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| Authors: | Adnan Pachachi |
|---|---|
| Akila Al-Hashimi | |
| Rachel Bronson |
July 22, 2003
Council on Foreign Relations
Speaker: Ambassador Adnan Pachachi
Speaker: Dr. Akila Al-Hashimi
Presider: Rachel Bronson, Director, Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
July 22, 2003
This meeting was on the record.
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Rachel Bronson [RB]: (In Progress) ... to see the number of people at this session is really a testament to the importance of this topic and to the excitement about meeting our guests today. I know that you just all heard about this yesterday, as I heard about it I believe on Friday, so it's really... it's quite delightful to be here. Let me introduce to you our guests today. To my right is Ambassador Adnan Pachachi, who is the head of the delegation that's here in New York today representing the Iraqi Governing Council. Mister Pachachi was in Iraq government service for many years. He was Ambassador to the U.N., 1958 to '65, and then again from '67 to '69. Between those two stints, he was Foreign Minister from '65-'67, and I believe comes from a long line of Iraqi politicians. He is the head of the delegation, as I said, that's here talking to the U.N. representing the Governing Council.
To my left is Doctor Akila Al-Hashimi, who served in the Iraqi foreign ministry recently. She was, as many of you know, Tariq Aziz’s French translator. Most recently, she was head of the U.N. mission for the Iraqi foreign ministry. In terms of Iraq's relations with the U.N., there are few who know it better than our guests here today.
They are going directly from us to the U.N., where they will brief the Security Council today on Iraq and give their views on what the U.N. can do in Iraq. So before I turn to the discussion, let me just say that today we are going to be on the record. Our guests today have said that they want people to know who they are and what they have to say.
Let me just turn to Ambassador Pachachi and ask you to tell us a bit about this Governing Council, what it is that you hope it will achieve or can achieve. What are the expectations from the CPA?
Ambassador Pachachi [AP]: Well, thank you very much for inviting us to make this presentation. From the first day after the fall of the regime, the previous regime, the Iraqi people have demanded continuously that there should be an Iraqi government to manage the affairs of the country. And I believe, probably rightly, that perhaps an Iraqi government can deal with these problems more effectively. The question is how to set up this interim government, or transitional government. At the beginning, the idea was that there should be representative conferences, like the one that was held in Nasiriyah, at the end of April and the other one in Baghdad. The intention was to convene as large a conference by the end of May, to elect members of an interim government, Iraqi government.
But there was disagreement on how to select the participants in the conference. And since speed really became of the essence, because we couldn't go on ... couldn't wait too long …
The ultimate aim of course is really to have a Constitution, that will be approved by the Iraqi people, a referendum, and then you have elections in the Constitution for a government that derives its legitimacy from the desires of the Iraqi people.
So, instead of elections which of course at the time were not feasible, and still are not now, because the Kurdish situation was very precarious, the judicial authority was almost nonexistent, there was no electoral law, no electoral register, no population census, no law regulating the formation of political parties, and the right of assembly and expression. All these things had to be enacted first before you can have a proper election. And since the enactment of these laws and this census and all this will take some time, the thought that perhaps ... in order to expedite the whole process is to ... select members of an interim council or a coordinator or a Governing Council through an extensive process of consultation, which was done by the Iraqis themselves.
But the main effort really was made by Iraqis, in discussions among themselves. I bring this up because this has been an accusation which we hear a great deal about, especially in the Arabic press and some other media, that the numbers of this Council have been appointed by Mister Bremer. This is not so. The members have been chosen through voluntary consultations among Iraqis and they have agreed that this Council should be as representative as possible, and hence, 25 have been chosen. So this is the answer to your question, how did this Council come about.
Also at the beginning of course there was the idea to have purely consultative, advisory body. But then we decided that it was not enough, and that whatever council or body is established, it has to have extensive responsibilities and powers in order to oversee the transitioning period and prepare the country for the Constitution and eventual elections. And as a result of this, the coalition authority considered most of the points that were made, and most of the demands that we have presented, and now the Council has real powers, it will appoint ministers, it will take over the question of security, the relations of Iraq with the outside world, a new currency, overhauling the economy and the judicial system and the educational system, the health system.
