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| Author: | Sharon Otterman |
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February 8, 2005
Some 40,000 Iraqi security force members “can go anywhere in the country and take on almost any threat,” General Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a Senate panel February 3. Myers’ estimate was the latest assertion in an ongoing dispute over how many Iraqis are fully trained for combat. At a January 18 hearing on her nomination to be secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there were 120,000 trained Iraqi troops, a number that approximated Pentagon estimates at the time. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) dismissed Rice’s number as “malarkey” and said, based on his observations in Iraq, that the tally was closer to 4,000.
Speaking before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Myers displayed a chart showing 79,116 Iraqi police and Interior Ministry security personnel, and 56,949 army and other military troops—a total of 136,065 security forces. All these forces are formally classified by the Pentagon as “trained and equipped.” But Myers said only a third of them were combat-ready; the remainder, he said, were prepared for less demanding missions like basic police work. Myers said he had confidence in the figures for the military forces, but the police estimates, he said, could be inflated. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz told senators that absentee rates in some Iraqi army units were as high as 40 percent, partly because many new soldiers fail to return from home leave.
Many observers say the vetting and training of soldiers, national guardsmen, and police, while improved in recent months, continues to be fraught with difficulty. The issue is of critical importance because, until the Iraqi forces are fully trained, U.S. and foreign forces will likely remain on the front lines against the insurgency.
According to the U.S. State Department, Iraq’s new security services have 12 separate but intertwined branches. The army is split into three branches: the regular army, the Iraqi Intervention Force, and the special operations division. The national guard functions as a separate entity, but cooperates with the army. The police force has three branches: the regular police, the Civil Intervention Force, and the emergency response unit. There is also the border patrol, the highway patrol, the dignitary protection service, and a small navy and air force.
Yes. The Pentagon sent a retired four-star general, Gary E. Luck, to Iraq in mid-January to review military operations and the training program. He is expected to recommend that thousands of additional U.S. Army advisers be assigned to Iraqi units to continue on-the-job mentoring and training. At present, there are a “few thousand” embedded U.S. advisers; this number could rise to as much as 10,000, Lieutenant General John R. Vines told The New York Times January 11. Vines will take over as the lead U.S. combat officer in Iraq in mid-February. Army General John Abizaid, the top U.S. military authority in the Persian Gulf region, said January 26, “Clearly, in the postelection environment in Iraq, we intend to increase the level of our training and partnership with the Iraqi security forces.” Abizaid did not provide details, and said they were still being worked out.
It depends on many factors, experts say: the effectiveness of the troops’ vetting and preparation, the quality of their equipment, their willingness to fight, and the strength of their insurgent enemies. Iraq’s interim Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib said February 7 he believed the country could establish full control of its internal security within 18 months. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld has declined to give a specific timeline.
In early 2004, Pentagon officials estimated that Iraq’s forces would reach what they considered full strength—250,000—in mid-2005. Since then, the insurgency has intensified and the performance of Iraqi units has been uneven: some have fought capably alongside U.S. forces, but others have deserted under fire. The U.S. military increased its Iraqi troop goal to 271,000 in June 2004 after a reassessment of the security situation. White House spokesman Trent Duffy said January 14 that President Bush hopes to have 225,000 Iraqi personnel trained by the end of 2005.
It appears to be, but because the U.S.-led training program has evolved over time, it’s difficult to know. “My sense is that we are on schedule,” says Steven Alvarez, a U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad. In September 2004, Rumsfeld testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believed 145,000 troops would be trained by the end of January 2005, about 20,000 more than current Pentagon estimates. A U.S. State Department report released January 5 stated that the training and equipping of the Iraqi army is “one week to one month” behind schedule. Significant desertion rates among police and national guard forces in Falluja, Ramadi, Mosul, and other insurgency hotspots have also set back the creation of effective units.
The U.S. State Department submits a quarterly report to Congress that summarizes how it spends the $18.4 billion in reconstruction aid that was granted in November 2003. Much of this money is being spent on training and equipping Iraqi forces. The Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTCI), the U.S.-led unit responsible for Iraqi security force development, provides some information about training courses and numbers of Iraqi graduates. The U.S. Defense Department also posts weekly training progress reports on its website. But Anthony Cordesman, a security analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who published an analysis of Iraqi security force development in early January, says additional details of the troops’ performance and combat-readiness are required to accurately assess their capabilities.
