New York

Henry Siegman [HS]: Welcome, ladies and gentlemen, to this morning’s program, and especially a very warm welcome to Ehud Barak ...

Ehud Barak [EB]: Thank you.

HS:…the former prime minister to the state of Israel, former chief of staff, the most decorated Israeli soldier in the history of Israel, and the many other wonderful things I can tell you about him, but you know most of them. My instructions are to leave as much time as possible for our discussion. As indicated, we’ll be talking for about 20 minutes or so, and then the floor will be open for your comments and questions. And we will give you further instructions. We here at the Council have very detailed ground rules for everything. We’ll keep you apprised of those rules as we go along. Ehud, people here, of course, are very anxious to hear from you about developments that are occurring as we sit here, some of them very helpful, some of them distressing. But before we get to that, in order to place those issues into a larger political context, give us some sense of how you see the macro developments in the world today, particularly in light of September 11th, change of regime in Iraq, the global war on terror. And then from there we’ll discuss the impact, the implications of those developments for the peace process.

EB: If I would have to do it in—might swallow the whole 20 minutes.

EB: Assuming that you’re really one of the most sophisticated audiences I have ever appeared in front of, I will use just stenography, assuming that most of us come here with the same kind of basic information. I see this period as a uniquely turbulent and uncertain era, to an unprecedented extend. It reminds me of the story about Yeltsin and the height of his struggle to take power in Russia. When he was asked by a guest to summarize the situation in one word, he answered, “In one word, good.” So the guest wondered how this comes to terms with reality, bearing in mind what we see around. Try to summarize it in two words. And he answered, “In two words, not good.” (Laughter) We see something similar happening here. I think that the landscape will be dominated by politics, geopolitics, and the economy, maybe the other way around in terms of causal change. But more accurately, it’s a kind of gestalt that are interdependent to an extent that we had never witnessed in human history. Politics, I mean, more than anything else. The coming election here in this country, we are for the first time in…only one superpower on Earth. Geopolitics, I mean the combination, a somewhat frightening combination of what happens in Iraq (I will come to it later), the prospect of nuclearization on a more advanced term in North Korea, and then following in Iran, what could happen in the Indian subcontinent as a result of the potentially—tension in spite of what we see right now on the surface of it. Bear in mind the fact that al Qaeda is still there. The terror has not been defeated— has not fully been explored and we don’t know what else is awaiting us in this arena. So we are seeing a very complicated landscape, and the same applies to the economic arena. When you look at the situation…everyone knows the effects in Japan, in Europe, especially Germany. But even in this country, somehow the strongest on fundamentals, when you look underneath the surface, see the deficit, the problems that are facing us right now, and the fact that somehow the easy prizes on the geopolitical arena are behind us. The defeat of the Taliban regime, the destruction of al Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan, even toppling Saddam Hussein in Iraq, they were all issues that you could predict in advance how they could end. There was a question of how long it will take, how many body bags will be brought home. But the result was somehow assured. It is now much more uncertain, much more chaotic, and much more interdependent. Basically, I believe that in the geopolitical arena, the key issue is Iraq. If the American administration would not be successful in establishing an upward moving spiral in Iraq toward restabilization in every area from public order— to resumption of production of oil and establishing a central government that gradually gathers more and more legitimacy, it can end with total chaos. You won’t have the support of Arab leaders, no way to push forward the Israeli/Palestinian agreement. You can just think of what kind of freedom Kim Jong Il will feel that he has in spite of the fact that basically he’s laughing, he’s threatening the world with an empty gun. Not technically, but in terms of excuses or reasons to use it. But what enjoyment he will get out of the capacity to insult, to intimidate the American president in an election year through a painful process of negotiation. And who will stop him from operating beyond repossessing a plutonium plant? And who will stop him from upgrading himself into the nuclear club by testing one simple nuclear device, even if he has only two uranium-based ones and maybe plutonium in enough quality for another two or three within nine months or a year from now? And try to think what will happen in the Indian subcontinent if America will prove to be a paper tiger as a result of failure to restabilize Iraq? What kind of respect will you enjoy in the Arab world? What will be the implication for the Ayatollahs in Iran if you try to coerce them or intimidate them or corner them in a way to stop their own—subterfuges into this nuclear device? And so these are very tough days. Many of you know Bremer is a highly capable guy, but the challenge is much more complicated and the ways to do it much more elusive, especially in the Middle East. Of course, the opposite is also there. If there is success, and now it’s 50-50 whether it’s success or failure…maybe it was more than 50-50 toward success in the beginning, but every week that passes there is no symmetry here. If an upward spiral begins to develop, the world, including the Arab world, will wait to see the result before they admit it. But if they just smell the signs of weakness, they will behave as if you already have failed. And every slight event in—spreads not on the backs of camels but with the speed of flight. And every week that passes without coming to grips with the realities that a second or third grade Iraqi police force is better than the best American unit for more than one reason, even if it comes to killing some Iraqis—kind of situation that should not occur. So it’s very, very critical and far from being secure. That brings us back to the political issue, namely there is a need to—with some results. The most tempting targets in the arena are the launching of the road map where basically both sides cannot afford being held responsible for the failure of the initiative. So for the short term, as long as that administration needs them in order to succeed in Iraq, maybe the more they need that administration in order to complete the peace in the Middle East, they will be predisposed to support it. But these are maybe the last two gifts, the smooth launching of the road map and maybe certain coercion of Syria into removing the Hezbollah from the northern border of Israel. There are no easy prizes left there. It will lead into consideration not to expose the president too much in the international arena for commitments and expectation where he cannot be sure that he can ultimately deliver. And the results might backfire in the administration’s face within a time frame of exactly a year from now.

