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| Speakers: | Lawrence H. Summers, task force co-chair; president, Harvard University; U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, 1999-2001 |
|---|---|
| Henry A. Kissinger, task force co-chair; chairman, Kissinger Associates; U.S. Secretary of State, 1973-77 | |
| Moderator: | Charles A. Kupchan, project director; senior fellow and director of Europe studies, Council on Foreign Relations |
March 19, 2004
Council on Foreign Relations
The Washington Club
Washington, D.C.
CHARLES KUPCHAN: [In progress]--of the independent task force on Transatlantic Relations that has been sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. I'd like to welcome all of you here today.
To my left and right are the co-chairmen of the independent task force. To my right, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; to my left, former Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers. Let me begin by thanking both of them for the time and energy that they devoted to this project. This was a long, hands-on effort over the last several months, and both of them made this a priority, and I thank them very much for the commitment that they made to the project and to the Council on Foreign Relations.
I'd also like to thank the members of the task force. We were 26 total— 21 Americans, five Europeans. This was meant to serve as a forum for an American perspective on the transatlantic relationship, but we felt that we needed to have Europeans present to help us in our deliberations. The group was quite diverse in terms of political composition, as well as in terms of expertise— historians, economists, political scientists, writers, [and] policymakers.
The task force began about a year ago, when Les Gelb decided— the [former] president of the Council, Leslie Gelb— that we needed to focus some attention on the relationship between the United States and Europe, which was experiencing a certain amount of turbulence over the last few years. The current president, Richard Haass, then lent his advice and energy to it.
We met four times over the course of the last six, seven months. We then continued to deliberate over the phone and e-mail, passing back draft after draft, perhaps more drafts than I care to remember. And the final product is what you have before you.
We gather today at an important moment in the transatlantic relationship, the recent developments in Spain [on March 11, bombs on commuter trains in Madrid killed 201 civilians] again pushing to the fore the importance of transatlantic unity on dealing with common challenges. And we essentially spent the last several months trying to address three questions. Our mandate was threefold: one, to try to get some sense of the causes of the turbulence in the Atlantic relationship. What are its sources? Two, how important is [the relationship] moving forward? Does this remain a central relationship to Americans and Europeans— as central as it was in the Cold War? And three, assuming the relationship remains vital— and that was the conclusion of the group— what's the agenda moving forward? What lessons can we learn from the past? What is the concrete policy agenda looking forward?
To share with you the findings of the group, I'm going to now turn to the two chairmen. Let me begin with Dr. Henry Kissinger. Henry?
HENRY KISSINGER: Thank you very much, Charlie. I will just make a few brief comments so then you will be able to say you were present at a historic occasion. [Laughter.]
The basic theme that we sought to evolve was the extraordinary and continuing relevance of what has come to be known as the Atlantic partnership for the future. We are now at a point that is different from any previous one. Tensions have existed throughout the history of the Atlantic relationship. But what is unique about the present situation is that there is not, as there was in the Cold War, an overriding threat to provide a common reference point; and that there is a need, therefore, to define common objectives with more care than was necessary under those conditions.
We believe that the two sides of the Atlantic have a real choice to make. Each side of the Atlantic has the option of operating on the principle that they will, from now on, pursue their own national interest, cooperate where they can, but do not— but are no longer bound by any special relationship. Or they can redefine a special relationship, which we would characterize as being prepared to do things for each other beyond the dictates of the national interest and beyond doing things for each other defining a common purpose. The nature of the international system will be crucially determined by the decision that is made with respect to this if Europe organizes itself on the principle that its primary purpose or [the] identity it sought [is] in opposition to the United States.
What if the United States believes that Europe has become irrelevant and is just another player with which we have relations of convenience? Then we will be living in a world very similar to the pre-World War I world in which regions and countries pursue their own national interests in combinations of shifting relationships, adjusted from time to time. [This would be] a relationship that, at the beginning, may seem very tempting, but is very difficult to maintain over an extended period, and in the case of Europe, wound up in an armaments race and in a huge conflict.
