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home > by publication type > transcripts > A Conversation with H.E. Abdullah Abdullah on U.S.-Afghanistan Relations
| Author: | Abdullah Abdullah |
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May 26, 2005
Council on Foreign Relations
Speaker: Abdullah Abdullah, minister of foreign affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Presider: Pamela Constable, deputy foreign editor, the Washington Post
Council on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC
May 26, 2005
PAMELA CONSTABLE: Good afternoon. Can everyone hear me? I want to ask if everyone can see me, because I'm short, so often I can't be seen. But I'll try to be heard. Welcome to this afternoon's session of the Council. I'm Pamela Constable, deputy foreign editor at the Washington Post, and until recently, the Kabul bureau chief for the Post. I've had the privilege of meeting our guest a number of times under various circumstances, this one being a particularly pleasant one. And, if I may, before I make the formal introduction, I can say that Dr. Abdullah has had the unique position of perplexing journalists the world over, because when we tried to tell our editors how he should be referred to, we say his name is Dr. Abdullah, which is never enough, they always want more. So then we say, he's actually Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, which they don't believe. I always wanted to ask him if he had a secret name I could throw in there to make my editors happier. Of course, now I'm an editor.
Let me officially introduce Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. As many of you know, and perhaps many of you have met him in the past, Dr. Abdullah is a medical doctor who studied ophthalmology at Kabul University. He received a degree there in 1983 and then went on to be resident ophthalmologist at an eye institute in Kabul. Then he continued to work as a doctor, working with eye surgery in Peshawar in Pakistan. And he was director of healthcare for what was then called the Resistance Front. In the '80s, he became extremely well-known as a senior adviser for the Northern Alliance and to the late Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. He served as special adviser and chief assistant to Massoud during the resistance to the Soviet Occupation until 1992. After that, he was director general of the Ministry of Defense in Kabul from 1993 to 1996, and after that, he was deputy foreign minister and spokesman for the government until 2001. He was selected to be minister of foreign affairs during the Bonn Conference at the end of 2001, which brought into power the coalition government headed by President [Hamid] Karzai. In June of 2002, he was reconfirmed in that position, and he has remained foreign minister until this day.
Dr. Abdullah is fluent in Dari, Pashto, English, and also speaks some Arabic and French, so questions in all languages are welcome, and without further ado, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. [Applause]
ABDULLAH ABDULLAH: Thank you, Pamela. It's a great honor for me to address the Council on Foreign Relations. In fact, this is my second address. The first one was in [October] 2002, just a month from the establishment of the [Afghanistan] interim government. I don't really know today what I said at the time, because it was just the beginning of the process. But, I'm sure that some of the things that I was envisioning, we were envisioning at that time, have already materialized. So, that gives one a sense of achievement— in the achievements as far as the Afghan people and the international community together. The leadership of Afghanistan, of course, President Karzai, today the elected president of Afghanistan.
One of the agreements from the beginning, or the start, or the initiation of the contact between Afghanistan and the international community, and that was an historical conference that was like the start of a new chapter in the life of the Afghans, and also, I should say, it coincided with our changing world shape in the international arena. Afghanistan, from being a forgotten country, to a large extent, I should say, became like the center stage in the war against terrorism. That was the bigger picture, but then the picture of Afghanistan was Afghans getting together, Afghans finding a hope after too many years of living in the dark situation. In the dark situation, perhaps I can call it, darkest in the history of our country, were the years which al Qaeda and the Taliban were ruling Afghanistan, and they were planting evil seeds for the rest of humanity, and they were doing it freely, with impunity, absolute impunity. And they were ruining the lives of millions of Afghans, as well as creating the environment to harm millions of others in the rest of the world. So, this is like what was happening at that time.
After September 11, after the tragedies of September 11th, [there] emerged a new opportunity. The dark aspect of that situation affected all of us. I'm sure that in [October] 2002, I might have said that the new opportunity and the positive aspects of the new situation will affect all of us in a positive way. So, as a result of the intervention and cooperation from the international community, the United States as the lead country in the coalition, as well as in the effort of the construction of Afghan in all sorts of political process, to the Afghanistan as a different place.
