home > by publication type > transcripts > U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East
Email
| Speakers: | Samuel R. Berger, Stonebridge International |
|---|---|
| Frank C. Carlucci, The Carlyle Group | |
| Carla A. Robbins, "The Wall Street Journal" |
June 5, 2003
Council on Foreign Relations
Washington, D.C.
Carla Robbins [in progress]: —if you add to that an enormous U.S. military presence in Iraq, more than 100,000 troops with very little prospect of them getting out anytime soon, the continuing war on terrorism, the on-and-off-again hostility and questions of our relationships first with Syria and Iran, Iran’s push for a nuclear weapon, which is potentially only a few years away at this point—you see a region which is demanding an enormous amount of U.S. attention, an administration that seems to want to give it that attention and seems to have great ambitions to make the world safer for all of us. But the question I want to begin with for our two distinguished speakers is, is there a grand strategy there or is it all ad hoc?
And if there isn’t a grand strategy that makes sense to you, can you in a very brief period of time tell us what you think they should be doing that would make the pieces fit together in a coherent way? Can we begin with Mr. Carlucci?
Frank C. Carlucci: First of all, let me say it’s a pleasure to be here and I apologize for my voice. And let me assure you that this is nothing stronger than cough syrup. It’s always a curious element for people. I would think that our strategy is fairly simple. We would like to have friendly regimes with enough broad participation of their populations to maintain long-term stability, so that we would have not only access to the region’s wealth, but we would be able to ensure the security of our good friend Israel. You said short. [Laughter]
Carla Robbins: You follow directions far too well. But the goal…this is basically saying that everybody wants motherhood and apple pie. If you want long-term stability, which I think is an admirable goal, do you see what the level of engagement is and the specific parts, pulling of American troops out of Saudi Arabia, debating whether or not to pressure Iran? Do you see these pieces fitting together in one coherent strategy?
Frank Carlucci: I think it’s a little different than that. These are all elements, but the main thing we can do in the Middle East is encourage the reformist elements. There are reform governments. Look at what the Omar of Qatar is doing, for example—the King of Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain. There are reform movements taking place, efforts to broaden the political participation of the populations of the region. We need to work with those reform elements, and we need to keep our profile. You’re right, we need to keep our profile as low as possible and not behave in a very ham-handed way. We need to solve the Iraq problem, we need to restore stability to that country, build a democracy if we can do it, we need to pursue—as the president is doing in the Middle East peace process and it’s more hopeful than any time in my memory at least, with the reform elements and the Palestinian authority, in which Sharon recognizes that the occupation can’t last forever. So I think there’s major progress.
But even if we do all those things perfectly, it’s still as the U.N.D.P. report said, “It’s a backward region.” It’s got a lot of social and economic problems that have to be solved over a period of time, despite its enormous resources. It’s got population pressures, rising unemployment, all those are going to have to be dealt with, and I think the best strategy we can follow is to work closely with the leaders that are reforming their societies.
Carla Robbins: Do any of you see a method to…is there a grand strategy for the Bush administration and one that makes sense to you?
Samuel Berger: I do think this is a moment of extraordinary opportunity in the region and not inconsiderable risk. Let me tell you what I think the strategy should be. I think there are three building blocks. I think it starts with succeeding with the peace in Iraq. There, I must say, I’m troubled by where things are at this point. Whatever one thought about Americanizing the war, I think Americanizing the peace is not likely to produce the kind of stability that we want. We can talk about this more, but I think we have to internationalize the process and Iraq-ize the process. But the first building block is let’s get Iraq right.
It seems to me the second building block is clearly what the president embarked on yesterday—I wish earlier, but I’m glad finally we are reengaged. I think yesterday was a hopeful day, and I agree with Frank that there is a lot of promise here. There is also, as we all know in this room, it’s a hard road to travel. And to me the really essential question is do we have the staying power in Iraq, do we have the staying power in the Middle East peace process?
The third building block is what is now fashionably called transformation—a word I don’t particularly like because it suggests that we somehow are going to wave a magic wand and create democracy throughout the region. But it seems to me there are two views here. There is one view, not necessarily the president’s view but certainly the view of some of the administration and some outside the administration, that Iraq is essentially a big pro-American aircraft carrier, which now exists in the Middle East from which we will launch regime change in Iran and Syria and then maybe eventually Saudi Arabia and Egypt, not necessarily militarily but otherwise. I’m troubled by that robust view of transformation.
I think if we have not learned anything from Iraq, we ought to have a certain humility about how little we know about the internal dynamics of these countries. But I do think, having said that, that we have, as Frank said, we have a tremendous interest in reform and change in this region. And I think we, therefore, have to align ourselves with the physics of change inside the region, whether that is in Iran, whether that is in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, and invest—this is a region that we extracted far more from than we’ve invested in. We have a moment now where we can encourage the evolution of opportunity societies rather than stagnant isolated governments that basically breed more bitterness than hope.
