home > about cfr > leadership and staff > eric heginbotham > Strategic Clarity's Muddled Offspring
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December 18, 2003
Asian Wall Street Journal
In his meetings with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao last week, U.S. President George W. Bush said that the United States opposes any effort by the leader of Taiwan to "change the status quo" in its relationship with China. Minus the diplomatic code, Mr. Bush put the democratically elected leader of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian on notice against undertaking a referendum on any issue related to the independence or sovereignty of the island, or perhaps any issue at all.
Mr. Bush, the same U.S. president who two years ago appealed ardently for a more Taiwan-friendly approach to Asia, is now being pilloried by his own supporters for kowtowing to China and beating up a traditional American friend. What explains this extraordinary turn of events?
In part, the answer lies in simple realpolitik. China might be a potential— or imagined— strategic competitor in the long term, but under current geopolitical circumstances, winning its active cooperation on the very real problems facing the U.S. is critically important. In particular, China's cooperation is a lynchpin, if not the lynchpin, to American efforts to end North Korea's nuclear program. China's cooperation on Middle East policy is also desirable, if not absolutely necessary.
But part of the explanation for last week's events— and perhaps a better answer for why the U.S. president's warning to Taiwan was so blunt and unconditional— lies in the Bush administration's prior abandonment of the longstanding American policy of "strategic ambiguity." But if the purpose behind that abandonment was to clarify the U.S. position, it has only served to muddy the waters.
For several decades, the U.S. steadfastly refused to specify whether, or under what circumstances, American military forces would come to Taiwan's defense. In April 2001, however, Mr. Bush declared that the U.S. would do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself." While denying any policy shift, the appearance that Washington was leaning strongly toward Taiwan was reinforced by the nearly simultaneous decision to authorize the sale of a much wider array of advanced weapons to Taipei than at any time since 1982.
Critics of the longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity have argued that deterrence requires clear statements about what kind of activity will trigger retaliation. But the purpose of ambiguity was never simply to deter an attack by China on Taiwan. It was, rather, intended to minimize the chances of war by deterring both sides from actions that might lead to conflict— a much more complicated game.
There are an infinite number of scenarios that might lead to crisis or push a crisis into a war across the Taiwan Strait. Any effort to clarify the specific circumstances of U.S. involvement beforehand only opens the U.S. to manipulation by Taiwan, China, or both. The danger is that it is likely to cause more miscalculations than it will prevent.
Whether or not Mr. Bush's earlier commitment to defend Taiwan had anything to do with Mr. Chen's calculations, China certainly believed this to be the case. And that left the U.S. with little choice but to either clarify its stance or abandon the one China policy entirely. Having leaned too far toward Taiwan, the Bush administration was then forced to lean equally far in the other direction.
Putting the pieces back together will not be easy. Having pushed hard for a referendum, it is not clear that Mr. Chen will back down. Although necessary under the circumstances, last week's threats by the U.S. may backfire, pushing Mr. Chen to go for broke. Indeed his present stance suggests he will do this. U.S. threats could also encourage Taiwanese voters to vote for a referendum rather than deter them from it. Over the last few days, even the opposition parties in Taiwan have distanced themselves from the American warning.
Returning to a stable center course based on general principles rather than specific commitments will provide the strongest deterrent to precipitous action by both sides. The U.S. should make it clear that Taiwan would probably have to fight alone if it chooses actively to pursue sovereignty. But Washington should, to the maximum possible extent, avoid lecturing Taiwan on specifically what it can or cannot do, and avoid taking sides over specific political initiatives.
The issue of weapons sales to Taiwan is critical and should also be revisited. Taiwan has purchased very few of the weapons authorized for sale to it by the U.S., and even Pentagon studies suggest that software— training and integration— upgrades will be more effective than additional weapons. Yet expanding the authorized sales list has greatly complicated relations between China and the U.S.
Rebalancing American policy will, ironically, allow the United States greater flexibility in supporting Taiwanese democracy. Had Washington steered a middle course earlier, it would have been significantly easier to support Taiwan's general right to hold referendums while distancing the U.S. from any specific ballot on the question of sovereignty. And Mr. Bush might not have found himself sitting next to an unelected leader, while lecturing an elected one on what his country can or cannot do.
A bit of ambiguity about the extent of U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan would minimize the possibility of miscalculation or manipulation by either side. In messy democratic systems like Taiwan, miscalculation can lead to chains of events that are difficult to predict and even harder to influence.
Mr. Heginbotham is senior fellow of Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
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