When I say a different place, I don't want to create an illusion of a situation that all the problems and challenges are gone. Far from it. But, [Afghanistan is] on the right track, in the right direction, with lots of hopes, and lots of opportunities and big, big challenges. The political process, which took us up to the emergency loya jirga [grand council], and later on the constitutional loya jirga, in which our constitution was ratified, and then the presidential elections, and in a few months' time, on the 18 of September, our parliamentary elections. On the surface, it appears like a few benchmarks, and timelines, and all that, but when you look at it in the context of a country which has been involved in destruction for 25 years, then it means a lot.
Then, at the same time, the process of reconstruction of Afghanistan started, the Tokyo Conference [on the reconstruction of Afghanistan], on the 22nd of January 2002, was the pledging conference for Afghanistan, where something like $5 billion were pledged for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. With that started our efforts in our situation while the country was way down below zero in all areas of life.
The big challenges ahead of us, first of all, when I remember being in the office of foreign ministry, or being in the meetings with the president, when we were asked about the challenges, the opportunities, the priorities, what are your priorities, what are your biggest priorities, we used to say, "One, two, three, four, five." But we were not sure which one comes first, how to put it, what are the other priorities that we're missing, because we were all new in that. And the situation was very unique. We started dealing with the priorities of the reconstruction, priorities of the security situation, human rights and women's rights, the political process, priorities of foreign policy, region, [and] international situations in all walks of life. Now perhaps, three-and-a-half years down the road, there are too many lessons, there are too many lessons to be drawn, and to build upon it for the future of this country.
But as a whole, the core point in the whole process I can mention two issues, two sentences. One, the Afghans were given the chance to get to their feet. The international community joined hands to help Afghanistan. As long as we manage to maintain the situation, this can serve as a guarantee, insurance, for the future of this country, not only Afghanistan, but the region, the stability in the global peace. These remain core issues.
What is the situation? There are too many questions, there are too many issues, but we are grateful for the continued commitment from the international community. The United States is the lead nation in the coalition as well as in the aid for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and in the recent visits by President Karzai. President Karzai might already be in Kabul by now, he left last night. I stayed one or two more days before going to Canada. All aspects of relations were discussed, and the president had a very fruitful meeting with President Bush and the administration, and the Congress, and I think he talked also extensively to the media. The focal point of this trip was the timing of the Joint Declaration of Strategic Partnership between Afghanistan and the United States.
This is a very historical perspective. We remember very well, some of you remember, and I mentioned forgotten Afghanistan, it meant that once we had joined the global campaign in fighting against the Soviet occupation, which I think had global consequences, not just that mere fact that as a whole, if you put it into context, that then Afghanistan was abandoned, and the international community disengaged itself, then there were other circumstances prevailing in Afghanistan out of the situation in the region, as well as in terms of the domestic situation in Afghanistan, and all this led to the situation of September 11th, and too many add up to tragedies which followed.
But, what was needed, and what is needed in Afghanistan, is the continued commitment from the international community of supporting Afghanistan in the way ahead, in the days and years to come, and I'm very happy that with the United States we have reached that understanding. We are seeking the same commitments from the international community as a whole, from NATO, from the United Nations, which has played a central role in the developments in Afghanistan in the past few years, and the European Union. President Karzai visited European Parliament, as well as European Commission just a few days ago, and that he was emphasizing from that meeting. I was in Japan just a few days ago. So, that's the overall context. And while there are too many questions which I will leave enough time for it, I think I may consider that this is enough as my introductory remarks. Thank you. [Applause]
CONSTABLE: Thank you very much. Can you still hear me? Of course, I forgot to say the most important things at the beginning, which were, please turn off your cell phones, No. 1. No. 2, this is on the record. And No. 3, I should also say— there was something else, I've forgotten what it was.
ABDULLAH: Introduce yourself.
CONSTABLE: Yes, thank you. You see, he's done this more than I have. We'll speak for a few minutes, and then we'll take questions from the audience, and do identify yourself, and just very briefly state if you have any affiliations that's relevant to today's discussion. Thank you very much. I'll just make a few questions, maybe we can get a bit of a dialogue going.
