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| Author: | Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies |
|---|
April 3, 2003
The Jerusalem Post
One would have thought that the defeat of the Taliban would have shattered for all time the mystique of the guerrilla. Apparently not. The whole world is in an uproar over the vicious hit-and-run tactics employed by Saddam Hussein's thugs to resist coalition forces.
Instead of being taken as a sign of the regime's weakness, this is wrongly seen as evidence of its strength. Already, agitated commentators are invoking comparisons with Vietnam and warning that even after the formal end of hostilities allied occupiers will never be safe.
Such a nightmare scenario cannot be dismissed out of hand - a good general must prepare for every contingency - but if the historical record is anything to judge by, it is unlikely. The US, along with most Western nations, has a long record of defeating guerrilla resistance all over the world. And the conditions present the only time the US suffered a serious defeat - in Vietnam - appear to be missing in Iraq today.
The primary job of the US army until 1890 was fighting guerrillas - American Indians, to be exact, the finest irregular warriors in the world. Defeating them was a slow and arduous process, with some famous setbacks such as the Battle of Little Bighorn, but in the end dogged generals such as Nelson Miles and George Crook managed to capture the last holdouts, including the Apache leader Geronimo and the great Sioux chief Sitting Bull.
Much of the historiography of the Indian Wars focuses on the US army's excesses, such as the massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890. But the army's ultimate victory was predicated not upon sheer brutality but upon the essentials of good counterinsurgency strategy: cutting off the guerrillas from their population base by herding tribes onto reservations; utilizing friendly Indians for scouting and intelligence, and by being relentless in the pursuit of hostile braves, never giving them a moment of rest.
Similar strategies were utilized, with similar success, by the army in its campaign to stamp out resistance to US rule in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. The Philippine War was long and ugly. It lasted from 1899 to 1902, with sporadic resistance thereafter, and it cost the lives of 4,200 US soldiers. But its success was sealed through a daring commando raid undertaken by Brig.-Gen. Frederick Funston. He dressed a unit of native allies in insurrecto uniforms and pretended to be their prisoner in order to capture the rebel chief, Emilio Aguinaldo, in his mountain lair.
Important as this coup was, it was not enough to assure the long-term acceptance of a US presence in the Philippines. This could only be done through measures designed to win the hearts and minds of Filipinos. In the early days of the occupation, US troops vaccinated children, set up schools, and repaired roads. Later on, the US granted the Philippines growing autonomy well ahead of other colonies in Asia. Nationalist leader Manuel Quezon was driven to complain: "Damn the Americans, why don't they tyrannize us more?"
AMERICA WENT on to wage many more counterinsurgency campaigns in the years after 1898, mainly in the Caribbean, where US troops occupied Panama, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and other places for varying lengths of time. Most of these occupations were carried out by a small number of marines who fought guerrillas while being careful not to alienate the bulk of the civilian population.
Resistance was not always entirely stamped out - the Nicaraguan rebel leader Augusto Sandino eluded capture from 1927 to 1933 - but vigorous policing usually kept the guerrillas isolated in the outback where they did not pose a threat to large population centers.
The bulk of the fighting was done by native enlisted men led by US officers in constabulary outfits such as the Haitian Gendarmerie or the Nicaraguan National Guard. This is an important point to keep in mind: While US forces possess superior training and firepower, they lack the local knowledge essential to root out wily opponents. This gap can be bridged only by local allies, whether serving informally alongside US forces (as with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, or the Kurds in northern Iraq) or in a more formal military structure (as with free Iraqis who are working for various US units).
While US troops fought openly against guerrillas in the pre-World War II period, after 1945 the emphasis switched to covert operations, with Washington supplying arms and expertise to friendly governments battling Communist insurgencies. This strategy failed spectacularly in China, which was taken over by Mao Zedong in 1949 because of the strong support the communists received from Moscow and the blunders of the Nationalist government.
But this defeat should not erase the memory of victories elsewhere. A small sample: Between 1945 and 1949, Greece defeated the Communist-dominated Democratic Army with US help provided under the Truman Doctrine. Between 1946 and 1954, the Philippine government, advised by the "Quiet American," Edward Lansdale, put down the Hukbalahap rebellion. And between 1980 and 1992, El Salvador, with US aid provided under the Reagan Doctrine, defeated the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).
IN ALL these instances, the US strategy called for carrots and sticks - aggressive military operations against the rebels combined with liberalizing reforms to win over the uncommitted populace. And, in all these cases, the US and its allies were successful.
The glaring exception is Vietnam, where the US pursued a similar strategy with a notable lack of success. America's failure was due to many factors, including a ham-handed military campaign that ignored successful counterinsurgency techniques of the past. But the ultimate problem was that the Communist forces operating in South Vietnam had a "deep rear" in North Vietnam, the Soviet Union and China. The US was loath to take decisive military action against any of these states for fear of widening the war. As a result, the insurgents always had a safe base of operations across the border and steady supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh trail. Even so, the Vietcong did not win the war. They merely softened up the enemy for the conventional invasion that North Vietnam mounted in 1975.
The question today is: Does Iraq more closely resemble Vietnam or the numerous places where US counterinsurgency strategies prevailed? The answer is probably the latter. In the first place, Vietnam's topography, with lots of jungles and mountains, was much more favorable to guerrilla operations than the deserts and towns of Iraq. And, unlike in Vietnam, it is doubtful that any neighboring country will want to give long-term support to a Baathist guerrilla campaign against coalition forces.
While neither Syria nor Iran, which share long borders with Iraq, is friendly to the US, they do not have particularly warm feelings for Saddam Hussein either. In any case, neither state enjoys superpower patronage, so they would be at the mercy of US forces if they fomented a wave of terrorist attacks against the occupation authorities.
Such a campaign is going strong now because Saddam's ruthless security apparatus remains in control of most urban areas. But assuming that President George W. Bush holds firm in his resolve to achieve a decisive victory, there is little doubt that the Ba'athist regime will be overthrown.
Saddam's appeal in the Arab world, which depends on successfully defying the "Crusaders," will be shattered. Thereafter, the US is committed to democratic reforms calculated to win over the bulk of the Iraqi population. (It is Israel's inability to implement such measures in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that prevents it from winning a more complete victory against Palestinian militants.)
If civilians are the sea in which guerrillas must swim, as Mao famously said, then the Ba'athists likely will find Iraq an arid place before long.
Max Boot is Olin senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of "The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power" (Basic Books).
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