Carla Robbins: You said that the U.S. should keep something of a low profile and not be ham-fisted or ham-handed. At the same time, it has struck me that the war in Iraq seems to have perhaps brought the Arab leaders to Sharm El sheikh, more of a willingness. They weren’t ready to have Sharon in the room, but they seemed to be more willing to engage in the peace process themselves. Is there something to be said for a strong stance like the U.S.’s in Iraq to create more opportunity or do you think that that is, if anything, undermining our chances?
Frank Carlucci: There’s clearly something to be said for success and following through on your commitments. Traditionally the Arab leaders have thought that the United States was sort of breath. Iraq demonstrated that we are not. On the other hand, I quite agree with Sandy that you can’t impose democracy from outside; it has to flourish from within and we have to encourage those elements that are working for a democratic process—and I emphasize the word process because I don’t think we can talk in terms of U.S.-style democracy in the region.
Each country is going to have to find its own way to broaden political participation. But I think that process is underway.
Carla Robbins: Do you think that just the fact that the U.S. has shown this extraordinary military strength, rather than creating more anomic and angry use in the street or perhaps at the same time has increased the possibility that the leaders are going to want to follow what the U.S. wants to do?
Frank Carlucci: Like many in this room I spent many years in diplomacy and diplomacy is very hollow unless it’s backed by a military strength. I think the collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated that. That doesn’t mean that you run in and use a military solution to every problem—indeed, it ought to be the last resort. And we ought to work our diplomacy first and I think it’s a reason it’s going to respond increasingly to our diplomacy particularly with the president’s direct involvement in the peace process, and I think that’s extraordinarily important.
Carla Robbins: So far the administration and the military investigators on the ground in Iraq have failed to find any weapons of mass destruction. I personally was a hawk on Iraq, and I personally believed that eventually, if not the smoking guns, all the components of it will be found. But separate from that, it does raise a very interesting question about Iran because that’s not hidden. They are moving forward in plain sight of the world, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to provide a full fuel cycle, which whether or not they break out immediately or with time from the NPT, will give them a capability to have a nuclear weapon much faster than Iraq, much closer than Iraq was. That’s a tough one, too. How do you handle this and how does it fit in with what’s just gone on with Iraq?
Samuel Berger: First of all on Iraq, I do believe that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction programs in the ‘90s. I disagree with my friend, Tom Friedman, that it doesn’t matter; I think it profoundly matters. We have to find out the answer to this. It’s a mystery at this point; we don’t know. Did he destroy the weapons, did he hide the weapons, did we overestimate what he had? Democracies cannot go to war on false pretenses, particularly democracies who now embrace a doctrine of preemption, which presumably is based upon being able to know what others have.
I, too, generally was in support of the president on Iraq, but I think that we have to find the answer out to what has happened here—whether that is finding this or discovering what happened to it or coming to grips with the fact that perhaps intelligence was not entirely accurate.
Iran is a challenging situation, but unlike Iraq, there seems to me much more interesting internal politics with which to work. I find that the Iranian nuclear program is a threat to us, it is dangerous and so is its support for terrorism. We have to deal with both.
My own view is that we ought to lay it on the table at this point with the Iranians. And say, very publicly, we are prepared to have more normal relations with Iran. We are prepared to address your issues, economic sanctions, isolation and you’ve got to address our issues—fundamentally terrorism and your nuclear program and let’s have that discussion. We can envision an Iran that is integrated in the national community and even help that happen if you come to grips with that.
The reason I think doing that and doing it publicly is that it will have, I think, a marvelous effect inside Iran or at least an interesting effect because it will force all these various elements in Iran. If the hardliners want to stop that, let them be the obstacles for the Iranian people achieving what we all know many of them want, which is greater integration with the international community and closer relations with the United States.
I think that much more than covert action programs and overt and explicit proposition to the Iranians at this point will either result in direct dialogue or will create a kind of torque in Iran in which it will be the Iranian government saying, no we’re the ones who are standing between the Iranian people and the world.
Carla Robbins: If you’re the real leader of Iran and the United States comes up to you and says, “Here are your choices. You can sit down and we’re willing to talk about what you’re concerned about” as Mr. Berger said, or not. But in exchange for that you have to be willing to give up your nuclear weapons, the same nuclear weapons that Iraq didn’t have, which made it easier for the U.S. to go to war there and the same nuclear weapons that North Korea does have, which seems to be one of the major constraints for why we’re not talking about preemptive military action there. I think that was sort of a sad chuckle. What decision do you make and do you agree with Mr. Berger that that’s the way to go?
Frank Carlucci: I think I’d pray to Allah to start. I think it’s unpredictable at this point. I think Sandy’s approach is reasonable. I wouldn’t even know—and I spent three years in the CIA—I wouldn’t even know how you’d start a covert action program in a place like Iran. It would be extraordinarily difficult. We’ve tried these things and they’ve failed. I think the open approach, where we’d tell them exactly what they can expect if they cooperate and they know that we’d all carry through on our commitments is perhaps our best hope.
