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The Middle East remains a source of tension and unrest, a region where some of the globe’s most intractable foreign-policy issues are fiercely contested. Insurgent violence threatens Iraq’s new government and tests the Bush administration’s strategy to plant the seeds of Arab democracy. Iran’s nuclear ambitions raise questions about proliferation of the world’s most destructive weapons, while its theocratic government keeps a tight grip on the electoral process and ponders relations with a transformed Iraq. Israeli-Palestinian relations improved after the death of Yasir Arafat, but it is an open question whether the peace process will go forward amid Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and Palestinian maneuvering for power in the post-Arafat era. In the Gulf region, authoritarian regimes are buoyed by high energy prices, but buffeted by threats from Islamic fundamentalists and calls for political liberalization.
Iraq
After 35 years of Saddam Hussein’s repressive rule and the trials of postwar Iraq, some 8.5 million Iraqis defied threats of violence January 30 and freely elected a parliament for the first time in half a century. Iraqi lawmakers then established an interim government and set about drafting a constitution. If all goes well, the constitution will be approved in a referendum in October and a permanent government elected on December 15.
The central challenge to any government is the centrifugal political forces that threaten to pull the country apart. Shiites, some 60 percent of Iraq’s population, were long oppressed by the Sunni Arabs, who make up about 15 percent to 20 percent of the population. Now the Sunnis have a majority in the transitional parliament. Kurds, about 20 percent of the population, have ruled their northern region with virtual autonomy since 1991 and are loathe to surrender it to a Shiite-dominated central government. Under Saddam Hussein, the Kurds, Shiites, and others suffered at the hands of the Sunni elite. Only 2 percent of Sunnis voted in the January poll—some boycotted the election, others feared insurgent attacks on voting stations—and Sunnis make up much of the ranks of the anti-government insurgency. Fashioning a satisfactory political role for Arab Sunnis in the new Iraq is among the most vexing problems facing the Baghdad government.
The possibility of Sunni-Shiite sectarian conflict in Iraq has rattled some of Baghdad’s neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Saudi Arabia has a large Shiite population in its oil-rich eastern province. Bahrain, home to the U.S. Navy’s 5th fleet and a non-NATO strategic ally, is 70 percent Shiite. Events in Iraq led Jordan’s King Abdullah to warn U.S. officials of a possible Shiite crescent reaching from Lebanon to the Persian Gulf.
Most Iraqi politicians seem agreed that U.S. troops should pull out of Iraq, although not until security improves. A massive program to train Iraqi soldiers, police, and border guards is under way. Some analysts have suggested Washington should announce its intention to undertake an orderly withdrawal from Iraq over the course of the next two years. This proposal is based on the premise that, in the context of a U.S. withdrawal plan, various Iraqi factions may be forced to forge a political deal to avoid all-out civil war. It is far from clear such a deal is possible, because Iraqi Shiites, Kurds, and Sunnis seem to want different things: Shiites want the political power they believe their demographic weight affords them, the Kurds want greater political power or autonomy, and the Sunnis fear they will be left at the mercy of both.
Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran begins its second quarter century with foreign policies based on both rational calculation and revolutionary values. Iran’s conservative rulers are pondering the merits of developing a nuclear-weapons program, weighing what sort of relations Tehran should have with Iraq, and calculating how they can maintain a hold on power.
Few other issues have disturbed the Bush administration, and indeed the entire international community, more than Iran’s apparent desire for nuclear weapons. Although Iran and European negotiators periodically craft interim measures in which Tehran agrees to suspend uranium enrichment activities, it shows few signs of altering its nuclear course. Following Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, the United States has emerged as Iran’s foremost strategic challenge and the primary motivation behind its nuclear-weapons program. A range of Iranian figures, both reformers and conservatives, has actively touted possession of nuclear weapons as the only way to deter an encroaching America.
