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| Speaker: | The Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz, The Century Foundation |
|---|---|
| Moderator: | Eric Heginbotham, Council on Foreign Relations |
| Speaker: | James T. Laney, Emory University |
May 19, 2003
Council on Foreign Relations
Washington, D.C.
Lee Feinstein: This is one of the Council’s most important and enduring task forces. Jim Laney and Morton Abramowitz have co-chaired this together now since [glitch in tape—audio cuts off] the North Korea story is it. I also want to thank the task force membership, the membership of this task force. I think it’s fair to say it’s probably the best nonpartisan grouping of nonproliferation and North Korea experts dedicated to looking at this issue. I want to thank them all for the time and energy they’ve put into this report.
I’d also like to welcome our task force Director, Eric Heginbotham, Senior Fellow in Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This is obviously an on-the-record Council meeting. We will go until 10:15, and with that I’d like to turn it over to the co-chair of the task force, Ambassador Morton Abramowitz.
Morton Abramowitz: Thank you, Lee. Good morning. I apologize that I’m beginning to lose my voice—I don’t know why but it’s going. We’re going to proceed as follows. I’m going to say a few words about the task force and a few substantive comments about North Korea. I’m going to ask Eric Heginbotham to summarize the basic points of our paper, our report. And I’m going to ask my co-chairman, Jim Laney, to make any final comments he wants and then we’re going to open it up to Q&A.
We started this report about six months ago. It started out as a comprehensive report on Korea, but because of the secret North Korean HEU [highly enriched uranium] program and its terrible implications, we ended up focusing almost completely on the nuclear issue and how to deal with it. We met over a period of six months—four meetings; there was a lot of controversy over what to do. That should not be surprising, there’s a lot of controversy on this issue within the U.S. government and outside the U.S. government and between the U.S. government and its allies. But we came up with what we believed is our best consensus shot at what to do.
Now let me say two basic things. The task force believes we’re facing a very dangerous situation on the peninsula whence North Korea is moving to acquire a much greater nuclear weapons capability and the possibility of transferring those weapons as they have threatened to other people to export them. That situation, which we feel we must do our best to resolve peacefully if at all possible.
Secondly, the task force was bedeviled, as we all are, by very major uncertainties as to what North Korea is about. Some of us believe that North Korea is determined to get a nuclear weapon, that it’s seemingly interested in negotiation is merely to postpone the U.S. from doing anything about it and that their safety of the country lies in acquiring more nuclear weapons and having the deterrent capability. We are uncertain—the second group was uncertain as to whether North Korea had adopted this policy.
There were indications that still they wanted to negotiate. That their major incentive to negotiate was its economic ability to survive and that, in any event, given the nature of the issue and the difficulties involved, it was still worthwhile to make a negotiating effort to deal with this issue. And with that, I will turn it over to Eric to give you a quick rundown of the basic points of the report.
Eric Heginbotham: Good morning. I’ll just discuss the primary recommendations of the report and we can touch on other aspects of the report during the Q&A. The essence of the report contains the following elements: The United States needs to build a broad coalition to address the North Korean nuclear issue. No strategy is likely to be effective without the support of key regional states, including South Korea, China and Russia. Currently there’s substantial disagreement on policy within this community of nations. All of them have expressed a desire to see the United States and North Korea meet for negotiations, preferably in a multilateral forum but not necessarily.
The United States appears more inclined to pressure North Korea, and if it does negotiate, to force North Korea to back down on all key nuclear issues before discussing U.S. concessions. The task force believes that the best way to get a unified coalition of states is to consult on a common strategy. Achieving unity will require the United States to make a serious effort to negotiate with North Korea before American partners will support tougher action. American partners will expect the United States to test the North Korean willingness to meet U.S. and other security concerns, which it expressed on several occasions. In return, the U.S. should expect and push that if negotiations fail our allies should support tougher policies toward the North.
The clock is ticking fast; there’s a need to test North Korean actions or intentions quickly. And the best way to do this is to enter talks on an interim agreement. In addition to testing the North, if successful, an interim agreement would stop the situation from hemorrhaging further in the short term by getting North Korea to freeze its nuclear reactors, [indiscernible] processing facilities, and to turn over its spent nuclear fuel. Other recommendations of the task force include establishing a full time, high-level policy coordinator to work with our allies to unify policy within the U.S. government and to deliver a consistent message to America’s partners overseas and talk with senior North Korean officials when that time is appropriate.