Over a period of time, I think the popular will in Iran will prevail. It’s clear the population, as Sandy says, is restless. It’s clear they want closer relations with the United States. It’s clear that the Mullahs are feeling the pressure, so if Sandy’s approach adds to that pressure, that’s all to the good.
Samuel Berger: One other thing, Carla, I think there is obviously in each of these situations—North Korea, outside the scope of this discussion, but North Korea being one—there has to be an or-else side to this, to my proposition. I don’t think that a nuclear weapons program in Iran is something that we would find acceptable. I found encouraging the statement that came out of the G8 summit in which—in far more forceful terms than before—the Europeans and the Russians said that an Iranian nuclear weapons program would be unacceptable. And that opens up the possibility if my grand bargain does not work, of a much more concerted pressure on Iran from the international community. I think we’d have a lot…just like in North Korea, we’ll have a lot more support from the Europeans for pressure, whether it’s economic or otherwise, if we have seriously and in good faith tried to negotiate a solution and failed because Iran or, I would say, North Korea is determined to go nuclear.
Carla Robbins: But is there time to do that? It would seem to me, if you look at the most recent analysis, particularly after Director General El Baradei went there and was quite surprised with how advanced they were in their uranium enrichment potential. Do you think there’s time, particularly if you’re talking about two processes at the same time, the potential for political reform in Iran, which it seems is an extraordinary thing—70% of the people vote for—and for reform at the same time. The Mullahs are still solidly in control. Hutmei [phonetic] seems to not be able to control or is pandering to the people who support terrorism and all that. That seems to be a long process, and particularly you’re talking about doing it through dialogue and engagement. At the same time you have a nuclear weapons program that potentially could be on line in a matter of a year or so.
Samuel Berger: But I’m talking about stirring up the process but not by covert action but by overt action. By the United States saying, “Okay, here’s two futures. We could imagine Iran part of the international community, indeed we’ll help you integrate. You’ve got to deal with your support for Hezbollah and Islamic jihad, Hamas, and you’ve got to deal with your nuclear program.
I think that on the table, not through back channels and Swiss diplomats, but publicly on the table forces a debate inside Iran, which hopefully will empower those who are stuck at this point and stymied.
Frank Carlucci: Carla, let me emphasize a point that Sandy made. I think the pressure point…
Carla Robbins: I think you’re supposed to be disagreeing. [Laughter]
Frank Carlucci: I can’t help it.
Samuel Berger: We’ll disagree with you.
Carla Robbins: Okay, great. [Laughter]
Samuel Berger: It’s much more fun to disagree with you, Carla. It’s like old times.
Frank Carlucci: I didn’t know this was a debate. I thought it was a conversation.
Carla Robbins: It is, it is.
Frank Carlucci: I think the pressure point is the Russians. Putin has a lot at stake here and restoring the relationship with the United States, and there are already signs as Sandy mentioned that he’s moving in the right direction to begin to ascertain that their trade with Iran is not used for the production of nuclear weapons.
Carla Robbins: The Russians—it seemed that President Putin made a commitment he was going to hold up the delivery of the fuel for the light water reactors in Bushehr. He made that commitment at the lunch at the G8. Prime Minister Blair came back and announced it and yesterday the head of Manamon [phonetic] said, “Hey, wait a minute. You’re talking about an $800 million project. I’m not sure that we really made that commitment.” So, the administration says that they believe that Putin gets it, that it’s going to be a threat to him, but the economic pressure in Russia is a pretty strong one.
And I’m not sure that Iran is as isolated as Sandy thinks it is, that the offer of sitting down with the United States face to face is…this is not an autarkic state like North Korea, it has relations with European countries. What we’re offering them—and once again, it’s also not Cuba, which has spent its whole life 90 miles off the…we won’t get into Cuba policy because we know where that goes. Do you think that just the offer from the United States is enough to change that?
Samuel Berger: No, I don’t, but you’ve got to start with the offer. The question here is whether the proposition to the Iranians that instead of having the United States engaged in economic sanctions, extraterritorially applied to the Europeans, although we try to get around that as much as we can. And as continuing to be an impediment to the development of the Iranian people, we can be part of Iran’s progress. But you’ve got to deal with the two issues that not only we’re concerned about but now the rest of the world is concerned about it—that’s the equation. Sitting down is only the vehicle for putting that on the table.
I want it to be public because I want that debate to go inside of Iran. And do we want to stick with our nuclear weapons and our support for Hezbollah or do we want, as most people who have visited Iran think many Iranians want, a closer relationship with the West.