I'm very interested, myself, in knowing more about the situation of relations between Afghanistan and the United States today. In the beginning there was, and remains, a very large outpouring of American support for the government of Afghanistan. There's been enormous military support. And I should say that for most of my time visiting Afghanistan, I found 99 percent of Afghans were very grateful for the support, particularly for the military support. And in every village people would say, "Please don't leave, not more, not less, we want more foreign troops, and more Americans." In recent weeks, there have begun to be more contradictions, a few more cracks opening up. There have been some instances that have made many Afghans quite angry. People in Afghanistan were upset about the reports about the desecration of the Quran. There have been people being upset about the behavior of the U.S. troops. There has been more pressure, I would say, from within Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan is walking a tightrope in many ways— it needs to continue to be grateful for and supportive of the Western backing that it gets, and yet it also needs to be sensitive to the needs, the demands, the rights of Afghan citizens.
So, my question to you is, how do you balance those two demands? And, if I may, just on a personal note, I remember when there was a bombing of the village in Deh Rawood, and I remembered how upset you were, personally, over this. And so, I know that you're someone who has strong feelings, as well as being a diplomat and a representative of your country, but could you speak a little bit about some of these potential contradictions and how you balance them?
ABDULLAH: Thank you. There are two or three issues, perhaps, in relation to your question. One, what was the expectation of the Afghan people when the Bonn process was started, and we had the Tokyo Conference, and the pledging for Afghanistan? The people of Afghanistan had very high expectations; in some cases legitimate, logical, in some cases a little bit of overestimating, or not realistic.
A country which was destroyed for 25 years couldn't be rebuilt in three-and-a-half years, [especially in a country] which only relies on foreign support in security, to a large extent, in the stability of the country, and financial support. Until it gets on its own feet, until it rebuilds, we not only missed 25 years in our history of golden opportunities, but it was destruction throughout, losing the institutions, destruction of the infrastructure, people were moving out of the country, migration, and minds were escaping from the country. So in today's situation, there is a sort of feeling among the people that perhaps we, as the government, were not able to deliver, or the international community might have not delivered as promised, this is one. So part of that expectation is legitimate, logical, part of it is not realistic.
The second thing that I ask all of our international partners, do we have lessons drawn from our contact in the past three years that we should look into, we should review it, based on the lessons, the outcomes, and draw a better track in our conduct? So addressing these issues will be addressing some of the grievances which might be felt among the people.
The third point would be that, for me, sometimes, it matters a lot whether I'm talking as an Afghan citizen, an outspoken one, or a foreign minister. But, when it comes to the lives of the people, it's all the same. It's all the same. When lives are lost, I'm hurt, because I was thinking that we as an Afghan nation have chosen a different path, when innocent lives are lost. When it is lost through our conduct, or the conduct of our partners, it might be the same. So that's another issue. But, in an overall sense, I'm confident still among the people of Afghanistan there is a broad understanding and there is a broad belief that there is a need for the presence of the foreign forces in Afghanistan for a long time to come. They see it in their own lives. They complain, as human beings, there is a free environment wherever there are things that they don't like, or they have a perception about the things, they complain, they criticize, they go to the media, they make demonstrations. That's another right.
But, then when it came to some violent reactions that took place a few days ago, then I separate two things, again. A sentiment of an ordinary Afghan, common Afghan man or woman, which might be more or less the same when it came to the issue of the desecration of the Quran, had it been true. Then the fact that some extremist elements were able to capitalize on that, and to lead what happened into violence, there, as well, we need to study it thoroughly, rather than pointing the finger at one or another groups. Study it thoroughly, and draw the right lessons from it. We should see what are the things in the environment that we can change, we can address, and things will get in the better direction. So it might seem a very sort of gentle response to that, but that's how I believe in the whole conduct.
CONSTABLE: To what extent do you think forces that could be described as fundamentalist, or anti-Western, or however you want to call them, represent or do not represent a threat to the government, to the country, and to its relations with the West?
ABDULLAH: Terrorism is one phenomena, extremism is the main ingredient for it. In our region it was allowed time to grow and to develop. It was a phenomena prevailing the policies in our region for so many years, or influence, the main influence, the main engine behind some of the policies driving it. That we cannot ignore. So we have inherited a situation in Afghanistan.
The ability of extremist elements to call the shots in some cases will depend on our performance, whether we can develop on the issues of government, on the expectations of the people when it comes to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the environment and security of the people, certain freedoms that the people expect, as well as our partners together.