And of course dealing with the urgent matters that face the country, like the provision of the necessary services to the people. So the Council will have an immense job ahead of it. But as I said, the main thing we'll focus on is to prepare for a Constitutional conference that will draft the Constitution to be presented to the people for their approval in a referendum.
RB: And what does preparing for that Constitutional conference entail? What time line are you thinking about, and how does this process work? What is important for Iraqis, what kind of process is necessary to get to some sort of Constitutional process?
AP: Well, the Constitutional conference is expected to have about 200 members, and they will ... they will either be elected, which means that we have to delay the elections for some months, in order to prepare all the registration that is necessary, or we can choose the members of this Constitution conference through the same method of extensive consultation among Iraqis, in which the Governing Council will take a leading role, of course.
RB: Doctor Akila, from your viewpoint, how is it going? That is a very general question, but there were great hopes, certainly in the United States, about what an intervention by the United States would bring to Iraq. There were many throughout the world who were very worried about the collapse of Iraq into distinct areas, spheres of influence, the kind of blood-letting, score settling that was possible. Given where you sat, in the days leading up to the war, when you look out over Iraq, is it as bad as you feared? Is it as good as you hoped? What is your sense about what the situation is like inside of Iraq?
AH: Thank you very much. Really inside Iraq, the war and what happened after, I don't want to appear optimistic, but I'd like to tell you that nothing that we feared, or you feared about Iraq has happened. Iraq remained united, and Iraq proved to the whole world, there is no fragmentation of Iraq. The people of Iraq are united ... in their mentality, in their behavior, and their way of life. . So these spheres of influence, or this separation of Iraqi people or categorization of Iraqi people didn't appear. But Iraqis showed more solidarity, more unity than ever. And I think that you have seen this on your TVs and in your media, and we live it every day. The war and the oppression before the war consolidated the unity of the Iraqi people.
RB: And in terms of the problems that we hear about security, the infrastructure, is it as bad as it looks from the outside? Are there places inside where it's better than it looks?
AH: It's...by itself, it's bad. But it's not as bad as outside people think. We live normally, schools continue, hospitals, yes there is looting, there are criminal acts, there is sabotage, but this is something normal, I think, after wars, in all societies, you have…such problems. It's just like when someone has cancer, he has to suffer chemotherapy, and now in this state of chemotherapy, we have problems, but we have hopes.
RB: What are the key challenges that you as a Governing Council are going to have to think about, in the next six and twelve and eighteen month periods, and that the United States should be thinking about? We're all involved in the day to day, the security, the electricity, the infrastructure. What are the big issues that are coming that we should be preparing for now? I imagine the Constitution will be a key issue ...
AP: Yes.
RB: ... that the Iraqis will have to prepare for. Are there other things that the United States should be thinking about, as big events or try to steer clear of as we build our policy and you build your policy?
AP: Well, the economy obviously will be a primary issue. Because we have to modernize the oil industry, which of course is the main source of revenue for the country. There's a very high rate of unemployment. A start has been made to absorb almost two hundred thousand demobilized soldiers into civilian jobs. And especially in labor intensive projects, like construction and building, because there is an awful lot of need for, preparing growth, buildings, public institutions and so on and so forth. So there must be a massive program in construction, and that will absorb quite a lot of unemployed people, mainly those who have been demobilized.
We have started building urgently about 1,500 schools and medical clinics throughout the country. We have to deal with the problem of the currency, to stabilize the currency, so that the new currency has reasonable purchasing power, within the means of the Iraqi people. And these things are being dealt with as a matter of urgency. We're starting to do all these things, and of course we need the time and we need the results.
RB: And what do you think the key challenges are for the United States, as our planners are busy planning away, trying to anticipate what the challenges will be?
