home > by publication type > transcripts > History Declassified: Nixon in China
Email
| Speakers: | The Honorable Winston Lord, co-chairman, International Rescue Committee; former U.S. ambassador to China, 1985-89 |
|---|---|
| C. Yen, C.K. Yen professor of Chinese American relations, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia | |
| Presider: | Thomas Blanton, director, National Security Archives |
March 21, 2005
Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
New York, N.Y.
[Note: Transcript begins in progress]
THOMAS BLANTON: --start with Ambassador Lord, whom everyone in this room, I’m sure, knows. He was there on that trip. He tells some of the great stories from that trip. And I’d love to just get your eyewitness reaction just to the movie as a show.
WINSTON LORD: I think, in 45 minutes, this piece did a remarkable job of summing up not only this trip, but the surrounding elements. You start with the general background at the time, then you move into the motives on both sides, then the process of getting in touch and signaling, then the substantive issues involved, then the actual trips and the substance of those trips, and finally the fallout and the impact. And to do all that in 45 minutes, I think, is quite remarkable. So I’m very positive about this on the whole. Some of my best lines were left on the cutting room floor. [Laughter]
BLANTON: I know. I was part of the interview.
LORD: Actually, you guys got all your best ones in, but a lot of mine were cut.
BLANTON: We had so few, you know.
LORD: Aside from that, and we can get into greater detail in the questions and answers, I want to make it very clear I’m very positive on this piece. There are some things that obviously had to be given so much short shrift, given the time constraints; for example, the significance, uniqueness of the [1972 joint U.S.-China] Shanghai Communique and its substantive overtones. I also think there was a tendency at times to suggest the U.S. was making most of the concessions. Not always, but for example, on Taiwan or the intelligence reports. And I would, of course, reject that. I do think each side had to take some courageous steps and each side gained from it. But I can develop this thesis further, if you like, in the questions and answers. We’ve got to keep the initial answer brief. And I repeat what I’ve said behind your back as well as in front of the people who produced this. I really think it’s a very, very well-done piece.
BLANTON: I just wanted to ask Chen Jian, who has done much of the archival sleuthing in China that has brought out this interactive quality of the diplomacy, just to comment about one matter which is still a curiosity to me, which is: How much of the new evidence of what we know of the Chinese side of this initiative is the result of a conscious decision by the People’s Republic of China, by the government, to tell a story of which it’s proud, and how much is it closer to the process we’ve seen on the American side, of former officials telling part of the story, some documents telling part of the story, some reporting, some research? How much is deliberate and how much is coming out from sleuthing?
CHEN JIAN: As I said toward the end of this program, I believe the Chinese-American opening was a grand turning point in Chinese history in many different senses. I completely agree with Ambassador Lord. It was not just the U.S. concession to China. And actually, just think about this. You know, China changed from an isolated, revolutionary country, anti-American and Communist country, and into something today, market economy, and it’s more capitalist than any— or many other capitalist societies in the world. What kind of concession on the Chinese part?
For this documentary, opening, I think 10, 15 years ago, it was simply inconceivable. And no other country had based its own legitimacy upon interpretation of history. And in order to dominate interpretation of history, then you must monopolize the control over historical documents. So it’s fundamental.
I just returned from China yesterday, and in the past two weeks, something exciting was happening. The State Department Historian’s Office has signed, just two weeks ago, two memorandum of understanding with the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives about joint publication of Chinese and American documents on the U.S.-China opening. This is unprecedented. And I believe the reason why— you say, this is deliberate? I don’t know. But if somehow even a Communist government, no matter how [inaudible] it actually is today, they will have to respond to the situation.
The declassification of U.S. documents, and when you see in Beijing street the— Kissinger in a transcript, not formally published, but the pirate version was on sale [laughter] and the way you see minutes of Chairman Mao Zedong’s talks with President Nixon and with [former Secretary of State] Henry Kissinger, and also now, even in China we can see the original version of the photo with Ambassador Lord [laughter]--
LORD: It’s been restored! [Laughter]
CHEN: You have been restored and come back to historical records. And there you find it’s a huge push for the Chinese government to respond to the situation. And also, more importantly, this is— in Chinese-American relations and in the history of the Chinese Communist government, this is a glorious moment for them because they won. I completely agree with Nancy Tucker, in a way, you say, you know, both sides won. So, exciting things are happening. And we will see more documents to come out in the next months or two, three years.
BLANTON: I’ll just remind you that we’re on the record tonight, which is somewhat unusual for the Council. But the movie is certainly on the record, and what Win Lord and Chen Jian and I have said is certainly on the record. I just want to come back to a comment that I think [former ambassador to China] Jim Lilley alludes to in the show where he says he thinks the card game is still going on. One of the questions that the producers asked all the people interviewed for this show was, “Who won the card game?” And you saw some of the answers. At the end, Jim said it’s still going on.
And it reminded me of the article that [Secretary of State] Condoleezza Rice wrote during the campaign of 2000, published in Foreign Affairs, saying the real challenge for the 21st century is going to be China as our strategic competitor, and the key military challenge is going to be missile defense. And that was all, of course, before 9/11. I’m just wondering, as a former ambassador, former head of policy planning, and long-time China watcher, do you think we’re going to see that come back, that focus on China as a strategic competitor?
LORD: Well, that’s a big issue, and I’ll try to be brief, because I think we probably want to stay on the film itself, rather than getting into U.S.-China policy, although we can do that in the questions.
That is the big geopolitical question of the next 20 years. When China, which is already growing stronger, when it’s much more self-sufficient even than it is today militarily and economically, are they going to be a cooperative world partner, or are they going to be a competitor? Are they going to be disruptive on the world scene, or they’re going to be integrated as part of the world community? And the honest answer is we don’t know. And that’s our challenge.
