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| Speaker: | Abdullah Abdullah, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan |
|---|---|
| Presider: | James Traub, Contributing Writer, New York Times Magazine |
September 22, 2005
Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
New York, NY
JAMES TRAUB: Good afternoon. I’m James Traub. I’m a contributing writer for the New York Times Magazine. And our guest today is Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the foreign minister of Afghanistan, and we’re going to speak for about 20 minutes or so, and then I’ll open it up for questions. The conversation today is on the record. Please turn off your cell phones, pagers and other wireless devices.
So I’d like to begin by saying that you’ve just concluded this election, which was extraordinarily nonviolent and nonfraudulent and was widely praised, not only in the West, but I just noticed this morning, even the Arab News Service based in Jeddah described the election as, “a brave public and transparent vote for peace.” So that’s really an extraordinary achievement in a country which has suffered so terribly for so long.
Now, having said that, there are things that we’ve read here about some of the shortcomings and difficulties with the election that I’d like to ask you about. One is that the turnout was quite a bit lower than expected, implying either that people were scared off by the fear of violence or perhaps they were apathetic in regard to the choices and also that quite a large number of the candidates—these were elections for both the parliament and for provincial councils—quite a few of the candidates, 200 or so, were described either as warlords or former Taliban officials, which obviously could pose quite a problem if they wind up in the parliament.
So should we view this election as a real turning point in the history of Afghanistan, or is it maybe more trouble than that?
FOREIGN MINISTER ABDULLAH ABDULLAH: Thank you. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
I think if we call them anything but a major turnaround and a landmark event, it will not be (fair ?) to that—to the exercise—by the people of Afghanistan. Four years ago this date, 90 percent of Afghanistan was still under Taliban and al Qaeda; and not only it was a threat against us; it was a threat that had already threatened the United States. It was a threat against global peace and stability.
So a few days ago, parliamentary elections took place in Afghanistan. It will not be without shortcomings. The important thing about the political process in Afghanistan—(inaudible)—would be that the people of Afghanistan, in the background of 25 years of war and destruction and occupation and suffering, they decided that—and they seized the opportunity—they seized the opportunity—and they recognized that the life has changed for the people of Afghanistan, and there is an opportunity and there is a new rule of living together and working together, and that’s through the democratic process.
So in every—in each step in the process, though it be the first loya jirga—emergency law loya jirga—which led to the formation of transitional government, or constitutional law loya jirga, which we ratified our constitution and later on the presidential elections and now parliamentary elections, the people are contributing willingly to make it a success, and they have done so.
Then if there are technical problems, it’s our fault. It’s—if our friends had to have a look at this more thoroughly or have to review it now for the future.
TRAUB: But why the very low turnout? It was about 50 percent, and people had thought it would be quite a bit higher. It had been higher for the presidential election a year earlier.
ABDULLAH: There might be one or two factors I think that has to be studied. It was around 50 percent, the turnout, which is not low by other standards.
TRAUB: American standards it’s good by. (Laughter.)
ABDULLAH: (Laughing.) To be a host in your—a guest in your country, I wouldn’t touch those issues. (Laughter.)
TRAUB: Yeah. I think that’s diplomatic.
ABDULLAH: In some cases, I might attribute some of the technical issues to it. In the SNTV system, which we had, single and non-transferable voting system with the—(inaudible)—with the province. In the earlier parliamentary elections the people were used to district constituencies where they used to—for the lower houses of the parliament they used to choose people from the district. That created a sort of—if they choose 30—30—elect 30 candidates—members of the parliament—from Kabul, the people from the west of Kabul, they wouldn’t know who to vote for their own—(inaudible)—and so on and so forth. That might be one factor.
And the other factor is that I think in Kabul there were 600 candidates in one province—in one city—and then the ballot paper with 600 names, 600 photos. That in itself—these sort of technical—
TRAUB: But there wasn’t fear of violence, for example, you think—
ABDULLAH: I think in the rural Afghanistan the turnout was much higher than in the cities. So in some cases, in some areas, it might have been fear of violence in the areas the Taliban had threatened or had killed people—assassinated election workers or influential people and so on and so forth. But as a whole, I think it should be considered as a (visible ?) successful election.
TRAUB: Let me ask you a little bit about this warlord question, because this has been an issue that has been constant throughout the period from 2001 when the new government began to be formed. President Karzai has been criticized sometimes because when choosing between taking the path of his more modern technocratic officials and working more slowly with traditional elders groups, as well as with ex-Mujaheddin, he’s tended to take the more cautious approach. And he has continued to work with some figures who at one time were associated not only with the Taliban, but with Osama bin Laden. Now, is that just the prudent thing one has to do in order to not rupture what is in fact a very fragile polity, even now?