Split between pragmatists who prefer stable relations with the West and ideological hardliners who prefer confrontation, Tehran has pursued a contradictory policy of restraint and aggressiveness. Thus far, some elements within the theocracy have managed to restrain their revolutionary colleagues, who seek to export Iran’s Islamic template to Iraq and engage the United States in a proxy war. Given the delicate internal political balance of power between hardliners and moderates, this could change. At the very least, Washington and Baghdad must contend with an Iran that is increasingly interested in Iraqi politics.
Among the most entrenched of Iran’s positions is Tehran’s relentless hostility toward Israel and international diplomatic efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Iran’s approach is still largely conditioned by a perception of Israel as the usurper of sacred Islamic lands and an agent of Western imperialism. Iran remains a generous benefactor of Palestinian rejectionist forces and terrorist organizations.
Finally, Iran’s mullahs are devising strategies intended to preserve what they consider the legacy of their 1979 revolution. Parliamentary elections in 2004 were marred by the application of arbitrary rules that excluded reformers from the balloting. The next event on the electoral calendar is the presidential election on June 17, 2005. For the moment, Iran’s reformers seem resigned to continued conservative dominance in Tehran.
Israel-Palestine
When Yasir Arafat died in November 2004, he was replaced by Mahmoud Abbas as the head of Fatah, the main political party of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and as head of the PLO. Shortly thereafter, Abbas was elected by a significant Palestinian majority as president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), running on a platform that condemned violence and suicide bombings as destructive of the Palestinian national cause.
Defying expectations that Arafat’s death would create great instability and internal collapse, the transition from Arafat to Abbas was remarkably successful and widely praised. At a February 3, 2005, summit meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon promised significant changes to improve the lives of the Palestinian people, including freeing Palestinian prisoners held by Israel; turning over five Palestinian cities to PA control; and removing checkpoints and roadblocks that impeded movement of people and goods in the occupied territories. In return, Sharon demanded that the PA consolidate its security forces, “dismantle” the terrorist organizations—Hamas and Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Brigades—and end all violence, reform, and democratize Palestinian governmental institutions, and end incitement against Israel.
In response to an informal ceasefire, announced by Abbas, that the various Palestinian terror groups promised to abide by, Sharon announced that Israel would end its campaign of targeted assassinations of suspected terrorists and raids by the Israeli Defense Forces into Palestinian areas. He stressed that the Israeli measures were unilateral and not agreements negotiated with the Palestinians and, therefore, did not signal Israel’s willingness, for the time being, to comply with the so-called road map peace plan or reengage in a political process with the Palestinian Authority.
Palestinian and Israeli measures and the dramatic decrease in violence and terrorism on both sides triggered worldwide expectations of a breakthrough in the Middle East peace process. However, with the passage of time, those expectations steadily diminished. Although Abbas successfully sustained a dramatically reduced level of violence on the Palestinian side, significantly reduced anti-Israel incitement in the media and from religious sources, and accelerated institutional reforms in the PA, he has encountered great difficulty in asserting his authority over militant Palestinian factions that have continued violent actions, albeit at a much reduced level. Abbas also has encountered resistance within his own Fatah organization from older leaders who oppose his reforms and demands that they be replaced by a younger leadership. He has not been able to control Islamic Jihad’s violations of the ceasefire, nor has he been able to consolidate successfully the many Palestinian security services set up by Arafat.
Abbas’ internal difficultiesstem in part, some observers contend, from the failure of Sharon and his government to honor fully their commitments to the Palestinians, which undermines Abbas’ claim that Israel will be far more responsive to Palestinian demands if the extremists end terrorism. Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities and the release of prisoners have been partial and much delayed. Most harmful to Abbas’ credibility has been the continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the large infrastructure supporting those settlements, and construction projects some fear are intended to bar hopes for East Jerusalem to serve as the capital of a future Palestinian state. Continued construction of an Israeli “security fence” is seen by Palestinians, and by much of the international community, as an effort to establish unilaterally new borders for the State of Israel before peace negotiations resume.
All of this took place against the background of Israel’s planned unilateral withdrawal of settlements from Gaza—and a handful on the West Bank—in the face of bitter opposition from the settler movement’s leadership. Uncertainties about the withdrawal raised fears that the unprecedented disengagement could lead to instability and even chaos in Gaza and further damage peace prospects rather than improve an already difficult situation.