As far as the card game, there’s no question the Soviet Union is less of a player than it was, but it’s still a significant player. I, myself, unless we really screw things up in our diplomacy, am not concerned about the Russians and Chinese getting close together. In terms of economic incentives, the Chinese clearly need us more. They have a history, they have bad chemistry, they have a long border with— they’ve settled, but there’s still tension about the overlapping populations. So there’s always going to be a card game, if you want to be crude in the language. But I think we have distinct geographic and historic advantages.
BLANTON: Were you surprised by any of the new evidence on the Chinese side just about the Chinese motivation and the initiative and the timing?
LORD: Not really. We knew, even back in ‘71 and ‘72, that obviously Mao and [Premier] Chou [Enlai] were running this. One slight mistake was saying we’ve just now recognized Mao’s role in this. We’ve all known that for 30 years. And it was clearly Mao and Zhou. What we didn’t know at the time was how much resistance there might have been at high levels. We now know [Red Army Commander] Lin Biao, who died trying to flee China, was probably against it. Madame Mao was clearly less enthusiastic. And it was a revolutionary move by Mao and Zhou. The four marshals’ role [who had written a report to the Chinese leadership recommending a new approach to the United States], I didn’t know about a year ago, or two years ago. I went to China and we had a conference and this came out. So that is news to me. Specific details, like the chairman highlighting the president’s inaugural speech is also new to me. But the general feeling of why they opened up, and that it was a two-person show over there, Mao and Zhou, was well-known even back in the ‘70s.
BLANTON: Let me just ask this one. [Deputy Press Secretary to the President] Gerald Warren was also, I believe, on that trip, that historic trip. I was wondering: Did anything strike you as completely new to you from this—
GERALD WARREN: [Laughter] Well, you must recognize that my—
BLANTON: There’s a microphone.
WARREN: My role as— was— almost throughout the Nixon years, was as a decoy. When Win and Kissinger and the president drove off to meet Mao, I was in front of the residence where they were staying— they went out the back way— with the press pool in the car, waiting for Nixon to come out the front door. Of course, he didn’t, and I had to be as much in the dark as they were, because, you know, they didn’t trust me any farther than they could see me. But other than that, no.
I do think, though, that I must say this. The change in China has been much greater than the change in the United States. The benefits to China have been much greater since that visit than the benefits to the United States, even though the diplomatic benefits have been great. But we had every bus in China. We had every vehicle in China, most of them Russian-made automobiles, for our use on that trip. We had every English-speaking interpreter in the Foreign Ministry at our disposal for that trip. And you go back— and I went back 15 years later— and the change in China was immense. It’s like the United States going from the turn of the 19th century to the turn of the 21st century. It was that graphic a change. So the benefits to China were immense.
LORD: Well, I agree that China has changed a lot more, obviously, since ‘71 and ‘72 than we have. But I do not agree that they got more benefits out of it than we did. I do think, as the— as it’s summed up, at the end, both sides won. And obviously China not only got balance against the Soviet Union, which they wanted; they came out of their isolation, got in the U.N. [United Nations], began to make their economic development. All of that is huge. But the advantages to us, with our relations with the Russians and how we ended the Cold War, some help on the Vietnam War, stability in Asia, their own economic growth, I really think it’s a mistake to suggest that one side got more out of this than the other.
WARREN: I agree. I think the world was the winner.
LORD: Yeah.
WARREN: The whole world. And the thing that really surprised me— and you mentioned this in your— in the film— is how asleep we were at all of the signals, the [journalist Edgar] Snow visit, the ping-pong [Chinese invitation to the U.S. ping-pong team in April 1971]. The president made a speech on the way out to San Clemente when he was about to announce his visit. He made a speech in St. Louis which was supposed to be a domestic policy speech but turned into a classic Nixon “tour de horizon,” in which he said the centers of power will be Europe, Russia, China, Japan, the United States. And our guys didn’t pick up on it. The White House press corps thought it was a terrible speech. They couldn’t pick up on it. But every Brit and every Asian reporter in Washington hearing it at the State Department did know something was going on, and they all rushed out to San Clemente to be there at the announcement.
LORD: Well, I’ll go beyond that. I think it was the same speech— at least there was one in Kansas City that Nixon made—
WARREN: Kansas City. That was it.
LORD: And Zhou and— we were traveling, Kissinger and I— I forget which trip it was— setting up the Nixon trip. Zhou Enlai gave us a copy of the president’s speech, because we had been traveling. And so he said, “Your president made a very interesting speech. Here it is.” [Laughter] Now that does raise also the signals in advance of the secret trip and whether they could have been picked up. I don’t think that anyone could be blamed for being shocked and surprised at what happened.
Having said that, the signals publicly were beyond what’s in this movie. We talked about the toast to [inaudible]. But there’s also unilateral travel and trade changes that we made through Commerce and Treasury, letting some people travel there. These were steps that were economically not significant but symbolic. The Chinese didn’t have to take any reciprocal steps, but they would note this as further evidence. Also, the president, as you probably remember, put out an annual report on foreign policy every year, and we also gave suggestions of the directions we were going in. But no one could have predicted, of course, the dramatic way we went about it. But the tea leaves were there going all the way back to Nixon’s foreign policy article in Foreign Affairs, all the way through that he was planning to do something, but no one expected [it to be] this dramatic.
BLANTON: I’d love to ask my friend, [former U.S. State Department Director of Intelligence and Research] Tom Hughes, who I think participated in that estimate that I flashed on the screen up there from August 1969— the National Intelligence Estimate— that said there’s no chance that China’s going to change its anti-U.S. stance. You had some other friends and information, people like [head of Far East intelligence for the State Department] Allen Whiting saying to you, “Well, maybe, maybe not.” What did you— what’s your retrospective today, do you think?
TOM HUGHES: This is August ‘69?
BLANTON: Yes, sir.
HUGHES: No, I was in London when all this—
BLANTON: You were— oh, good. [Laughter] You got out of that one!
HUGHES: Got out of that one.
