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Updated: January 2007
| Author: | David L. Phillips, Executive Director, The Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity |
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Why should the United States care about rogue regimes or failed states? Simply put, unstable regimes are a threat to U.S. interests. Terror groups and criminal networks find haven in weak or failed states. They exploit porous borders to move people, money, weapons, and drugs. Human security is affected when government institutions are unable to meet basic needs or provide essential services. Poverty, disease, and humanitarian emergencies have transnational implications. Not only are conflict prevention and nation-building investments in U.S. security, they are also consistent with American ideals.
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May 2005
A disenchanted government insider’s take on the planning that did go on for postwar Iraq that the Bush administration willfully ignored.
By David L. Phillips
U.S. INTERESTS
Why should the United States care about rogue regimes or failed states? Simply put, unstable regimes are a threat to U.S. interests. Terror groups and criminal networks find haven in weak or failed states. They exploit porous borders to move people, money, weapons, and drugs. Human security is affected when government institutions are unable to meet basic needs or provide essential services. Poverty, disease, and humanitarian emergencies have transnational implications. Not only are conflict prevention and nation-building investments in U.S. security, they are also consistent with American ideals.
THE END-STATE
Clarity of purpose is critical. What was the reason for intervention? Was it to stop aggression, to prevent ethnic cleansing, to eradicate weapons of mass destruction, or to create a liberal democracy? Goals must be based on a realistic assessment of what can be achieved. Without a clear vision of the end-state, government agencies and international organizations will not know what to do.
Governments always feel pressure to complete the mission and execute an exit strategy. Self-imposed deadlines can be avoided by measuring progress in milestones; however, setting goals and moving quickly to achieve them does not obviate the need to sustain activities. Success is contingent upon the level of commitment as measured in time, manpower, and money—and only success can win “hearts and minds.”
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Burden-sharing and unity of command are the twin pillars of successful nation-building. Governments, regional organizations, multilateral bodies, international financial institutions, and nongovernmental organizations must define their respective responsibilities to develop a shared understanding, reduce redundancy, and maximize resources.
The United Nations is typically the vehicle through which the international community organizes collective action. Encompassing various aspects of nation-building—from peace and security to humanitarian relief and reconstruction—the UN has undertaken forty-one missions since 1990. Authorization under Chapter VII of the UN Charter enhances local and international legitimacy, enshrines political and security arrangements, and gives nation-building a clear mandate.
A holistic approach includes humanitarian relief, transitional security, rule of law, infrastructure reconstruction, economic development, and the political transition. During the immediate post-conflict period, activities focus on humanitarian assistance and quick-impact projects to jump-start the economy. Once conditions have stabilized, reconstruction emphasizes rebuilding physical infrastructure and creating conditions for investment and long-term economic development. The political transition involves elections at the local and national levels, adopting a permanent constitution, building democratic institutions across the country, and restoring full sovereignty.
Coordination is essential. Agencies should focus on areas of expertise. For example, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is best suited to assist the return of displaced persons. The European Union (EU) is experienced in economic development. Bretton Woods institutions—the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)—help broaden the donor base and contribute to economic restructuring. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has the skills needed to organize elections and promote civil society. Peacekeeping and police operations should provide protection to the field personnel of these various organizations.
Institutions must be adequately resourced to be effective. The political commitment and resources of G-8 and other countries can be leveraged through a Peace Implementation Council (PIC). The PIC encourages consensus among donors, concerned countries, and neighboring states. It also serves as a consultative framework to keep neighbors abreast of plans and to involve them in activities. For example, managing refugee flows requires a common approach to opening borders, as well as assistance and protection in accordance with international humanitarian law. Neighbors have legitimate concerns when a failed state exists on their borders, but they must not meddle in the internal affairs of other countries, nor must they unilaterally deploy troops across frontiers.
Burden-sharing is not a one-way street. If PIC members contribute to nation-building, they are also entitled to a reasonable share of the decision-making. It is also reasonable for them to expect a level playing field when it comes to reconstruction opportunities. The United States should not be concerned about losing control of the nation-building process. It retains influence by virtue of its leadership within the institutional hierarchies of international organizations. At the same time, U.S. interests are served by diffusing responsibility, thereby reducing costs and obligations. Efficiencies are to be encouraged, but nation-building cannot be done on the cheap. There is no such thing as “nation-building light.”
A fast-moving emergency necessitates a rapid response. Though lag time will inevitably result, it can be reduced by integrating lessons learned and best practices from previous nation-building experiences. A standby response corps, a database of nation-building experts, and a standing crisis-response fund can help prevent delays.
The United States needs to bridge the gap during the early stages of a crisis or when negotiations become bogged down at the UN Security Council. To create a secure environment for nation-building, the military needs a clear mission and adequate resources for addressing security and related challenges. The military must pivot quickly from combat operations to civilian administration. To this end, civilian planning and civil-military relations should be integrated into all phases of planning and post-conflict stability operations.
