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| Authors: | Daniel William Christman John G. Heimann, Financial Stability Institute |
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March 26, 2004
Miami Herald
The Andean region is teetering on the verge of collapse, and the implications are serious for the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. Recent U.S. policy in the region has narrowly concentrated on the drug war in Colombia, though after 9/11 it added a strong anti-terrorism component. Although the drug policies have produced some positive results, this limited impact falls far short of the region's needs.
The U.S. focus on drugs in Colombia largely has neglected the other countries in the region. Venezuela is a powder keg ready to blow. Ecuador is plagued by habitual instability. Although strong economically, Peru is adrift politically. Bolivia could erupt again. In short, the prospect of regional collapse is real.
This is one principal finding produced by a Council on Foreign Relations commission we co-chaired, ''Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region.'' U.S. drug policy is embodied in the multi-billion dollar Plan Colombia and the annual Andean Counterdrug Initiative. However, Plan Colombia expires at the end of 2005. Andes 2020 outlines the next phase of U.S. engagement after Plan Colombia ends and recommends a new strategy with practical solutions.
Our drug-war policy can be improved in four areas: We need to approach the problems regionally, not country by country; rural development, including land reform, is necessary to transform the areas where the drug war takes place; targeting the baby cartels that run the drug trade will strike a blow to the industry as a whole; and we need to address the demand side of the problem in addition to the supply side.
The spraying of illicit crops has decreased coca production in Colombia, but these were offset by rises in Bolivia and Peru. This ''balloon effect,'' when drug traffickers move coca up and down the Andes mountain chain, is the Achilles' heel of our drug policy. Reorienting U.S. counter-drug policy to emphasize a regional approach, not a bilateral approach, could help pop the balloon.
The current approach is out of touch with rural realities. There is no effective ''carrot and stick'' method to solving the problems, because Andean nations cannot provide effective law enforcement or incentives for economic development in rural areas. The laws of economics suggest that coca eradication cannot be completely successful as long as poor people have only one viable option: to grow the most profitable crops, coca or poppy.
Along with the counternarcotics programs, Washington needs to dramatically increase funding for economic development and employment-generation programs. These are needed as part of a broad rural-development strategy that includes land reform, investment, increased revenue generation from local elites and the extension of social safety nets for farmers affected by the global economy.
Since our successful operations against the Medellin and Cali cartels, we have neglected the numerous ''baby cartels'' that operate under the radar screen of U.S. policy. Using powers in the USA Patriot Act, the administration should create an interagency team to financially decapitate these groups by freezing the assets of those supporting drug-trafficking and terrorism.
Finally, though policymakers have voiced recognition of the need to reduce demand, U.S. policy disproportionately spends resources on supply control efforts. A 1994 RAND study found that investing $34 million in treatment reduces cocaine use as much as spending $783 million for foreign source country programs (e.g., spraying) or $366 million for interdiction.
One specific idea to address the global issue of drug demand is the creation of a special World Bank development program for drug-cultivating countries, funded by the top 20 consuming countries in the world. These countries would contribute 10 percent of their annual counter-drug budgets to this World Bank fund, which would disburse aid for development programs in areas where eradication took place and replanting needs to be prevented. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime would verify the successful elimination of cultivation by producing countries. They would then receive access to the bank's special development fund and more flexible terms from the International Monetary Fund.
In light of the other security crises around the globe, we are not calling for an increase, or a reduction, of American commitment to the region. But right now the United States is spending billions of dollars on a drug war that is failing. Our efforts, as correct as they may have been in 1999, are also undermining other major goals in the region: security, democracy and prosperity.
To make the U.S. policy truly effective for this vital region, the U.S. government must extend Plan Colombia but restructure its priorities and resources. Together with the international community, we must commit to a policy of continued engagement with the Andean region that delivers improved and sustainable results for local government and the region's citizens -- and that serves U.S. strategic interests. The planning for this renewed commitment must start now.
Dan Christman, a retired Army lieutenant general, and John Heimann, former U.S. comptroller of the currency, co-chair the Council on Foreign Relations commission that produced the recent report, "Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region."
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