BLANTON: It was your— that was a clever move, because up until— Nixon made sure that Tom Hughes went to London [laughter] I think is the real story I would like to get on the record some day. Yes, sir, Mr. [inaudible].
QUESTIONER: Win, could you say a little bit more about the role that thinking about Vietnam played with Nixon, Kissinger, and with the whole policy team? I mean, there was a tendency— especially you see this in Kissinger’s memoirs, sort of to hope, or to count on China and the Soviet Union— we were playing both cards, of course, on Vietnam— to somehow help us out. And I think there were a lot of illusions about what the Chinese would do on Vietnam, and a lot of illusions about what the Russians would do on Vietnam, which prevented us from realizing for a long time that we had dug ourselves into a hole from which we’d have to climb out by ourselves.
LORD: Well, I’ll try again to be brief. There were many motives on the U.S. side for opening up, as the movie I think effectively shows— the Soviet factor, stability in Asia. Vietnam was not the top one, but it was a significant one, hoping that by moving with both the Chinese and the Russians, we would isolate Hanoi, make them more flexible in negotiations.
The purpose, of course, of the opening with respect to the Soviets, was to have improved relations with the Soviets, not to be antagonistic. And it had a dramatic impact, not only the summit meeting, which was set up within weeks after this secret trip, but also the [1972] SALT [strategic arms limitation treaty] agreement, economic agreements, the Berlin agreement, all within a matter of weeks or months, as you well know. And we felt that by having this dramatic improvement with both Moscow and Beijing, that Hanoi would, as a minimum, feel psychologically isolated; their two big patrons dealing with us bilaterally, and indeed, having summits in the middle of the fighting along the Chinese border.
I think Nixon put more stock in, particularly the Russians, as opposed to the Chinese, hoping to bring this thing to a close, than Kissinger. We both thought it would help. I think it did have some help around the edges. We never expected them to cut off aid. But we did make the pitch to the Chinese and to the Russians that it’s in your interests to get this war over. We particularly said to the Chinese, you want to do it in a way that doesn’t humiliate the United States. If we’re going to balance the Soviet Union together with you, you can’t have us leaving by overthrowing a friendly government in Saigon. We’re willing to leave, as this suggests, in terms of withdrawing our troops that won’t be close to your border. And so we appealed to them. And the Chinese sent emissaries to Hanoi shortly after some of our trips. The Russians also talked to them.
So I think it was of some help in getting the Vietnamese finally to agree to a deal that was military only, and to drop the condition that we overthrow the Saigon government. But I wouldn’t exaggerate the Russian-Chinese impact, and it wasn’t the primary reason for opening to China.
BLANTON: I’d love to have Chen Jian just briefly comment on that question. There’s some evidence that the trip actually helped lead to the ultimate 1979 war between China and Vietnam as part of the—
CHEN: There are two points I want to emphasize. First of all, after Kissinger’s secret trip, the first foreign country Zhou Enlai traveled to visit and to brief [on] the meeting was Hanoi, the leaders in Hanoi. He tried to explain to the Vietnamese leader that China would stick to the principles, would still support Vietnamese people’s struggle against U.S. imperialism. But the Vietnamese leaders were not convinced. Actually, I would say that Sino-American rapprochement played a very important role, not decisive, not only, but a very important role in creating a further gap between Beijing and Hanoi.
And secondly, actually, China did help, especially now that the new declassified documents indicate that in December 1972, in the crucial moment that the Paris peace talks [to cease fighting in Vietnam] were at the juncture, and Zhou Enlai represented Beijing and advised the Vietnamese leaders that “OK, you must now cut a deal with the Americans.” And Zhou Enlai’s argument was that “OK, let the Americans go. When the Americans have left Vietnam, OK, you control the scene. So sign the agreement with the Americans.” That’s the— that is the main argument. And then, in the late 1970s, when the third Indochina war was being shaped, the Vietnamese were very angry. They say, “OK, you know, you always gave us wrong advice.”
QUESTIONER: [Inaudible]
CHEN: The Chinese.
BLANTON: Mr. Kalb?
QUESTIONER: I’m Bernie Kalb. I was one of the reporters—
BLANTON: There’s a microphone for you.
QUESTIONER: I’m Bernie Kalb. I was one of the reporters on that trip. I went over there for CBS News, along with other CBS correspondents. And when I see this, of course, it evokes all sorts of memories. But the overriding residual I pull out of this is what a waste of years it was before the United States and China effected this rapprochement.
When we stop to think, for example, of Mao Zedong using that specific phrase the Chinese had stood up, that use of that verb, in 1949, from the Pavilion in Tiananmen Square; you think of the way the years piled up before Nixon did his piece in Foreign Affairs called— calling for how do we find an end to bring China out of its angry isolation— but for me, among many memories, the little bit of picture that the film makes something about was the handshake between President Nixon and Zhou Enlai.
I keep thinking of 1954— I was not there at that particular time— the 1954 Geneva conference [for restoring peace in Indochina] where the Chinese betrayed the Vietnamese. There’s simply no question about the betrayal of the Vietnamese by the Chinese, by Zhou Enlai. But in 1954, when John Foster Dulles was secretary of state, and when Zhou Enlai at that session in Geneva held out his hand to shake and John Foster Dulles gave him the cold affront of walking right by— and I was on the— at the airport, and I was waiting for how Nixon would emerge from that plane, my own feeling was, Nixon was— Nixon’s arm had been stretched, that regular arm was 15 feet long [laughter] so it could offer him a— what is a supplicant’s handshake to Zhou Enlai.