Or we can take an international system less interest-based, more value-based, in which we— in which both sides of the Atlantic decide that the common histories, the common and comparable values, enable them to define a common purpose for the creation of the international system, and that they would cooperate under these new circumstances in bringing that about. Now it is obvious that in the last few years there have been major tensions, and we have experienced crises in the last few weeks. So it is not self-evident that the perspective of our group is inevitably the outcome that will be achieved.
We believe that the tensions are caused in part— in large part— by structural changes: by the collapse of the Berlin Wall [in 1989] and therefore the end of the Russian danger; by the attack on the United States on 9/11, which has been perceived in a different way in the United States and in Europe; by the redefinition of security policy that evolved after 9/11; and there were also disagreements caused by policies.
Our group decided that we would not try to achieve a consensus on the policy question because it ranged from people like myself, who strongly support the administration, to others who have a different view on specific policies. We decided we would concentrate on the question: where do we want the Atlantic relationship to go? And we are rather proud of the fact that we achieved a consensus among this diverse group [on] the direction, which we've outlined in this paper, for what we believe will be, if the historic decision that has to be made, which is very similar to some of the decisions that were made at the end of World War II, on which the then-international system was based. That is the basic theme of our report, and I will leave the details to the question period.
LAWRENCE SUMMERS: You know, I'm just going to say very briefly some of the same things that Henry said.
If the United States is an indispensable nation, as the report says, Europe is an indispensable ally for the United States. Our strength, our ability to have influence in the world, [and] our ability to advance our values depends crucially on our legitimacy. Our legitimacy depends, in turn, on our ability to cooperate with other nations and most especially with the nations of Europe. And that's why the future of the transatlantic partnership is of profound importance for the United States. It [was] tested after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and after 9/11 in a way that it has not been before, and it is for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to set a new direction. Whether that new direction will be [a] continued partnership to advance common values in a world of very different threats and opportunities than that of the Cold War, or whether that direction will be [one] of division, remains very much to be seen.
But we are in agreement— and the membership of our task force represents quite a wide spectrum— that the path of partnership, the path of rededicating policy on both sides to the objective of cooperation is the better course. We reject the view that it is appropriate or inevitable that Europe define itself as a counterweight to the United States. And we equally reject as appropriate the view that the United States should seek to divide Europe by assembling particular coalitions for particular causes. Rather, we believe that a unified Europe defined as a partner rather than as a counterweight to the United States is in the global interest.
KUPCHAN: We're now going to move to the question-and-answer period. Let me remind everyone that, unlike most Council events, this meeting is on the record. Let me also remind you to please turn off any electronic devices if you have not already done so. When you ask a question, please state your name and your affiliation in a very brief and concise question to one of our chairmen. Thank you. First question, please. And I believe we have a mike, so if you could just wait one minute.
QUESTIONER: I am Lincoln Gordon, presently at the Brookings Institution. I wanted to ask, Dr. Summers, how you would explain the concept of legitimacy to the average American voter? In this group, obviously, people understand what international legitimacy is, but how would you explain that aspect, which is fundamental to the report of your proposed policy, to lay people?
SUMMERS: I have to record that this may be the first time that a holder of the position I now hold had his advice sought on the question of how to explain something to the average American voter. [Laughter.]
QUESTIONER: Well, it's a good precedent.
SUMMERS: It seems to me that no matter how strong you are, you don't get very far without friends. We are dealing in a world of democratic nations. What people think of the United States is going to be very important to whether those countries cooperate with us or whether they don't. They see us as a bully. They are much less likely to cooperate and we're likely to have to do far more difficult things in order to encourage cooperation than if they see us as a partner.
There are hard things that have to be done in the world: whether it’s with respect to nuclear proliferation, whether it's with respect to humanitarian intervention, [or] whether it's with respect to supporting reform and promoting development. When we do those things in societies all over the world— when those things are done in societies all over the world, they will be much more effective if they are seen as reflecting a judgment of a global community rather than of a single nation. And so as we approach any part of the world we will be— our views will be taken more seriously. We will be able to have more influence if we are part of a partnership than if we are speaking only for ourselves— in part because they will be seen as less self-interested if we are part of a partnership.
