THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION has staked American credibility on creating a functioning democracy in Iraq.
Quite rightly, the immediate focus is on restoring order and eliminating the threat posed to coalition soldiers by remaining Baathist elements. But even after this is achieved, more problems loom ahead if the administration does not broaden its longer-term approach to democratization to include an ambitious effort to change the underlying political culture in Iraq.
Our current strategy focuses heavily on institution-building. The prevailing wisdom is that the creation of effective political institutions - such as the establishment of the rule of law, an effective judiciary and an adequate system of public administration - must precede elections. Institution-building is important, but success in Iraq over the long term will depend crucially upon developing a political constituency for democracy.
Unless we want Iraq's first elections to be its last - monopolized by religious extremists - we need to help create a critical mass of Iraqis who think and act in democratic ways. We need to help change ordinary Iraqis' mindsets so that they begin to think of themselves as citizens in an emerging demos rather than subjects in a rigidly hierarchical society.
One need only look northeast of Iraq, to the five Central Asian republics, to see the shortcomings of a strictly institutional approach.
Over the last decade there, the United States has helped put in place many of the institutional trappings of liberal democracy - constitutions, parliaments, nominally independent judiciaries - yet these countries remain far from liberal or democratic. Autocratic leaders have used the forms of democracy to undermine its very substance, and passive populations have allowed them to get away with it. Individual rights are routinely trampled, the political opposition is harassed and jailed and elections are rigged.
A democratic political culture is as crucial an ingredient for democracy as properly structured political institutions.
When Alexis de Tocqueville made his famous study of American democracy in the early 19th century, he was captivated more by the relations that prevailed among American citizens than by our political institutions. He viewed democracy in America as fundamentally a social condition, of which the most positive element was the tremendous civic spirit that existed at the local level - the way citizens banded together to address common problems.
A long-term effort to develop a democratic political culture in Iraq should begin at the level of the individual, by helping to impart this civic spirit to ordinary Iraqis. Working with sympathetic Iraqi political leaders, we should endeavor to strip away the fear and passivity that Saddam Hussein's rule has imbued.
We should help redefine what it means to be Iraqi, and the rights, responsibilities and behaviors implied therein. The aim should be to create a critical mass of what the Slovak intellectual Martin Butora has termed "positive deviants" within Iraqi society - individuals who are democratic in their orientation and understand they have the capability and the responsibility to work for a better future for their country.
The key to altering the authoritarian mindset is to take people outside the context of their everyday lives and show them new ways of interacting. Exchange programs that offer Iraqis in-depth exposure to another, less-hierarchical culture are one such vehicle. Another is to place foreign lecturers in Iraqi schools, where they can introduce not only new ideas but also - by example - new, more reciprocal patterns of behavior. A third is to embed foreign volunteers in other Iraqi institutions. The news media can be an important vehicle for redefining Iraqis' sense of identity as well - offering a forum for collective discussions about the country's recent dark past and the manifold possibilities for its future.
A second step should be to support the linkage of democratically-minded individuals into civic networks. One individual may not be able to change society, but large groups of such individuals can. In Central and Eastern Europe, civic networks have emerged as a powerful political force for democratic change.
The pressure they have provided from below has helped ensure that political leaders play by the democratic rules of the game. Ultimately, in Iraq, the development of such a political constituency for democracy will provide the surest guarantee that the institutions we help put in place today will endure tomorrow.
This will no doubt be a difficult and time-consuming task. But America's credibility in the world depends upon us getting it right.
Stephen R. Grand is the John B. Hurford International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.