Home | Site Index | FAQs | Contact | RSS  | Podcast

• Related Materials

  • Lebanon’s Weak Government
    By Esther Pan
    Backgrounder
    July 20, 2006

  • Syria, Iran, and the Mideast Conflict
    By Esther Pan
    Backgrounder
    July 18, 2006

  • Mona Yacoubian on Syria's Crackdown
    Podcast
    May 26, 2006

  • Lebanese Political Leaders “Unable” to Reform or Take Country Forward
    Interview
    May 8, 2006

  • Syria: Has Assad Dodged a Bullet?
    By Esther Pan
    Backgrounder
    April 26, 2006

  See Also

  Syria

  Syria's Leaders

  Author:	Esther Pan

  Updated: March 10, 2006

  • Bashar al-Assad, 40, president
  • Assad’s inner circle
  • The Old Guard
  • Outside government
  • Outside Syria

  ---

  Bashar al-Assad, 40, president

  Trained as a doctor, Bashar never expected to become president. His father, former President Hafez al-Assad—who ruled Syria with an iron fist for thirty years beginning in 1970—groomed his elder son Basil as his successor. But when Basil died in a car crash in 1994, Bashar was summoned back from ophthalmology studies in London to take over the position of heir apparent. After Hafez al-Assad's death in 2000, the country's Majlis (Parliament) lowered the minimum required age for candidates from 40 to 34 to allow Bashar to become president.

  The Assad family is part of the minority Alawite sect, a Shiite Muslim faction that —despite making up only 12 percent of the population—has dominated political life in Syria since the Baath Party seized power in 1963, and forms the core of the country's armed services and intelligence bureaucracy. After five years in power, Bashar—who introduced tentative reforms after his election before being forced to pull back—exerts an unknown degree of control over the security apparatus of the state. Bashar has replaced many of his father's old guard with his own loyalists, but he has also pursued policies that have threatened the security of his own regime. These include opposing the U.S. war in Iraq—which earned Syria severe U.S. animosity and international pariah status—and pushing through a term extension for Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, widely seen as a Syrian puppet, in the fall of 2004. The move was an overt power play to assert Syria's control over Lebanon, and it forced Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri to quit the government and join the opposition. Hariri and his opposition movement gained tremendous popular support until Hariri was killed in a Beirut car bomb attack February 14, 2005. The assassination, which also killed more than twenty others, was blamed on Syria and sparked mass demonstrations in Beirut that forced Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon after twenty-nine years of occupation. A United Nations investigation headed by German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis implicated many high-ranking Syrian officials in Hariri's death. Assad denies any Syrian involvement. The investigation continues under the leadership of Belgian prosecutor Serge Brammertz.

  Assad’s inner circle

  • Maher Assad, 37, head of the Presidential Guard. The youngest of Hafez al-Assad's four sons, Maher studied business at Damascus University, then followed older brother Basil into the military. Many thought he would be named successor after Basil's death; instead, Bashar was chosen. This may be due in part to Maher's reputation as unstable. In October 1999 he reportedly shot his brother-in-law Assef Shawqat in the stomach after an argument. Shawqat recovered, and Maher has since earned praise as the commander of the Presidential Guard. He is also a member of the Baath Party Central Committee. He is mentioned in the Mehlis report as one of the people who planned Hariri's murder.
  • Ali Habib, 66, chief of staff of the armed forces (2004-present). Habib has been in the military his entire life. He joined the Syrian army in 1959 at age twenty, and graduated from the military academy in 1966. He steadily moved up, commanding a regiment from 1971-75, then an infantry brigade from 1978-84. He led Syrian forces against Israeli forces invading Lebanon in 1982, headed an infantry division from 1984-94, and was commander of special forces from 1994-2002. He became a general in 1998 and served as deputy chief of staff from 2002 until 2004, when he was promoted to his current post. He is a member of the Baath Party Central Committee.
  • Assef Shawqat, 55, head of Military Intelligence. Husband of Bashar's sister Bushra, he was promoted to his current position in 2005. Shawqat has a law degree and a doctorate in history from Damascus University. He joined the Syrian army in the late 1970s and rose through the ranks. He met Bushra in the mid-1980s. While courting her, Shawqat was imprisoned several times by her brother, Basil, who objected to the match. In 1995, a year after Basil's death, Shawqat and Bushra eloped. After the news got out, Hafez al-Assad summoned them to the palace, where he gave them his blessing. Shawqat has since become very close to Bashar, and is considered one of his loyalists and strongmen. Shawqat is implicated in planning Hariri's assassination by the Mehlis report.