KISSINGER: Can I make a point with respect to this?
SUMMERS: Please.
KISSINGER: Any international system has an element of power and has an element of legitimacy in it, in the sense that unless most nations consider the arrangement just, everything has to be settled by force. So it's in this wider sense that the concept of legitimacy is relevant.
But I want to pick up a point, which I don't want misunderstood. Namely, I don't want to create the impression that we were saying that the United States is acting as a bully and should stop acting as a bully. What we said specifically in the report when we dealt with the issue of multilateralism versus unilateralism was that this issue is very often misstated. The issue of unilateralism versus multilateralism arises primarily when there is no agreement on purposes. When there is agreement on purposes, then you automatically have a multilateral solution. When there is no agreement on purposes, then you have— the nation of the United States has to decide whether the particular issue so deeply affects the national interest that it pays the price for acting unilaterally or whether it says, "We don't care what other nations say."
And so— and we have also stated in this report that there was a long period of consultation, but I don't want to get into the policy disputes. I simply want to point out that this was not a characterization of our policy. It was a general statement that, where possible, we should see common purposes and act in a— on a common basis; but if absolutely necessary, then the question has to be decided from case to case.
KUPCHAN: Third row. Right here.
QUESTIONER: Elizabeth Drew. Dr. Kissinger, I don't want to disappoint you by not causing trouble. This all sounds swell, but—
KISSINGER: What?
QUESTIONER: I said this all sounds swell, yeah. There should be—
KISSINGER: Thank you. [Laughter.] That's more than I've gotten in previous eight years here. [Laughter.]
QUESTIONER: How do we get there? You, I'm sure, would not suggest we get there through changing administrations. What practical steps, not [options], not meetings— what practical steps can get us to this new relationship?
KISSINGER: I can't help—
QUESTIONER: [Off mike.]
KISSINGER: You know this joke about somebody who said the way to solve the submarine problem is to heat the ocean and boil them to the surface. [Laughter.] Somebody asked him how you're going to do that. He said, "I've given you the idea. The practical application is up to you." [Laughter.]
There is no— at least we have not discovered an easy technical gimmick by which you get there. The first thing you need is a commitment on both sides of the Atlantic that this is an important task. Secondly, you then need an effort on both sides of the Atlantic to address not the tactical questions of the next day, but where we would like the international system or the particular problem to move.
We gave an example on the issue of pre-emptive or preventive action, which has been a subject of great dispute. The group unanimously agreed that some such actions are necessary or can be necessary, but it also indicated that after this emergency period, an effort should be made, beginning with the Atlantic nations, to define principles by which such actions can be undertaken so that it is not in the definition of only one country. And one would say— I would say the same about the issue of nonproliferation and the issue of failed states and similar issues.
If I can add a personal comment on the issue of proliferation, which we did not discuss in that much detail, which is— one of the debates between Europe and the United States is the issue of negotiation or confrontation. But one other issue that needs to be discussed is, even if one goes the route of negotiation, how much time can one permit the negotiation in relationship to the growth of proliferation, and what does one do as that time expires? These are the sort of questions which we believe should be addressed. We are not saying that this will be successful. We are saying it is necessary if we want to continue to talk about an Atlantic partnership.
KUPCHAN: Do you want to add anything, Larry, or— next question? Please, right here.
QUESTIONER: Diana Lady Dougan, CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies] and Cyber Century Forum. I was intrigued that in your opening remarks, that neither one of you discussed the elephant in the corner— or not even in the corner— and that, of course, is the European Union. To what degree do you address the issue of the European Union as, quote, the legitimate negotiator in many areas? And obviously, trade is one that is especially sensitive. But when you're talking about an Atlantic partnership and an Atlantic alliance and the growing European Union, it strikes me that it has to— you have to figure out to what degree you want to make a separation— or even can make a separation at this point. So I'd appreciate both your comments on this.
