to say…that it’s worth remembering in the ’90’s, that Russians took the exact same position on Bosnia and then Kosovo, that the Russians, French and Germans are taking now, which is that we shouldn’t use force. We should continue to rely on diplomacy—And they also threatened to veto any Security Council resolution and deny the Security Council resolutions. And then as soon as the conflicts were over, within a week, they committed forces to the U.S. led NATO peace keeping detachments on both occasions. Now throughout that period, the Clinton administration was very careful not to exacerbate its difference with the Russians. To try to salve their wounded pride. To try to turn aside their more intemperate remarks, and to make clear at all times that whatever the current differences, there was a future partnership available…ahead. So I think that as long as the current administration makes at least as much effort to repair relations with our closest Allies, as the last administration did with our former adversary, there’s every prospect that the self interests of all concerned will bring them all to some kind of early resolution, early partnership in Iraq, if an effort is made. And in that regard, the administration has perhaps a little belatedly invited NATO to take a greater role in Afghanistan, and I think NATO is probably prepared to do that. I believe that a NATO role in Iraq at a suitable moment would be the best way of multi-nationalizing the security responsibilities while retaining a strong U.S. leadership.
JS: In the Kosovo case, we carefully steered around the United Nations or the Security Council. And therefore there were not the disputes that we now see before U.S. that make it more difficult to proceed.
ES: Let me recognize (Inaudible)…but I also think it is fair to say there was a consensus…or I felt a consensus among members of the task force that would echo the…that the discord in New York should not be a deterrent to U.S. efforts to bring others on board, and I don’t…I think the task force was probably less pessimistic on that issue than a lot of the media is on that issue. And I think that’s a very important point.
Harriet Babbitt.
HB: Thanks very much. Given the timing of the report, it’s understandable that you will have focused on the necessity of bringing in the rest of the international community and protecting the Iraqi people. I was interested to see the pieces of the report that dealt on the building of the Iraqi civil society, and particularly the involvement of women, and I was very happy to hear that you all planned to continue the Council’s role in helping define how this process goes forward, as the context becomes clear, will be very important. And to the extent that you elaborate on the pieces of the report which focus on the building of Iraqi Civil Society as part of the sustainability of the effort will be very, very important. So thank you.
ES: I’m first going to turn…ask if I may…break protocol and just ask Lee Feinstein…it’s about 10:35, do we need to be closing up here, or…We’ll take one or two questions and gentleman in the back…actually I’ll take one question, and then I’ll invite panel members to say any quick last words that they care to make. Yes?
NF: The name is Nelson Feragotti from Abu Dhabi Television. From the brief notices that we were given by the honorable panelists, it seems that they do not foresee an active role of the regional powers, especially the Arab countries…the neighboring Arab countries to Iraq, and the Arab league members. Except maybe at the final phase of things, and mostly on the receiving end. They were not invited to share in the policing for instance of the reconstructing of Iraq in a post war era. I wonder if this impression that I got (Inaudible)?
Unknown: Well, we didn’t single out the Arab neighbors, but they certainly were intended to be included, and participate. We hope they will participate in the reconstruction of Iraq. Recognizing that one of the elements of reconstruction is the reconstruction of the oil industry, which of course affects their own interests. And also that we invite constabulary and civil police and if there are those who are prepared to provide them, they certainly should be very carefully considered and welcome.
Unknown: —just add, security situation in Iraq’s past behavior in the region should also lead the States of the region to want to participate, and we talked about a regional security forum, in which that might be possible, and clearly the sizing and relationship of Iraq’s future conventional military forces all play a role in the mind and view of the neighborhood and the neighbors.
ES: I’m sorry. We just don’t have time. But I want ...
ES: You had your hand up…let me apologize, and then second, let me recognize you.
BJ: Bill Jones from Executive Intelligence Review. The analogy with Japan as you pointed out in the report is not totally accurate. You call Iraq a liberated country rather than a conquered nation, although there are a certain amount of conquests involved in there. But the difference with Japan, I think, is the fact that the Emperor did surrender. And by surrendering, he left in place a network which could be utilized by the occupying forces in order to keep things going. The question with Iraq is what is this network? What are you going to do to the Ba’ath party? Is there a civil service of sorts there that one could rely on? What about the army? And secondly the regional issues I think are very important, given the fact that many of the people who are pushing this war are those who simply don’t have Saddam Hussein alone in their sights, but they want to revamp the whole situation in the Middle East, and there’s been talk about going against Iran, talk about reforming Saudi Arabia and the like. And the danger is, if the war goes very well, very quickly, there might be more of a knee-jerk reaction by the people who want to go further than that to redo a situation, which could cause total havoc in the area. I think that the Council would want to address these types of issues if not in this report, in a report soon to follow, in order to counter other reactions that may be forthcoming in the aftermath of the war.