AP: Well, the United States has been quite generous. Congress I think has donated 2.7 billion dollars in the next six months, which makes up almost one-third of the ... actually almost one-half, I think, of the interim budget, the country's budget for the remainder of this year. And of course, we can use the help of the United States and other countries and the international organizations, for whatever expert help they can give us. Of course, Iraq will need enormous amounts of money in the next few years, to overhaul the economy and move to modern bases, and modernize everything. We have been dragging behind the rest of the world in so many things.
So, a great deal has to be done, and I think the United States, as I said, and the international organizations can be of some help, they can give us help, although I must say that Iraq does not lack in qualified, experienced people. The degree of expertise is probably one of the best in the region, so all we need is really to re-employ those people who have been for example in the oil industry, it was totally, completely run by Iraqis - to employ them again and then to have the results, and also to organize their work in such a way that...without any political intervention and interference, as the previous regime used to do.
RB: Let me ask my last question, and then open it up to the group, and this has to do with the international organizations. Doctor Akila, you've worked with the U.N., and I was reading through the report that the Secretary wrote about Iraq, and he has this interesting paragraph, and let me just quote it. He said, "While many Iraqis lodged frank criticism about the aspects of the United Nations’ past record in Iraq, they also expressed appreciation for the organization’s ongoing humanitarian efforts, and stressed the need for the United Nations to play an active role, not least in facilitating and supporting the political transition. All Iraqis consider the United Nations' involvement essential to the legitimacy of the political process." What role do you see for the United Nations in Iraq? What would be helpful and useful to the Iraqi people?
AH: I think the most important role for the United Nations in the new Iraq is to help the establishment of the new Iraq through our Constitution, the legislation, for elections, for referendum, and also for the building of political institutions in Iraq. .We don't have the traditional democratic political regime. We haven’t had the traditions of political parties for 35 years, being ruled by one party. We need to be re-educated on this. People, institutions, even academies are needed for this democratic process and for the new Iraq. And I think the expertise that the United Nations has from experiences in Cambodia, and in other places of the world can help a lot in Iraq, and their lessons learned from this past experience. And I hope that by expertise and by funding, the U.N. will participate in the acceleration of this democratization process.
RB: Do we need to have a second resolution? Do we need a restructuring of the current American-U.N. relationship, or is what we have enough to work with, to go forward?
AH: A new resolution to do what? I think 1483 is quite enough. And we work very closely and very hard with the U.N. representatives in Iraq, in order to prepare for this process. So I don't think a new resolution is needed...all is stipulated in 1483.
RB: All right, let me open up to questions...go ahead.
George Schwab [GS]: George Schwab, National Committee on American Foreign Policy. Thank you very much for your presentations. My question is directed to our honorable guests. I wonder whether you would care to comment on the significance of the U.S. presence in the region.
(Background Conversation)
AP: Obviously, the United States has its own interests and its own global outlook, in the East and elsewhere. You know, I've heard a great deal of talk about whether the war in Iraq was legitimate or whether it was legal and so on. This I assure you does not bother Iraqis at all. What happened is that Iraqis were rid of an odious regime. And if this was done by means that are considered by some to be illegal or out of the realm of legitimacy, it does not bother the people of Iraq. They are happy that at long last they are able to express themselves freely, without fear. Of course, political parties have been formed. Newspapers have been published. So in spite of all the disappointments, the frustration, and the continued suffering of the Iraqi people, there is that sense of freedom, which is really something that one has to see to appreciate.
RB: Ambassador Murphy.
Richard Murphy [RM]: As long as the American military is there, and we're acting as the provisional authority, we will be the principal target for Iraqis who want to get their own government. In the meantime, it will be, I imagine, increasingly difficult for all of you to avoid the charge of collaboration with us. How do you foresee managing that accusation? It will come. It's hit at a lower level with some of the police forces already. How can you keep your distance from us, and work with us?
AP: Well, so far the Americans have been very helpful regarding the setting up of the various institutions of government in Iraq and have been helping to push and expedite the process for the Constitution. They have given most of the power they would have had, under the Security Council resolution, they have given it to the Governing Council. So the Governing Council really has enormous powers and we have every reason to believe what Mister Bremer said, that he will never object to anything that the Iraqis themselves have agreed upon, and in fact even if there is some perhaps difference of opinion that can be managed through consultation. There is no question of veto being cast or being used by the American administration.