ABDULLAH: When we started up the Bonn agreement, it was mainly the—(inaudible)—who were against the Taliban and al Qaeda and old Mujaheddin which had fought against the Soviets, who joined hands and supported the process and welcomed the process and, of course, supported President Karzai as the president of Afghanistan and then moved along.
And that situation there was—it wasn’t an ideal situation. In northern Afghanistan there were 20,000 army under one person; in northeastern another 20,000 or 15,000; in western part of Afghanistan another 15,000 under one person—armies, well-trained, well- (fought ?) people. So this was the environment.
And in order to bring the people into the process—in order to ensure the success of the process—we have two choices if you’re looking at it in sort of black-and-white manner. You antagonize all the people and while—you have to fight against terrorism; you have to fight against narcotics; you have to rebuild a country; you have to build a nation; you have a state. Antagonize all those people who have supported the process or work in between. This was part of the process, part of the solution—get them into it, and then changes in (the form ?). As a result of such an attitude, today we have a national army being training, with the support from the United States and the international community as a whole. Then those armies demobilized, demilitarized, and then some of those figures in the government—some of them in the opposition.
So if you do not find for these sort of people a place in the process, it means, first of all, the process is not inclusive. Secondly, you’ve threatened the whole process in doing so. Then comes the issue of former Taliban and those who had worked with al Qaeda. In that sense, they are being very cautious. Of course, there is a clear line that those who have been part of those terrorist agendas and party to those criminal acts against us, against the rest of the world, their name is on the black list—black list of the international community—and on our own list, and they will not be—they are not willing to join the process. They want just to reverse the process, and they will not be (allowed ?) to, and they will not be welcomed.
Then thousands of ordinary Taliban. When we are talking about Taliban, it’s not that all these people were trained in the same schools and are of the same evil agenda. There are thousands of people who, under different circumstances, perhaps thought that this was a movement which will bring peace and stability in the country who joined or forced to come—(inaudible). Those people—(inaudible)—from the beginning. They joined process, and they are like ordinary citizens—
TRAUB: But many of the warlords, as I understand it, are playing a bad role in a number of ways, that, for example, one of the difficulties of wiping out the narcotics trafficking is that this is a chief source of income for the warlords. They control the customs outlets. Basically the small amount of legitimate income the country gets tends to be siphoned off by these folks. Plus they foster this enormous criminal enterprise as well.
ABDULLAH: They—(inaudible)—involved in criminal activities today, though it is narcotics, which is one of the worst crimes according to our law and according to our constitution. It is in our constitution, the illegal activity. Those who are involved in those activities, they have to be dealt with,—(inaudible). And there have been examples of things.
Then sometimes you are talking about perception, rather than facts and evidences. Under that perception, we shouldn’t jeopardize the whole process, which is the one quasi stabilization in the country, the one which is for consolidation of the achievements in the democratic process. Because to antagonize too many people under one name—if there is somebody who had an army under his control—5,000, 500, 50 soldiers—fought against the Soviets, fought against the Taliban and al Qaeda and today disarmed and he wants to be in the parliament and run for the parliament, and the people vote for him, why not? So if he is not there, where would he should—(inaudible).
TRAUB: Better to have him in than out.
ABDULLAH: (Inaudible.)
TRAUB: Better to have him in than out.
ABDULLAH: I think there are people who have influence among the people, who are popular-based, who have constituency, and if the people vote then in, of course, yes.
TRAUB: Let me ask you about the security situation because again, something that I think we all read is road projects have to be abandoned because engineers are being killed out in the countryside. One hears stories that maybe al Qaeda and other insurgents are actually moving from Iraq and beginning to infiltrate into Afghanistan through Pakistan. So could you just describe for us what you would say the security situation is now?
ABDULLAH: Recently there have been some increase in the number of security incidents around the country, especially in those eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan. And to describe to you briefly the nature of security—(inaudible)—it has been of two natures.
One, the coalition forces led by the United States, with the Afghan National Army, initiated operations to engage the Taliban—remnants of Taliban—in some areas, mainly of that nature. All Taliban operating against civilians, against aid workers, mainly, as they call them, soft targets, against an influential person, a religious leader, somebody in charge of a village and so on and so forth. So this is in the nature of the security incidents.
TRAUB: But is there some kind of second front, which is the expression one sometimes hears, where Islamic fundamentalists have actually begun to move in larger numbers into Afghanistan, creating a new kind of threat that didn’t exist before?
ABDULLAH: I would say that this is—it is—sometimes it is difficult to bring coordination among the international community, but to these terrorist groups and terrorist elements, automatically or by nature, they are good in coordinating efforts. And automatic, sometimes, when they see and find the in chance—there is an opportunity there—they will hit.