Carla Robbins: Moving onto an easier one—Saudi Arabia. What do we do? Is Saudi Arabia the enemy; is it the friend? Is it the way the briefings to the Defense Advisory Board last year suggested that it was - our biggest problem in the region and the majority of the hijackers came from Saudi Arabia? How do we deal with them or can we just ignore them and expect that the rest of the region will improve and they will catch up eventually?
Frank Carlucci: Well, as Adel Al Zubera [phonetic] has said, the Saudis have made mistakes in the past and it’s clear that they have been a little slow on the pickup. We’ve had trouble with them in cooperation on the war against terror. They’ve tended to spread their money around rather loosely. The spread of wahabbism has perhaps been deleterious, there’s no question about that. As Aljaberra [phonetic] pointed out part of their problem is that they’ve been very secretive and they haven’t published their cooperation with us.
The Pentagon says they cooperated with us fully during the Iraq war. It’s clear that they are cooperating very well now in the war on terror. The Crown Prince has said he needs to broaden political participation in the governing of Saudi Arabia. So, I think even in Saudi Arabia there is movement. And we have to remember that over the years they’ve stabilized the oil price and that is tremendously important for the economies of the world. I think we have no choice but to work with the government of Saudi Arabia.
I think the real target of al-Qaeda is Saudi Arabia by the way. They hate us and we’re a vehicle to get at Saudi Arabia. I think Osama bin Laden really wants to topple that regime and have his people move in, but that’s a whole other story.
Carla Robbins: My time is almost running out. We can continue with the Saudi Arabia because it’s fascinating but I did want to ask you one question. You guys came real close to a deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and in the end it didn’t work. Is that because of Arafat or did something else go wrong? And now, if you could in a very brief way, what advice would you give to President Bush now that he is fully engaged so that you can close the deal this time?
Samuel Berger: I have discovered that Camp David is a bit of a rashamon [phonetic]. There’s the Palestinian Camp David and the Israeli Camp David, there’s Dennis Ross’s Camp David, and Rob Malley’s Camp David.
Carla Robbins: There’s the Camp David you told me about that—the Wall Street Journal. [Laughter]
Samuel Berger: I do think that we made progress in Camp David in the sense that for the very first time the final status issues, which had been hermitically sealed were broken open—Jerusalem, borders, right-of-return, Israeli security. They were on the table and for 10 days intensely discussed and differences were narrowed. In the final analysis I think there were lost opportunities on all sides, but by and large, I think Arafat…the Palestinians were not blessed with Nelson Mandela. At the moment that they needed someone who was prepared to give up one or more of the fundamental tenets of what is a movement in order to gain a government. Barak was prepared to divide Jerusalem, which was thought to be a red line before Camp David. The Palestinians did make concessions at Camp David. It’s wrong, the view that they made no concessions is wrong, but Arafat ultimately was not prepared to confront his own people and say here’s what we’ve got. It’s a great deal, it’s not everything we’ve always wanted but it’s a lot better than will be otherwise.
I think that we’re in a very different situation two and a half years later. A lot of blood has flowed under the bridge since September, and we’re not going back to final status discussions for some time, although when we do, the same issues will be there. And I believe that the contours that we were talking about at Camp David and that later were put out in the Clinton plan in December and then later was developed even further in Taba are ultimately the contours that we’ll embrace.
I would say now let’s not have that ambition. Let’s get this truck that’s stuck in the mud out of the mud. Let’s change the dynamic. Let’s make things happen on the ground that improve the lives of Palestinians, that improve the security of Israelis, create some momentum, create some breathing space, restore some trust. And in my judgment the road map is a device; it doesn’t come necessarily with directions. A road map can say, here’s Washington, here’s New York—you can go through Chicago, you can go through Philadelphia, you can go through Boston. There are a lot of decisions that have to be made along the way.
I think it is appropriate at this point to reduce expectations, one. Two, it is essential that the president remain involved. Number three, I don’t think he has to be involved the way President Clinton was during—not eight years, during 11 days at Camp David. A lot happened over eight years that was done by Secretary Albright, Dennis Ross and by others, including Under Secretary Christen [phonetic], including peace for Jordan. But I don’t think you can escape the details on the Middle East.
The difference between whether or not Prime Minister Sharon is going to close down all of the unauthorized settlements or some of the unauthorized settlements—ambiguous in the statement. That’s important, the next step. The question of whether or not Abu Mazen is going to get a cease fire out of Hamas or disarm Hamas, that’s a detail. But I assure you we won’t get to the next fork in the road if we don’t deal with those details. And I really doubt whether Prime Minister Sharon and certainly, and maybe Abu Mazen, are going to take—even Condi Rice and Secretary Powell’s word as the final word. Prime Minister Schroeder particularly knows how to get to the president.
Frank Carlucci: Carla, can I recommend an article in today’s Wall Street Journal? There is an article, which says that the economic woes of Israelis are bringing about the realization on the part of the Israelis’ that the solution to their economic problems is a viable Palestinian state where there can be some commerce between the two states. I think that’s an important sign.