I don't think the question of collaboration is such a serious one. Obviously the remnants of the Ba’ath party, who have infiltrated some of the fundamentalist religious movements, of course try to show that the members of the Governing Council are stooges, they are puppets. But I think the Iraqi people by and large know this is not so, and if you ask the Iraqis now, do you want the American troops to withdraw from Iraq? Eighty percent, if not more, will say no. They want American troops to stay in Iraq, because that's the only way to prevent chaos presently. So on collaboration, this is not Vichy of France, this is something quite different. And I think the policy of the United States is really in the right direction. It's giving the Governing Council as much authority as it needs to expedite the whole process toward an elected government.
Kenneth Bialkin [KB]: Kenneth Bialkin, Skadden Arps. We don't underestimate the problems and the conflicts and the schisms and the differences that exist. But as you approach the Constitutional issue, as you approach what kind of society you're going to have, as you look at what are the references of your government, one thing I haven't heard anything about, in terms of premises, is the extent to which Iraq as a nation rejoining international society, will be committed to some of the fundamental principles that guide the western ... or any of the democracies. For example, will the state be secular or religious? Will there be an adoption of, let's say, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as individual entitlements to your people? Will you guarantee freedom of religion? Will you guarantee freedom of speech?
Will you sustain the independence and freedom of press? Are you committed to the right of assembly? As you rejoin the free world, just to take a pointed question, will you accept diplomatic relations with the State of Israel, for example? It exists. Are there any premises that unite these obviously disparate religious and political groups, but can you come together with at least these universal declarations that might underlie an approach? There's been no clue, I haven't seen anything about that, and I wonder whether you could speak to it.
RB: Let me also ask, on that point, what kind of challenges are you going to face when you address these kinds of questions from within Iraq? These are very broad questions, and presumably there are a lot of different groups on different sides of the issues. So, how are you going to address those, and what kind of challenges do you anticipate facing from your own population?
AP: All these matters will have to be considered by the Constitutional conference, prior to the Constitution. But a large number of Iraqis, and I think Akila and myself are among them, want to have the kind of Constitution that you described, very much. We would like to have this, but of course we may not be able to have everything we want, but I believe the majority of Iraqis would like to have ... every Iraqi would like to have a Constitution as close to these principles as possible. I mean this is what we want, this is what we dream of.
Regarding the relations with Israel, we have said often that this really depends on the agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Once agreement is concluded between Israel and the Palestinians in which there will be a Palestinian state side by side with Israel, in an area of Palestine which is, which the Palestinians make up more than 95 percent of the population, and there is a viable contiguous Palestinian state, there's absolutely no reason why not Iraq, like other Arab countries, will recognize Israel.
It depends really on agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but not before that. I mean, this is a general opinion among Iraqis. And I think this is an opinion which is shared by most of the other Arab countries. Of course, Egypt and Jordan have completed peace treaties with Israel, because they have, you know, border problems and ... they have borders with Israel. Iraq doesn't. So Iraq has been bothered by the Palestinian issue, because of its sympathy with the Palestinians. Once this problem is resolved between the Palestinians and the Israelis, then there would be reason for anything else to happen.
RB: What kind of challenges, on Ken's question, do you anticipate on the religious front? You already see different groups beginning to organize and clearly members of the Iraqi Governing Council have very different views about the role that religion should play in the new Iraqi state. Is that going to be one of the most challenging and contentious issues for you to grapple with?
AP: As my colleague, Akila said, there was no communal fighting in Iraq after the war, there was no civil strife. I think the Iraqis have learned the virtue of tolerance and coexistence, and that we’re living really in peaceful harmony. Now, of course there are religious parties, I mean, I consider them as political parties - political parties that would want to give religion a big role in running the state. But they would have to go to the people in an election and try their luck. But you see, when you talk about Shia and Sunnis, and Christians and Arabs and Kurds, these are not monolithic parties, solid monolithic parties, in fact among the parties you have everything. You have Communists and you have capitalists. You have religious people and you have secular people and atheists.