HS: I have to interrupt you, and I have to do so for two reasons. First, my instructions are to make sure that I interrupt you, and that we have actually ...

EB: Your instinct would lead you to this anyhow. (Laughter)

HS: But there’s a better reason why I must interrupt you, and it’s my only chance to interrupt a commanding general. I’ve never had an opportunity before. But the question that I wanted to ask you based on what you have just said is, given these realities that you have described so cogently, so dramatically, if you were giving advice to President Bush who has just made a major personal commitment to this road map and to the peace process, what would you say to him?

EB: I will come to it in just a moment. Just let me complete the line of thought with one last remark. (Laughter) If the economy was in a different shape here, the administration could leave the geopolitics on the shelf for a year, especially bearing in mind the opening positions about the world when they were elected. But the point is that the economy’s not necessarily going to show the results. Overshadowing the landscape are the uncertainties that directly stem out from this potentially chaotic geopolitical landscape, combined with the situation in Europe, the twin deficit, and the shadow of potential protracted recession, not to mention potential deflation. And I feel very strongly that people in all places are in much more trouble than they are ready to admit right now, both in the political arena and in the economic arena. When you listen to the leaders of the European Central Bank, they seem relaxed. Are they really relaxed? Maybe these are governors of central banks…I know many of them personally, Greenspan included. They don’t tell us what they really think about reality. Of course, they tell us what they believe. Central bank governors should tell about the realities. It’s not the same. And when you see—guys relax, this means that this is the reality or maybe they are paralyzed by the absence of political will in Europe and readiness to tackle head-on the realities of the European economy in order to reform them. And once he’s paralyzed, he doesn’t want to appear as paralyzed. Maybe it’s the fear that by doing the right thing they will push the German economy into deflation without being able to control it. And do you really feel, those of you who are dealing with it, that the rumors—spread by the Fed here about the arsenal of means to deal with the deflation…does anyone fully understand? No one in the West has seen deflation in 70 years. Do we really believe that it’s that technical and easy, that just by having this readiness to buy whatever amount of Treasury bonds that will mature in two years, that will stop it? Or the readiness to manipulate the long end of—by playing with overnight—that will work? If we have to look at the only experience, 70 years ago, both in the most powerful democracy and the deep stress and the fascist emerging in Nazi Germany, in both cases it was—you have seen something much more profound: political instincts, vision, leadership, execution, and pursuit of meaning for a whole people, a deep understanding of human nature and the nature of their own people. It’s not about technicalities and without a much more profound approach to this challenge, we might find ourselves in a not very orderly withdrawal into a protracted recession. It’s a simultaneous total—it’s terra incognita and I suggest that we do not mislead ourselves. I spent a lifetime leading people in organization under crisis, on the battlefield, in special operations, in politics and even turning around an economy, a very small one, one hundred billion, from a deep recession into an unprecedented boom. And I can tell you that when real crises happen and if they are tantalizing enough and brutal enough, many people, including leaders, lose for some time their calibrated, delicate or subtle judgment, their sense of direction and their detachment from the direct events that enables people to do the right thing. And many people, including leaders, don’t know what to do so they do what they used to do in previous crises, even if it sometimes it leads not toward salvation but more toward disaster or at least to continued muddling through. And I just wanted to make this point. We know from Israel we are always walking on the—but for the first time in many years, the whole world situation is far from being clear and it’s leading more into a kind of—than into a kind of sunlit—now about our conflict, I would say that first of all, focus should be on Iraq. It’s the most important element right now. In a way, the smooth launching of the road map is serving Iraq. It’s part of the presidential commitment to Blair and to the Arab world to do something, to be even-handed. It’s very important. It’s a silver lining of two years of bloodshed in the Middle East. And I believe that in spite of what happened yesterday, there is still a certain chance that the launch will be smooth. That doesn’t mean that when we come to the real thing it will happen. It’s much more