And the choice of that picture of the president in motion, not both feet planted on the ground, was just so delicious for me, because I keep thinking of the waste of time and the wasted years that went by. The French had recognized early. Other countries had. But the United States, with an incessant tattoo of anti-Communism and against the Chinese and the “red menace,” et cetera, et cetera— and I look at this thing, and I think of the waste, waste of years. Who knows what might have been the dividends of an earlier rapprochement between the United States and China, whether the Chinese would resist at the [inaudible] or whether the United States did resist and so forth. I’m thinking of ‘54 in Geneva. I’m thinking of the [1955] Bandung conference [to promote Afro-Asian cooperation] when the Chinese would— reporters who could not go into China after Edgar Snow, et cetera. There’s so much on this story. And I congratulate the 45 minutes, but I keep wondering what has been left out.
LORD: Well, let me make a quick comment on this issue. We can debate about whether there were lost opportunities and wasted time in the ‘50s and ‘60s, and so a strong case could be made for that.
The problem for the United States side, of course, was Taiwan. And whether it was the Warsaw or Geneva talks, or our secret contacts in the beginning, the Chinese position essentially was, “We can’t even talk to each other until you agree on Taiwan and buy our position,” which is very tough for any American president, whatever the geopolitical advantages, to overcome and the domestic uproar, not to mention dumping a faithful friend.
And so it’s easy now to say what a waste and we should have moved quicker, but you’ve got to remember what any president, whether it was Kennedy, Johnson, or Republicans, faced. And indeed this was right up until the end. When we were writing through the Pakistani channel, and I was basically drafting the notes with Kissinger, we wouldn’t agree to go to China unless the agenda would be broader than Taiwan. So the initial notes we got from Zhou Enlai through the Pakistanis basically said come on to China and we’ll talk about Taiwan.
And so this issue was still there, and we went back very firmly. We knew we had to talk about Taiwan, obviously, but we said, “No, we’re only going to come if the agenda is broader.” So the breakthrough came, and there was considerable delay, when the Chinese finally agreed that the agenda would be beyond Taiwan. Now, I don’t want to dominate it too much, but on the Taiwan issue, again the suggestion is made here that it was all U.S. concessions. There is a quote of mine saying they had to make some moves too. After all, we had a defense treaty, we had troops there, and so on.
I would make three or four points about what Kissinger did in that secret trip and what the president did. And there’s no question it was secret and hidden from the world. But in defense of that, first of all, we could not have moved ahead— so you have to balance off the pluses and minuses— without some formulations. Secondly, it’s easy to nitpick now what a perfect scorecard would have been, forgetting what the other guy has to give as well.
Thirdly, the formulations that Kissinger used, for example, in July ‘71, and the president, were important but they were rhetorical. They didn’t require action. We will not support independence. We will not let the Japanese get in there. These are important statements for the Chinese and they needed that to move ahead, but it didn’t require us to do anything. What we didn’t do was [say] “We’re going to switch diplomatic relations, we’re going to annul our defense treaty, we’re going to pull our forces out.” Even the reference to forces was “some forces as there was greater stability in the region,” which was a reference to Vietnam, because our forces in Taiwan were there not just for Taiwan, but for Vietnam and the general situation, which is another way of saying, “If you want our forces out of Taiwan, help us on Vietnam.”
So the only point I’m making is that I think there was a slight suggestion that we went overboard on Taiwan. And remember the concessions they made. And then, finally, I would point out that Taiwan has not done badly. To this day, we have de facto embassies; we’re selling arms; the security has been assured, although it’s still threatened in many ways; they’ve had incredible economic success; and they’ve become a democracy. So I think you got to keep all this in mind when you talk about the Taiwanese.
BLANTON: Absolutely. I think the reason those transcripts were news was because they contradicted what was in Kissinger’s memoirs, rather than they were unreal about the deal at the time.
LORD: Yeah.
BLANTON: And second, I think the larger point is that the documents show that Kissinger’s own and Nixon’s own discussions with the Chinese never envisioned the Taiwan that we have today.
LORD: Right.
BLANTON: In fact, they were talking about a time frame of 10 or 15 years for unification, which is not the kind of independent, economically strong— well, relatively independent, shall we say— country. But yes, sir, in this row. Yes, sir.
QUESTIONER: Watching the film—
BLANTON: Microphone. Just identify yourself.
QUESTIONER: Steve Low, Foreign Affairs Museum Council. Watching the film as a non-China expert, you come away— I came away with two observations. One was the “great man” theory of history. As the film presents it, this was an initiative of Nixon’s; not Kissinger to Nixon, but Nixon to Kissinger; and it was also an initiative of Mao to the four [marshals]. And the impression you get from the film is that he knew what he was going to get from them and he invited them to come back. So it was these two men simultaneously coming to the same conclusion.
And you wonder: Why did they do it at this moment? And again, the impression you get is the Soviets had overplayed their hands, and both countries sought— so really, it happened because of the Soviets.
LORD: Well, I would not— that was a driving factor. For the Chinese, there was another factor. They were totally isolated from the world because of the Cultural Revolution. They withdrew all their ambassadors except Huang Hua in Egypt. And they knew when they opened with us that Japan and Europe would follow, not to mention the United Nations, and they would break out of their isolation. Some of them didn’t give a damn about isolationism, but people like Mao and Zhou did, particularly to balance off the Russians. So there was that additional fact. And for us, there were the other factors that we’ve already talked about. But, obviously, the Soviet dimension was the crucial one.
CHEN: And also, you must remember, you know, on the China side no one else, not Zhou Enlai, not the four marshals, but Mao: Mao was the person who could make the decision. And also, there are two important background factors we must remember. First of all, in 1969, China and the Soviet Union were virtually at verge of major war. And secondly, that was the time the highest stage of Mao’s continuous revolution, the cultural revolution was winding up.
BLANTON: Yes, sir? Right in the back, in the blue, and then on the aisle.
QUESTIONER: Thanks. David Apgar, Corporate Executive Board. What implications does this history have for our current efforts to get China to manage North Korea to a more stable nuclear policy? For example, one might conclude that since the Chinese had seen so much secrecy on the part of the U.S. government in managing internal communications 30 years ago, that they might not be so surprised at, you know, things like this weekend’s revelations that the U.S. did not disclose everything we knew about transfers of enriched uranium from North Korea via Pakistan to Libya. Maybe they wouldn’t be so surprised, given the earlier history. Are there any conclusions along these lines that one can draw from the history?