I would not be surprised if this happens in Afghanistan—they try to—because success in Afghanistan is failure for al Qaeda.
TRAUB: Yes.
ABDULLAH: Success in ( Iraq ?)—into this situation for the coalition would be a failure for al Qaeda, in Afghanistan or elsewhere. So in that sense, I wouldn’t be surprised.
TRAUB: Yeah, in terms of the coalition, the Bush administration has been saying they would like to begin drawing down the number of American troops who are there and turn that—more of that responsibility over to NATO troops. Now, I just—there was a piece in The Economist about Afghanistan the other day, and they cited one of the chief officials of the Italian contingent, who said that our military presence here is very, very, very light. That was three “verys,” which I would think is about two more than you’d be comfortable having.
So if the United States is going to turn over to people whose view of this is very, very, very light, isn’t that a genuine threat to security in Afghanistan?
ABDULLAH: I think these days the issue of NATO in the coalition’s role and synergy and coordination between the two has been an issue of discussion at all levels among the NATO member states, as well as the coalition as a whole.
What is important for Afghanistan is the engagement of the international community in a focused manner for some more years to come in order to help the Afghan people to stand on its own feet—on their own feet—and consolidate the achievements for the past 30 years, not to let the al Qaeda or Taliban to ruin those achievements. That’s as far as Afghanistan is concerned.
There will be a chance to discuss these issues in a little bit more detail during the post-Bonn conference, which is supposed to take place early next year in London, but the United Nations and Afghanistan are working on this, and then London will be the host place. So there we will—
TRAUB: You didn’t quite answer the question.
Are you concerned about that kind of transition?
ABDULLAH: My concern would be if by any ways and means the effectiveness of the—(inaudible)—if it is (affected ?) I would be concerned. If that effectiveness is preserved while new mechanisms are introduced, I wouldn’t mind, as an Afghan.
TRAUB: Have NATO troops been as effective or as forceful as American ones?
ABDULLAH: I would say that if NATO takes over, if there is an—(inaudible)—takes over responsibility of the counterterrorism, it needs time—it will need time. It will need perhaps trained forces to be deployed and perhaps even the issue of equipment, and all these maters will be considered.
So it’s not that since we have NATO forces today they can shift into the counterterrorism mission with the present situation. So a lot of things should happen before it gets—really, that’s me judging it from a outside (peace ?).
TRAUB: There’s a recent study that suggested there would be another 10 years before either NATO or American forces could actually leave Afghanistan and Afghanistan would be able to essentially guarantee its own security.
Does that seem wildly too much, or is that actually a plausible figure, from your point of view?
ABDULLAH: The in—from the view of the people of Afghanistan, of course, they would like to see things—objectives—achieved sooner—(inaudible)—would be the case. But if not exactly 10 years, if it is one or two years less or a few months more, but in a broad sense a few years—
TRAUB: So it’s a huge commitment. I mean, the commitment is—we haven’t even talked about the economy, but obviously the level of commitment that you feel that you need from the international community, both the military commitment and the political and the development commitment, is enormous. I would just think that the history of these things, where the energy tapers off over time, might worry you that, in fact, the world will move on and Afghanistan will be left to fend for itself.
ABDULLAH: This is in the back of our minds all the time.
TRAUB: Only the back? (Scattered laughter.)
ABDULLAH: And we have suffered because of similar situations which the world was not interested in Afghanistan, and as a result of that, the world suffered and we suffered enormously.
TRAUB: You mean throughout the 1980s and ’90s.
ABDULLAH: Nineties. Nineties, after the end of the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so the situation was left alone, and then we had neighboring countries of Afghanistan meddling and the internal situation (developing ?) and later subsequent events which took place in that country.
(Inaudible)—the concern is there, but I think it is—again, I’m not saying 10 years, but long-term commitment is the right investment of the international community. It’s not just an investment in the well-being of one nation; it is much more more than that, and that is—(inaudible)—I think.
In—(inaudible)—we hear about security incidents here and there. It’s because of—(inaudible)—that this issue was what’s left at its own mercy, not because of the lack of progress in the past few years.
TRAUB: Let me ask you one more thing, just about development issues, and then I’ll throw it open to questions from all of you.
When we think about Iraq, obviously a country which is more—far more—tormented in many ways right now than Afghanistan, nevertheless, its’a country that was a middle class country for quite a while and has many people who have professional, university training, high-level of literacy and so forth.
Afghanistan is a country at the bottom of the UN human development report. It has the level of life expectancy, literacy, child mortality that you find in the most devastated countries in Africa.