Two, to repair relations with the Republic of Korea, which have become badly strained over the last several months—in large measure as a result of the North Korean nuclear issue and disagreements over policy with it. And third, the U.S. needs to work to prepare contingency action should negotiations fail. These might include sanctions by the U.S. and its allies and it could include some kind of a blockade or quarantine. The task force acknowledges that there are all kinds of problems associated with these and does not recommend embarking on them quickly. Their application must depend both on close coordination with U.S. allies and partners in the region and on an assessment of all relevant circumstances. Even under the best of circumstances, the contingencies that we’ve discussed are not guaranteed to succeed.
With that, I think that covers the essence of the recommendations and I’ll turn the floor over to Ambassador Laney.
James Laney: Good morning. I simply want to highlight a couple of things that are already in the report that Eric has referred to as being absolutely essential. The United States, as it approaches this very difficult and intractable problem in North Korea, must utilize a coalition of allies in the region. This is for our own interest as well as for the fact that the allies there have a huge stake in the outcome. First of all, of course, is Seoul. And I think the recent visit of President Roh Moo-hyun here in Washington is a good first step toward reestablishing the kind of ease of relationship that we have come to expect between Washington and Seoul, but the coalition goes beyond simply the alliance with South Korea. It includes, as the report points out, Japan, which has a huge interest in the outcome of the Peninsula. China, which has already, of course, as you know, taken an important step in arranging for a meeting in Beijing. And, of course, Russian cannot be omitted from that list.
The coalition is necessary if we are to bring serious and hopefully successful dealings with North Korea to some sort of conclusion. It’s also necessary, because if our attempts to head-off the North Korean nuclear project fail, we will have allies in our attempts to begin to bring pressure on North Korea. Such pressures as indicated here—the options that would be there would be certain kinds of sanctions, possible embargo, and even in extremis interdiction of possible shipments of missiles or weapons of mass destruction.
We feel in order to achieve this, this kind of coalition, this kind of strong initiative of policy out of Washington we need a high level coordinator of policy—full time, full time. I mean at the highest level. And this person then would not only work within the administration here but also have that freedom of initiative to work with our allies in building that coalition. There’s been an obvious willingness on the part of these allies already as indicated to participate in such a coalition. This is not something that we would be involved in getting reluctant partners. But it is also is necessary because we—and I think this is the heart of the report—in all of this we’re testing North Korean intentions.
We have no illusions—I don’t think anybody on the task force has any illusions about North Korea and what they’re about with regard to their nuclear program and the development of nuclear weapons. The question is, can they be induced to give it up in ways that are honorable, and we have to test that. And they may not. If they don’t, then we will have a coalition behind us.
And this, in Asia, is absolutely essential. We’re talking about countries that have a huge stake in the Korean Peninsula and in the security and stability of northeast Asia. So this is one place where our allies don’t constrain us but strengthen us. And I think that with a coordinator that strength can be marshalled to bring about some sort of an approach, which if not successful will be acceptable, both to the public here and to the publics in Asia.
Morton Abramowitz: Thank you, Jim. Let me just punctuate three points. First of all, I think the administration deserves some credit for multilateralizing this issue. It’s not a usual direction for this administration. But the fact is that these countries, particularly China, Korea, and Japan have as equal an interest as we do in trying to do away with North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. And engaging them, I think, has been a very major step forward. Secondly, there’s no country that’s more crucial to this issue than China.
China keeps North Korea going, mainly with food and fuel. And they have the greatest immediate leverage on North Korea. China has a great interest in trying to deal with this issue, both because of their fears of war, the fears that this might induce proliferation in other countries like China. So putting the Chinese forward on this issue—putting pressure on the Chinese to participate and be prepared to be tougher on North Korea is essential. But to get there we have to, I believe, show the Chinese that we are seriously prepared to negotiate with the North Koreans and make a serious effort, even though I think we all have skepticism that we can work out an acceptable agreement.
Thirdly, on this interim agreement I want to add one point to what Eric said. The interim agreement is an immediate effort to test the North Koreans to try to do something quickly and it attempts to freeze their facilities and secure the spent fuel. And in exchange for this, however, the United States would be prepared to give it security assurances and would not take any measures to prevent other countries from providing assistance to North Korea. So there is something of an arrangement here, which North Korea would give something that it has some deep interest in, and we would get a major advance in trying to prevent their plutonium programs.