complicated. There is a need for determination. There is a need to try to influence Syria without embarrassing it, to redeploy the Hezbollah from the south and stop sponsoring terror. And the most urgent purpose or goal should be to bring the Europeans into the same administration’s interpretation of the road map. The road map is basically an interpretation of the President’s vision as expressed in his speech last June. It carried with it three elements: removal of Arafat from executive power, cracking down on Hamas and Islamic Jihad on behalf of the Palestinians—brigade which are—terror organization of Arafat himself, and establishment of a transparent and accountable institution that will become a—from the free world without ending up in the—Switzerland. And this vision had been diluted by the Europeans, the same Europeans with whom you enjoyed the—of the second UN Security Council before the attack on Iraq. But they diluted it in a more effective way. Basically, they are trying to save Arafat for their own reasons. It’s beyond my—to analyze the collective diplomatic soul. But they are determined to save Arafat, and I am confident that if Arafat will enjoy the slightest drop of executive power, there will be no peace. Even if he wanted…just symbolic might be enough in the Arab world to derail an effort. But clearly, if he enjoys any concrete executive power, there will be no peace. Now Arafat is very skillful in identifying the slightest cracks between the Americans and the rest of the—the Europeans, Russia and Kofi Annan. And he will immediately - he has an interest to derail it. The reason is that if the—the new prime minister, the security forces, the treasury will be able to crack down on Hamas and Islamic Jihad, eventually putting an end to terror and strike a deal with Israel, many Palestinians will raise a question about why the hell we buried thousands of ourselves in the last two and a half years? Why didn’t Arafat complete it three years ago or eight years ago? And he will do his best to torpedo it. So the most important issue is Iraq. No way to move ahead into the substantial state without restabilizing Iraq. And the second most important is to convince the Europeans. And I believe that the events of the last 48 hours will provide a good reason for it. The response to Sharon’s commitment, clearly against his instinct, to these illegal outposts was a coordinated attack by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Brigade of—which are Arafat’s people. Now if after all this effort, after the launching of the road map, Arafat is still involved in terror, it’s time to call a spade a spade. If he looks like a terrorist, if he walks like a terrorist, he quacks like a terrorist, maybe he’s a terrorist, you know? (Laughter) It’s time to be able to admit reality. There is no leadership in this complicated world, especially in regard to the Middle East. If you never even seem to be determined about what the reality is, they do not highly appreciate consultations. We like in our country to consult. They want to see action and direction. Before 9/11, I met with the vice president and we talked about Saudi Arabia. He asked me what their policy was with regard to terror, how—develop. I told him, “You know, I don’t believe that they have an independent position about terror. Their position is a mirror image of what they think is your position.” It was before 9/11. If they think that you’re determined to—and destroy terror, you will find them aligned almost fully behind you. If they feel that you are not determined, and don’t ask me how they prove it, they have more than one way. They had at the time, more than one way to prove it. “They will immediately take a terror medium between you and the terrorist and you will see these charities which are basically protection money flourishing.” And the same somehow applies to these days. It’s important to update them. It’s important to respect them. It’s important to work with them in a mature way. But don’t delude yourself that you’re really consulting anyone—effort. You should lead. There is a—in leadership. There are risks in leadership. But there is no other way to navigate through such a difficult situation without a strong sense of leadership and direction. I should admit that this presidency really set an exceptional example in the last year and a half of both moral and strategic leadership. And I hope that this sense of direction and leadership will not be diluted in the coming quarters. (Applause)

HS: I think I forgot to tell you in my introduction that Ehud Barak is a determined man. (Laughter) You told us now the good. You haven’t yet described the “not,” but I won’t ask you to do that. Instead, I think we’re going to go straight to questions from the audience. I remind you that we are on the record, and bear that in mind when you make your points. And I also remind you that when you get up to ask questions or to make comments, identify yourself and please be brief. That will hopefully enable me to also say to Ehud that he should be brief in his responses.