CHEN: You know, China is a different country today. And even in 1969 to 1972, China was still in confrontation in a general sense with the United States, and in sharp confrontation with the Soviet Union. And today, China increasingly is becoming an insider of international community. And China’s knowledge of the United States today is of no comparison back in the late 1960s and 1970s, you know, they knew so little about the United States.
I think what the Chinese government today tried to do is to try to show that China is a responsible actor on the international scene. If there’s anything the Chinese could draw from the lessons of— the event of 30 years ago— was that it pays if China tries to become a responsible member of the international community. And then the opening was the first step toward the big change.
BLANTON: Let’s see, Mr. Keeny, I believe. Here’s a microphone.
QUESTIONER: Yeah, Spurgeon Keeny, National Academy of Sciences. As one of the innumerable bureaucrats and officials who were very peripherally involved in this issue, I was— and who were totally surprised by the trip, I’d like to say I think this is one of the most interesting and best documentaries I’ve ever seen. But I have a question for Winston Lord. Aside from yourself, who were the people in government, or outside of government, who really were influential in Nixon’s initiative in taking this move, contrary to the advice or at least tendency of most of the people around him in government? To what extent was this totally his own idea, or who was influencing his thinking?
LORD: Well, Nixon— the quick answer is, it was basically totally his own idea. Kissinger also very much saw the geopolitical advantages of this move. And one thing I do question is [National Security Council (NSC) staff member Alexander] Haig’s comment that he and Kissinger thought the president lost his mind when he sent this memo. [Laughter.] That just doesn’t make any sense to me. I was not in the front office at that point; I caught up with this later. But they would have seen the immediate advantages— I know Kissinger would have. Maybe they were surprised that the president moved within a week of his inauguration to get in touch with them. But I don’t quite understand that Haig quote.
So Nixon came in, clearly, with this in mind, for all the reasons we’ve discussed in terms of the motives. And Kissinger independently. And so they had a very close geopolitical view.
Now in getting ready for the trip, part of the handicap with the secrecy— which, you could argue, was necessary, for a variety of reasons— was you couldn’t draw on the experts as much as you’d like. Now we would ask for memos from the CIA, from State and Defense and so on, because there was a general review of China policy, and we had Warsaw talks and so on. So we had that cover. And so we could get a lot material that was useful getting ready for these trips. The president and Kissinger did meet with some outsiders leading up to the trips before it was public.
UNKNOWN: Who were they?
LORD: Allen Whiting was one. [Statesman and author] Andre Malraux from France was another. And these were helpful in educating him. But in terms of his basic goal and his basic strategic purpose, nobody influenced him. And he was just reinforced in learning about China from others. He— this is genuinely an initiative— the great man theory, if you will— together with Kissinger, that this was in the U.S. national interest. But he did get educated on China in the ways that I’ve mentioned. And John Holdridge, who unfortunately has passed away, was on the NSC staff, knew quite a bit about China and Asia, and he was also very helpful.
UNKNOWN: And donated that shirt. [Inaudible] John Holdridge was the six-foot, three-inch one who donated—
LORD: By other shirts— on the plane, I said to Henry, when he was complaining he didn’t have any shirts and he had to borrow Holdridge’s, and it of course was made in Taiwan, as I said, I said, “Henry, you haven’t even sat down yet with Zhou Enlai to negotiate, and you’ve already lost your shirt, you know.” [Laughter.]
BLANTON: Yes, sir? Right here in the— on the aisle.
QUESTIONER: Steve Myrow of the Defense Department. Slightly over a decade ago, before he passed away, [former CIA Director] Bill Colby had said that it was no longer possible to keep a big secret in Washington. Would it be possible in modern day to have secret diplomacy on this level? And if not, is the added transparency of our actions and the confidence-building measures that come with that a sufficient offset?
LORD: Well, you probably should answer. The quick answer is no on the first part of the question. There’s no way you could do this today— no way, in my opinion. You could never pull this off, I don’t think, again. In terms of that 48 hours in Beijing, it just— you could pull off back channels and secret communications, certainly, and that’s going on all the time. But something of the scale of a secret trip to China, it just isn’t in the cards. But you may want to comment as well.
UNKNOWN: No, and I think your point is very well taken about the other side of the coin, the confidence-building, because one of the long-term foreign policy outcomes of the secret diplomacy, of course, was the shock in Japan and the feeling of mistrust among allies, not to mention at the State Department, I’d say, of the White House. And one has to measure these, I think, factors cumulatively, so that when, ultimately, Henry Kissinger is trying to enforce certain agreements that he had made, say, with South Vietnam, he doesn’t have the political backing to do so, because the trust no longer is there.
And so, there’s a deterrent component to it. It is something that— though looking at this incredible master stroke, that we do have a sense of nostalgia for, I must say. I certainly hear it in Win Lord’s—
LORD: Well, let me also comment on the secrecy. There’s no question, in ways you’ve mentioned and other ways, you paid a price for the secrecy of this particular initiative.
The arguments for it— I’m not saying there are overwhelming arguments against it. The arguments for it is that, given the background, you saw in this of the political explosiveness in both countries— in the case of the U.S., of the reaction— and also the attitude of allies, Taiwan and others, that if before we even knew how we were going to work things out and go there, because we weren’t sure they were going to agree to a Nixon trip— we thought they would— we didn’t know whether we’d wanted to go if Taiwan was going to dominate the agenda, for example. And so to publicly announce in advance would mean that every congressman or every Taiwan person or Japan, all that— would be coming in and trying to get you fenced in on positions you could take with the Chinese before you even sat down to a talk with them. And so it was a very tough decision.
