David L. Phillips, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, says the Bush administration “sold out” the Kurds when it failed to protect Kurdish rights in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, which set up Iraq’s interim government. Still, he says, the Kurdish leadership has ruled out independence for Iraqi Kurdistan, the northern Iraqi region that has been largely autonomous since 1991. Instead, it is pressing for a federal Iraq that will guarantee the Kurds a measure of autonomy.

“The Kurds have said that they are not seeking an independent state,” says Phillips, deputy director of the Council’s Center for Preventive Action. “They’ve made a strategic decision that they can secure their primary interests as a federal entity within Iraq.” Phillips was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on July 1, 2004.

With the interim Iraqi government in place after the June 28 handover of power, how do you view longer-term relations among the Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis?

There are four possible outcomes: First, Iraq becomes an Islamist country run by fundamentalist Arab Shiite clerics. Second, a dictator, in the mold of Saddam Hussein, emerges as a strongman to keep the country together. Third, Iraq falls apart, and Iraqi Kurdistan becomes independent. None of those options are good for the Iraqi people, the countries in the region, or the United States. The fourth and best option involves a constitutional arrangement distributing power among the country’s different ethnic and religious groups so that each of the communities feels it has a stake in a federal democratic republic of Iraq.

Isn’t that what the interim constitution, the transitional administrative law [TAL], calls for?

Yes, the interim constitution lays out a federal arrangement for power-sharing, but the Bush administration omitted any reference to the Transitional Administrative Law in Security Council Resolution 1546. As a result, the transitional administrative law has no standing. The TAL was the primary accomplishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority over the past 15 months. The Bush administration rendered it null and void by excluding it from the Security Council resolution authorizing Iraq’s interim government.

Why was inclusion of the interim constitution in the Security Council resolution so important to the Kurds?

The principles of the interim constitution may still inspire Iraq’s future governance, but there are no legal requirements that the transitional administrative law be the basis for any future arrangements in Iraq. This has caused the Iraqi Kurds a lot of anxiety, because the interim constitution enshrined a bill of rights that was a model for Iraq and the Arab and Muslim worlds. It also clearly stipulated federalism as Iraq’s future form of government. The problem with the interim constitution is that it didn’t affirm an absolute role for Islam as the foundation for law-making in Iraq and it included a clause— 61 C— that gave the Kurds an effective veto over the permanent constitution. [Powerful Shiite cleric] Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani objected to those two elements, thereby creating a crisis that has further polarized Iraqis and worsened prospects for harmonious intercommunal relations.

But Sistani himself is not opposed to federalism, per se, is he?

The important thing to recognize is that the Arab Shiites are not fundamentally opposed to the principle of federalism. The Kurds misunderstood their opposition to the transitional administrative law as opposition to federalism itself.

The Shiites are just opposed to a veto?

They are opposed to a veto, and they want to make sure that Islam plays a paramount role as the basis for Iraq’s future law-making.

But on the other hand, it is said that the Iraqi Shiites are not like the Shiite clergy in Iran, who took power in a hardcore Islamic state.

If the Arab Shiites are denied a rightful leadership role in the central government, the Arab Shiite community will become radicalized and we run a greater risk of an Islamist government taking power in Baghdad. The Arab Shiites have been disenfranchised by the Ottomans, the British, and the Baathists. As Iraq’s majority, they have a rightful claim to the lead role in the central government. That doesn’t preclude, however, significant power-sharing, with the regions allowing Iraqi Kurds to have at least as much self-rule as they did during the so-called golden years of de facto independence in Iraqi Kurdistan [1991-2003].

What does the Shiite leadership think about the Kurds question? Clearly, they realize the Kurds have a significant armed force and— if denied some of what they want— could try to secede.

If Iraq is taken over by a Sunni strongman or becomes an Islamist state, then the Kurds will feel they have no place in Iraq and will walk out. On June 1, Messrs. [Massoud] Barzani [leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party] and Jalal Talabani [president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan] sent a letter to President Bush threatening to cut ties with Baghdad and boycott future elections unless the transitional administrative law was affirmed as the basis for Iraq’s future government. When the Bush administration decided to omit reference to the law in the Security Council resolution, Barzani and Talabani left Baghdad and went back to Iraqi Kurdistan.

What is the situation now?

Arab Shiite envoys have made their way to visit Barzani and Talabani in order to assure them that Sistani’s opposition to the TAL doesn’t necessarily mean that he is opposed to federalism, which is an adamant demand of the Iraqi Kurds. Since the June 1 letter, there have been no suggestions by the Iraqi Kurds that they intend to disassociate from Iraq.

The Kurds are taking part in the interim government?

The Kurds wanted either the post of prime minister or president. They feel as though, as the second largest ethnic group in Iraq, they deserved one of the top two slots. They didn’t get either of them.

What did they get?