Roland Paul: Mr. Prime Minister, welcome. My name is Roland Paul. I’m with Ivy Barnum and O’Mara. Do you believe that Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al Aqsa Brigade would call off their reign of terror if they believed the Israeli government was committed to withdrawing from the settlements, other than the few contiguous ones that I believe were agreed to at—?

EB: Hamas and Islamic Jihad will not stop their efforts to destroy Israel, even if Israel would be ready to dismantle all the settlements. Their far-reaching end is just to destroy Israel. We have to admit it. I think that the Palestinians out of their own need, that’s the first kind of attribute of legitimate regime, is the monopoly and the use of weapons. And—made a point of reminding it to the Palestinians in Arabic in his speech in Akkaba last week. There is no way to avoid it. If they cannot crack down on Hamas and Islamic Jihad, maybe not immediately after the terror attack against Israel, they should not appear as serving the Israeli government or the American administration. But if they cannot do that, they are worthless. Abu Mazen is clearly a serious and sincere person, but leadership is about action. It’s not about contemplating the potential, what might happen or what should happen. The only reason to bring him there is to provide an approach—Palestinian people to put an end to it. Now the terror organization under Arafat himself could be easily stopped. But it needs to remove Arafat from any executive power in order to do this, and it’s not going to be easy. My strong feeling is that we’ll see a lot of ups and downs along the way before it happens. And when people ask me, “Okay, but how about Sharon, is he ready,” I tend to say that with all the disputes that we have with Sharon, the burden of proof is not upon him. It’s not Sharon who is responsible for this bloodshed. It’s the Palestinian side—yesterday and Arafat himself. So maybe Sharon will be ready to do the right tough choices when the time comes. Maybe he will find it very difficult. It’s up to the other side. Whenever the Palestinian tells you it’s about occupation, occupation, occupation, the spokesman…sometimes spokeswoman, very capable ones…tells us once and again, I say, “No, it’s about terror. How do I know? I was there. It was just two and a half years ago, not two and a half generations ago.” And for the first time in the history of the conflict, we put an offer on the table together with President Clinton in which in exchange for end of conflict, right of return not to Israel but only to the Palestinian state and an understanding of our security problems, affiliation to our birthplace. The Palestinian would be given the Palestinian independent state contiguous over 90-plus percent of the West Bank and 100 percent of the Gaza Strip with access to the neighboring countries, with right of return into the Palestinian state, even with a foothold in eastern Jerusalem in the Arab—as part of their Palestinian capital. And Mr. Arafat rejected it, even as a basis for negotiation. We did not negotiate it, and he turned deliberately and consciously to terror. That’s what makes it all about terror and any other description is nonsense.

HS: In follow-up of that question, would you say it is possible to reach an agreement eventually with Israel and the Palestinians without essentially going back to the formula that you put on the table then?

EB: I think that basically what you see now is a closing of the circle. All the players came to where we were in a way two and a half years ago. The Palestinians understand that they cannot defeat Israel by suicide bombing. Basically, it was about a Palestinian attempt to dictate to Israel suicide bombing as a new diplomatic tool. And we will never, ever yield to it, period. So they realize that they failed. Israel understands the limits of power, and even the administration understands that it cannot—control, you have to do it hands-on if you want success. Now I think that however long it takes, whether it takes five months or five years or 15 years, when the time comes to make the decisions, what will be on the table will be basically the same deal that was discussed at Camp David to the slightest details. I warned Arafat a year before Camp David that we are sharing heavy responsibility. Maybe it’s the most complicated conflict on Earth, but it will—decided in Heaven unless human beings will take action to solve it. And we happen to be these human beings. And of course, I cannot impose it upon you, I told him. I can impose a war upon you, or you can impose terror. But we cannot impose upon each other in agreement. But if we fail to take the decisions, we will fail. I told him a year before Camp David that—six year anniversary of the Oslo Agreement with Clinton and Arafat at the residence of the late ambassador. I told him, “Look, if we fail, we will bury thousands on both sides of the divide before we or our successors will come exactly to the same problems, to the slightest details, with just too many innocent people under the—” But that was his choice. And we are not going to—and someone will ask later about what Israel should do in regard to it, since ultimately it won’t be solved by the American president. There is no way to impose peace on a—battling kind of sides that are not ready to take the decisions on their own.

Stephen Blank: Stephen Blank, Pace University. You underlined the importance of creating an upward spiral in Iraq. How do you assess developments to date since the end of the war?