  The Old Guard

  • Ghazi Kenaan, deceased. The 63-year-old general and former interior minister ruled over Lebanon for two decades from 1982-2002, as head of Syrian military intelligence there. Kenaan, an Alawite, was an old guard loyalist of Hafez Assad and had been mentioned as a possible successor. During his time in Lebanon, Kenaan influenced Lebanese politicians to protect Syria's interests from his base in the town of Anjar, near the Syrian border. His death October 12 from a gunshot to the head was declared a suicide by Syrian authorities; many observers were not convinced. Kenaan's death came just days before the release of the major UN report investigating the February assassination of Rafik Hariri in Beirut. Many experts say Kenaan was either involved in planning the assassination or had inside knowledge of it. The Mehlis report accuses Kenaan of involvement in Hariri's death.
  • Rustom Ghazali, former head of intelligence in Lebanon. Kenaan's successor in Lebanon from 2002 until the forced pullout of Syrian forces on April 26, 2005, Ghazali also acted like a colonial administrator in Lebanon. On orders from Damascus, Ghazali decided who filled the Lebanese government's top positions, supervised its foreign policy, and manipulated its elections. Experts say Syria also used Lebanese banks to launder money earned from smuggling and drug running. Ghazali himself is a major shareholder in one of Lebanon's major cell phone providers. He was questioned for over fourteen hours by UN investigators and is implicated in Hariri's murder by the Mehlis report.
  • Walid al-Moualem, Foreign Minister. Moualem, a career diplomat, is a canny and experienced negotiator who represented Syria at the Wye Plantation negotiations with Israel and the United States in 1998. He also served as Syrian ambassador to Washington. Experts say he has pushed hard for a peace deal with the Israelis in the past, and could do so again. He took over responsibility for Lebanese affairs after Hariri's death and was promoted to foreign minister in February.
  • Abdel Halim Khaddam, former vice president. Khaddam is a Sunni, although his wife is Alawite. He served as foreign minister of Syria from 1970-1984, then as vice-president from 1984-2005. He was instrumental in working with Kenaan to exert Syrian control over Lebanon, and had a very close relationship with both Hafez al-Assad and Hariri. He is also alleged to have profited greatly from his time in Lebanon. Since quitting his post last year, Khaddam has gone into exile, publicly accused Bashar al-Assad of threatening Hariri a few months before his death, and met with exiles and U.S. and European officials in Paris, where he is living. Some mention him as a potential candidate as head of a new Syrian government. Assad's government considers him a traitor and will try him for high treason.
  • Hikmat Shihabi, 64, former chief of staff (1974-1998). Shihabi, a onetime member of Syria's negotiating team with Israel, served for many years as chief of staff before he was retired in 1998 in a housecleaning purge prior to Hafez al-Assad's death. Shihabi—seen as an ally of then-vice president Abdel Halim Khaddam—was considered a potential threat to Bashar. As Hafez al-Assad lay dying, Syrian papers published leaks saying Shihabi would be indicted on corruption charges. Shihabi, who was in Lebanon at the time, boarded a plane and fled to exile in California. He was reportedly seen off at the Beirut airport by Hariri, a close friend. However, a month later, Shihabi returned and was officially "rehabilitated" by Bashar.
  • Ali Aslan, 73, former chief of staff (1998-2002). Aslan was Shibahi's deputy, and took over the post of chief of staff from 1998 until his retirement in 2002. Aslan was an old friend of Hafez al-Assad and joined the Baath Party military committee in 1962. He favored mandatory military service for Syrian men, and negotiated arms deals with suppliers around the world, including Russia, China, Armenia, North Korea, and Iran. He rose quickly through the army and was promoted to general in 1984, when he was also elected to the Baath Central Committee. He was credited with improving Syria's military readiness, but was retired after reputed clashes with Shawqat.
  • Muhammad Naji al-Otari, 61, Prime Minister. Otari, the former longtime governor of Homs province, became prime minister in September 2003. He is a Sunni member of the Baath party, and considered a strong administrator, but not a skilled politician. Experts say the prime minister post is a mostly technical position with little real influence.
  • Farouk al-Shara, 60, vice president. A former Hafez al-Assad loyalist, Shara served as foreign minister from 1984 until February 2006, when Assad appointed him vice president to replace Khaddam. Shara is a Sunni Muslim who rose through the Baath Party and handled secret negotiations with Israel in the early 1990s. Before becoming foreign minister, he served as Syrian ambassador to Rome and acting information minister. Experts say Shara is not too involved in domestic policy, but is still an influential figure. He is one of the few non-Alawites in Bashar's inner circle. He is accused of lying to UN investigators in the Mehlis report.
  • Ali Douba, former head of military intelligence. Douba was an advisor to Hafez al-Assad, retaining significant power until he was pushed aside by Bashar in 1999 over fears that Douba could be a rival for the presidency. He is currently living in Paris.
  • Ali Haydar, former head of the Special Forces. Haydar was pushed aside in 1995 after expressing his reservations about hereditary succession. He lost his post for "insubordination."