One factor which I want to add to what I said earlier on the issue of peace and violence: I don't think that the issue of drugs, narcotics, was irrelevant to what happened. There was a sort of element of that, as well, in what happened. Extremism will take time to— education, policy of the people. Too many media, civil society— all these aspects— reconstruction, as I mentioned, development— in a country which is still at the bottom of the human development index. It still has not moved from that for them, up. The mortality rate, child and maternal, the illiteracy, and all the enabling factors for extremism exist. We can judge it for ourselves. I think they're moving— I think— again, two points. I'm not saying that we don't need to review our conduct. I'm saying that we do need to review our conduct all together wherever we can address it; in a sort of realistic manner we have to address it.
At the same time, I'm of the opinion that with the continuation of the process, the threat of extremism will come down. We might utilize this new opportunity in the parliament. But, at the same time, in overall trends I see a positive note.
CONSTABLE: I wanted to ask you about the parliament, but first, since you brought up drugs, I think many people here are very interested to hear about the situation of drugs in Afghanistan. A lot of the focus until now has been on the production of poppies, and whether it's right to eradicate them, and all the different policies. But, it seems to me that what's beginning to happen, or what could be beginning to happen, which is much more worrisome than the production, is what you may call the criminalization of, or the organization of the drug trade.
Now, if you start developing some sort of unholy alliance among fundamentalists, tribal groups, drug— not growers, but growers and traffickers, and maybe even Taliban, we're talking about— it's a post-conflict, it's a post-ideological situation that's ripe for crime, that's ripe for the organization of crime, that the country is modernizing very rapidly, people have SUVs, lots of weapons, communications are much better. You can flash a news report around the world now all the way to the middle of nowhere. Are you worried about various forces coming together to be a much more serious threat to the state, than, say, even than one of them individually?
ABDULLAH: No, certainly. This is a scenario where we need to be alarmed about it, and aware of it, and prevent it and make every effort from the materialization of that scenario. But, there are efforts in that direction, in those directions. The criminal elements in the drug economy, we are approaching the religious leaders to give these sorts of fatwas [religious decrees]. Luckily, so far, the mullahs of Afghanistan all together have not fallen prey to their demands, they have rejected that and they have announced it as sort of illegal. That is the point.
When it comes to the other aspects of it, there are a few areas of common interest: extremism means rejection of education, rejection of development, rejection of humane treatment of human beings, men and women, so on and so forth. And it is exactly— in terms of the Taliban, some were explaining it at that time in religious terms, that perhaps this was from their religious beliefs, but my view throughout was that, look, there is an agenda, a political agenda, ideological, whatever you call it, but in order to apply that agenda, they needed to degrade the nation to the lower levels, men and women, to deprive them from their identities, from their culture. What would the destruction of Buddha bring to the Taliban but a bad name? But first, that they are doing it in a sense of defiance towards the international community that we are capable of doing whatever we want, at the same time it sent a signal that you cannot stand against us. If the leaders which stood there in the heart of Afghanistan for 18 centuries, in the symbol of identity of a country with old culture, and history, and too many things embedded in it, if they could destroy that, how could the innocent women in Afghanistan stand against that?
There is a common agenda for all of these elements, but if the environment is growing in their favor, they will try. But, it's our responsibility to prevent that from happening by those issues, which I mentioned earlier, government, security, reconstruction and development, in development, education, and health.
CONSTABLE: I want to open it up to questions, but I just have one— if you could possibly— you mentioned the parliament briefly. Just briefly, do you think that the election of a parliament, do you think it will happen, do you think it will be successful, what are the pitfalls and problems on the way, and can you picture a parliament in which you have a [former Taliban foreign minister] Mr. [Mullah Wakil Ahmed] Muttawakil and Mr. [inaudible] and all these characters debating the issues in a peaceful manner?
ABDULLAH: The reason that I was late in responding was that I was visualizing that situation. It will be interesting. First of all, whether the parliamentary elections can take place on time, that's my hope, that's my sincere belief. We should make every effort to make it happen, and to let it happen on time, because there is— again, those who are against the process, of course, ordinary people there will be questions among them, but those who are against the process, they will be able to capitalize on that, and raise questions, that there will not be a parliament. You have followed this story very closely in the past two years, any other time there is a perception, a prevailing perception.