Samuel Berger: Just to pick up that last point. It really was, I think, an extraordinary moment when Prime Minister Sharon, who has been, in many ways, the most consistent figure in the Middle East for 25 years, whether you have liked his positions or not. For him to say yesterday that a democratic Palestinian state is important to the security of Israel. I could imagine Prime Minister Rabin looking down from heaven and smiling as he heard Prime Minister Sharon say that.
Carla Robbins: Oh, boy. Well, on that hopeful note, and it is rare in discussions in the Middle East that one has a hopeful note, we go to you, who are I’m sure more informed than I am and we’ll ask even more focused and brief questions. So, if you could identify yourself and I’m hoping Dan Schorr has a question. Dan, I saw you walk in. Do you have a question? I want to start with you? Is he here? Dan?
Dan Schorr: First of all, since you say that, let me point out that Sharon did not speak of settlements yesterday; he spoke of outposts yesterday and that the difference between the two we’ll find may be very, very important. My larger question goes this way—I was intrigued by the statement that a democracy does not make war under false pretenses. My own reading of history would indicate otherwise.
Samuel Berger: It should not make war under false pretenses.
Dan Schorr: I think that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was an indication of false pretenses. I think we have yet to discover whether the war against Iraq was fought under false pretenses, that’s something that will require a lot of investigation, which is going on today. Is it really true that you think…do you have faith in a democracy that they would not be fooled into going into a war that it otherwise would not have gone into?
Samuel Berger: I’m glad you asked that question. First of all, let me be clear, I’m not suggesting that we did in this case. The point I was making is it is important for us to answer these questions—that’s why President Bush is sending out 1400 more inspectors into Iraq to continue the search and to determine what he can find. I would also think you might invite UNMOVIC to play some roles, so that what we do find is believed by the world. So I want to be clear, number one, I think there are questions that have been raised and we haven’t found much. We need to find the answer. I’m really taking issue with those who say that because we’re all joyful that this tyrant is gone, it doesn’t matter whether or not the rational that we use to go to war was true or not. I fundamentally disagree with that. As always, you’re right about…historically I guess I should have said, and intended to say, that democracy should not go to war under false pretenses because certainly, as you point to in the Gulf of Tonkin, there are other examples where that has happened.
Frank Carlucci: Can I comment on the distortion of intelligence issue because I’ve been in the intelligence world and I’ve been in the policy world and I also know a number of the players very well, and I can assure you that people like Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and Don Rumsfeld would not distort the intelligence. Intelligence is not a science. Unless you spot something with a satellite and if you’re piecing together bits and pieces of human intelligence, trying to form a mosaic, there are all kinds of judgment calls and there are all kinds of hedges that are put into intelligence and analysis. Policymakers have to make judgments based on the best intelligence they get. Their judgments may be wrong and sometimes the intelligence is wrong. I can remember when I was National Security Adviser, the intelligence community told us…they put out an intelligence report saying that Iran would never back off from attacks on shipping in the Gulf if we use force. Well, we used force; we sank half their Navy and they backed off. And I argued with that intelligence estimate and I think it is a responsibility of policymakers to use their best judgment on the basis of the intelligence they’ve received. And I am sure that nobody in this administration distorted the intelligence and I’m sure the agency did not distort the intelligence, otherwise you would have some resignations.
Samuel Berger: Just in the interest of Carla wanting to have a little bit of disagreement here, let me say briefly, number one, I believe—did have weapons of mass destruction and we’ll account for them but we haven’t yet and we should. Number two, I do believe there were misstatements of fact. On March 16 when the vice president said that Iraq had reconstituted nuclear weapons, there’s not anybody in the intelligence community who believes that true. Now that may simply have been an inaccurate characterization. He might have meant have a nuclear weapons program. I know nobody in the intelligence community who believed that Iraq had reconstituted nuclear weapons. So I do think that there was, with respect to the linkage between al-Qaeda and Iraq some over statement. It doesn’t go to the fundamental questions of whether what we did was justified, but I think it’s true.
Carla Robbins: This gentleman right here. Can you stand up and state your name and affiliation please.
Tadashi Maeda: My name is Tadashi Maeda with Japan Bank National Corporation. I have a question on the U.S. policy to Iran. The United States supported unilateral sanctions by the—Sanctions Act, and there seems to me there’s no connection with the allies, especially in Europe. And Europe has now tried to make the more—and the more engaging process and it seems to me more accelerated movement right now. The European Commission is now trying to create trade and cooperation agreement with Iranians.
Carla Robbins: What is the question?
Tadashi Maeda: Yes, question—North Korea is…the United States is argued that it should create bilateral dialogues. So my question is why the United States—different rhetoric or strategies to two members of the axis of evil?