The floor is open for questions.
Question: Mike Billington from Executive Intelligence Review. It’s become very well known in the media in the last few weeks or highly discussed that the neo-conservative—the Straussians as they’re now called—circle that pursued the war in Iraq were driven more ideologically than over the issues that they put forward as their reasons for war. And it’s also true that throughout the ‘90s this same circle has been at the forefront of pushing for confrontation with Korea. And that they see that as part of their drive for a confrontation with China and that this was much of the fight that took place through the 1990s. Are you concerned or are you looking at the question of dealing with this ideological commitment to confrontation with China as well as Korea by the people in the administration?
Morton Abramowitz: First of all, I don’t see any effort to…in this administration right now I think there’s been a sea change in this administration and China has become a major cooperative element in our policies and particularly on dealing with North Korea. So I don’t see that there’s any effort now to try to stoke up a major hostility with China—it’s quite the contrary on the part of the administration. On the question of how to deal with North Korea, there are clearly differences within our task force and within the administration. And one group in the administration clearly feels it’s necessary to test out a negotiating effort; another feels that it’s hopeless and that we should do everything possibly to bring them down.
I think everybody recognizes the dangers of any sort of military effort or even a blockade. I believe that attitude is one important attitude among various parties in Washington. I don’t think it’s, at the present time, a central feature of the Bush administration. I have confessed some difficulty in determining what the Bush administration policy is. They say they want a peaceful solution and they want to pursue it diplomatically, but they have not really defined what those terms mean. And until they do, I think there will be some uncertainty about how they are planning to proceed.
Eric Heginbotham: Do you want to add anything Jim?
James Laney: Yes, I want to add just a little bit. I think all of us bring to any situation certain preconceptions and they may be born out of experience, but pragmatism often rules the day, especially in foreign policy. And I think that, in the instance of East Asia, the pragmatism of what a hard line—just beginning with a hard line and being willing to do that more or less on our own—would do to our relations with South Korea and China, as well as Tokyo, are not just imponderable but really they have an enormous downside. I would find it very difficult to think that people would entertain seriously, as a first option, simply moving in a hard line against the situation.
The task force does not, in any sense, endorse an easy approach toward the North. But we do think that having the regional allies on our side enormously strengthens our hand and makes it possible to introduce sanctions and other things that might be necessary if the testing of their intentions fails. We can’t do all this by ourselves in North Korea. There are too many borders—both the South and North, not only South Korea but China and Russia. So, I’m really not nearly as pessimistic as the premise of your comment would indicate. How it plays out is another matter. Maybe our worst-case fears will turn out to be true, but it’s very important that we take these steps to assure that we have all the regional powers on our side as we move forward in this.
And I think the indication of the meeting last week between the two presidents indicates that that’s the route that they intend to take.
Question: Robert Keatley. Mort, there’s a lot of talk about the attitudes of younger South Koreans who do not see the North as a threat and do not see the value of the U.S. relationship in a way that their older generation did. How much trouble is the U.S.-South Korean relationship in, if any? And how does this complicate the effort to deal with the North?
Morton Abramowitz: I have my own views, but I’m going to defer for the moment to the former Ambassador of South Korea and see what he has to say and then if I have anything to say I’ll add to it.
James Laney: I think the younger generation in Korea is not so much anti-American as they are pro-Seoul. There’s a new sense of nationalism and pride in the economic and democratic progress of the country. And they do not want to be simply a cipher in a policy in which they feel or which they have little say. I think the kind of relationships that are not being built and nurtured between Washington and Seoul greatly allay those concerns and address them. I don’t say that they will eradicate them all together.
But the main thing is that Seoul be taken seriously in its concerns—not that it drives the policy unilaterally. I’m saying that I think that is their basic feeling. They’re like young people everywhere, they want a sense of pride and they want to feel like their country is being heard. And I think right now, largely that’s the case, far better than it was a year ago—say at the dying embers of the Kim Dae Jung administration.