So how is it possible even to envision creating a functioning, not to mention prosperous, state in a place which has been neglected and devastated for so long?
ABDULLAH: So that gives it an urgency.
TRAUB: I should think.
ABDULLAH: And, yes, war—devastation because of the war—in being in that list always. It makes the situation so grave. But at the same time, the progress in the past four years has been significant.
TRAUB: You mean, economic progress, you mean?
ABDULLAH: Yes, of course. We have started in a sort of highly emergency case—crisis case. We started with that. Today we have moved out of that; we are in—we are not in the humanitarian emergency crisis situation, but certain things have been done in the area of building infrastructure, in capacity building, millions of—(inaudible)—students, refugees returned back home, students going to school—5 million, 6 million boys and girls. So these are the steps taken so far.
But in order to make sure that the process continues, resources will be needed. Effective way of allocating resources and implementation of (assistance to ?) Afghanistan is needed. I think—again, in the upcoming conference we have to review how best and effectively these resources allocated to Afghanistan could be—
And then there are potential opportunities like Afghanistan’s location. Regional economic cooperation is something we are hoping that, despite all the (hurdles ?) and the foreign policy challenges surrounding Afghanistan, we think that this is a hope for the future. Trade is already made a lot of progress. Just one year, 1.5 billion (dollars?) level of trade between Afghanistan and its neighboring countries.
So changes have taken place, but we need, again, in the developmental side as well, continued long-term effective commitment from our international partners.
TRAUB: Well, so on that upbeat note, we’ll turn it over to the audience.
So I just ask everybody in advance, when you—when I do call on you, please remember to state your name and your affiliation and try to ask a question that is reasonably brief and that can be answered, I guess, reasonably briefly.
Yes, in the middle there. Yeah. I’m sorry, I was pointing at you. Yes. No, no. (Laughing.) That’s good. Thanks.
QUESTIONER: Hi. I’m Kimberly Martin from Barnard College, Columbia University.
And my question is about Afghanistan’s foreign affairs and diplomatic relationships. Can you talk a little bit about the challenges that you face trying to maneuver between India and Pakistan as two of your near neighbors?
ABDULLAH: Had it been the only challenges, I would have allocated the whole time to that question. (Laughter.) We have a few more of such nature.
From India and Pakistan what we have the expected has been to consider their bilateral relations with Afghanistan out of the—(inaudible)—I think asking too much, but out of the context of their own bilateral relations, India and Pakistan.
Stability in Afghanistan serves the interest of the stability in the whole region; everybody benefits—development in Afghanistan, economic relations with Afghanistan, and all that. From time to time we have been affected because of the relations between the two countries. And there is a tendency sometimes, at least—I have one or two examples—that our relations have been affected under the shadow of relations between other countries.
We have Iran in our neighborhood—Islamic Republic of Iran—which has supported Afghanistan throughout the Bonn process and later on in the construction of Afghanistan. And we have—we enjoy good relations. But at the same time, you have the international community partners led by the United States. We have strategic—signed the declaration of strategic partnership between the two countries just a few months ago. So we have Russia and China in that region, which they have been supportive of the process, but at the same time, they might have other geo-political concerns in the region.
So all these things come into account, but based on that logic that through further stabilization of Afghanistan and development in Afghanistan, everybody can benefit. We have sought understanding of all our partners in that sense. It has not been easy—
TRAUB: I’d like to ask you a quick amendment to that question. Do you in effect benefit from Pakistan and India’s competition with one another—that is to say, you can play off each against the other?
ABDULLAH: (Chuckles.) Well, I think—
TRAUB: I guess the answer’s yes. (Laughter.)
ABDULLAH: No, I think the—indeed, with both countries we had different backgrounds in our relations before September 11th. And there was a totally different environment. But then with Pakistan we started establishing relations and friendly relations. There are a lot of challenges that we need to overcome.
India , as the biggest democracy in our region, just a few weeks ago, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited us, and they laid the foundation of the parliament. And then—and he said it—he said in that—on that occasion that the biggest democracy of the world, and perhaps the oldest in our region, helps the youngest democracy in that region. So there are all these bonds which hopefully will help us move forward.
TRAUB: Yes, the gentleman towards the right side there? There’s a microphone coming up behind you. Other side? There you are.
QUESTIONER: Donald Shriver (sp) of Union Theological Seminary.
Yours is an Islamic republic. What would you say are the differences between the status and the applications of Shari’a law in your administration and that of the Taliban?
ABDULLAH: Well, the Taliban was an agenda, and first of all, they believed in the Islamic Emirate not in a Islamic state. They believed that they can spread Islamic revolution throughout the world, so that’s why they used to call their own entity Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, not Islamic republic or Islamic state of Afghanistan.