You have Socialists, you have everything. Nationalists. So what differentiates the Iraqis are not their ethnic origins or religious and sectarian affiliations, but rather their political beliefs.
RB: Trudy.
Trudy Rubin [TR]: Trudy Rubin, from the Philadelphia Inquirer. I'd like to ask you about the issue of legitimacy, which you've touched on. Do you feel that if there is a consultative process for choosing the people who will draft the Constitution, that this will convey enough legitimacy on the whole process that follows, including the ultimate elections of a new government? Do you think, as some people argue, and Secretary General Annan has hinted, that it would be more helpful if there was a more obvious and defined U.N. sponsorship for the process? Would this be useful in conferring legitimacy and taking away any stigma of an American puppet? How do you see legitimacy as being conveyed from within, from appointment and consultations, or is something more needed?
AP: Well, as my colleague Akila said, the United Nations could be very helpful in helping us to draft the necessary laws, prior to the elections. Also they will be able to observe and supervise these elections. They have expressed their readiness to help us conduct a population census, to enact an electoral law, through the voters register. De Millo said this is one thing, one field in which United Nations has had a lot of experience and know how. And they said they can even help us to organize a Secretariat of the Governing Council. So we would like the United Nations to play a bigger role, and if it does, I think the greater the legitimacy would be the operations and the acts of the Council.
RB: We have so many questions, I'll try to get to everyone.
Maurice Tempelsman [MT]: As a follow up to Rubin's question, first of all, I wish you well in what you do, formidable task. But can you elaborate a little bit more on the way the consultative process. I'd like to get a better understanding of how this was done, particularly in the sense you are in transition, and the lessons learned from the transition across the more permanent structures the Constitution is going to be very important to what works and what doesn't work, in light of the ethnic, religious realities that you have in Iraq. Whether they are not as serious as the outside perceives, or whether they're worse. Yugoslavia taught us this lesson that we can't overlook, what happens when you have a country which was under…and then the government changed. So can you elaborate a little bit more on the process of consultation, and therefore the issue of legitimacy?
AH: For this process of Constitution, = in Iraq we have establishments, we have institutions, we have the intellectual people, we have lawyers, we have the judges, we have university professors, a lot of intellectual people. You are not going to be starting from zero. You have already these things inside. All despite these years of the ruling party, of the oppression, but we're still there, we can work together, we can consult with others, and we can arrive to have this credible process of having our Constitution, for having our own legislation with the outside support, outside ... the support of the United Nations, of the United States of America, other countries, other institutions, so you are not going from nothing. It's different in other experiences and other places, where United Nations worked for this political process.
We have already these things. So it's a matter of time, just a little bit of time, a little bit of more security inside Iraq, and I'm optimistic. I think everything will be all right sooner or later. The most important thing for Iraqis, all of Iraqis, is to have their own elected government, and to put an end to the military occupation. And this is the goal of the Council. We are working very hard, we're trying to work very hard with everybody in Iraq. Now you see some protest against the Council, as Mister Murphy said, or accusing people of collaboration. Many people say this is a good sign of health in Iraqi society, we are very happy, and you can not satisfy everybody. But if the Council can succeed very soon in its work, that will make everybody accusing us or any other party of being collaborator or anything like this.
RB: Wendy Luers, on this topic.
Wendy Luers [WL]: Wendy Luers, from the Foundation for a Civil Society. Following on Maurice's point, a number of ambassadors and other officials and other people from Civil Society in Central Europe, in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have come forward with a number of proposals, to share their experience in disbanding secret police, putting civilian controls over intelligence, property restitution, Constitution and Bill of Rights writing and all of those things. And particularly in the area of developing civil society, which takes a very, very long time, and will draw upon your youthful population. How open do you think the Iraqis themselves are to people who are Europeans and Slavs and Hungarians, who are coming from a different part of the world, in sharing these experiences? Is this something that they would be open to, and enthusiastic about? Or would they see it as something that is removed from their experience?