When we had our presidential election, and our constitution ratified, at that time there was a perception that if the parliamentary and presidential elections were not together, the parliamentary elections will be postponed forever. So we should prevent that perception from growing. At the same time, I am aware of the hurdles: security is one issue, but the role of the coalition forces, the [inaudible] forces, or the national police, national army, government institutions, that's one thing, but at the same time what helped us a great deal in security, getting to the presidential elections, it was the will of the people. They wanted that to happen.
I'm sure that the same will prevail during the parliamentary elections, but it is a much larger exercise. There are 5,000 candidates already. That's a big deal. But my hope is that it will happen. Yes, when it comes to the parliament, how interesting the parliament will be, we have chosen the citizen— single, non-transferable vote voting, that makes it a little bit sophisticated. I saw the president use this word a few days ago. But, it will be— in Moldavia, for example, there were issues for a short period of time, but there were issues of crucial importance to the people, to different groupings. It was debated peacefully, skillfully I should say, without letting those debates prevent an ultimate success for the loya jirga, which was the ratification of the constitution. I hope that sense will prevail.
CONSTABLE: OK. So please, I'm sure many of you have questions. Sir, can you just identify yourself?
QUESTIONER: [Inaudible] Mr. Minister, could you remind us how much aid was pledged to Afghanistan at the Tokyo donor's conference, and how much has actually been delivered?
ABDULLAH: Nearly $5 billion, because $5 billion for 5 years, in some cases it was for 3 years. So it is difficult, the configuration is a little bit difficult, but altogether it is $5 billion. And I should say that more than that has been disbursed. More than that has been disbursed. Then talking to the people of Afghanistan, one asks, "Where has that money gone? Where is that money?" And they are asking questions, as I mentioned, in some cases legitimate, in other cases, out of lack of understanding of the situation. But, also the way that this money is being spent, this is also a question, because mainly run through the international organizations, and NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], which was the right thing to do at the time, lacking capacity in the establishment itself. But, the people, all of us want to see a shift, a sort of gradual shift from that situation into a situation that really— capacity is there in the governmental institutions, and the administration itself, and deliver in a cost-effective, and transparent manner.
So the point from the people is also to the way that it has been disbursed. But, also, in the Tokyo conference, another $8 billion— it was $8 [billion] to $12 [billion]--because again, depending on who is pledging it for 3 years, who is doing it for one year, who is doing it for five years, according to their own regulations. What's pledged, which is disbursed into the— for example, just to give you one example, Japan pledged $500 million in Tokyo, $400 million in a Milan conference, and the disbursement, rate of disbursement, Japan is one of the positive, good, very good examples, it is like over $800 million, so nearly $900 million, nearly all.
CONSTABLE: Sir?
QUESTIONER: Thank you. [Inaudible], Georgetown University, sort of a follow-on to the aid issue. How do you view, now, the development agenda of the country, taking into account, obviously, the complexities that you have enumerated today. It is clear the institutional issues are sort of the precondition for dealing with the rest, but clearly the future of the country is based in large part on its economic viability, which cannot be founded on donors' aid. Donors' aid is good, and it's good that it's flowing, that it's coming in, and it's well spent, but if you would have talked to investors, or to the local business community in your country, you would say, where is our economic future, where do we place ourselves, how do we view ourselves in the next 10 to 15 years? What, if any, are the areas of possible [inaudible]?
ABDULLAH: [Inaudible] which are very complicated, and upon its own nature in every single case. That's one question that will affect it throughout. Whatever we wish, whatever we do, that will be an important factor.
Coming to the situation in Afghanistan, it is a very unique case of post-conflict, a very unique case of post-conflict situation. You don't have too many examples of 5 [million], 6 million refugees out of the country in modern history. You don't have examples of 1 million killed, over 1 million killed, over 1 million disabled. Twenty-five years of war with such a gravity and force in a country and still that country's surviving. So that's, that's a very unique case, I just mentioned one or two elements and features of it. So that is— that is one issue.
At the same time, as we started in the process of reconstruction— developing, creating, enabling— environment from the private sector was one of our main— our main priorities. As it was stated the other day, it's perhaps one of the only countries which mentions in its constitution about the role of the private sector. So are we successful or not, that's something else, but we have done a lot in that— in that respect.