Samuel Berger: I’m not sure I understood the question fully, but if the question is why do we differ from the European approach on Iran—I think we have fundamental strategic differences from some of our European allies, particularly France and Germany. I don’t think this is a flash-in-the-pan; I think we have different views of the world, different views of the threat, and a different willingness to use military force to defend our national security.
They are taking the approach that trade is important, reconciliation is important. Time will tell who is right, but we cannot tolerate a regime that sponsors terrorism and is the process of acquiring nuclear weapons. We have a different view of our national security than they do, so we will part ways on a number of issues, I’m afraid in the future.
Carla Robbins: Next question, Ambassador Schaffer.
Teresita Schaffer: Tessie Schaffer from CSIS. I want to come back to the question of transformation, which I look on as very close to the question of winning the peace. I’m a little bit troubled about how you fit transformation into a strategy. Is it an assumption that because of the magnitude of the U.S. military impact on Iraq there will be transformation and a further assumption that that transformation will be positive? Or is this something that the U.S. can control or seriously influence? And in the latter case, how do you relate the reformers of whom both of you spoke to the current regimes in countries friendly to the United States and to the rather messy Iraqi political scene?
Samuel Berger: In the first thing is to get Iraq right. There will be no transformation, whether you like the term or not if we don’t get Iraq right and what does that mean? Clearly we have to restore law and order there, but I think it is a mistake to not internationalize the peace. Because I do not believe our current posture is sustainable domestically. We have 34 countries with us in Kosovo today. We’re now 10% of the force in Kosovo. If we are not going to invite in the Arab countries, the NATO countries and others, we are going to carry the burden and we are going to carry the risk. And I’m not certain Americans will want universal health care in Iraq if there’s not universal health care in the United States, so I worry about sustainability.
Second of all, I worry about risk. That is, we’re losing about one soldier a week in Iraq. It is not a benign environment. Again, we ought to syndicate that risk and bring the rest of the world with us. We’re going to have to give up some control. I understand the reason, and I have a lot of respect for Jerry Bremer. I understand that we want to…the place is a mess, we want to get in there. And we think that we can restore law and order better if we do it ourselves and we’re going to suspend politics for a while, while we do it. But if we think we’re suspending politics in Iraq we’re kidding ourselves. There’s politics everyday in Iraq. There’s politics going on in the mosque, there’s politics going on in the marketplace, there’s politics going on in meeting places. If we don’t legitimize that politics and we don’t create a channel for that politics to create some kind of Iraqi transitional authority that has legitimacy and we think we can do that two months from now, we’re going to face a very different situation. That’s not a full answer to your question, Tessie, I don’t want to go on longer, but it seems to me you start off by getting Iraq right. And getting Iraq right, seems to me, is helping the Iraqi people build an outward-looking, forward-looking modern government, with a government that is representative of the cross section of Iraqi interests, probably not democratic in our terms for a very long time. And that in and of itself will reverberate through the region and will change the economics of the region and chance the politics of the region.
Carla Robbins: Can I ask a very quick question which is, you guys sent 20,000 American troops into Haiti and you tried to get it right. You got out awful fast and the place is as bad as it was beforehand, and I can tell you that because I’ve been there. My question is how long a commitment does the U.S. need to make in Iraq to get it right and do you regret that you guys got out too fast in Haiti?
Samuel Berger: I love the fact that you’re the last person in the world who cares about Haiti. Haiti is a long answer, Carla, and I’m going to give a short answer to that question. In my judgment, the mistake that we made in Haiti, and we made it, was telling Aristide that he had to respect the Haitian constitution, a revered document that has existed for all of about 27 seconds and who was understood only by one person at the State Department, and not serve essentially half a second term. Because what happened when Aristide stepped down, and we encouraged him to step down…
Carla Robbins: I shouldn’t have asked the question…how long do we need to stay…
Samuel Berger: I’m going to finish the answer though, okay. Is that we divided power from authority, and that is my judgment. However long it takes. And the president has said that, and I hope that he means that. I worry that we’re going to be…the pressures next year are going to be to minimized. What are the pressures? The military doesn’t particularly like the peacekeeping mission. They’re designed to fight wars not to be policemen. Number two there are people in this administration who don’t particularly like nation-building, don’t think we should do it, and don’t think we ought to get too deeply involved there. Number three, the Arab countries aren’t going to want to have us hang around for long. Number four, I don’t think we’re going to want body bags coming back in the fall of ’04, to pick an arbitrary date. So all of those things worry me and those are going to be pressures for us to downsize and to head for the door, which is part of the reason why I want to internationalize this now.
Carla Robbins: Do you want to follow-up on my question quickly, how long do we need to stay in Iraq and how does that comport with keeping a low profile?
Frank Carlucci: It took us 50 months in Germany, post World War II to go from the end of the war to a national election. Obviously this takes time; it’s not an easy thing to do. We’re going to have to be involved in Iraq for some time to come. Sandy’s right, if we impose too much security the pressures will build and explode against us. On the other hand, we can’t allow chaos to reign in Iraq, so Jerry is trying to achieve some kind of balance here. I would agree that the more that we can internationalize it the better off we’re going to be.