AH: Let me ask you a question. Have you ever been to Iraq?
WL: No.
AH: So I think if you go to Iraq, you will see how open we are to all people. We have the coordinator, the CPA coordinator for Iraq is the Romanian Ambassador. And Iraq is open to all experiences, all expertise, all help coming from outside. We don't consider with hostility people coming to us, even the American soldiers now in the streets, despite these acts of terror against them. But if you ask me, they are always welcomed everywhere they go in Iraq. They have very good relations with people, with women and children, everywhere. So we are not a closed society. And by nature, we are a very diverse society. We are united in this diversity, but we are at the same time open to others. So every expertise, anyone wanting to help Iraq, we are fully open to this, and we will welcome them.
RB: Jim, thanks for your patience.
James Zirin [JZ]: Jim Zirin, from Sidley, Austin, Brown, and Wood. Your presentations, which have been most interesting, centered on the need for a new Constitution, and you seem to put that at the head of the list of things to be done. And of course you had a Constitution at the time of the accession of the Ba’athist regime, which as I understand it, provided for institutions of government and also provided the court system and legislation and the like, and also provided for guarantee of many of the basic rights that Ken Bialkin referred to. Has any consideration been given to adopting the old Constitution as your interim Constitution, as a way to jump start the process of moving the country forward?
RB: Ambassador, since you were representing the country at a time when the constitution was contested you probably have some thoughts.
AP: Probably you are referring to the Constitution of 1925.
JZ: Yes.
AP: Which of course was suspended and then repealed, after the revolution in 1958. And since 1958 we have had several interim Constitutions. And the last one, of course, under Saddam. When you read this, it sounds very democratic, like the Soviet Constitution under Stalin. (Laughter) The way it was implemented is different, because it gave the Ba’ath party almost an exclusive right to run everything in the country. But we want to go a little step further than the Constitution of 1925. The world has moved on since then, and we feel that the Iraqi people who are a much larger educated population than they were in the Twenties, would demand a Constitution that enshrines the concept of the primacy of the individual.
And rejects any collectivist ideas, which have been used to oppress the people of Iraq over all these years. And we hope to have a Bill of Rights, of irrevocable rights. We want to concentrate such ideas and concepts like the subordination of the military to the elected civilian government. The peaceful transfer of power through periodic elections. We want to create a civil society in Iraq. It may not be easy. It will not be easy, obviously, but I think it's an aim worth working for. And a lot of us will not be satisfied with less. There are people working. We'll probably go through a process of trial and error, and we fail sometimes, but I think it's to have a vision that we can really look forward to achieving.
And as my colleague Akila said, true, Iraqis are the least xenophobic in the Middle East, perhaps in the area. They have a tradition of loving foreigners, they love foreigners. They like to see them and of course, under Saddam it was a crime, to meet with foreigners. But the Iraqis themselves are quite open. And that's why the Romanian gentleman, called on me actually, he came and he said, they are prepared to share their experience with us, and we work on that, whatever experiences come from whatever source.
RB: We have so many questions, my idea is grouping some, so if we could go David Phillips and Chris?
David Phillips [DP]: David Phillips, with the Center for Preventive Action of the Council. In the past, there have been competing claims between Iraqi exiles and Iraqis in the country. I note that the majority of the Governing Council includes people who participated in the Salahadin Opposition Conference in 1992. How would you characterize the view of Iraqis to exiles who have come back to the country?
AP: In fact, the majority of the Governing Council are people from inside of Iraq, they are not expatriate political leaders. Most of them have been living in Iraq…
DP: What's the dynamic then ... (Overlap)
AP: The fact that Iraqis were outside Iraq, and they worked for the liberation of Iraq, from this regime, I think should be a point to their advantage, because a lot of them left probably comfortable lives abroad and their families, who have been living there for a whole generation, and they came and accepted a very difficult life and a very dangerous one. So I think the people who were outside have really contributed quite a lot. And I think it's very unfair, frankly, to characterize them as if they have no interests, no connection, and no experience of what the Iraqi people have suffered. It is because they have this feeling, that they have this sense of solidarity with the people inside, that they have really decided to leave their life of comfort and come to Baghdad and try to help in the re-integration of Iraq.