SUMMERS: Ultimately political arrangements by which Europe carries on its policy, by which Europe carries on its trade policy, should be and will be decided in Europe. On the path that we make clear in this report [that] we very much prefer and want to see unfold, it will be in the United States' interest in the future, as it has been in the past, for the process of European unity to evolve. And that will obviously have consequences for the European— for the increasing role over time of the European Union. And that is something that is entirely— it's not for the United States to judge— but that is something that is entirely compatible with American interests.
We do warn that if Europe defines its unity not in terms of its internal objectives and our shared values in the world and in partnership, but if it defines its unity as a counterforce or a counterweight to the United States, that will inevitably be threatening to the alliance. You cannot have as a centerpiece of your foreign policy the containment of your closest ally. And if that were to be the direction in which European unity moved, it would inevitably fracture the alliance and raise profound questions for the American attitude towards European unity. But that seems to us to be neither necessary nor appropriate, nor what we would forecast. And so we would see on the path we outline in this report a role for the European Union that will be defined in Europe, but will in all likelihood show some increase over time.
KUPCHAN: Front row, please?
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Paolo Liebl, Maya Liebl Institute. The question that I have here is: if we're talking about unity of purpose, as Dr. Kissinger mentioned, is there an issue here that may be unsolvable in terms of the willingness of the European allies to resort to force? Is this a structural, philosophical issue which puts us at odds with the Europeans?
And if we look back at our visions, the American-made visions of partnership with Europe— well, we go back to President Kennedy's vision, you know, as outlined in the early '60s, of partnership among equals, that Europe would rise after World War II and everything would— and would be able therefore to share the burden and be an equal in terms of the relationship— this transatlantic relationship. Together— you know, in joint fashion— we would take care of issues of peace and security and development and what have you. It seems to me that time and again— in the '70s and the '80s and the '90s— an issue that has been sort of— perhaps [has] become moot now because of the end of the Cold War— [is] that use of force is the— is one of the fundamental problems, or the reluctance thereof that we perceive in the United States. European defense budgets are low.
KUPCHAN: Can I ask you to get to the question, please?
QUESTIONER: Yes. European budgets are low. The Europeans have, time and again, indicated that the American way of dealing with international issues— and this brings me to the issue of lack of unity of purpose— is the fact that problems have to be solved in a way other than the use of force, that the use of force is essentially not a good idea in general. Is this a systemic problem, or are they not hawkish? Thank you.
KISSINGER: I don't think we know the answer to that question today. Anybody who studies history will never argue that diplomacy operates in a vacuum and that the use of methods is irrelevant to the challenge that you face. So if one elevates this to a general proposition then one would certainly be entering a totally unique period, and we see that in the debate over what caused Libya to change [by announcing its intention to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs in December 2003]. Was it diplomacy in the abstract, or was it a combination of pressures plus the experience of Iraq? We as a group could not answer the question like this. We can only say that, on the basis of the experience which we have judged, some willingness to use force for some agreed objectives has to be a component for that policy. When that is and under what circumstances, we cannot define.
And it also remains to be seen whether the European reluctance is, in part, caused by the conviction that the United States will take care of the problem anyway, and that therefore they can focus on their domestic politics. And that they see no need to subordinate their domestic politics to an international crisis that they may analyze differently and which they think, in any event, will be taken care of by us.
SUMMERS: But I don't— I would just add two things. I don't think we would have made the recommendations we did if we perceived that there was as sharp a cleavage as your question suggests, with a systemic European unwillingness to use force in any circumstances. And our reading of the recent record is that there clearly are differences with respect to the use of force, but that they don't go to the kind of stark dichotomy that your question suggests.
The report also does make a related, I think important, point, which is the desirability in thinking about the partnership of focusing on complimentary capacities. It is important, if you get in them, to win wars. It's also important to win the peace. And the report discusses a range of capacities— peacekeeping, various kinds of police functions, [and] various kinds of foreign assistance functions— in which the European Union is the principal power in the world today and emphasizes the notion of complimentary capacity.
KUPCHAN: Second row at the end, please.