EB: I think that the probability is lower than it was six weeks ago. I think that I’m not very optimistic. I say it cautiously. I don’t want to sound too pessimistic. The description of it in too pessimistic terms might somehow happen. But there is a need for urgent action. It cannot be based on America. I would bring in every known government organization, every international ...there is a big price, there are high risks there. So everyone who wants to share those risks, come under the umbrella and contribute. I will use a metaphor. I met one of the people who was responsible for reactivating of the power system in Iraq. He told me, “You cannot operate the big kind of operation of power generating unit without having one of the guys who operated it before.” You have to find those Iraqis, thousands of them, and to pay them not $20. If it takes $200 per month, it’s worth every cent. It will save you many millions down the stream, and maybe damages that could not be—back or compensated for by money, by any amount of money. So there is a need to bring thousands of Iraqis back into the oil field, back into the police, back into every aspect of—to water supply, and not wait until American companies and contractors and subcontractors come. That’s not the time frame. Now if you lose the feeling of the people in Iraq that you are moving forward, the opposite will happen. You will see more ambushes, more attacks on Americans. Everyone has his assessment of when it becomes a real problem. How many body bags are needed here in order to begin to raise questions of when the boys are going to come home? And you will see into this vacuum, not just the Sunni but ultimately you will see the Shiite clerics encouraged by the Iranians to try to fill the vacuum. And at certain steps, you will see the Turkish government ask for some kind of—to try to manipulate its influence with—and go and create some security zone. And the results could be a catastrophe, not just for Iraq. And it relates to the economy. Voters in this country will not analyze alternatives might be worse than what we face now. Voters will see this is the short-sightedness of that administration. Maybe not—so, but that’s what they will say. So it’s combined everything. There is a need for urgent, aggressive, heavy in-cash operation to bring services, public orders and appearance of normalcy to Iraq within another six weeks. It’s not a project for six months. Within less than six months, you will lose the capacity to retrieve it, to put it on an upward positive spiral pattern.

HS: Richard.

Richard Garwin: Richard Garwin, Council on Foreign Relations. You’ve emphasized the spirit of the people in fighting deflation and having a positive upward spiral in Iraq, even in the survival of the state of Israel. But how about the spirit of the Palestinians? Did Sharon, when he went to the Temple Mount, when he allowed the construction of settlements, did he consider what that would do to the spirit of the Palestinians to recruiting for Hamas? What can one do for the future? Why not eliminate settlements without waiting for the cessation of terror? You can always put them back. They’re not helpful strategically anyhow. They increase the vulnerability of the Israeli people. What should be the next step rather than trying to persuade the other side that they would lose thousands, you will lose thousands, and be forever in the same situation? Maybe they like that.

EB: I would not draw a moral equivalence between the Palestinians and Sharon. Sharon never initiated or ordered a deliberate attack on civilians in order to shatter the standing power of the Palestinian people. Basically, terror is not about those who are buried. They are the means. The objective is to shatter the cohesion of the society and to hit the souls and the minds of those who remain alive. We have never been involved in terror. Now we fully understand the Palestinian suffering. I believe that Sharon is not unaware of it. But you should ask yourself who is responsible for it. It brings me back to the famous quotation from our legendary Mr—.who was a great dove and a great humanist. He said, “Once and again, the Palestinian leadership had never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” (Laughter) We cannot do it for them. We tried it so many times, even the last two years and the last eight years. Let me tell you, I think it will not change before they will realize that nothing will happen. But the question for Israel is how to avoid being paralyzed by the fact that there is no—and here there is a difference between myself and Sharon, a point of dispute. I fully agree and support his position about fighting terror, and we would have done basically the same. Here and there you can find mistakes along the way, but basically we would fight terror. But there is a difference on the strategic level. We, myself, Peres before me, Rabin before he was assassinated, saw a compelling imperative for Israel to disengage itself from the Palestinians, to put an end to our reign over the Palestinian people. Sharon seems to reveal it recently at a not very young age, but we have seen it for ten years. And the logic behind it is very simple. Between the Jordan River in the East and the Mediterranean in the West, there live 10 million human beings, 3.5 million Palestinians, 6.5 Israelis, including 1.1 million Arabs. If there is only one political unit called Israel, it will inevitably become either non-Jewish or non-Zionist. If this Palestinian bloc can vote, it’s—If they cannot vote, it’s an apartheid system. So we have a compelling imperative to do this. Now Rabin and Peres and myself saw that the Jewish State cannot afford imposing it unilaterally without having a bona fide effort to reach its—agreement. That is the logic behind Oslo. And it’s still valid. And that’s what we tried to make at Camp David. The only point that I added to it, I had some reservation from the security arrangement and from this process that was announced in the middle of the way where we have to give tangible assets before we know whether the—is heading toward striking a deal. And I said, “Okay, I’m ready to go very far, even further than most people would be, but only if I understand that the partner is there and he’s ready to make his own tough decision, and we are going to end with the end of conflict and giving up the right of returning to Israel, which is a code name for destruction of Israel through demography and history.” So that’s basically the situation. We cannot replace them, but we should take now that we found that there is now partner, certain unilateral states. I dispute Sharon on this issue. I believe that we had for two years now take determined action to establish this fence system, both for security reasons…it would reduce by hundreds the death toll of Israelis and to signal to the rest of the world, as well as to the Palestinians, that we are determined to disengage and put an end to our reign over them. But at the same time, in order to avoid it becoming a unilateral imposition of terms, I would leave the door open for resumption of negotiation. At any moment, no—be on the full absence of violence and now add to it the reforms that were demanded by President Bush, and would say that the door is open, the principles will be the same principles that were on the table at Camp David. Every day passes that we build this wall, and they do not enter into the open door, makes them explicitly responsible for the avoidance of an attempt to make peace. And the moment people believe that the Israeli public had been drifting to the right, it’s nonsense. It’s the same public with good healthy instincts—on terror, and you have to be ready to take decisions when there is a partner. But as long as there is no partner, just explosions, the majority of people who are ready to make the compromises submerged. And the moment there will be a partner, the moment the Palestinian leadership will appear with their character and capacities of a President Sadat or King Hussein of Jordan, you will see these majority steps up and begin to move. And if the government headed by Sharon or by anyone else will try to stop it, the people will prevail, not the government.