DP: Just a quick follow up. Is there a process...for selecting leadership within the Governing Council?
AP: Yes, there will be I hope elections very shortly, a Presidency. I don't think there will be one President, personally, I don't know, but probably there will be a council of Presidents, in which each member of the council would be given the responsibility for overseeing certain government departments, so that the relations between the executive branch and the Governing Council, which really in essence is more of a legislative body than anything else, can designate some of its members to undertake executive responsibilities, by overseeing various departments. And this way I think that the connection between the executive and the legislative will be maintained.
Christopher Isham [CI]: Chris Isham, ABC News. Returning for a moment to the problem of security, I think your optimism is encouraging, however the attacks on U.S. troops and daily attacks are getting more organized, according to Councilman Brown. The U.S. administration has said that the attacks are mounted by remnants of the regime, the Ba’athists, et cetera, but there's no real clarity on who this resistance is, how it's organized, what they're composed of, who these elements are. Are they former members of Fedayeen Saddam? Who are they? I wonder if you'd share your insight, and who you think is responsible for the attacks, both on the U.S. troops and the structure, preventing the country from moving forward.
AH: Well, there are several types. You have first of course the common criminals. Thousands of them were released by Saddam prior to the war.
CI: Yeah, I'm talking less about that than I am about the more organized attacks against the ... (Overlap)
AH: Yes. Well, as I said, some of them are doing it because they want to avenge some perceived grievance they have had. But the others obviously are remnants of the Ba’ath Party, especially those groups that were very close to Saddam and very loyal to him, like the Special Forces and the Fedayeen Saddam and others, and as I said, they have been infiltrated, or they have infiltrated rather some of the religious extremist groups, and there is no doubt some assistance, financial assistance and perhaps even weapons have been smuggled into Iraq from various places, the region. I don't think they have coordinated their acts on a national level all over the country, but of course, they are more organized than before. And the way to deal with them, I think of course besides improving the economic situation, is really to increase the police force, and we have a program of increasing the police force from 32 thousand presently, to about 70 thousand.
They need of course the crash program of training, the policemen, both in Iraq and elsewhere, from Europe and other places. Many countries have offered to help train the police. So eventually we are going to have a well trained police force, well paid, with sufficient weapons and means of movement, who could deal with these acts of violence probably more effectively than the British and the American Army, because they know the country better, they know the people who have been involved in all these acts of violence, and they'll be able to track them down probably with greater efficiency than the American soldiers, who really have absolutely no training in the methods of law and order.
RB: Bob, andGianni if you could follow with your question, we’ll take two at a time.
Bob Hormats, Goldman Sachs [BH]: I'd like to follow up on this point about security. As you undoubtedly know, there's enormous pressure on the administration here to broaden the coalition, to get more countries to provide military courses, particularly countries in NATO, but outside that, including India and Pakistan. To what degree do you think you and your colleagues can play a role in facilitating or encouraging that process? And secondly, how much would it help? There seems to be a conventional view, at least among certain people in this country, that if you reduced the visibility of the United States by adding forces of other countries, that would give greater legitimacy to the new Iraqi leadership, and it would also make the U.S. less vulnerable, less prominent, in terms of being attacked. How do you see that process? One, can you play a role in facilitating it? And two, to what degree do you think it would help the process and stabilize the process?
And let me just add one point. Traditionally countries that rely heavily on energy find it very difficult, and this is true throughout the Middle East, but not only in the Middle East, if you rely too heavily on energy as your dominant export, dominant element of the economy, it's very hard to develop other aspects of the economy. There's too much reliance on one sector and virtually no emphasis on developing industrial sectors, services, smaller businesses. This is true throughout the area. So one thing I think to bear in mind in structuring the new system is the importance of private property and the importance of an environment that provides support for entrepreneurs outside the energy sector, small and medium size enterprises. It's a problem that every Middle Eastern country has. If you can deal with that problem, you'll have made a major success.