Morton Abramowitz: I don’t disagree with what Jim just said but I think there is some fundamental differences between South Korea and the United States. South Korea does not want the North Korean regime to fall apart. I don’t think any American would be unhappy to see that government depart from the scene. South Koreans are worried about what would happen to that. They are also deeply obviously worried about war. And I think in the new generation—there is a new generation—I think it has less of the attitude that the older generation had towards the U.S.—in the new generation I think there is a lesser fear of North Korea. South Korea has built up enormous forces, enormous economic capability. North Korea is a decrepit state, and I think many South Koreans look at North Korea as a charity case as much as a danger to the South.
So, how to square these things in terms of policy, in terms of what we do with North Korea is, I think, a difficult issue. I think that presidents have made a start on it, and I think that’s been a positive step. But I don’t think this issue is in any way resolved. I think there are serious differences on how to proceed. I’ve got to get some press here—back there.
Question: I’m Stephanie Nealer with the Voice of America. Throughout the 1990s we had the agreed framework in place and many in this administration point to that as having been a failed policy because of the way that it fell apart and that North Korea was indeed working behind the scenes in violation of that agreement. So you’re recommendation though is to revisit some negotiations that have basically the same kind of goals that the agreed framework has. My second part of my question is that you’re also recommending that the U.S. provide some security assurance that the North Korean wants that we would not invade them or we had some kind of written assurances—something this administration says it will no do. I’m curious to—starting with those two attitudes by the administration—how you recommendations are going to be received and what you expect to accomplish with them.
James Laney: I think the reason for skepticism about the North is well placed and we all share it. The issue is do you go to the last resort first or do you try, along with your allies, to see if it’s possible through testing of the regime, whether or not the dismantling of the thing and all of this up-font rather than at the end, as it was with the [indiscernible] framework and then possibly provide a basis for assurance—not just the United States but also to the world. That remains to be seen, and I think skepticism—bordering on cynicism is well placed. I think it’s very important that we, as I say, work with our allies and in particular South Korea, to show good faith and the attempt to deal with the nuclear program and missiles. And do it in such a way intrusively and up-front that it has some measure of verifiable success. It remains to be seen whether that can be done and the other options remain on the table.
Morton Abramowitz: We have tried to design a policy that is extremely tough, particularly in terms of verification, which makes it unfortunately highly unlikely that North Korea will accept. We don’t know. But more importantly is the United States must be perceived—I’m repeating what Jim has said—the United States must thus be perceived in trying to resolve this problem peacefully. It may not be possible. But to resolve it peacefully we have to mobilize our allies and we have to indicate to our allies that we are prepared to try to negotiate a peaceful settlement. That’s very hard to do. We think we designed an effort which is much tougher than the agreed framework and much tougher provisions. Whether the North Koreans would ever accept it is highly uncertain, but that is sort of the essence of the approach. And we can’t think of any better way to try to resolve this peacefully.
James Laney: Let me just make one addition. In 1994 we dealt with North Korean bilaterally and that was much to the discomfort of Seoul and to the exclusion of our allies. The administration is presently proposing a multilateral approach and I agree with that—we do agree with that. And I think that gives us some basis for garnering their interests and support in this whole project. So it differs from ’94 in that regard, as well as in the tough up-front demands that we place upon it.
Question: Julia Chang Bloch, the University of Maryland. Does your report specifically go into what you’d like China to do and what is your estimation that China would cooperate?
James Laney: Well, it’s mostly—and I have to confess—it’s mostly in generalities. In the sense that, one, that we feel that China has a big stake. Two, they must proceed to support that stake it has to be tough on North Korean—be prepared to tough on North Korea, but they will not do that without the efforts by the United States to work out something on North Korea. Whether they will do it if that effort fails one can’t be sure, but we must do everything possible diplomatically and other ways to try to ensure that’s China is prepared its bring its weight to bear on North Korea.
Frankly, I don’t know what the outcome will be. One has to be very prudent and very cautious. But the Chinese have a critical role, there is no doubt, and that has to be a centerpiece of our diplomacy with North Korea there’s no doubt also. Beyond that it’s going to have to follow the evolution of events and the American government’s management of the diplomatic relationship.
Eric Heginbotham: Sir?
Question: Jim Lobe, Interpress Service. Can you assess, in at least some ways, how the war in Iraq may have affect the situation—and if I could draw your attention to maybe two things. One, there was the New York Times report where a senior administration official, just before the Roh, spoke about how fearful the North Koreans must now be because of our targeted weaponry and so on, that they could be taken out on the military side. And the other—in terms of American diplomatic credibility—when it says it’s going to commit itself to a diplomatic process and then in the end essentially takes a unilateral route, how much does that contribute to the credibility in telling the countries whose backing we need for this, that we really are truly committed to figuring this out diplomatically?