HS: Yes, but you say that among your conditions is no terror, stop the violence. You have a partner. Israel now does have a partner. They say, beware, God may answer your prayer and give you what you want. There is a new partner. Now the goal of the terrorist organizations, you know better than anyone else, is to prevent a political process from beginning. That’s their goal. And if the government of Israel places down the condition that it will not begin the peace process unless all terror ceases, you are giving the terrorists the incentive they need to proceed with terror.

EB: You know, Henry, it’s not mathematics. Believe me, some people in the world suspect that maybe Sharon will not be able to read the difference between 100 percent success and 100 percent failure. Believe me, he will. The problem now is not that Israel will not be capable of making these observations. If there is the presence of a real concrete, converging and coherent effort to destroy Hamas and Islamic Jihad, believe me, Israel will be able even under Sharon to carry on with certain exceptions. But I don’t envy Sharon. He—that he’s going to dismantle these outposts. He really faced within 24 hours this coordinated attack. And you should ask him, what is the meaning of yielding to it? What is the meaning of avoiding? Now clearly this guy deserves to be...but of course it’s a question of judgment.

HS: Which—? Make it clear.

EB: But the question is was this improper timing to do that? That’s a matter of judgment, and I agree that there could be more than one position on this delicate issue. But we should not blind ourselves. Nothing in this struggle will be decided by a single operation. And I should remind some of you with long memories that it’s not just Sharon. I was a foreign minister under Shimon Peres, post-assassination of Rabin. When he decided…I was not even informed. It was a kind of quick decision, you know—security brought to him the opportunity in order to—it was followed by a series of terrible suicide attacks that raised the question in retrospect about whether it was justified. Ultimately, it ended up with—Peres. So politically, it was not a clever step. But here it’s not about politics. It’s about bloodshed. 750 people already killed, innocent people. And there is a question, what should be done? So I do not envy Sharon. He is not in an easy situation. And of course, someone can raise a question about the timing, especially the launching of the road map.

HS: One back there.

Herbert Levin: Herbert Levin. When you’re in an optimistic mood, could you tell us what indicators there would be over the next few months for positive developments on the Palestinian side? How would we know that the good guys are winning?