According to information released by the U.S. government, it consists of:
According to the Pentagon, as of January 19:
According to the January 5 U.S. State Department report, the combined forces will be at their required size by March 2005. In all, 18 of 27 planned battalions are now operating. A battalion can vary in size from 300 to 1,000 men, depending on its mission.
Most of the current soldiers have received eight weeks of basic training, according to the Pentagon. This consists of instruction in weapons, marching, discipline, and physical training. To beef up the ranks, a new, accelerated program is under way for new recruits who were soldiers or officers in Saddam Hussein’s army. These forces receive three weeks of U.S. training before joining army units.
Iraqi Intervention Force soldiers are slated to complete an additional six weeks of training in street fighting, building-clearing operations, and other techniques necessary for anti-insurgent operations in cities and towns; it is unclear how many have done so.
The Iraqi Special Forces receive intensive training in unconventional warfare operations, counterterrorism, survival, and escape skills that lasts 12 weeks or more. There are two special forces battalions. The 36th Commando Battalion consists of militia fighters linked to political parties who opposed Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi Counterterrorism Battalion receives specialized training in tracking terrorists. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense plans to create a third special forces battalion in the coming months.
Officer training programs have been slow to get off the ground, experts say. Among the recent developments: a pilot, three-month officer training program began in Baghdad in December 2004 with some 150 NATO trainers, and 42 officers have attended NATO officer training school in Europe, according to the U.S. State Department.
Poor but improving. Many Iraqi bases were destroyed in the U.S-led invasion or heavily looted afterwards, and some require nearly complete reconstruction. The State Department, which is charged with spending the $18.4 billion in U.S. reconstruction aid, has budgeted $691 million for rebuilding Iraqi army bases and other facilities. Construction is under way at five military bases: Kirkush, Kirkuk, Talil, An Numaniya, and Al Kasik.
National Guard forces are recruited and serve in regions where they live, often returning home at night after conducting operations or joint patrols with U.S. forces. As with the U.S. National Guard, Iraqi guardsmen serve part-time but are subject to full-time deployments. U.S. military analyses have found that these local forces are more vulnerable to insurgent intimidation and infiltration; at least two senior national guard commanders have been arrested for insurgent ties. General Luck is expected to recommend that more national guard soldiers be assigned to bases distant from their home regions, news reports say.
As of January 19, there were 36,827 trained soldiers in 45 battalions. In its January 5 report, the U.S. State Department forecasts the national guard will reach its target strength of 62 battalions and number 61,904 men by August 2005.
The three weeks of formal training follow the Iraqi army model, focusing on weapons instruction, marching, and physical fitness. Afterward, troops continue on-the-job training by conducting operations with coalition forces.
The Iraqi police force is broken down into three major divisions:
As of January 19, there were 58,126 trained police: 55,059 regular police; 2,862 in the Civil Intervention Force; and 205 in the Emergency Response Unit, the Pentagon reported. However, this number includes so-called unauthorized absences, police officers who have not reported to work for some length of time but are still being paid. Pentagon plans call for a total of 140,190 police in Iraq: 135,000 regular police, 4,920 civil intervention police, and 270 emergency response personnel.
New recruits undergo eight weeks of basic training, while former police from Saddam Hussein’s regime receive three weeks. As of December 27, 2004, 18,323 regular police officers had been through the eight-week training, and 34,801 were trained in the three-week Transition Integration Program.
In light of the insurgency, the eight-week academy curriculum now includes more field training, the State Department reports. The Pentagon is providing additional rifles and machine guns, improving security at police stations, and making efforts to link police stations to responsive back-up forces and police commando brigades.
Specialized police units get additional training. Civil Intervention Force members, for example, are due to receive six additional weeks of instruction; it is unclear how many have received this training.
As with army facilities, many Iraqi police stations were either destroyed in combat, heavily looted after the U.S. invasion, or have been attacked and damaged by insurgents. The U.S. State Department reported January 5 that construction is under way on 49 new police stations, and funding has been committed to complete an additional 867 stations.
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