Carla Robbins: Next question.
Peter Zimmerman: Peter Zimmerman. I want to ask about a peace of grand strategy that is sparked from events in the Middle East but doesn’t quite restrict itself to the Middle East. What do we need to be thinking about the nuclear proliferation situation? We have now seen three nations—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—walk up to having a bomb, while still staying within the letter of the non-proliferation treaty and getting, generally speaking, seals of approval from the IAEA. Is the treaty broken? Do we need to fix the treaty? What do we need to use as our foundation stone for a rational nuclear non-proliferation policy?
Samuel Berger: First of all, I agree with the president’s emphasis on proliferation and the nexus between proliferation and terrorism. What I’m concerned about is that we have a very narrow approach to it. That is, our focus is on three countries and our weapons seem to be basically preemption. Let’s open up the aperture. Over the last 20 years actually the non-proliferation treaty has been fundamentally a success—Brazil, Argentine, Chile, South Korea, South Africa, the Ukraine, Bellarus, Kazakhstan, Taiwan. I could go on—all have given up their nuclear programs. We’re now down to a core of outlying countries essentially that are very, very problematic. So, number one, I don’t reach the conclusion that some folks do, which—I think we need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and the NPT, not weaken it, more intrusive inspections. I think we have to use a panoply of tools at our disposal, from covert action to military action at some times to stronger export controls, to diplomacy. And I think we have the right heading on the screen, non-proliferation, but we’re coming at it with a rifle rather than with something more comprehensive.
Carla Robbins: And the gentleman behind you who is so gracious to wait.
Michael Sterner: Mike Sterner, retired Foreign Services Officer. If you look back over the past 50 years of Middle East history you don’t see many examples where massive Western military intervention has produced lasting political results and quite the contrary. In ’56, for example, we got the tripartite invasion of Egypt putting Nassir on the map politically, spreading Nassirism all over the region. ’67 gave us the birth of the Palestinian Arms struggle. Sharon’s invasion of Lebanon—I’ll be finished in just a minute—in ’98 was a political defeat for Israel, as we all know. History doesn’t always have to repeat itself, but in view of that historical record it’s a little difficult to understand how this administration can be so confident that you can really change the political dynamics of this region by the application of military force. And that seems to be part of the doctrine that we have here. Would the panel like to comment on that?
Frank Carlucci: I don’t think that is the administration’s view. We went into Iraq because Iraq posed a threat to the stability of the region and was engaged in the process of trying to develop weapons of mass destruction and had links to terrorists. Sandy may argue with me, but at least the Bush administration convinced the American people there were those links, that’s why the American people supported the Iraq venture. But I don’t think we went in with the idea that we’re going to transform the political dynamics of the region. But having done it, we’re trying to make the best of the situation and use it as Sandy’s says, as a model for the rest of the region.
But at the same time, I think we recognize we can’t impose democracy from without, particularly American-style democracy. We need to work with those elements in the region that are moving towards a reformed process and there are a number of them.
Carla Robbins: Another question?
Flynt Leverett: Thank you, Flynt Leverett from the Brookings Institution. I wanted to pick up on a point that Ambassador Carlucci made about Russia as a potential leader for dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat. I wanted to ask both the panelists what they thought and might think about the idea of China playing a similar role? Disclosures that the Chinese government made to the IAEA over the last several months have been a very important piece of the new picture that we have of the Iranian nuclear program. Also China in contrast to some other members of the P-5 was actually relatively cooperative in the UN diplomacy, leading up to the war on Iraq. And you could make an argument that given China’s vastly expanding energy needs and the pace at which those needs will grow over the next decade or so, that China has a new interest in playing a stabilizing role in the Middle East. And I’d appreciate the thoughts of both the panelists on that question. Thank you.
Frank Carlucci: He makes a good point. Of course, China is a key to the North Korea if we’re going to solve that riddle, but they could also be helpful on Iraq, which is why it’s important that we maintain a constructive dialogue with China.
Samuel Berger: The only other thing I could add is I think, in theory, I agree with your point, but as a practical matter, China is going to take a while to grow into its new suit of clothes as a global force. China has never wanted, in recent times, to play much of a role in these kinds of issues. The fact that they’ve stepped up to North Korea, I think, is a very positive development. To get them to step up to Iran, I think, is an interesting idea and one that we ought to pursue but you’re pushing a new concept on China about how they should view their role in the world, given the important economic position they now have.
Carla Robbins: We have five minutes left and the Council is tough on its presiders who go over, so no speeches—incisive brief questions and we’re going to have incisive brief answers. And if your question isn’t incisive, I’m cutting you off.
James Sasser: Jim Sasser, former senator and former ambassador. A moment of levity—I heard a comedian say last night that…
Carla Robbins: Is this an incisive question?