I personally think Japan was the most serious. And I didn’t press at the time— I want to be honest about this— about telling the Japanese. They were notorious for media leaks, no matter how few people you told. I do think what we would have done— and this is hindsight— was have someone below the radar, like myself or Holdridge, go to Tokyo, see Prime Minister [Eisaku] Sato a week, say, before the secret trip, let him know what was coming, so he at least could tell his people that he knew in advance.
Now, the argument against that is, first of all, either he only knows it himself, and when it comes out his Cabinet is upset that they didn’t get wind of this, or he didn’t do anything about it, or it might even leak out if he did tell others. So that’s the counterarguments. But there’s no question we paid a price, and particularly with Japan. But all these counterarguments for secrecy, and I think they essentially outweighed the price we paid.
BLANTON: Yes, sir?
QUESTIONER: I have a question about the domestic political calculations on the Chinese side. Ambassador Chen, one of your earlier books discussed the role that— the calculation in the Korean War, how Mao saw this as advantageous for consolidating the revolution in China. And I wonder what— at the time of this opening, whether— what was the analysis on the Chinese side about the domestic effect of an opening to the Americans? Why— was there a concern? Was it that external considerations dominated internal considerations at that point?
CHEN: Thank you for this question. And this also leads me back to the earlier discussion about if there’s any lost opportunity or lost opportunities. Anti-American imperialism was a huge theme in China, and since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, anti-American propaganda associated with China’s entry into the Korean War and “hate America” campaign dominated the Chinese life. And I sang the song in the movie, and people say, you have good voice. [Laughter] No, it’s memory, it’s memory, which is more important. So—
BLANTON: You left out the punch line, though, of the song, which was cut on the cutting-room floor. When [inaudible] goes to the zoo for the first time and sees the wolves, he says, “Mom, Dad, the Americans!” [Laughter]
CHEN: So this is a very real— in other words, this is the essence of the Chinese Communist revolution. But on the other hand, it’s interesting, both by challenging the United States and also by cutting deals with the United States, you see different indications of Chinese nationalism. And what is behind Mao’s revolution is a very big theme to make China strong, to allow China to reoccupy a central position on the world scene. And the Chinese victim mentality had been used by Mao both in mobilizing the Chinese population, and the victim mentality on the Chinese part was very unique because it formed such a sharp contrast with age-old Chinese self-perception of China being the center of the world, the central kingdom. And therefore, the Chinese believed that their humiliation during modern times were more profound than any other victim mentality.
And so what is different for the early period was that challenging the United States became a major theme of mobilizing the Chinese population in the Chinese victory, the so-called Chinese victory during the Korean War. You think about this was the first time in modern Chinese history China entered a major military confrontation with an international coalition, led by the strongest nation of the world, composed of almost all industrial powers, and China walked out of the war, namely, the Korean War, in the position to claim, “OK, at least I was not defeated.” What kind of force of mobilization that was.
But in 1969, 1970, Mao’s revolution was already losing people’s inner support. The theme of changing China into a land of universal justice and equality was no longer believed by the Chinese people. And there you find in order to show the Chinese people the Chinese Communist Revolution still had created something, and that is, China was recognized by the international community, and especially the United States, as a real power. That is why this picture— Nixon extended his hand toward Zhou Enlai— becomes so important. And Zhou Enlai actually, as the documentary mentioned, prepared for this; he instructed the Xinhua News Agency correspondent, saying: “Take the right move, must take the right picture.” And it was famous thinking about that.
So in this sense, you do find this grand turning point in Chinese history with that revolution was dying and a new theme, the theme of modernization, of transforming China into a direction which is different from original revolutionary direction, was being shaped. And this is why I think this is a very important moment, especially in Chinese history.
LORD: This is very well said. Let me just add a couple of details which just reinforce your point about this sense of humiliation on the one hand and the middle kingdom on the other. And by the way, most their history they haven’t dealt with the outside world as equals. For 4,000 years they were number one; then they had a bad 150 years of people occupying them and humiliating them. So in ‘69, they were just beginning to deal with equals for the first time in their history.
First of all, by having the U.S.--Kissinger and then Nixon— come to China, as opposed to vice versa, that was paying obeisance to the middle kingdom. We were very sensitive to this. We knew as the greater power that we had to show some magnanimity. So we had no problem going there. Nixon was very conscious of the need to erase the John Foster Dulles memory, and he knew he was going to stick his hand out and shake hands. So he was very sensitive to that.
LORD: [Inaudible] the Nixon trip, to show you the sensitivity on the Chinese side, the Chinese were very clever how they acclimated their domestic scene to this revolutionary change. We go in October ‘71 and we first meet very small meetings with Zhou Enlai and some of the top leaders, beginning to get them involved in this opening. Then we go to a cultural event, not one of these dreadful ballets, something else that was dreadful, I don’t know, in which you had the very top cadre, so you’re now reaching maybe a couple of hundred and they’re getting involved in this opening. This is all while we’re setting up the Nixon trip. Then we begin to go to the various tourist spots, both to check out the logistics for the Nixon trip, like the Summer Palace and the Great Wall and so on, but that in turn exposes us to some more ordinary Chinese tourists. So you go from one step of secrecy and intimate circle to the next step of more and more public Chinese reception.
And then, finally, another example in terms of their sensitivity to being an equal power, was the Shanghai Communique, which we in October presented them with— sort of a typical State Department draft about how much both countries loved each other and got together [laughter] and had all these great agreements. I’m exaggerating a little bit.
BLANTON: We’ve got the draft. It’s pretty close. [Laughter.]
LORD: Yeah. The next day, Zhou Enlai comes in and literally— I think literally, but certainly figuratively— throws our draft on the floor and he says, “This is insanity. We’ve been fighting each other in Korea. We’ve been isolated and mutually hostile for 22 years. And you have a communique that’s going to suggest we’re close bosom buddies. This is not only dishonest, it’s going to confuse our domestic publics, it’s going to unnerve our friends and allies around the world. What the hell’s going on? This is ridiculous. What we ought to do is each side state its position,” which is what’s unique about the Shanghai Communique. How many communiques do you know that are still invoked 30 years later? It’s an extraordinary document. And of course, we were a little nervous. We had two days left, and we had to go back to the drawing boards. And Kissinger and I stayed up all night redrafting this thing. But they were correct.