EB: First of all, you know that a pessimist is an optimist with experience. (Laughter) I see two scenarios for the next three months. The optimist one is that somehow a follow-up of Akkaba will appear, a kind of Madrid II, or Madrid II-plus, gathering international governments, the Europeans, Russians, UN, to launch a ceremonial launching of the road map. And then it might happen according to this scenario late in the summer, and then we will be in the election year here. And everything will depend upon what happens in Iraq. If Iraq is re-stabilized, it will give a great opportunity for putting an end to our conflict since the Arab leaders will be more cooperating. Syria will take American recommendations much more seriously as something that they cannot afford to refuse. And the rest of the world will be more supportive. If the effort to re-stabilize Iraq will fail or is still muddling through, it won’t be easy to move forward beyond it. The pessimist scenario is that something like what we have seen in the last 48 hours will repeat itself several times. You don’t need more than two or three times to put it on the shelf for a year and a half. Now when it comes to the real decision, let me make it clear. I strongly believe that Sharon has to dismantle not just several dozen but all the one hundred illegal outposts. In fact, when I was in power I told the security people, “Don’t even inform me. Whenever you see an illegal outpost, dismantle it before sundown. And if it’s Shabbas, wait until after Shabbas and immediately dismantle it.” (Laughter) And the reason was not the Palestinians. The reasons were very simple. Israel is a law-abiding state. We owe it to ourselves. We cannot afford illegal outposts, even if there were no Palestinians. And of course he should find some ways to ease daily life for Palestinians in order to give the—an opportunity and to make subtle judgment about other operations. But when it comes to the real story, I would back Sharon for standing like a rock, not moving a single step forward before it becomes clear that these reforms that were demanded by the President are being translated into action. And it is only then when they prove in action their readiness to crack down on Hamas, Islamic Jihad and that the burden of proof will be then, not a minute before. And so the optimistic scenario is that we’ll have this Madrid II, that the administration here will find the right opportunity and we’ll tell the Europeans loud and clear there is no way to play it with—since nothing will happen. It will make the whole effort fruitless. We have to join hands and show Arafat and the Palestinians a unified coherent front. I told Powell you should find some expert that will put in writing every definable or identifiable attribute of executive power and explicitly delegate it. Otherwise, there will be no agreement, however frustrating it might seem. This is the reality.

Leon Black: Leon Black, Apollo Management. You referred in your talks to the incomprehensible support by Europeans of Mr. Arafat. And there have been theories that this had to do with the large Moslem populations in Europe, latent anti-Semitism, a desire to have a multi-polar counterweight to America. Whatever the reasons, what can America and/or Israel be doing on a proactive, constructive basis to have the European countries rowing in the same direction with us to be able to create the type of front that you described from your mirror description that Arabs will respond to and maybe at that point have something constructive happen here?

EB: I’ll tell you a story. Several weeks before I left power—it was maybe two or three months after the opening of this intifada and I still owe you one detail. To the best of my knowledge, Sharon’s trip to the Temple Mount was a political demonstration against myself, it was not against the Palestinians. And we know for sure that it was a very good excuse for them to explain why the intifada happened, but it was not the reason. But hard evidence showed months before that they prepared themselves for an eruption of violence. I ordered the IDF to prepare for it nine months before Camp David took place. Several weeks before I left the office, I met with Chirac. At the time there were 35 Israelis killed and some 400 Palestinians. So Chirac told me there is no way to make an agreement now. So many Palestinians were killed, so few Israelis. I told him, “Are you crazy? Do you mean that we have to wait until another 350 Israelis will be buried before the—? It’s crazy! It was their choice!” I have no real explanation. I wouldn’t try to pretend to analyze what you hinted to, but I can tell the following. Especially if the effort to re-stabilize Iraq is successful, the Americans will have more—than you believe over—I see a major objective in convincing Blair. Blair is a unique leader. I remember him from Kosovo where he cooperated very forcefully with Clinton to end up with an operation there, even when there was some hesitation both in his backyard and here. And he’s a man of principles and a great Churchill-like leader rather than a typical labor leader in Britain. And he might listen when you come to him with real material proving the record of Arafat recently in the last several days, not a month or years ago. I believe that he could be convinced about the need to take coherent action. It won’t be easy with the French and some others, but it could be at certain points successful with Putin for different reasons. There are many areas for cooperation with Putin that begin with—and the nuclear technologies for Iran. And he has a very strong interest. The most important strategic objective of Putin is to keep the kind of right proper relationship with this administration in order to be able to pull his economy out of the mess, even within five or ten years. He needs it. And he will be ready to go a certain way, especially if you convince—will be convinced about the determination of the President to get it. Rehearse in your mind the developments around this second UN Security Council Resolution. You will see to what extent the determination of an American leader to certain extent can help mobilize some support. Now it’s not that crucial an issue for them as the Iraqi issue was, and I expect that there is at least a probability that it will work. Now short of it, it won’t work. There will be no agreement. It will end up a failure. You might be able to delay acknowledging it or recognizing it, but it will lead to a failure. So—the effort and it is highly important and urgent.