Jim Sasser: …the administration had found the weapons of mass destruction and they were North Korea. [Laughter] But my real question is to my friend, Sandy Berger. Sandy, on the question of trying to work out some accommodation or modus operandi with Iran, how can that be possible when we now have a doctrine of preemption, which says that the United States would embark on a program of regime change at any time we feel a regime represents a threat to us? And the question is this, when a country finds itself in the axis of evil, as Iran does, as Iraq was, as North Korea is, and it sees that the United States chooses diplomatic means to deal with North Korea, which has nuclear weapons, why would Iran want to forestall that regime or want to forestall its own nuclear weapons development?
Carla Robbins: Thanks to the senator’s filibuster, I’m going to have to group our questions. This one other gentleman here please. You will get an answer, sir.
Allan Wendt: Allan Wendt. Mr. Berger, you emphasized the importance of the details in a Middle East settlement—Jerusalem borders and eventually right-of-return. The previous presidents have gotten very much involved in the details, as you know, of course. The current president would seem to be disinclined to do that. Do you think that at the end of the day that is a realistic strategy, to delegate the details to others?
Samuel Berger: Let me try to answer both Jim and this question quickly. Jim, to me the elevating preemption from an option to a doctrine encourages proliferation rather than discourages proliferation. It says to Kim Jong Il, Saddam Hussein’s mistake was he didn’t get his nukes fast enough, so I agree with the premise of…I don’t think it’s helpful. In terms of detail, again, in the sweep of eight years we think of Camp David, where President Clinton was deeply immersed in the details. But over eight years this process went on through secretaries of state and through Dennis Ross. But I do think that you cannot stand totally detached. What we may call details, Dan points out the difference between the word settlements versus outposts. Mark my words, that little detail will be an impediment to making the next step and the president can’t be totally removed.
Carla Robbins: Would you like to answer the senator’s question also?
Frank Carlucci: I don’t know that we ever had a doctrine that said you have to wait until you’re attacked before you can react. A form of preemption has always been part of military strategy, and I think we have to recognize that the world changed with 9/11 and the possibility of terrorists getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction. We’re in a very different world than we were then. As far as Camp David or the peace process is concerned, I would only point out that this is a president who has kept his word every time and he says he’s going to be involved. I think we have to accept it at face value.
Carla Robbins: I want to thank both of you. You have lived up to Lindsey’s expectations and mine. It was fabulous. Thank you so much for coming.
To order Task Force reports, Council Special Reports, and Critical Policy Choices, please call, fax, or order online from our distributor, the Brookings Institution Press: phone +1.800.537.5487, fax +1.410.516.6998.
For information on other reports that are not for sale, or for general publications information, please call +1.212.434.9516 or email publications@cfr.org.
Start-Up Nation addresses the trillion-dollar question: How is it that Israel—a country of 7.1 million, only sixty years old, surrounded by enemies— produces more start-up companies than large, peaceful, and stable nations like Japan, China, India, Korea, Canada, and the UK? With the insights of geopolitical experts and investors, the authors examine this nation’s adversity-driven culture to answer this question and offer prescriptions for a global economy on the rebound.
In Forces of Fortune, Vali Nasr presents a paradigm-changing revelation that will transform the understanding of the Muslim world at large. He reveals that there is a vital but unseen rising force in the Islamic world—a new business-minded middle class—that is building a vibrant new Muslim world economy and that holds the key to winning the cold war against Iran and extremists.
In Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know, Julia E. Sweig presents a remarkably accessible portrait of Cuba's unique place on the world stage over the past fifty years, including its internal politics, its often fraught relationship with the United States, and its shifting relationship with the global community.
Complete list of CFR Books
The report of this bipartisan Task Force of distinguished leaders and experts represents a strong consensus on the importance of repairing America's immigration policy. It makes the case that maintaining America's political and economic leadership depends on attracting talented and hard-working immigrants, and on securing the country's borders in a smart, effective, and humane way.
This report finds that nuclear weapons will remain a fundamental element of U.S. national security in the near term, and makes recommendations on how to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. deterrent nuclear force, prevent nuclear terrorism, and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
About Independent Task Forces at CFR
Complete list of Task Force reports
Identifying international threats and acting on them may be the most difficult job for U.S. policymakers. This report
provides an actionable road map for managing international threats before they erupt into crises and makes a strong case that preventive action is not a luxury but a necessity.
For more than a decade, the United States has mostly watched from the sidelines as Asian countries organize themselves into an alphabet soup of new multilateral groups. In this report, the authors review the relationship between pan-Asian and trans-Pacific institutions and suggest policy guidelines for a new U.S. approach to this new Asian landscape.
Complete list of Council Special Reports
To request permission to reprint or reuse CFR material, please fill out this permissions request form (PDF), referring to the instructions on page 1.
Copyright 2009 by the Council on Foreign Relations. All Rights Reserved.