James Laney: On the first one—the impact of the Iraq war on the North Korean perceptions —we can only base that on their actions and on what they have said. And by and large, they have very much noticed it. If anything, it has led them to take a position—at least a public position—that the best way of securing a deterrent against the United States is not through negotiations but through having nuclear weapons. But it is—I think, my own view —it is more an incentive to try to negotiate on their part—this may be a wrong judgment—than really a statement of what they intend to do. That’s a debatable thing. Now, your second point—I’m sorry, say that again; I forgot.
Question: On the one hand you’re saying that we have to persuade our allies to and other countries in the region that we really are committed. But there is this rising notion, especially with the failure to recover any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that the United States always intended to go to war with Iraq, even though it went through the UN in September and so on.
James Laney: I don’t think there’s any intent to go to war with North Korea on part of this administration. I don’t mean to say that is off the table, but I believe that everybody recognizes all the limitations and all the difficulties of going to war, particularly on South Korea. The administration has said that it will pursue diplomatic route. As I said before, they have not defined what that diplomatic route means. Whether it’s a means of mobilizing the allies to take a tough policy against North Korean, and thereby hopefully induce, that North Koreans would give up their nuclear weapons or whether it’s a serious effort ultimately to negotiate. I don’t know; we will have to wait and see. My own belief is—and I’m repeating what I have said—that they can only mobilize a coalition if they make a serious effort to negotiate something with the North Koreans.
Question: Adi Raval from ABC News. What kind of role do you foresee the UN in reference to the North Korean situation and secondly, the United States’ pursuit of a national missile weapons defense system? How much of an impediment is that in reference to our relations with our allies in the region and the North Korea situation?
Morton Abramowitz: I think, in regards to the UN that is, of course, one multilateral forum which the administration may well want to use in order to try to build a coalition and try to put international pressure on the North Koreans to work out an agreement. At the present time, I think we’re principally focused on our regional partners and allies—that’s mainly Japan, South Korea and China. And how we pursue the multilateral effort I think there are many forms. The United Nations is one form. I frankly do not know how the administration intends to proceed. I think it would be more likely a smaller forum, but the UN is not precluded as regards an anti-missile system. In terms of our regional allies, I see there’s always been some concern on part of the Chinese, but in terms of North Korea—you know the Japanese have themselves been thinking of the impact of North Korean missile and nuclear capabilities and have been talking about that. I don’t see that right now as a major concern or a major issue.
Question: Amanda Dory from CSIS. My question relates to the reports that we’ve seen in the press about potential Pentagon plans to change force posture in Asia to include in the Korean Peninsula. And whether the task force or you, as individuals, have thought through the drawbacks and the potential advantages of re-posturing forces in Korea in terms of your recommendation to engage with the North Koreas? Whether you have concerns about the timing of re-posturing or if you see any benefits, for example, in terms of offering as a carrot to the North Koreans some of these changes?
Morton Abramowitz: We did not go into this in detail. We looked at it principally as a U.S.-South Korean issue. We felt it was necessary at some point to get out of the Yongsan area. We had been discussing with the South Koreans, as I understand it, a repositioning of our forces—perhaps some reductions. Our attitude has been all of those are perfectly legitimate subjects for discussion, but any major changes should await a better resolution of where we are in terms of handling the North Korean problem. So we were in essence very prudent.
I think the North Koreans could well notice if the United States were to move its forces, its advanced Division back, that North Koreans might well consider that very dangerous to them, as an indication the United States might take action. I don’t think that’s necessarily bad, but we felt, by and large, that given South Korean concerns, that we should be very prudent at this point in moving our forces. That was sort of the essence of our view at this time. Bob, you’ve been waiting patiently.
Question: Thanks, Mort. Bob Hathaway, Woodrow Wilson Center. Two South Korean questions: of the task force quite properly, in my judgment, talks about the importance of coalitions. But at the end of day, suppose it’s impossible to fashion a coalition for a more coercive approach toward the North and here, I’m talking specifically about the South Koreans. I feel confident in predicting that you do not want to imply that the South Koreans should have a veto over U.S. policy no matter what the circumstances are. But could you talk a little bit more about what it would take for the United States or the United States and others to move forward even in the absence of agreement in the South Koreans?