The U.S. significantly increased its diplomatic engagement with the parties to prepare for the Gaza withdrawal. Lieutenant General William E. Ward was appointed by President Bush as “senior security coordinator” to oversee the security situation in Gaza and to assist Palestinians with the reorganization of their security forces. James Wolfensohn, the former head of the World Bank, was designated by President Bush and the so-called Quartet—the group made up of representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, and Russia that monitors and promotes the peace process—as their representative. His assignment: work with the parties to assure successful transfer of authority and conditions that will make possible economic development and political stability.
At a meeting at the White House on May 26, 2005, President Bush welcomed President Abbas and made the clearest commitment to Palestinian statehood by a U.S. president. He said it is U.S. policy that permanent-status negotiations about the border between Israel and the Palestinians, when they occur, must begin at the 1949 armistice line, and no changes can be made in this line without Palestinian agreement. “This is the position of the U.S. today, and it will be the position of the U.S. at the time of final-status negotiations,” he said.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia presents one of the most difficult tests for the Bush administration’s pro-democracy agenda. The administration has grappled with how to prod a close ally toward economic, social, and political reform while seeking its cooperation on a host of high-priority issues like the war on terror, Iraq, oil prices, and Arab-Israeli peace.
Administration officials have acknowledged Saudi anti-terror efforts. The Saudi government has taken strides to clamp down on contributions to extremist groups from Islamic charities. More stringent laws have been passed to control money wire transfers. Extremist clerics have been removed from their posts or “reeducated.” Stepped-up counterterrorism efforts have results in a series of gun battles and arrests of suspects. American officials report that Saudi intelligence-gathering has grown more pro-active and that officials are more willing to share information.
Still, institutions that are critical to reducing terrorist financing—for example, a financial intelligence unit—have not been established as promised. Certain Islamic nongovernmental organizations with offices on Saudi soil, such as the International Islamic Relief Organization, operate outside Saudi law. And there is increasing evidence that many of the suicide bombers terrorizing Iraq are Saudis—as many as 61 percent of all such bombers, according to the WashingtonPost.
From February through March 2005, Saudis voted in three-phased municipal elections. For some regions, this was the first such vote in more than four decades; in others, it was unprecedented. Although voting was limited to men and the power of the municipal councils was undefined, the vote undermined King Fahd’s 1992 assertion that Islam and democracy are incompatible. However, in May 2005, three human rights advocates who peacefully called for a constitutional monarchy were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, putting a chill on the reform movement that seemed somewhat promising only a year before.
Saudi Arabia faces enormous socioeconomic challenges. Sixty percent of Saudis are under the age of 18, and 40 percent are younger than 15. Many experts say the kingdom must restructure its education system, to counteract the appeal of fundamentalist teachers and better equip students to compete in the global economy. In 2004, the government launched a “Saudization” program that is designed to bring more Saudis into the workforce and to help the kingdom reduce its dependence on foreign labor. Results so far have been mixed. Experts also point to the importance of Saudi Arabia’s future accession to the World Trade Organization.
Saudi Arabian and other Gulf countries in the oil-rich region have profited from dramatic energy price increases that have pushed the benchmark price of oil above $50 per barrel, sparked by unrelenting demand and aggravated by worries about war and terrorism. Saudi Arabia’s economic importance is unequalled among petroleum producers because it controls one-quarter of the world’s oil resources. It alone has enough spare capacity to increase output rapidly in times of shortages and thus soften oil-price shocks. The Economist reported in April that the International Monetary Fund advised the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries that “it must increase global spare capacity from 3 million to 5 million bpd [barrels per day] in order to ensure ‘the stability of the world economy.’” Saudi Arabia’s oil minister, Ali al-Naimi, announced April 21, 2005, the Saudi government would expand facilities and increase oil-production capacity from 11 million to 12.5 million bpd by 2009.
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