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| Author: | Esther Pan |
|---|
September 6, 2005
Iranian officials claim they are pursuing nuclear technology for peaceful civilian purposes only, such as generating electricity. But most international proliferation experts suspect the fundamentalist Muslim theocracy is using its nuclear program to enrich uranium to higher levels than necessary for civilian nuclear-energy production and secretly trying to manufacture nuclear weapons.
Since the revelations of Tehran’s nuclear ambitions became public in 2002, the United Statesand other countries have been pressuring Iran to halt the program. TheUnited Statesrefused to deal directly with Tehran, but the European Union began negotiations to reach a diplomatic solution to the standoff. In late 2004, U.S. officials agreed to support European efforts. In November of that year, Iran negotiated a deal with Britain, France, and Germany: The Europeans promised to give Iran economic incentives and assistance with its civilian nuclear program, and Iran promised to halt uranium enrichment.
After Iranian dissidents blew the whistle in 2002, Tehran admitted withholding information for nearly twenty years from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations’ (UN) nuclear watchdog, about aspects of a uranium-enrichment program. Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Iran’s new president, said after he was elected in June that Iran had a right to a nuclear program. In August, Iran also resumed sensitive nuclear work at some of its facilities, bringing two years of negotiations with the European Union on its nuclear program nearly to collapse.
Under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which governs nuclear-energy use around the world, any nation can enrich uranium for civilian nuclear-power reactors. Uranium enrichment is a critical part of both nuclear energy and nuclear-weapons programs. During the enrichment process, naturally occurring uranium is converted into nuclear fuel. Depending on its enrichment level, this fuel can power either energy plants or, in a more refined state, nuclear weapons. Under Article IV of the NPT, which Iran ratified in 1968, a country can develop its nuclear-power capacity under a legal civilian program. Then the country could give ninety days’ notice that it intends to drop out of the NPT, convert its civilian nuclear program to a nuclear-weapons program, and declare itself a nuclear-armed power.
Its program has facilities considered legal under international agreements—that is, declared to the world and open to IAEA inspections—and facilities that were either kept secret or are suspected of hosting activities not permitted by international agreements.
The legal facilities include:
The facilities that were previously undisclosed or host suspect activities include:
There are at least two plants at Natanz, says Charles Ferguson, a nuclear expert and the science and technology fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. One is a small-scale pilot plant that was likely used to test centrifuges and enrich small amounts of uranium; the other facility is a bigger, commercial-scale plant able to enrich much larger amounts of uranium. According to information from IAEA investigations, Iran has completed neither the pilot-scale nor the commercial-scale enrichment plants, although the pilot-scale plant houses more than 100 centrifuges. A commercial-scale plant would have as many as 50,000 of that type of centrifuge, Ferguson says. After the 2002 revelations, Iran admitted the existence of the Natanz facilities and allowed IAEA chief Mohammed ElBaradei to tour them in February 2003. In August 2003, IAEA inspectors found samples of highly enriched uranium, which Iran is not allowed to have under the NPT, on some of the centrifuges at Natanz. Tehran claimed the centrifuges—which were likely purchased from the network of rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan—were already contaminated with the material when Iran received them. An independent panel of experts confirmed this claim in August; nonetheless, a U.S. State Department spokesman said August 23 that the report didn’t prove Iran ’s innocence, saying there are still “unresolved concerns” and “open questions” about the country’s nuclear intentions.
Iran has long pursued nuclear energy and weapons, experts say. “The shah had these aspirations,” says Ashton Carter, a former assistant secretary of defense for international security policy and the Ford Foundation professor of science and international affairs at Harvard University. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi governed Iran from 1941 to 1979, except for a brief period in 1953. In the 1970s, Iran had a fledgling program to develop nuclear weapons even as it negotiated to buy nuclear reactors from France, Germany, and the United States, experts say.
Yes, experts say, and it is widespread and enthusiastic. Many Iranians feel, and their leaders reiterate, that as a great state, Iran should have access to nuclear technology, experts say. Iranian officials have repeatedly defended their right to a nuclear-energy program, also citing possible threats from Israel and U.S. forces in the region.
It’s unlikely at the moment. The U.S. military is already stretched thin in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and there would be little domestic support for another war, many experts say. But Bush said August 13 that “all options are on the table” regarding Iran. “If you tried and failed in negotiations—really tried and failed—force is something to consider,” says Robert Gallucci, a former ambassador-at-large for nonproliferation issues and dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. One possibility is that the United States or Israel could carry out a disabling pre-emptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, Iranian officials have issued strongly worded warnings against such an attack, saying they would retaliate.
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