They got a vice presidency. The position of deputy prime minister was subsequently created and given to a Kurd. At first, the Kurds refused to accept it, but Barham Salih ultimately accepted the job. In doing so, the Kurds sent a message of flexibility.

What is the U.S. position now?

The United States is increasingly marginalized. America’s ability to influence events was already waning the closer we got to the handover.

So it’s up to the Iraqis themselves to bargain?

As in 1975 and again in 1991, the Kurds have been sold out by the United States. They have recently learned a hard lesson— that the Bush administration is not able or willing to champion their interests.

That’s a pretty tough assessment.

The Kurds have made a compromise. They’ve agreed to participate in Iraq in exchange for the rights and protections embodied in the transitional administrative law. When the Bush administration decided to abrogate the law—

When you say the Bush administration abrogated the law—

The Bush administration authored the Security Council resolution that established the bona fides of the interim government.

But it didn’t abrogate the law; it just didn’t put the TAL in the resolution.

Laws that are drafted by an occupying power no longer exist after governance is handed over to an internationally recognized sovereign.

So everything in that law no longer exists?

It is not enforced as law, but the spirit of the interim constitution may continue to inspire political discourse on Iraq’s future. That’s what the Kurds have to bank on. The United States isn’t going to go to great lengths to protect their interests or deliver a deal.

The Kurds have other problems, too. None of the surrounding countries want them to have an independent state either, right?

The Kurds have said that they are not seeking an independent state. They’ve made a strategic decision that they can secure their primary interests as a federal entity within Iraq.

What is going to happen when Iraq holds elections?

[First,] there’s going to be a national assembly that [will reflect] roughly the proportional ethnic and religious mix in Iraq and where the existing political parties will play a prominent role. The assembly will designate a constitutional commission, and the commission will draft a document that will need to be disseminated, debated, and ultimately ratified. If the Kurds want to influence the permanent constitution, they need to reach out to other Iraqis and seek support.

Are the Kurds willing to integrate the peshmerga [the Kurdish militia] into the Iraqi armed forces?

They are willing to transform the peshmerga by accelerating the retirement of some, turning others into a carbinieri, and integrating some into the Iraqi civil defense corps. The flashpoint is Kirkuk [the oil center in the north].

What’s the percentage of Kurds, Arabs, Turks, and others in Kirkuk?

The Kurds have been creating a reality on the ground by acquiring property and harassing Arabs so that they leave the city. There needs to be a census taken in Kirkuk. Prior to that census, an internationally supervised property-claims-and-compensation mechanism needs to be fully implemented. There’s also a need for a demarcation process drawing the boundaries of the federal entity called Iraqi Kurdistan.

Is the idea to have an Iraqi Kurdistan made up of three provinces or one big province?

No decision has been made on that.

Is it agreed that the oil revenue goes to the state, or does Kurdistan want a cut?

There’s a precedent for revenue-sharing in the U.N. oil-for-food program. The Kurds want to have a percentage of oil revenue from the Kirkuk fields that is proportional to their population.

Which would be what?

There needs to be a census, but probably 20 percent or so. My recommendation would be the establishment of a joint commission between the Iraqi Kurdistan Authority and Baghdad to manage future oil development and negotiate production-sharing agreements.

How would you forecast relations between the Kurds and Turkey?

Turkey is strongly opposed to Iraqi Kurdistan becoming independent and has threatened military action if the Iraqi Kurds move in that direction. That being said, Turkey’s greatest concern right now isn’t federalism in Iraqi Kurdistan, it’s radical Islam in Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan serves as a useful buffer between Turkey and Islamists in central and southern Iraq. The idea of a secular, pro-western entity called Iraqi Kurdistan, with which Turkish concerns have extensive commercial ties, is attractive to Turkey.

What about Iran and Syria, which also have Kurdish minorities? Do they have any views on what Kurdistan should be like?

Iran’s primary concern is instability. It wants democracy in Iraq because that will establish Arab Shiites in leadership roles. There are elements in Iran that have been fomenting intercommunal difficulties. At the end of the day, Tehran doesn’t want those difficulties to spiral out of control and lead to widespread violence or the break-up of Iraq.

And the Syrians?

Syria is a transit point for foreign fighters. There is $3 billion of Iraqi money in Syrian banks that the Baathists deposited. And Syria has a human rights problem with its Kurdish minority. Syria relies on cheap Iraqi oil, and it sells low-priced consumer goods to Iraq. The continued operation of the Banias [oil] pipeline [that runs from Kirkuk to Banias on the Syrian coast] should be linked to Syria’s noninterference in Iraq’s internal affairs, enhanced border control, better human rights protection for Syrian Kurds, and a return of contested Iraqi funds in Syrian banks.

Are the Iraqi Kurds Shiite or Sunni?

There are some Shiites, but they are mostly Sunni.

Do they feel any kinship with the Iraqi Sunnis?

The ethnic difference is greater than the religious bond.