Secondly, to what extent are you concerned about the possibility that if the North Koreans do move forward on a nuclear weapons program that South Korea and Japan as well may well decide they need to have their own nuclear arsenal?
Morton Abramowitz: On the first issue, which was on what do we do if South Korea doesn’t go along with it. Quite clearly we don’t want to be in a position of letting South Korea be the only determinant of our policy. On the other hand, we also do not want to be in a position of doing things, which will effectively lead to a major blow-up in U.S.-South Korean relations. I think the only answer to that, in large part, depends upon how we handle—I’m not going to give you a good answer—a large part of that depends how we handle the run-up [phonetic] to the effort to get the North Koreans to abandon their programs peacefully.
If it can’t be done, we will have to simply exert great pressure, and at that time we will have to make a decision on our own national interests. Whether this is issues of such a magnitude and so dangerous and that we have to do things that the South Koreans may not like. I can’t answer that question. Pardon me, go ahead.
James Laney: First of all, I don’t know that I would agree with the premise of your question, that there’s going to be that much reluctance. China and Japan, as well as South Korea are very concerned about the nuclear development in North Korea. This is not something they look upon with equanimity at all. It threatens Japan directly and South Korea and destabilizes the whole East Asia situation as a result of North Korea’s development Tokyo would begin rumblings about the possibility of going nuclear. So you have a whole new ballgame and as a result…and Russia has recently made statements indicating their dissatisfaction with that prospect of nuclear North Korea.
What we need is a consolidation of that in a way that is a nucleus of our policy and gives us a basis for leadership. And I think this brings us to a point of a need for a very high level coordinator in our government to work full time at that. This is not something that’s just going to emerge; we have to work at it. But I think that the ingredients for that kind of coalition are clearly present, not that there won’t be difficulty or even at times some opposition, and we need to utilize that, exploit it, and move forward.
Morton Abramowitz: But we don’t have an adequate answer to that issue, quite frankly. It’s a very difficult issue. We hope we don’t have to reach it. What was the second question?
Question: What is your concern about [inaudible—too far from microphone]?
James Laney: To be frank—and this is me speaking personally—I’ve always wondered whether the South Koreans thought they might inherit the North Korean’s nuclear capability once unification was achieved. I don’t think that is high on their minds. I don’t think that is necessarily their aspiration, but the thought has cross my mind. I think that with Japan, I think the marriage of missiles and nuclear weapons capabilities is a very dangerous thing for the Japanese. They perceive it very strongly. It is already occasioning a significant debate in Japan. I think if we do not handle the issue, if we are not able to deal with this and we learn to live, so to speak, with a North Korean nuclear capability, perhaps, accompanied by an effort to interdict the export of fissile materials, I think that could have an enormous influence on Japan and change the way the Japanese thing about things. That is one dangerous aspect of living with the North Korean nuclear capability.
Eric Heginbotham: We’ve got to go—one more question, sir?
Question: Peter Cook with NBC. I was wondering if you all could elaborate a little more on the possible contingencies discussed in your report. This idea of a blockage and possibly sanctions in the event talks fail—how effective could these steps be and what do you think would be the North Korean reaction specifically to a blockage.
Eric Heginbotham: One reason we took a very conditional approach to particularly the issue of blockade is that it is a military measure. It certainly would be highly provocative. First, on its effectiveness, I think there are serious questions about it certainly could not guarantee that North Korea could not export fissile material. In fact, it would be highly unlikely to be very effective without strong support from regional partners and a sort of a land blockade by China and Russia. And even with that kind of support—plutonium is very small, it’s easily transportable and is difficult to detect. You basically have to be right on top of it in order to detect it, so it’s not an entirely satisfactory answer to the question of whether North Korea can export plutonium once it gets it.
On the other hand, there may not be too many other options if we get to that point and, therefore, the task force considered it as a legitimate option should the North go ahead and reprocess its spent nuclear fuel. This is a point, I think you’ll note in the report, on which there’s quite a bit of debate. There were some dissenting views. It’s not an easy question and we certainly didn’t arrive at a formula under which we would necessarily recommend imposing a blockade. It’s simply one tool in the inventory.
Thank you very much for coming. We very much appreciate it.
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