Then—that’s in the broader picture, but when it gets into details, they had the extreme interpretation of the Islam and their own interpretation of Islam. And, in fact, they were using this as an instrument to—(inaudible)—oppression and represseion of the people in humiliation of a nation, in destroying the identity of a nation which has been Muslim for 13 centuries. But at the same time, they have lived in coexistence with other religions in its neighborhood as well as within the country. They couldn’t even tolerate the Buddha statues in Afghanistan, which was there for—for—centuries and nobody had touched it.
So that’s—theirs was al Qaeda agenda under the name of Islam, while in our case is the recognition of the identity of majority—sort of absolute majority—Muslim nation which has been—
TRAUB: Give us a specific example or two of something that was prohibited during the Taliban time in the name of Islam that is now permitted.
ABDULLAH: For example, from the simple things in life, like education for boys and girls—banned, except for the education of boys under their rules—their curricula. What they teach the matters of in the extreme—(inaudible)—manner. So that’s nothing to do with Islam.
The right of women for education, for services, for their participation in the politics and so on and so forth. So we had women candidates for presidency. We have women candidates for the parliamentary elections, which—a ldquoa for women—25 percent quota for women—in the parliament. While the women on the streets of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, used to be beaten up because if they have high-heeled shoes and it could have made noises on hitting the ground.
So that’s nothing to do with Islam. That’s an evil interpretation, and even abuse of faith in the worst manner.
TRAUB: All right. Somebody from this side. Yes?
QUESTIONER: Betty Marsh from Garhalding (ph).
Since four U.S. companies have most of the reconstruction bids at very high prices in Afghanistan, is there any cooperation between the locals or any education so that they can take over the roles of these companies and exit sooner and let the local people take over the responsibilities?
ABDULLAH: When earlier I mentioned about the implementation of the assistance, I think it’s in the best interest of the donor countries as well as the recipient Afghans to have a review of what is happening. There are some times when the aid is—assistances are implemented through some organizations. It is very costly. The overhead costs that they charge is enormous and so on and so forth.
Sometimes when it comes to the private sector, you have—(inaudible)—contractor, which make the contracts. I’m not talking just about the use of that—in that sense—I’m talking about it as a whole, that the same project would be contracted, let’s say, for 500,000 (dollars). They subcontract that one to $300,000. Then they subcontract the same thing. And we end up with something like $35,000 for the same project.
So there is—they are flaws in this which has to be reviewed for the best interest of the taxpayers’ money from the donor countries as well as the recipient country, which really want to have the most efficient way of usage of assistance.
TRAUB: Yes?
QUESTIONER: Edward Bliar (ph). Comment if you will on the border with Pakistan, which is no border for the Taliban or the terrorists and a stiff border for the anti-terrorists.
ABDULLAH: Well, it is tough. I mean, your question as well as the borders. (Laughter.) Recently, there was this idea of fencing the border during the visit by President Musharraf and foreign minister of Pakistan. And it was raised with me also during our conversation.
The Taliban have been able to cross the border from time to time. Al Qaeda elements have been able to cross the border from time to time. And that is hurting us. That is hurting the coalition. That is hurting the development in Afghanistan in those parts.
And it’s a long border. The terrain is extremely rough. I know that there are certain constraints in controlling the whole border in both sides. But at the same time, we believe that we can work out mechanisms to stop this infiltration of Taliban and al Qaeda from the other side of—
QUESTIONER: What kind of mechanisms?
I think we are working with the United—there is a trilateral mechanism. The United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan military and security elements, which we are dealing with it. I’m not aware of the details of the progress on that front, but this is one mechanism.
But there is a whole—based on that logic, that only through a stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan, the countries of the region serve their own interests. By promotion of that logic as well as working together with neighbors, as I mentioned, to overcome these challenges.
It is a challenge for us, and it’s also a challenge for Pakistan. But we need to work and we need to be focused on that.
TRAUB: Is President Musharraf doing enough, or do you feel he’s not doing enough?
ABDULLAH: I can—that’s—you’re asking me—enough is not enough is the most sensitive word in the—(inaudible)—neighboring country, Pakistan.
But the need for continuation of efforts is there.
TRAUB: (Inaudible)—sir. It’s why you’re the foreign minister. Yes?
QUESTIONER: I’m Richard Hatalet (ph).
More on Pakistan, but specifically on Monday you mentioned earlier the foreign meddling in Afghanistan’s affairs. What about the ISI? And Pakistan has throught also to—which had used the Taliban in the past as a strategic instrument, providing it with money and with weapons. And Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was a favorite of the Pakistanis who is there now as a thorn in your flesh.
