home > by publication type > backgrounders > IRAQ: Weapons of Mass Destruction
Email
April 9, 2003
That seems certain. Although Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein claims to have destroyed his entire stockpile of chemical and biological weapons--and the capability to rebuild his arsenal--in accordance with U.N. Security Council resolutions imposed after the 1991 Gulf War, virtually no experts believe him. Moreover, intelligence officials say that Saddam continues to try to acquire nuclear weapons. In a September 12, 2002, speech to the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush called Saddam's regime a "grave and gathering danger" that is building up its stores of deadly chemical and biological agents and trying to get the bomb.
It's not clear. No U.N. weapons inspectors were in Iraq between December 1998 and November 2002. Current U.S. estimates of Saddam's arsenal are drawn from discoveries made by current inspections and from testimony by Iraqi defectors, satellite surveillance, other intelligence sources, and Iraqi purchases of specialized equipment and materials that could help produce illicit weapons. In 1991-1998, when inspectors were in Iraq, they did not uncover the full extent of Iraq's weapons capabilities because Saddam's regime had become so skillful at hiding its arms programs. Many suspect that deception continues.
Probably not, experts say. But Iraq has been trying to get the bomb since the early 1970s. The Iraqi nuclear program suffered a major setback in 1981, when the Israeli air force destroyed Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor, outside Baghdad. The loss of Osiraq drove much of Saddam's nuclear program into hiding. Experts say that at the time of the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq was just months away from having refined enough highly enriched uranium to build a single crude nuclear weapon--far closer to getting the bomb than coalition leaders had realized. But by the time the U.N. inspectors left in 1998, they had destroyed much of the Iraqi nuclear program.
Experts disagree. Iraq could probably pull together the funding, scientific expertise, technical equipment, and infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon, but it almost certainly lacks one key ingredient: enough fissile material, such as highly enriched uranium, necessary to spark a nuclear explosion.
We don't know. The Bush administration warns that Iraq has been trying to purchase a large quantity of sophisticated aluminum tubes that could be used in centrifuges to produce highly enriched uranium. If Iraq got the tubes, experts say it could still take years to build the centrifuges and then enrich enough uranium for a single bomb. A recent report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) argues that Iraq would need several years and extensive foreign assistance to build the facilities to produce its own highly enriched uranium; British intelligence offers similar estimates, arguing that it would take Iraq at least five years to create enough fissile material for a bomb.
Perhaps. Experts say Saddam could acquire a bomb far sooner by stealing or buying highly enriched uranium on the black market. A September 2002 dossier from Britain's intelligence services reports that Iraq has been trying to acquire fissile material from unspecified countries in Africa. Experts say that the former Soviet republics might also be a likely source. The Bush administration says that if Saddam acquired fissile material, he could have a nuclear bomb within months--an estimate that largely agrees with the independent IISS report. British intelligence estimates are somewhat more conservative, arguing that it might still take Iraq a year or two.
Not easily, experts say. Even if Iraq succeeded in making a crude warhead, the device would be very large and hard to transport abroad or pass to terrorists without detection. Iraqi missiles probably couldn't carry such a hefty warhead, and an Iraqi plane carrying such a device would risk being shot down by neighboring states.
Probably, most experts say, but we don't know exactly which ones. Iraq secretly launched an offensive biowarfare program in 1985. After the Gulf War, Saddam claimed to have destroyed all of his germ warfare agents and munitions but admitted to having previously produced 25 missile warheads and 166 aerial bombs variously filled with such agents as anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin. Iraq also claimed to have produced about 20,000 liters of botulinum toxin solution, 8,500 liters of anthrax solution, and 2,200 liters of aflatoxin-but U.N. inspectors believe the Iraqis probably made thousands more liters of the deadly agents. Some experts also say we can't rule out the possibility that Iraq might also have the smallpox virus tucked away; there was an outbreak of the disease in Iraq in the 1970s, and Iraqi scientists have experimented with the closely related camelpox virus.