RB: So Bob, you've cleverly put in three questions. (Laughter). So on the need to internationalize the presence on the ground, and diversify the economy. Gianni, let me go to you and hope that you're going to take us even further afield in internationalization. That's just a guess ... (Overlap)
Gianni Picco [GP]: I'd like to ask you, what is your perception of the behavior of your neighbors?
AP: I beg your pardon?
[GP]: Of the neighbors around Iraq, how do you feel they are behaving at the moment?
AP: Yes.
[GP]: And the second very brief question is if you have any sense of the delay in the production and amount of Iraqi oil, since we have been now told over and over again of a number of deadlines which were never met, and what do you think your assessment is for a good production of Iraqi oil by the end of the year? Are we going to have two million barrels a day by the end of the year or not?
AP: Thank you.
RB: The need to internationalize the forces that are there. The need to diversify the economy and what are the time lines we should expect. And what roles are the neighbors playing? And I think of interest to this group is particularly Iran.
AP: Well, regarding the international forces, of course the problem is now really between the countries that seem to be willing and ready to provide the troops and the United States, because these countries say they want to do this under the umbrella of the United Nations. And it seems to me that the United States is would welcome these troops, provided they be under the command of the central command, the American central command. Also, I think Kofi Annan has stated that the U.N. is not ready yet to undertake this responsibility. As far as we are concerned, as I said, we would rather really concentrate on building the police force in Iraq. And let the Iraqi handle this problem. We'd rather have people to train our police force, to have up to the amount necessary, rather than troops from outside.
Then, of course a U.N. umbrella would be welcome. But this will take time. I mean to really have international forces, that are prepared and deployed, and you have to have the…security council. This will take time and the security situation is very scary, and it needs to be met without delay. Regarding the economy, I agree with you that we should diversify our economy, and I think there is general agreement among the members of the Governing Council to give the private sector much, much greater role in the economy of the country, and to probably get rid of some of the government industries which are owned by the government and very badly run. Privatization is going to be the aim of the Governing Council.
Our neighbors, well, (Laughs), you can't choose your neighbors, can you? (Laughter) But of course I think with Turkey, we have two problems. They are extremely sensitive about what kind of Kurdish autonomy or a federal system that will be. That's what the Kurds want, a kind of federal system which they can assure a wide measure of autonomy and be not part of Iraq. And we have another problem also with Turkey, water. The dams which were built by the Turks on both the Euphrates and the Tigris, have really led to a shortage, basically a shortage of water in the two rivers, and this will affect in the long run the livelihoods of millions of Iraqis. This is a matter that has to be really dealt with and acted on very effectively and quickly.
We maintain in Iraq that we should apply the rules of international law. The certain established sites over the years of countries that have been using the waters. This is of course a question that is not unique to Iraq, but there are other countries in the world who have the same problem. Our relations with Iran of course have never been easy. Very difficult relations. But we feel that Iran should refrain from intervening and interference in Iraqi affairs. And I am happy to say that the people who reject Iranian attempts to interfere in Iraqi affairs are the Shi'a. They want to keep their independence, and throughout the centuries, the Shi'a leadership have been the most persistent and strong resistance to Iranian attempts to interfere in Iraq.
But we have heard of some infiltration from the Iranian side. We heard of some money being given to various armed groups. So we have to deal with this. I mean, it's a problem. Regarding our relations with the…there's no problem and they..can improve with time. Of course the Syrians are extremely worried of course now, and they had good relations with the previous regime towards the end and they are not very sympathetic, I must say, to the Governing Council. (Scattered Laughter) But they have come around, I think.
[GP]: Thank you.
RB: Well, let me apologize to Imran, Paul, Jim, Melanie, John, all of you had your hands up from the very beginning, but we have run out of time. Howar, I'm sure you could have offered a few points right here at the end talking about the Kurds, I'm afraid we won't have time to continue that conversation. So let me thank you all, our guests are off to the U.N., so we can't keep them any longer, but certainly thank you to my guests for a very enlightening discussion.
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