So each side— whether it was Taiwan, or revolution in the world, or what we thought of Vietnam, or whatever it was— stated their positions. And then where there were some agreements, like against hegemony, the Russians, or principles of coexistence or some bilateral exchanges, these took on much greater credibility because they were against the backdrop of the candor of the disagreements. And friends and allies around the world were not unnerved, and our domestic publics were somewhat reassured. So it was a brilliant stroke by Zhou Enlai, and I think he took it to Mao and that’s where he got his instructions.
BLANTON: Yes, sir?
QUESTIONER: David Weller from U.S. Trade Representative’s Office. Someone earlier alluded to, you know, coming back to China 20 years later and sort of seeing the results, to some degree, of this opening and sort of drawing a line from 1971-72, to recognition, to economic reform, eventually WTO [World Trade Organization] entry, all of that. This is a question, I guess, primarily to Professor Chen.
To what degree did economics go into the thinking here, or was this really— I mean, the film definitely plays this primarily as this geopolitical strategic move. To what degree was there a recognition that, as you say, that the policies of autarchy, et cetera, have been failing and China needed technology transfer, et cetera, and that was part of the thinking of the generals or whoever else was doing the thinking in Beijing?
CHEN: The opening certainly paved the way for economic changes in China, especially in hindsight. But I believe in the later ‘60s and early ‘70s, economic considerations were very, very insignificant in the opening. It was a strategic consideration. And also, it’s a consideration from the Chinese leadership’s perspective, especially Mao’s perspective, how to present a case to the Chinese people that his revolution after— Mao knew his revolution was failing— after all, was still worthy. And an opening with the United States in this dramatic way really gave Mao a case to— and he’s correct in this case— to set a kind of historical position for himself, for Mao, himself, and for the Chinese revolution.
And there are two cases I want to mention in the ping-pong diplomacy, for example. It’s interesting, when the American ping-pong team visited China and they had a series of matches with the Chinese, in the team match the Chinese never beat Americans 9-0, it’s always 6-3, 5-4. [Laughter.] And very careful, but it created such a subtle sense of superiority in the mind of the Chinese people because everyone who was watching knew we had control. But even that— and that was broadcast on national television.
And also, in Zhou Enlai’s meeting with the American delegation, there’s an American ping-pong player, Glenn Cowan, a long-haired person, who, against the instruction from American— leader of the American delegation, the manager, and he was not— he was a troublemaker, he was a hippie. He was not supposed to ask a question. But still, he asked a question for Zhou Enlai; he asked for Zhou Enlai’s opinion of American hippie movement. [Laughter.] And Zhou Enlai— Zhou Enlai in the controlling manner says, “OK, we all— when we were young, you know, I understand you, we had some confusion in our mind, but when we grow up, we become more mature. I believe you will be the same as I had experienced.” [Laughter] And reportedly, his mother—
BLANTON: Glenn Cowan’s mother.
CHEN: --sent a bunch of red roses to Zhou Enlai to thank [laughter] to thank the premier for educating her son, who obviously could not be educated in the decadent American society. And thinking about, you know, stories, small stories like this one, what kind of impact it had upon the Chinese population.
BLANTON: Mr.--oh, I’m sorry. Right here in the front row, and then I’ll come back to you. Here’s the microphone.
QUESTIONER: Oh. Sorry.
BLANTON: Just identify yourself.
QUESTIONER: Franz Oppenheimer. What happened when Kissinger met with a Chinese delegation in Geneva before any of the things happened shown in the movie?
LORD: Well, Kissinger didn’t go to Geneva, actually. There were talks— you’re right— in Geneva and in Warsaw. In fact, during this period, it was mostly— it was Warsaw, in the late ‘60s. And they— we had Ambassador [Walter J.] Stoessel. We had other people there. There was one interesting incident in Warsaw, not Geneva— Geneva was more in the ‘50s; Warsaw was more in the ‘60s. And we were talking to the Chinese, but it was mostly propaganda. Get back to the earlier point— they were saying, in effect, “We can’t do anything until we solve Taiwan.” So it was getting nowhere.
But we instructed Ambassador Stoessel, our guy in Warsaw, to get hold of the Chinese ambassador in Warsaw and say— I forget what the message was, but it was basically that we want to improve relations. And the Chinese ambassador had no instructions, and he wasn’t supposed to talk to the American. [Laughter.] So Stoessel was chasing him all over the city, down the elevator. He never could get hold of the guy. It was amazing. [Laughter.]
BLANTON: [Laughter.] Runs him down the stairs at a diplomatic reception. The Chinese ambassador is fleeing, and Stoessel’s running after him.
CHEN: And also to follow, Ambassador Lord, as you know, the Chinese— we cannot talk about anything except the Taiwan question can be settled. Actually, Zhou Enlai reported this to Mao, and this was Mao’s comment. He said: “OK, we must allow the Americans to change. They used to be monkey, and now they are ape. They still have a half-tail.” [Inaudible] It takes some time for them to change into human being. [Laughter.] Let it be like this: “We must allow them some time for evolution.” [Laughter.] This is—
LORD: Actually, in the Mao-Nixon meeting, which of course I was in, Mao did say, about Taiwan, “We can wait a hundred years on this.” So they understood that they had to make concessions. What we basically did in the Shanghai Communique and what we did for years was to kick the Taiwan issue down the road, so we could get on with the anti-Soviet hegemony issues and all the other issues, and both sides preserving their position on Taiwan— yes, some historical formulations, which were important to the Chinese, but basically there was a tacit agreement that this thing was too sensitive to resolve, and we had larger fish to fry at that point. And this was part of Mao’s courage, on his side, to put this aside.