Yes. In May 2000, the British government estimated that even if Iraq had halted its biological weapons program, it could rebuild it within months, and the Bush administration has accused Saddam's regime of constructing mobile bioweapons labs.
No.
Almost certainly, experts say. Iraq has admitted that it produced 3,859 tons of chemical weapons in the 1980s, including mustard gas and lethal nerve agents such as sarin, tabun, and VX. U.N. weapons inspectors uncovered and destroyed much of Iraq's chemical weapons stockpiles, munitions, and production facilities. But when inspectors were withdrawn in 1998, Iraq allegedly retained 6,000 chemical bombs, as well as 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas and some amount of VX. Iraq is also thought to have the precursor chemicals necessary to brew hundreds of tons more of mustard gas and nerve agents.
Several ways. While Iraq is prohibited by U.N. resolutions from building missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers (about 100 miles), British intelligence indicates that it retains a stockpile of up to 20 al-Hussein missiles with a range of 400 miles--enough to hit Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or U.S. bases in Kuwait and Qatar. These modified Scud-B missiles could be fitted with germ or chemical warheads and launched within 45 minutes of a command, according to British estimates. But other experts maintain that Iraq hasn't yet perfected the missile technology to deliver chemical or biological weapons; the explosion of a missile warhead could destroy much of its chemical or biological payload.
More feasibly, experts say, Iraq could spread deadly germs or gases with shorter-range rockets, artillery shells, unmanned low-flying drones, or sprayers mounted on fighter jets, helicopters, or ships. The Bush administration has also warned that Iraq could pass weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, although some experts argue that Saddam is unlikely to share his prized doomsday weapons.
Weigh in on this issue by emailing CFR.org.
To order Task Force reports, Council Special Reports, and Critical Policy Choices, please call, fax, or order online from our distributor, the Brookings Institution Press: phone +1.800.537.5487, fax +1.410.516.6998.
For information on other reports that are not for sale, or for general publications information, please call +1.212.434.9516 or email publications@cfr.org.
Start-Up Nation addresses the trillion-dollar question: How is it that Israel—a country of 7.1 million, only sixty years old, surrounded by enemies— produces more start-up companies than large, peaceful, and stable nations like Japan, China, India, Korea, Canada, and the UK? With the insights of geopolitical experts and investors, the authors examine this nation’s adversity-driven culture to answer this question and offer prescriptions for a global economy on the rebound.
In Forces of Fortune, Vali Nasr presents a paradigm-changing revelation that will transform the understanding of the Muslim world at large. He reveals that there is a vital but unseen rising force in the Islamic world—a new business-minded middle class—that is building a vibrant new Muslim world economy and that holds the key to winning the cold war against Iran and extremists.
In Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know, Julia E. Sweig presents a remarkably accessible portrait of Cuba's unique place on the world stage over the past fifty years, including its internal politics, its often fraught relationship with the United States, and its shifting relationship with the global community.
Complete list of CFR Books
The report of this bipartisan Task Force of distinguished leaders and experts represents a strong consensus on the importance of repairing America's immigration policy. It makes the case that maintaining America's political and economic leadership depends on attracting talented and hard-working immigrants, and on securing the country's borders in a smart, effective, and humane way.
This report finds that nuclear weapons will remain a fundamental element of U.S. national security in the near term, and makes recommendations on how to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. deterrent nuclear force, prevent nuclear terrorism, and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
About Independent Task Forces at CFR
Complete list of Task Force reports
Identifying international threats and acting on them may be the most difficult job for U.S. policymakers. This report
provides an actionable road map for managing international threats before they erupt into crises and makes a strong case that preventive action is not a luxury but a necessity.
For more than a decade, the United States has mostly watched from the sidelines as Asian countries organize themselves into an alphabet soup of new multilateral groups. In this report, the authors review the relationship between pan-Asian and trans-Pacific institutions and suggest policy guidelines for a new U.S. approach to this new Asian landscape.
Complete list of Council Special Reports
To request permission to reprint or reuse CFR material, please fill out this permissions request form (PDF), referring to the instructions on page 1.
Copyright 2009 by the Council on Foreign Relations. All Rights Reserved.