QUESTIONER: Doyle McManus from the Los Angeles Times. I presume you have had a chance to present your recommendations to people in the Bush administration. I'd like to know what responses you've received. Has the Bush administration fully embraced your recommendations? And to the extent that it has, what evidence can you adduce to show that policy and behavior reflect your recommendations?
KISSINGER: Actually— I see Larry is looking at me as if this is my department. [Laughter.]
SUMMERS: I'm not a confidant of the administration's. I don't know about you. [Laughter.]
KISSINGER: We have sent these recommendations, actually under both our signatures, to the administration.
SUMMERS: But only yesterday, so—
KISSINGER: That's right. Wednesday— I think Wednesday. And we have not had a reaction, but we did not ask for a reaction. At this point, my belief is that most of these recommendations are compatible with the direction in which the administration is moving, and I'd say most only because I want to give them some maneuvering room. But we have not had a formal reaction, so I cannot— this is my instinct, based on my knowledge of the people.
KUPCHAN: Please.
QUESTIONER: Ivan Lebedev with the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS. I have a question for Dr. Kissinger. And the question is, when you are talking about relations between the United States and united Europe, do you think that Russia can become a part of this united Europe in the near future, or do you think that it will still remain separated from the traditional and new United States allies in western and central Europe for quite a long period of time?
KISSINGER: The task that was set for the commission or for the— for our group was to discuss the relationship between Europe— or which was really defined as the NATO-Europe— and the United States, I believe, and therefore we have not dealt with that question formally. But it would surely be compatible with the spirit of our group to believe that Russia should be part of a dialogue that is generated by this approach. Whether it's part of Europe or in its own capacity, that is something to be left for the future, since after all Russia has not yet fully decided whether it wants to become part of an integrated Europe or operate with Europe on a friendly basis. But surely any discussion of the international system would have to include an important and respected role for Russia, as it redefines itself in new boundaries and with new institutions.
KUPCHAN: Let's go to the back row, please.
QUESTIONER: Yes. My name is Jeffrey Winograd. I'm the editor of the independent newsletter called FocusIsrael.com [www.focusisrael.com]. And I'd just like an elaboration on a sentence in your report where you talk about the [fact that the] United States needs to define more precisely its concept of a Palestinian state, and [that] Europe must more seriously— must take more seriously Israel's concern for security. Would you both be able to elaborate on exactly what you're talking about?
KISSINGER: Again, in fairness to my colleagues, I have to say that this was not a subject we discussed in extreme detail. What was in the minds of the drafters was this— the real— one of the fundamental issues of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is to define coexistence between the two societies so that normal life can begin again and [so] that people's attention turns, to some extent, [away] from their disagreements.
In the case of the Palestinians and Israel, the border is different from all the other borders in the region which used to be internationally recognized and is a cease-fire line. So therefore, a relationship of the border to security, but also a relation of the border to democracy is something that— I'm not speaking for myself— requires consideration. But whether one agrees with the particular definition that I have given, any solution would have to [not only] define a security arrangement for Israel, but also [define] a role for a Palestinian state that is compatible with the dignity of its peoples.
Now, I can go on and explain my own views on this subject, but it would not be fair to my colleagues. We wanted to call attention to the fact that this is an issue that requires solutions and which requires solutions by— in my view, by the abandonment of standard positions and [by] an attempt to see what both sides of the Atlantic could do by influencing those countries with which they have a special relationship.
SUMMERS: I think the last point is the crucial one. It wasn't our purpose to define the parameters of a Mideast peace plan, rather to highlight this as an area where cooperation between the United States and Europe was important and to highlight the respective relations between the United States and Israel and the Europeans and the Palestinians.
KUPCHAN: Sir, please.
QUESTIONER: Murrey Marder, Neiman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard. I would like both gentlemen to reply to this point. From what I can glean from just skimming through the report, I see no evidence that the central issue between the United States and its allies was actually discussed. Let me be specific. The most fundamental difference between the two allies— between the United States and the Europeans— is not simply the question of pre-emption or preventive war; it's a fundamentally different concept of internationalism. The Bush doctrine declares that the United States will seek an American version of internationalism.