How is Pakistan, quite apart from the border and the—sort of the al Qaeda business—how is Pakistan behaving toward you?
TRAUB: Perhaps you could also explain what the ISI is for those who aren’t sure what that stands for.
ABDULLAH: ISI is the Interservices Intelligence of Pakistan. And the old situation, which support for—I mean, before September 11th, when support for Taliban was described as the national security interest of Pakistan. And ISI was implementing that policy, and there was an Afghan cell which was in charge of these activities. So whatever was happening was—of course, ISI was in the core of it.
Our hope today would be that, based on the new policy of Pakistan—announced policy of Pakistan—all those activities of those elements who might be in the private sort of manner—individual sort of manner—might still be—have kept some sympathy for their old friends will be checked and controlled. That’s our wish. That’s our hope.
And I think I may not refer to the old situation that much because that was a very grave situation. And we all have suffered because of that situation.
It was because of that situation that millions of people were displaced inside Afghanistan, and men folk of the family were separated from women and brought to the deserts and different part of the country.
And it is because of those old situations that the terrorists were able to do whatever they want and whatever they plan against all of us throughout the world. That’s the old situation.
Then the policy changed after September 11—the policy of Pakistan. We were the first to welcome it.
President Karzai visited Pakistan five times. I visited Pakistan perhaps six, seven times in official visits in order to put things of the past as things of the past and deal with the today’s situation based on the new realization of our interests, which is only in working together and living together in peaceful manner.
TRAUB: I assume, by the way, when you said it is your wish or hope that the ISI cease to do this, you also mean they have not yet ceased to do this. There still are rogue elements, or whatever, who are working against Afghanistan’s interests.
ABDULLAH: I would say that if there are, then they need to be stopped. If there are. And—
TRAUB: I’m going to keep trying until I get you to misspeak. (Laughter.)
Yes, sir?
QUESTIONER: Hi. Jeff Laurenti with the Century Foundation.
Minister Abdullah, what continued to mystify many Americans is how four years after the intervention, you still have a Taliban resistance movement at all—four years of taking a pounding and such. And it doesn’t appear to be purely ideological because lots of former Taliban have been cheerfully able to join the new regime, even with now formally fundamentalist views and compete in elections.
What is it that motivates—what is the—what’s the state or, excuse me, the motivation, the manpower, the money, the munitions of the Taliban resistance? And is the new Afghan army capable in the long haul of being able to subdue this kind of rebellion? And is it, in fact, affordable—costs something like 17 percent of Afghanistan’s gross national product at this point? Will it be able to sustain—will Afghanistan be able to sustain this kind of army? Could this Taliban, without foreign forces, regain control over parts of Afghanistan?
ABDULLAH: The situation with Taliban and their activities today—they have managed to not only to capture 90 percent of Afghanistan’s soil earlier, but also to infiltrate Central Asian republics and to go far beyond that. So they have developed such a capacity at that time that even today we fail to visualize it because that situation doesn’t exist anymore.
And then in between all those networks, Afghanistan—and with the developments in Afghanistan, it created a gap for the activities of Taliban. So they were sort of cut off from the rest of the networks.
Certainly right from the first in early moments of our victory and liberation of Afghanistan with the help of the international community, Taliban went after their own interests, those hard-core Taliban. The motivation is there, so is the motivation for those terrorist elements which bombed London a few months ago, so would be the motivation for somebody who bombed the hotel in Egypt or Indonesia or wherever.
So that’s there. This is a bunch of people all over the world that are of the same motivation and have to be dealt with the same sort of strategy.
But at the same time, in Afghanistan, al Qaeda had lost its capital. It was not like losing a cell somewhere. So al Qaeda will do everything in its power in order to reverse the process and to make it a failure. In the events of the—their activities could be interpreted in that way.
Not all the sources of funding for al Qaeda we all know in broad sense if not in very detailed manner. And they manage to smuggle arms and ammunitions and so on and so forth.
So for al Qaeda we should realize this has been the strategic defeat—what happened in Afghanistan—losing the capital while their outfits are everywhere, but they lost their capital.
So in that sense, these efforts and these activities could be interpreted.
In today’s situation, three and half years ago, Afghan national army only was an idea, which we used to discuss it in the meetings of G-8 countries. Today there are quite a few thousand of them being trained. And then in the past—(inaudible)—years, they are more and more being engaged with the coalition, with the American forces, in the activities against Taliban and al Qaeda. And by all accounts from our friends, they have performed very well. So they have delivered.
Into this situation? No. Afghan national army, Afghan security institutions will not be able to defend Afghanistan against terrorism and al Qaeda. But in some years to come why not? I think that’s our hope. That’s our wish. And that’s what we are planning for and we get support for.