BLANTON: Let me just— Mr. Kalb, you can have the last word, where— we’re—
QUESTIONER: Thanks so much.
BLANTON: Time’s up.
QUESTIONER: Terrific film, terrific discussion. But we haven’t said a word about U.S. public opinion at that particular point, when the president made the trip to China in February ‘72. And one of the great debates was whether President Nixon was ahead of public opinion with respect to China or whether President Nixon was trailing public opinion with respect to China. The president is often given credit for pulling the United States in that direction. I happen to believe the opposite, that there was a readiness in American public opinion to strike some sort of relationship with China. So I wonder if both of you for a minute would factor in U.S. public opinion in this process.
BLANTON: I can just speak briefly. In the documents, there’s a couple of interesting comments: That one of Nixon and Kissinger’s chief concerns around the time of the secret trip is that the Chinese not let any of the Democratic leaders of the Congress come first. [Representative] Mike Mansfield [D-Mont.] had already asked to go to China. [Senator] Ted Kennedy [D-Mass.] was interested in going to China. There were at least five other Democratic members of Congress that had made requests and were interested in this, which is some evidence for your sense that maybe there was a readiness, and that one of the concerns the White House had was don’t let one of those guys go first. And the Chinese helped.
CHEN: Actually, the very famous formulation, statement in the Shanghai Communique about Taiwan— that people living on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believed there is only one China, and Taiwan is a part of China, and the United States does not challenge this notion— this was not actually created by Henry Kissinger. This was first introduced by Mike Mansfield in 1968.
LORD: One last point on the public opinion. I think there was a readiness to open up. This is proven, of course, by the dramatic impact, as I mentioned in the film, of the television pictures— toasting in the Great Hall of the People, the Chinese army band playing “America the Beautiful.” And we didn’t really realize that— I don’t know whether you did— when we went over. As I said in this piece, Nixon and Kissinger were on the plane coming back, saying, “I wonder what the reaction’s going to be?” There was a little naive underestimation of how huge this thing was, which does suggest that there was a willingness to do this. But it’s easy now to say that, therefore, it was easy to do it politically. It certainly wasn’t. I think the drama was crucial, but also it has to do with Americans’ view of China and Chinese generally, which swings from one extreme to another. Throughout our history, we’ve had an unbalanced view. Even today we tend, in the relationship, to go from gloom to euphoria.
If you just take the last 60 years, in the ‘40s the Chinese were our allies in World War Two. Then in the ‘50s, we’re fighting them in Korea and they’re “dirty red communists.” And then there’s the Cultural Revolution, and so on. Then we have this opening and there was tremendous euphoria, and everyone sort of suddenly overlooked the imperfections of Mao and the society and everything else and the Chinese foreign policy, and everyone was in love with China.
And then, as reporters started to be based in Beijing, some of the warts came out again in American view. For a while, it was the Chinese “yellow hordes,” “red guards,” and “blue ants.” Then it was Chinese capitalism and Deng Xiaoping. Then as things are really going well, in the late ‘80s, we had Tiananmen Square [protests in 1989] and we go back again.
So we’ve sort of vacillated between the evil Fu Man Chu and the noble peasant of Pearl Buck. I think American opinion is very volatile on China, and I think there was a tremendous outpouring, going back to missionaries and doctors and love of the Chinese history and culture, which all burst forth at this moment.
BLANTON: I think we’ll leave it there. And thank you all very much. [Applause.]
(C) COPYRIGHT 2005, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE.
NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED.
UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION.
FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON’S OFFICIAL DUTIES.
FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL JACK GRAEME AT 202-347-1400.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.
In The Closing of the American Border, Edward Alden goes behind the scenes to tell the story of the Bush administration’s struggle to balance security and openness in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
In Termites in the Trading System, Jagdish Bhagwati reveals how the rapid spread of preferential trade agreements endangers the world trading system.
America Between the Wars explores how the decisions and debates of the years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Twin Towers shaped the events, arguments, and politics of the world we live in today.
Complete list of CFR Books.
This report lays out a thoughtful agenda for U.S. policy toward the Democratic Republic of Congo, arguing that what happens there should matter to the United States--for humanitarian reasons as well as economic and strategic ones.
In this report, CFR Senior Fellow Michael A. Levi analyzes the potential use of deterrence in preventing terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons and recommends a new approach to U.S. declaratory policy, as well as ways to improve U.S. capabilities to determine the sources of terrorist attacks.
Complete list of Council Special Reports.
This report argues that the United States must lead with domestic action on climate change and proposes a U.S. negotiating strategy for a global UN climate agreement that includes commitments from all major economies, while also promoting a less formal Partnership for Climate Cooperation that would focus the world's largest emitters on implementing aggressive emissions reductions.
This Task Force report examines changes in Latin America and in U.S. influence there, while taking account of the region's enduring importance to the United States. The Task Force offers an agenda for U.S. policy toward Latin America and identifies four critical areas that should provide the basis of a new U.S. approach.
About Independent Task Forces at CFR.
Foreign Affairs has compiled a collection of articles that offer policy prescriptions to some of the world's most pressing problems.
To order Task Force reports, Council Special Reports, and Critical Policy Choices, please call, fax, or order online from our distributor, the Brookings Institution Press: phone +1.800.537.5487, fax +1.410.516.6998.
For information on other reports that are not for sale, or for general publications information, please call +1-212-434-9516 or email publications@cfr.org.
To request permission to reuse Council materials, please email publications@cfr.org or fax +1.212.434.9859.
Please include the complete information of the requested work—author, title, sections/pages to be copied or reprinted, and number of copies to be made—along with a brief description of where and how you would like to reuse the work.
You may also request permission for Council material through Copyright Clearance Center. For more information, please click on the link below.
Copyright 2008 by the Council on Foreign Relations. All Rights Reserved.
Global Economy 