November/December 2005
Summary
Public support for the war in Iraq has followed the same course as it did for the wars in Korea and Vietnam: broad enthusiasm at the outset with erosion of support as casualties mount. The experience of those past wars suggests that there is nothing President Bush can do to reverse this deterioration -- or to stave off an "Iraq syndrome" that could inhibit U.S. foreign policy for decades to come.
September/October 2005
Summary
Because they lack a coherent strategy, U.S. forces in Iraq have failed to defeat the insurgency or improve security. Winning will require a new approach to counterinsurgency, one that focuses on providing security to Iraqis rather than hunting down insurgents. And it will take at least a decade.
January 18, 2007
President Bush's new "surge" plan to clear and hold Baghdad's neighborhoods faces a tough challenge from high levels of sectarian violence.
January 5, 2007
A cessation to the violence in Iraq cannot come about without some kind of national reconciliation between the country’s warring factions. But previous reconciliation efforts by Shiite leaders have failed to entice Sunnis into the political fold. What are the prospects for success now?
December 1, 2006
It is unclear if classifying the conflict in Iraq as a civil war will have serious ramifications for U.S. military strategy there or, for that matter, U.S. domestic politics.
November 8, 2006
With U.S. forces mired in Iraq, the cost of war has escalated. But some critics decry the manner in which the war is being funded more than the price tag itself.
August 31, 2006
As American influence in Iraq wanes, Arab, Turkish, and Iranian influence over Baghdad will invariably rise.
March 2004
Task Force Report No. 43C
Written a year after U.S. and coalition forces went to war with Iraq, a time when American officials faced questions about U.S. staying power, this timely report strongly urges President Bush and senior members of Congress to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to Iraq.
June 2003
Task Force Report No. 43B
With mounting costs to American lives and treasure in Iraq, and success there so clearly tied to American staying power and the coherence of U.S. strategy, the Bush administration must sharpen and deepen its commitment to making Iraq a better and safer place. As a first step, the authors argue that the president should set the direction for his administration by making a major foreign policy address to the nation, explaining the importance of seeing the task through, as well as the costs and risks of U.S. engagement in postwar Iraq.
March 2003
Task Force Report No. 43
Written before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, this report accurately predicted that winning the peace in Iraq would be a far greater challenge than winning the war. The report says that this challenge falls largely on President Bush, who must make clear to the world that the United States is prepared to stay the course for the multibillion-dollar, multiyear commitment of U.S. troops, civilian personnel, and other resources that will be needed to achieve a lasting peace.
September 2002
This highly influential book, written as the Bush administration turned its sights on Saddam Hussein’s regime, takes the reader back to the pre-war days of uncertainty about Saddam’s weapons and his ties to major terrorist organizations, outlining a powerful case for a U.S. invasion of Iraq.
October 6, 2006
Watch experts discuss the impact of the U.S. intervention in Iraq on the wider Middle East.
October 6, 2006
Watch experts discuss the impact of the Iraq war on U.S. alliances with Europe and Asia.
October 6, 2006
Watch experts discuss the impact of the Iraq war on U.S. foreign and military policy.
October 6, 2006
Watch experts discuss the impact of the Iraq war on coping with rogue states and proliferators.
May 2, 2006
Listen to authors Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor speak on their book Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq.
October 6, 2006
Listen to experts discuss the impact of the U.S. intervention in Iraq on the wider Middle East.
October 6, 2006
Listen to experts discuss the impact of the Iraq war on U.S. alliances with Europe and Asia.
October 6, 2006
Listen to experts discuss the impact of the Iraq war on U.S. foreign and military policy.
October 6, 2006
Listen to experts discuss the impact of the Iraq war on coping with rogue states and proliferators.
May 2, 2006
Listen to authors Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor speak on their book Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq.
October 6, 2006
F. Gregory Gause III leads a discussion on the impact of the U.S. intervention in Iraq on the wider Middle East. Shibley Telhami sums up the discussion by acknowledging that pulling out of Iraq today could lead toward even more civil war but says, “At this point, whatever we do, we have very little impact on the outcome in Iraq, whether we stay or go.”
October 6, 2006
Philip Gordon leads a discussion with Dana Allin and Phillip Saunders on the impact of the Iraq war on U.S. alliances with Europe and Asia. Gordon sees the transatlantic difference over Iraq as a difference over America in Europe, rather than over Iraq. The impact of the war on America’s Asian allies is also discussed, as is the notion that the Iraq debate has significantly displaced the China debate.
October 6, 2006
A panel discusses the impact of the Iraq war on American foreign and military policy. The war is assessed in terms of the Pentagon’s transformation plans and American military doctrine as well as its parallels with the Vietnam War.
October 6, 2006
A panel discusses the impact of the Iraq war on coping with rogue states, failing states and proliferators. The nexus between rogue states, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorists is also discussed.
January 11, 2007
Richard N. Haass, CFR president and a well-known Middle East expert, says what President Bush’s Iraq speech “represented more than anything else was the re-Americanization of the effort.”
January 18, 2007
Anthony H. Cordesman, a leading strategic analyst of the Iraqi war, says the Bush administration’s latest strategy on Iraq makes victory there “possible” but “the problem is it also isn’t probable.”
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