Unknown: It’s our suspicion that unlike Japan or Germany, that a large percentage of Iraqi people will look upon this as liberation. That is an important distinction from the past. Yes, indeed, we will remove the top ranks of the Ba’ath party from anything further to do with government. Some of them will be brought to trial if they have crimes of blood on their hands. The military we will…as the report says…we will reorganize the military. We want Iraq to have the capacity of self-defense. We do not with Iraq to be in a position to threaten smaller neighbors. That is a difficult task to balance. And indeed most of the police will stay in place. It will only be some of the people at the top. And over time they may be carefully vetted for those whose past actions make them inappropriate to stay in position of responsibility, but most of the police we need to maintain civil order in the society, and the Iraqi police will be a large part of that.
Unknown: Maybe I could just mention in the second part of the question, it’s a pool of men eating hypotheticals into which the task force did not jump, happily. (Laughter) And I think that probably Lee would be able to convey your suggestion to Les Gelb that we take a look at the whole liberation theology process that now seems to be part of the Washington scene.
ES: With that, let me invite…and in fact I’ll start with…to my left…General Sullivan…whether the panelists want to make or say any final words?
GS: No, I would just reinforce the primary message of the report. We must win the peace and that’s a long term effort, requiring the best of the American people, and our government. This is a critical step in a very vital region, and we have to stay the course, and be adaptive and creative, and resolute in the pursuit of our aims. A viable economy in Iraq is not only an oil economy, it’s an economy of the people, just going about their lives and earning a living. And we need to facilitate that and facilitate a government of laws in this country.
ES: Dr. Schlesinger?
JS: I reiterate that this is a fateful decision for the United States. The future of the image of the United States may be affected, certainly will be affected, whether it is seen as the city shining on the hill…as President Reagan used to refer to…or as a new imperial power. Depends on the effectiveness with which we carry out phase two after the military operation. We often say that our argument is not with the Iraqi people, it is with the government of Iraq. That is frequently said about other countries. In this case it is critically important. It is our judgment that much of the Iraqi population will be happy to see Saddam Hussein gone, and that they will find that the environment that develops post military will be one in which the society can flourish and they can return to the kinds of growth patterns that they had in the 1980’s…in 1970’s…and that they will have a degree of freedom that they had before 1968 when the Ba’ath took over.
Unknown: Let me just add that what my two colleagues have just said, I certainly subscribe to. I think this is a fateful and important and very significant challenge for the United States…maybe more important than even the challenge of what we have to do to get to the point…as I think General Sullivan expressed it…we have the ability to address this second stage of the problem. I also think that the hype around Washington, and our colleagues in the media, that we are genetically incapable of dealing with this problem, or that we are condemned to a sufficient degree of ignorance, never to be able to address it successfully, or that our British cousins learned all there was to know, and have not told any of U.S. about how to understand this kind of situation, are perhaps overdrawn, and the challenge of the task force was to respond in many ways to those challenges. I think it’s done it particularly well at the first level of difficulty, but not way down in the weeds, which is clearly what our military and our civilian leadership and the departments of government will have to take on.
The fact is that we are not alone in addressing this question in this town, it’s the current feeding frenzy of think tanks, to be working on this set of issues. But that we have been able to take a strong group of very tough minded individuals, with different perceptions, and different ideas, and reel them into a consensus sufficiently broad to produce a useful report on a very, very difficult subject, I think is an accomplishment of the Council, the task force, and the director. And I believe in fact that this is not the last report and probably the subject needs continued and very significant attention, both in government and out. Which I think is one of the great strengths of this country, that no issue is too important to leave solely in the hands of those who’ve been assigned by the bureaucracy to deal with it (Laughter) that this particular activity on the part of the Council has been a worthwhile endeavor and I am pleased to have been partnered with so many distinguished and accomplished people in making it happen, and I hope it will serve the purpose for which it was intended, that it will provide new information, new thoughts, new ideas, and new challenges to the folks who have to undertake this enormous burden.
JS: We had a word on the theology of liberation. (Laughter) Democracy we should recognize is an organic growth. It does not come about instantaneously. And we want to see a stable government, a responsible government in Iraq, but it is not going to become instantly democratic in the sense of an American styled democracy, or a European styled democracy. And moreover it is not likely to be an instant model for those in the neighborhood.
ES: Before we close, let me just say one word. That I think it’s very important to emphasize…and I had this experience yesterday on Capital Hill…that the task force focus on the enormity of the challenge is not…should not in any, way, shape, manner or form be inferred as any effort to deter the administration. As Tom has said, it is an effort to encourage the administration, the American people, to come to grips with the magnitude of what we have in front of us, but to buy into that effort. And to support it. The task force…the fundamental belief of the task force is that the United States has no alternative. If war takes place, and there is a post conflict challenge, we have no alternative to engage it with everything we have. With that, I want to again express my very sincere appreciation to Ambassador Pickering and Dr. Schlesinger, and to the extraordinary members of the task force. Thank you very much for coming.
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