People also have invested in the construction part. Perhaps billions of dollars have been invested by private citizens. That's a big, big sort of booming system, so to speak. So the country has its own national resources, it has a location which can function as a land bridge between masses of population in South Asia and Central Asia, and [inaudible] economic interactions can take place. So one of our focuses would be on regenerating the economic integration and the economic cooperation. For example, route a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan or India, we benefit as a country. So would be transit of goods and other things.
While narcotics remains a big challenge for all of us like the threat from the terrorism, these are the potentials. Then, in the past three years, we had a sort of emergency situation. We were dealing with too many enemies. So how to materialize the transition from the emergency into a developmental phase? That is another issue.
National development of study, we have, other strategies of national scope, but it was for the first time that we are working on national development strategy based on our experience of the past and so forth. Then on the issue of development again, when the country— there is no country which could be built solely on the basis of the grant assistances from the outside world. We have the experience of martial plan and the whole thing, which happened in that circumstance. There are no such other examples, so to say, "in development," is a process.
Now, if we are able to build the basic infrastructure, which is needed for development of the private sector, if you are thinking of the transit between different areas, it cannot happen without having the basic things in place. If you can develop our legal framework and take the red taping and all that from the way of development, developing of the private sector, which we are working on it, how sectors would not be related to be judged, and we should review it as well.
So that is— and also the national resources itself. We have the biggest copper mines, which countries have shown interest in. We have the biggest iron mines [inaudible] energy, gas, and oil, to some extent how feasible it is. The others we know to a large extent, but gas and oil we don't know.
So all these are some of the [inaudible]--the diaspora, which is gone out of the country and can bring too many skills— already brought skills to be proficient to the country. These are all opportunities. Will we be able to put it all together and not to commit mistakes which others have made and seize the opportunity in the best way possible? That remains to be seen. I'm optimistic.
CONSTABLE: Over here, somebody? Bill?
QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask about your neighbor to the north.
CONSTABLE: Please identify yourself.
QUESTIONER: Bill Maynes, Eurasia Foundation. Some of the neighbors of Uzbekistan have supported [Uzbek President Islam] Karimov and in his use of force against the civilian population in the Ferghana Valley. I wonder if Uzbekistan— I mean, if Afghanistan has a view on how the world should respond to something that happened right across the border from you.
ABDULLAH: My view in that— our view in that regard, would be the— there isn't a sort of black and white, one-way solution to any problem. To recommend use of force or to not to recommend it at all, I think that we have been through difficult and different phases. We know that there isn't such a prescription. But in regards to the situation in Uzbekistan, while there is an overall situation, there is also the element of extremism in extremist groups which are the product of those— that period which Afghanistan was ruled by extremist elements. Those are the remnants of that agenda in that program.
So while we shouldn't ignore that element into what is happening in overall sense, I think the dealing with the issue of Uzbekistan by [keeping] stability in mind as a priority, at the same time, making sure that the actions which is taking the situation doesn't further destabilize and deteriorate and we don't enter into sort of a vicious cycle that [brings] more instability, more bloodshed. It doesn't happen so in our situation, it's purely in our interest to see our neighboring countries in peaceful situations. We don't have— in our focusing on stabilization of Afghanistan and consolidation of democratic process and the construction of— and at the same time, improving the relations and utilizing further the opportunity which is there for the progress in the whole region. So we are concerned from escalation of violence in Uzbekistan. It seems that to be under control to some extent, how it develops in the future remains to be seen.
CONSTABLE: You mind telling me what's the time? I've lost track.
ABDULLAH: It is ten to three.
CONSTABLE: OK. Sir? Oh, I'd like to hear from a woman. Any women out there? I have— yes, ma'am? [Laughter]
QUESTIONER: Hello.
ABDULLAH: Hi.
QUESTIONER: [Inaudible] Oh, sorry. This is Carly Ponticelli, I'm senior coordinator for international women's issues at the U.S. Department of State, and we are very grateful to Minister Abdullah, he's one of the co-chairs of our U.S. Afghan Women's Council, so I don't know if any of you know it, but he is a very strong champion of women's human rights in Afghanistan and we applaud you.
I was asked during an interview yesterday, Minister Abdullah, how— what was my reaction or our reaction to the report that was just released by Amnesty [International] which concluded that, based on a couple of scattered reports, it appears that there was "systematic and widespread violence against women in Afghanistan." And I made it clear that what we saw recently in Afghanistan working together was certainly a systematic and widespread progress for women in Afghanistan, which doesn't always make the news. But I wondered how you respond to those reports. Thank you.