TRAUB: Anybody in the back who I’ve been ignoring until now?
Yeah, in the back there. The second to the last table—yes? Right.
QUESTIONER: Gregory Maniatis, Migration Policy Institute. A maddeningly simple question. Where do you think Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden are?
(Laughter.)
TRAUB: And if you have exact coordinates, that would be—don’t waste them of us, though, of course.
ABDULLAH: Outside Afghanistan.
(Laughter.)
TRAUB: Like in New York, for example?
ABDULLAH: No, I wouldn’t be here if—
TRAUB: Why do you feel confident of that?
ABDULLAH: No, I think that’s based on the evidences, based on the fact that—
TRAUB: People assume Mullah Omar is in Iran right now?
ABDULLAH: No, I think that he wasn’t friendly at any state.
TRAUB: So he’s in Pakistan as well?
ABDULLAH: He’s outside Afghanistan. I’m sure that he’s not in Tajikistan or in Turkmenistan.
(Laughter.)
TRAUB: Well, we’re running out of stans. You’ve made that fairly clear.
Yes, sir?
QUESTIONER: I’m Kenneth Bianca (ph) of (Scatton Yarps?).
I have a question about economic development. But first, I’d like to say that in view of the challenges you face, the obstacles that you encounter and the accomplishments that you’ve made, you and your colleagues have done a stunning job. It’s historically remarkable, and many of us here wish you the very, very best of luck as you continue because it is so impressive.
Having said that, I’d like to ask you about the prospect for economic development in your country. It’s well known that one of the elements of your economy has been the poppy growing and narcotics, and a large part of the country has been dependent on that crop. The country’s otherwise agrarian and has other aspects.
But how do you see the prospects, and what are your plans and objectives for permitting Afghanistan to develop and ultimately stand on its own as an economic entity and unity? Where do you see the opportunities for employment and growth? What are the things you have to offer in the international community? How do you expect to get there? What help do you need? And how do you think you’re going to do it?
ABDULLAH: Thank you. Thank you very much. The challenges we all know. What are the challenges in that country? What are the opportunities, what are the potentials? And where are we as far as seizing those opportunities and capitalizing on the potential?
The narcotics—the opium—only this year we were able to get it under control and bring a decrease into the cultivation of opium—so a decline in the cultivation, which is a good sign because it is from one side, it contributes to the economy—its illegal economy—but, you know, from the other side, it criminalizes the economy.
TRAUB: How large was the decline by the way? Was it a big or little decline?
ABDULLAH: There is—to be honest, I should tell you about the irony behind it. Twenty one percent decrease in the cultivation—in the acreage. That’s fine. But then this year we had good weather.
(Laughter.)
TRAUB: So it was a good harvest.
ABDULLAH: It was good harvest. And it was good harvest for wheat and for all the other crops, but also that. So—but it’s still a decrease. There’s still a significant decrease.
It is better. So if we can maintain, let’s say, the 21 percent decrease in acreage or more or less in the coming years, this will come under. So it’s very promising. But the issue is that we need to address some very fundamental issues like alternative livelihoods for the farmers, the issue of traffickers working with our neighboring countries and so on and so forth.
What is happening today is the legal framework from the private sector. It’s a very private sector friendly in that aspect of it --sometimes because of the perception of security. Sometimes also because of security we have problems in developing and moving forward in that regard. But that’s there, and the private sector has seized this opportunity.
In the construction, for example, sector, billions of people has invested (sic) by the people of Afghanistan. So that—in itself—the economy is moving.
Trade is booming and investment not significant. Investment in the telecommunications sector, hotels, services and so on and so forth is there, but still it is needed.
The natural resources of Afghanistan is untapped. We even don’t know. We do have gas and oil in northern Afghanistan. But we don’t know how feasible they are. But then there are other minerals, like copper and iron, which are one of the biggest in Asia—the mines in Afghanistan. So we have an eye on that. So by using those natural resources, it helps the economy.
But then again, the prospect of regional economic cooperation. The gas needs in South Asia and the resources in Central Asia, like in Turkmenistan there is the pipeline—the idea of the pipeline between Afghanistan—Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan and India later on, which is something—the transit location of Afghanistan is something which brings hope and brings wealth to Afghanistan.
It is—on all those fields that we are hoping to by working in a sort of long-term strategy, then the revival of the agricultural base in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has the potential become self-sufficient, for example, in wheat. We are just a little bit short of being self-sufficient, while three years ago, most of the wheat for consumption inside Afghanistan was imported one.