  Outside government

  Ali al-Bayanoni, General Guide of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The leader of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned, is currently in exile in London, but wields considerable influence through the network of social services his supporters provide throughout the country. Although Hafez al-Assad ruthlessly suppressed the Brotherhood's political activities—most notably in a brutal 1982 crackdown in the town of Hama that left tens of thousands of civilians dead—experts say the Muslim Brotherhood is still Syria's most viable opposition party. Both Hafez al-Assad and his brother Rifaat courted Bayanoni's support at various times.
  

  Outside Syria

  Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat, 68, a younger brother of Hafez al-Assad, has long sought to rule Syria. He graduated from Damascus University and joined the army in 1963. He advanced rapidly and supported Hafez's seizure of power in 1970. During the 1970s, Rifaat's unit, the Defense Companies, became an elite force of some 55,000 soldiers equipped with tanks, artillery, and helicopters. This unit was instrumental in the 1982 military action in Hama, earning Rifaat the nickname "the butcher of Hama." In November 1983, after Hafez suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized, Rifaat staged a coup attempt. It was put down by Syrian troops, and after Hafez recovered in March he stripped Rifaat of his military command and appointed him one of three vice presidents to dilute his power. In May, however, Hafez suffered a relapse, and Rifaat once again tried to seize power, an attempt which failed. Rifaat was sent on a series of "diplomatic trips" abroad. Rifaat has spent the last dozen years in exile. Rifaat has reportedly kept up a campaign to present himself as an alternate leader of Syria to European and other officials. He even announced himself as a Syrian presidential candidate after Hafez's death in 2000; Syrian officials threatened him with death if he returned to the country.

  Sumer al-Assad, Rifaat's son and head of the Arab News Network. Bashar's cousin runs a London-based satellite television network partly financed by his father. The network ran reports critical of the Syrian regime in the 1990s as part of Rifaat and Sumer's campaign against Hafez, which culminated in a gun battle between their opposing camps in the Alawite Latakia region in 1999. The Syrian army restored order, imprisoned many of Sumer's supporters, and closed down an illegal port run by Rifaat. While Sumer and Rifaat are not seen as direct threats to Bashar, they are potentially disruptive influences who add to the list of his problems.

   

  Weigh in on this issue by emailing CFR.org.

• 

  New CFR Books

  

  In Termites in the Trading System, Jagdish Bhagwati reveals how the rapid spread of preferential trade agreements endangers the world trading system.

  

  America Between the Wars explores how the decisions and debates of the years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Twin Towers shaped the events, arguments, and politics of the world we live in today.

  

  In The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, Noah Feldman tells the story behind the increasingly popular call for the establishment of the sharia—the law of the traditional Islamic state—in the modern Muslim world.

  Complete list of CFR Books.

  

  

  New Independent Task Force Reports

  Confronting Climate Change

  This report argues that the United States must lead with domestic action on climate change and proposes a U.S. negotiating strategy for a global UN climate agreement that includes commitments from all major economies, while also promoting a less formal Partnership for Climate Cooperation that would focus the world's largest emitters on implementing aggressive emissions reductions.

  U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality

  This Task Force report examines changes in Latin America and in U.S. influence there, while taking account of the region's enduring importance to the United States. The Task Force offers an agenda for U.S. policy toward Latin America and identifies four critical areas that should provide the basis of a new U.S. approach.

  About Independent Task Forces at the Council.

  

  

  New Council Special Reports

  Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt

  This report outlines the nature of the challenges in Pakistan's tribal areas, formulates strategies for addressing those challenges, and distills the strategies into realistic policy proposals worthy of consideration by the incoming administration.

  Avoiding Transfers to Torture

  This report analyzes the debate over U.S. use of assurances against torture, explaining the contexts in which they are used, how they can be conveyed, and what they can contain, and recommends a number of ways to respond to criticism so that the United States can continue using assurances.

  Complete list of Council Special Reports.

  

  

  Pre-release: September/October 2008

  • “The Right Way to Engage China:” Henry M. Paulson argues that the prosperity of the United States and China depends on helping China further integrate into the global economic system.

  

  

  

  Publications Information

  To order Task Force reports, Council Special Reports, and Critical Policy Choices, please call, fax, or order online from our distributor, the Brookings Institution Press: phone +1-800-537-5487, fax +1-410-516-6998.

  For information on other reports that are not for sale, or for general publications information, please call +1-212-434-9516 or email publications@cfr.org.

  

  

  Permissions Requests

  To request permission to reuse Council materials, please email publications@cfr.org or fax +1-212-434-9859.

  Please include the complete information of the requested work—author, title, sections/pages to be copied or reprinted, and number of copies to be made—along with a brief description of where and how you would like to reuse the work.

  You may also request permission for Council material through Copyright Clearance Center. For more information, please click on the logo below.

  

  

•  

By Region  |  By Issue  |  By Publication Type  |  The Think Tank  |  For The Media  |  For Educators  |  About CFR

Home  |  Site Index  |  FAQ  |  Contact  |  RSS  |  Podcast

Copyright 2008 by the Council on Foreign Relations. All Rights Reserved.