Fundamentally, when explanations were asked about the Bush doctrine, reference was made, as Dr. Kissinger has referred indirectly, to the fact that there had been individual actions of pre-emption. However, there has never been in the United States a fundamental concept of pre-emption, never a Bush doctrine of pre-emption. Admittedly, very few Americans are aware of this, but I think more Europeans are aware of it. And I do not see how you can go from— you can even get back to square one without facing that problem.
SUMMERS: The judgment of the report— which I think is widely, though certainly not universally, shared by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic— is that there will be occasions on which some form of pre-emption is appropriate. For individual nations to arrogate to themselves— alone and without consultation, and independent of doctrines that are established collectively— the ability to engage in pre-emption would be highly problematic for the world system. Therefore it is essential that there be consultations on this vital issue. These consultations may not produce agreement on a precisely worded set of guidelines and they may not lead to agreement in any individual case, but it is important that as this area becomes more important, as it inevitably will given the nature of the threats that we face, that it be a matter for active dialogue between Europe and the United States.
KISSINGER: I went through eight years of Murrey Marder, and I know that he always asks very acute questions. Let me make this point. First of all, the notion of pre-emptive action is not all that new. After all, in Kosovo the action was pre-emptive in the sense that there was not an immediate military threat, but it seems to be more acceptable to many people because it involved human rights, while, say, [action in] Iraq involved a definition of security. But— so the notion of pre-emptive action is not that novel, and, in fact, we listed in the report a whole series of conditions in which it had been generally accepted.
What is new in the present situation is not an invention of the Bush administration. What is new in the present situation is that security threats have been privatized and that therefore some of the traditional methods of foreign policy that were used in the Cold War, like deterrence and diplomacy, do not work with groups that, one, have nothing to defend, and two, have stated no objectives. And then an additional poignancy is added to this through weapons of mass destruction. So it is an international problem inherent in the system, not in the actions of the Bush administration.
What we have stated in the report, however, is that actions that were taken under emergency conditions, under the impact of those new conditions, should, in the future, be discussed as principles at least to see whether some general principles can be evolved. But it has always been recognized that when a nation feels its fundamental security is threatened, it reserves the right to act if necessary on its own. The debate occurs at what margin you make that decision. But it is a key question for our period; I agree with that.
KUPCHAN: We have time for one final brief question from Dan Schorr.
KISSINGER: Your problem isn't brief questions, it's getting brief answers. [Laughter.]
QUESTIONER: Thank you. It seems to me that a fundamental need in any relationship, including an Atlantic relationship, is that one party be able to trust the word of the other. What happens to an Atlantic relationship when, as has now happened, one of the newest members of the North Atlantic alliance, Poland, its president [Aleksander Kwasniewski] says, "We were misled by the United States"?
KISSINGER: I haven't seen that comment, and I'd be very sad if that comment were made. And I can't believe that it was made without some context. But fundamentally, our— what we are describing is a relationship of confidence in a common future. I don't know what domestic politics may have influenced what statement. We're talking about general principles. General principles require a faith in a common future. And one of the problems that exists now is that too many— too much is sacrificed in too many countries, especially in Europe, to domestic politics.
SUMMERS: I don't know about the specific comment you referred to either, Dan. But trust is something that has to be built up over time. It depends upon relationships between leaders and their advisers. It depends upon habits of regularly— regular and timely consultation. It depends on managing disagreements privately and diplomatically, rather than through the press. It depends upon [a] mutual understanding of domestic political concerns in each other's issues. It depends also on a willingness to subordinate domestic political imperatives to broader and longer-term international objectives. And there's [a] need for— what the report, I think, makes clear is that there's [a] need for improvement on those dimensions on both sides of the Atlantic, and that absent the glue that, in a sense, the Cold War threat provided, it becomes that much more important. And this is not just a matter of the last several years or the next several, but [it] stretches further back and stretches further forward— [it] is [that] great efforts be made to maintain the partnership in a strong and trusting way.
KUPCHAN: Alas, our time is up. Let me end simply by thanking again Henry and Larry for their devotion to this important project, and thanks to all of you for coming this afternoon. [Applause.]
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