HS: We have time for one short question, a final question, and for a short answer. Yes. Before you ask your question, my instructions are to thank our guest because the moment you will have answered it, everybody will get up. So let me take this opportunity to thank you for having been here. (Applause)

Martin Gross: Very briefly, Marty Gross from Sandalwood. My question’s about Camp David. You went to Camp David, I suppose, thinking you had a partner in the event you made a very far-reaching offer. When that offer was rejected, were you surprised? And before you went to Camp David, I’m just curious, did you discuss with your intelligence services what you thought Arafat’s reaction would be if you made that offer and what did they tell you? (Laughter)

EB: In real life statesmanship, things are never that clear-cut and—in a kind of a strict, simple causal chains. You face a complicated situation with many alternatives interrelated to each other. And you have to make decisions in spite of all the uncertainties. Now I never pretended that I know the answer, and you cannot answer this. But I was convinced that we will never be able to act. First of all, we will never know. If we won’t try, we will not know. We’ll never know. And it was clear to me. I warned our people long before I was elected prime minister that we are heading into the iceberg. No way to continue this reigning over Palestinians for another 25 or 35 years. And it will explode in a situation that will end up being a tragedy for Israel. If we just let it happen out of the—it will end up with burying thousands of people on both sides, hundreds of Israelis, being isolated in the world and torn apart from within. Many Israelis will say that’s the responsibility of our own government. We never tried. Now you can never penetrate the soul, and in spite of all the doubts, and we had the doubts…I was the head of the armed forces when Rabin was in power and tried Oslo. I raised my reservation from some security arrangement, but basically I supported—I spent hundreds of hours with him discussing this situation with—and all these efforts to have a breakthrough. And unlike—he was honest, direct, down-to-earth, a leader, that was honest to the point of cruelty with himself about reality. He never trusted Arafat. He always suspected. But he felt that there was no way but to give it a try. In fact, he tried to find alternative leaderships and behind every door that he opened he could see Arafat in the background. (Laughter) So at the end, he decided, “Okay, let’s accept reality. He’s there, however you try. So let’s talk to him.” Clinton has a wonderful story that several moments before they have to go out to the South Lawn to have this—Oslo, he came to Rabin and told him, “You know, now comes the moment for a handshake.” So Rabin…many of you know him, he was blushing and feeling uneasy and moving kind of uneasily. But ultimately he told Clinton, “Okay, I understand. Handshake is okay, but no kisses.” (Laughter) And I basically felt the same. I fully realize that everything is possible. I read all the intelligence reports. I headed our intelligence community for years when Bill Casey headed yours. And I know it. Sometimes people say, “Oh, maybe the whole thing was not well-prepared, you know.” It reminds me of a visit I had to South America. I was briefed about a conflict between Argentina and Chile where the Vatican was called upon to solve it, and it took them two years to study the material. We don’t have to study it. We spent all our lifetime. We fought. I know every bend in the road. And there are metric tons of documents that cover all our negotiations on every continent expect for Antarctica and the North Pole. Even during my own, no Israeli prime minister during his premiership met Arafat for so many hours. So it’s about political will and character. It’s not about the nature of the problems. So we have to try it. I didn’t know in advance what would happen. At the opening morning of Camp David, I told Clinton, “I am not sure what brought Arafat here. Maybe it’s a moment of truth for him. But maybe it will end up just with another attempt to extract from me and you a more documented position that he will carry on to another international instant. And the only thing that we can do facing this uncertainty is to make sure that our own behavior will not push him into the second possibility. Namely, we should make it clear that there would be no documents, no written drafts, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. I have no illusions that it will be erased from the memory of the world. And you, President, should be very clear when the time comes to make your judgment about why it fails and let us hope that it will be successful.” Now let me tell you, Clinton would never have blamed Arafat for the failure if Arafat was ready to negotiate the offer. And it would fall on the—What really infuriated him was the fact that Arafat rejected it even as a basis for negotiation. And that tells you something, namely that he understood that it’s not just whispering something in Arabic to someone and telling something else to a TV station in English. If he would commit himself, there would be an agreement. Were he to explicitly put an end to the conflict, commit himself to giving up the right…and another element. He just doesn’t have the character. And I deliberately used the example of President Sadat and King Hussein. We have thousands of graves in our military cemeteries as a result of fighting against them. They will be beat the—in the battlefield. But the moment they decided to go to peace, they did not wait until every extremist in the fringes of their society will agree. They led and they struck a deal. In the moment there will be such a leadership on the Palestinian side, an agreement within several months, an implementation within several years. (Applause)

(Background Conversation)