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The term global governance does not capture a world where rules are changing, power is decentralizing, and international institutions are challenged to keep pace. The world is neither governed, nor governable in the sense of a “world government” nor is a world government desired or desirable for the United States or most nations. Yet there are rules—some formal, some informal—and they have an important impact on states and on people’s daily lives.
In the most traditional sense, global governance refers to laws, treaties, and institutions established among and between sovereign states by formal agreement. The United Nations, which marks its sixtieth anniversary in September 2005, is the best example of this system of agreements. The body comprises 191 member states and is intended to be a universal organization of sovereign states, each of which is nominally equal in the international system. Other international institutions are created by states for a particular purpose, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), which works to reduce barriers to trade, or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors the use of nuclear energy. Not all nations may qualify for membership in such organizations, and others may choose not to participate because of disagreements over an institution’s aims or procedures. Membership in some institutions, such as the African Union or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), is primarily a function of geography. In other cases, nations may choose to affiliate with an institution because of shared economic concerns or values, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the United States, and Mexico.
But treaties and international institutions account for only part of what constitutes global governance today. Rules are often the result of what states do on a day-to-day basis, rather than the result of a negotiated agreement. They grow out of routine collaborations between governments, financial regulators, and police investigators—a complex web of global “government networks.” Yet states do not hold a monopoly on setting international standards; private citizens and groups are increasingly influencing the rules of the road.
At the same time, changing ideas about the sanctity of states’ sovereignty have given rise to new expectations about a government’s obligations under international law to protect its own citizens from harm, and about the responsibility of others to intervene when state leaders fail to fulfill those obligations. Ensuring the protection of at least minimum human-rights standards is steadily surpassing the long-prevailing standard of nonintervention as an international priority. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, an independent group of diplomats working to complement the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals, describes this developing international expectation as the “responsibility to protect.”
Rules and expectations governing the use of force are also being challenged due to terrorism and other dangers that do not have borders. The right to use force preemptively to stop terrorists before they strike has gained greater currency since the September 11, 2001, attacks. The failure of the UN Security Council to authorize the use of force to prevent genocides in Rwanda in 1994 and Kosovo in 1999 has raised doubts about the morality and legality of doing nothing to stop the killing only because the members of the Security Council cannot agree on a resolution. The inability to stem violence in the Darfur region of Sudan further exacerbates this worry.
Relevance and capacity may well be the watchwords in the current debate over how best to deal with transnational issues, such as proliferation, catastrophic terrorism, failed and failing states, and development. Are the old, existing rules and institutions relevant to the new threats we face? What needs to be replaced or updated? When is unilateral action acceptable, or necessary? Some issues these questions raise include:
United Nations Reform
The United Nations is, of course, at the center of this debate. The Security Council’s division over the Iraq war in 2002 and 2003, the uncertain international terrain since 9/11, the continuing failure of world powers to act effectively to prevent or stop genocide, and gross mismanagement of the Security Council’s oil-for-food program have combined to create pressure for UN reform.
In 2004, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, established by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, released a report discussing the interrelated nature of threats in the developing and developed world, and offered numerous recommendations for addressing them. Annan issued his own report on UN reform in 2005, In Larger Freedom. Additionally, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell co-chaired a congressionally mandated task force, American Interests and the United Nations, which concluded that an effective United Nations was in America’s interest, and that the U.S. government should give UN reform more attention. Five congressional committees are currently conducting independent investigations into the UN’s mismanagement of the oil-for-food program, for which Kofi Annan appointed Paul Volcker, former chair of the Federal Reserve, to conduct an internal study. On August 1, President Bush used a recess appointment to make John Bolton the new U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations. Senate Democrats had previously blocked a floor vote to confirm Bolton's nomination. His recess appointment will end when the 109th Congress adjourns in late 2006.
Finally, a meeting of world leaders in New York in September is intended to address reform issues, such as Security Council expansion; lax management and oversight at the United Nations; a mismatch between the demand and capacity for peacekeeping; and re placing the discredited Commission on Human Rights, while strengthening the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights.
The demand to hold war criminals accountable for their crimes has given rise to efforts to create tribunals to try and prosecute them. Separate ad hoc tribunals have been set up to prosecute individuals charged with war crimes carried out in the Balkans and in Rwanda. In July 2002, a treaty creating a permanent tribunal, the International Criminal Court, entered into force despite U.S. opposition over concerns the court did not protect Americans from frivolous or politically motivated prosecution. President Clinton signed the treaty, but recommended his successor not submit it for Senate approval until “significant flaws” were addressed. President Bush “unsigned” the treaty in May 2002, and negotiated bilateral agreements with nations to provide immunity for U.S. citizens from prosecution. In March 2005, however, the United States abstained from—and did not veto—a resolution referring a list of alleged Sudanese war criminals to the ICC for indictment, signaling a shift to passive acceptance of, and cooperation with, the Court.
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This report argues that the United States must lead with domestic action on climate change and proposes a U.S. negotiating strategy for a global UN climate agreement that includes commitments from all major economies, while also promoting a less formal Partnership for Climate Cooperation that would focus the world's largest emitters on implementing aggressive emissions reductions.
This Task Force report examines changes in Latin America and in U.S. influence there, while taking account of the region's enduring importance to the United States. The Task Force offers an agenda for U.S. policy toward Latin America and identifies four critical areas that should provide the basis of a new U.S. approach.
After two decades of liberalization, many countries around the world are adopting new restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) that could retard continued progress. The authors make recommendations for correcting this protectionist drift by proposing guidelines for how countries can better regulate FDI yet still reap its economic benefits.
In this Council Special Report, the authors make a strong case that the Bush administration’s policy of diplomatic isolation of Syria is not serving U.S. interests, and offer informed history and thoughtful analysis of the country and its external behavior.