So there in helping the (agri- ?) culture as the basis of economy and the focus on the mines and minerals and location of Afghanistan in the private sector and investment in Afghanistan. I think the—where that’s hopefully with the parliamentary elections now over in with having a new parliament in place in a few weeks’ time. This will add to the sense of the stability in the country and to bring more investment to the country.
TRAUB: Someone else in back there. Yes, sir?
QUESTIONER: John Templespring (ph).
I would like to ask you about the internal balance in the politics in Afghanistan itself. If ®MDNM¯it’s the Northern Alliance that occupied Kabul, and the Northern Alliance has been losing its authority to the Pashtun—and President Karzai, of course, is Pashtun himself—are you worried about that balance? Or do you see a future for those of you who came from not the Pashtun side of the fence?
ABDULLAH: Four years ago, again, this date, we were in the mountains not of Kabul. And we were thinking that, yes, we can—the United States will step in sooner or later, and we will be able to have the chance to get into Kabul.
But going to Kabul should be a part of a process—a political process—which will lead to the stabilization of the country and lay the foundation for a stable, democratic Afghanistan.
We were thinking at this date on the basics of the political process. When it came to the ethnic balancing and ethnic participation, we were the ones from Kabul who were pushing for President Karzai to be the president—to be the first president for the interim government. Later on, the loya jirga, of course, approved or voted for president after six months. That, as well, we contributed great deal.
So it is that sense the realization of the need of today’s Afghanistan that has brought us from where we used to be four years ago to where we are today. And hopefully with the parliament in place and all the other aspects of it, we will have again positive steps toward stabilization.
But in our conduct in the past four years are the lessons that all things that could have been done better. Certainly there would be. But the people of Afghanistan from all the angles, they have shown this understanding and this willingness to work together. And that has been the main element that has got us from where we used to be and to where we are.
TRAUB: And yeah?
QUESTIONER: Ken Roth from Human Rights Watch.
I’d like to come back to the question of the warlords. And, I mean, as you’re undoubtedly aware, there is a broad interest in Afghanistan for some mechanism of transitional justice as soon as possible. We hear it all the time from people we speak with that they’re upset that their—you know, the past murderer of their uncle is in government. And they fear that, you know, there could be a repetition of 1992 once the Americans pull out.
So with that in mind, as you’re aware, the Afghan Human Rights Commission developed a so-called plan of action to develop some kind of tool of transition—transitional justice. And the government, at a meeting in The Hague, committed to adopting that plan of action. But since then, nothing has happened.
So my question to you is, would you first agree to publish the plan of action, which still hasn’t happened? And second, could you talk about the government’s plans for actually enacting that plan of action?
ABDULLAH: In fact, in the meeting in Hague, I was representing Afghanistan. (Inaudible)—I was the head of delegation of Afghanistan in that meeting. And one of the things which was a part of that plan of action, it was the consultative process—consultative process—process of consultation before started implementing that plan of action. As far as I understand, that consultative process is underway.
But coming back to the issue or warlords, I am so happy to see that all those anticipations, all those predictions, which were made about the situation in Afghanistan, how it will develop—it has not developed that way.
For example, during the elections, while there will be shortcomings and as we move along and as the list will be announced, there will be complaints. And all these things have to be to be reviewed thoroughly and with serious—in a very serious manner in order to draw lessons for the future system. Or even if the electoral law has to be reviewed, it has to be reviewed if that’s the broad understanding of the Afghan people. Those things should be done.
But most of those things, like the people using force against one another and so on and so forth in a broad sense, that will affect the whole process has not taken place.
So on the issue of transitional justice, I think the main focus would be, after this consultation, on the issue of balancing between stability and instability and addressing the issues of human rights abuses today as the priority. All the things which has happened in the past has the number-one priority and which way to carry it out.
I think it is true instability that further human rights abuses can take place in that country, or in an unstable environment, we should be very much aware of that.
But having all that said, in a broad term, yes, I believe in transitional justice. But based on the realities of Afghanistan, based on the situation that it does not lead to further injustices itself in the process, as well as does not lead to instability in the country.
TRAUB: So are you saying, in effect, that this act of looking backwards at past atrocities even, may be a luxury that Afghanistan simply cannot afford right now because it is simply too weak or fragile?
ABDULLAH: I would say that in today’s situation, if there are enough resources and efforts are made to prevent any abuses of human rights from taking place—or grave abuses of human rights from taking place—today under this circumstances, in itself, will serve that interest of justice of the past and justice of today. But we are dealing with a situation that we have to do all the things, but it’s the issue of prioritization.
TRAUB: All right, I think it’s—I believe we have to stop unless my watch is wrong. It’s two o’clock. Thank you very much. It’s really been enlightening for all of us.
(Applause.)
ABDULLAH: Thank you. Thank you very much.
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