ABDULLAH: And unfortunately I haven't seen the report itself, but from what you yourself have stated, it is evident what it means. I would say that progress is unbelievable progress in that field, from what it was, where it was, and where it is today. But at the same time, I should say that I would agree that it states that widespread violence is also taking place. We are far from a situation that we will be satisfied when it comes to the human rights and women's rights situation, but at the same time, there is such a proactive effort by the government, with the support of the international community, to bring improvement and in— I'm not sort of idealistic person to think that the ideal situation would be such and it can materialize tomorrow. In an environment where poverty is everywhere, where illiteracy is prevailing, where the health situation is such where the job opportunities are as it is, where the institutional capacity lacks to the extent it is needed. And there's still some violence taking place and some terrorist actions taking place, security situation is not improved. In such an environment, I should say that violations can happen and widespread violations can happen but not from the aspect of the systematic approach in overall, on daily basis, one can see improvement, change, but long before where we get where we want to.
CONSTABLE: If I might be permitted to add, I myself have observed an enormous difference between what's happening in the cities and what's happening in very rural areas, in terms of— in places like Kabul and Mazar and Herat. In provincial capitals, women are— have come— made leaps and bounds, but still in tribal village areas, women are still very much confined to a very traditional way of life, in which many cases they have no choice over their own lives. So—
ABDULLAH: What we are talking about is a sort of evolution— an evolution which will, which has to take place in the minds of the people. Some make religion an excuse. Some will make tradition, culture an excuse. And in all that, while we all know that— that in religion, in our culture, there is room, there is, there is tolerance, there is enough understanding of that in so on and so forth. To, to change,--two things what you are seeking: To change the environment, it could be done through systematic approaches. When we take development to the rural areas, then changes, education, some service and so on and so forth, media plays a big role and institutions of society play a big role. But this will help change the environment, but to change mentality of people who have suffered, who have broken hearts and minds for years and years and years and they cannot skip the impact of what has happened to them, that will take much longer than many would imagine.
CONSTABLE: Time for a couple of more short questions. Sir?
QUESTIONER: [Inaudible] You had mentioned some of the importance of security. After the military defeated the Taliban, Mr. Karzai requested substantial troops to assist in establishing security environment. The response of the coalition was woefully inadequate. This raises the question of how does one deal from the central government with so-called warlords and how is the progress going in that regard?
ABDULLAH: The demands, the expectations, the need could be enormous, but what we are dealing with is a real situation. Where the international community is contributing a lot, at the same time much more is needed. That applies to the reconstruction assistances, that applies to the security assessments and so on and so forth.
But the whole situation of the security instability, so to say, it— again, that will also depend on too many other factors. But yes, the foreign forces; the national security institutions; national army, over 20,000; the national police force of 40,000. Are the best well-trained police force in the whole region? It's a question. So, in a situation like that, to get the priorities right and to ask of the support from the international community to meet those priorities, is something that we are dealing with it throughout— and with your permission, the last point in your question was—
QUESTIONER: Dealing with the warlords.
ABDULLAH: Warlords. The situation has changed. First of all, I have problems in my vocabulary applying this word, to whom it can apply, to whom not, but I know what you mean on that. That situation has changed. We started in an environment that too many armies existed throughout the country. Today we have a single national army, the process of DDR [disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration] has succeeded, to a large extent. Thousands of deadly weapons were cantoned in the past three years. These were under the different leaders, military leaders in different parts of the country that's now under the control of the central government in the national army. That applies to the forces which were that. How much of those forces have been reintegrated into the society? That's a question. Some have been into the national security institutions, some in the civilian life, but as a whole, we have to look at it. That situation has changed to a large extent today and at the beginning, it was— there were resistance towards it from the people who had forces under their control. Gradually, some learned the easy way, some learned perhaps the hard way, and some took the elected— national elected approach in that regard, and now we have a situation that you cannot apply the situation of two years ago or one year ago to what is happening today. So, improvement.
CONSTABLE: Well, I think we're out of time, unfortunately. Maybe there'll be a little informal conversation afterwards, but thank you so much, Dr. Abdullah.
ABDULLAH: Thank you.
CONSTABLE: It's been great to have you here. [Applause]
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