It has, and experts say that Pakistan’s military and Interservices Intelligence (ISI) both include personnel who sympathize with—or even assist—Islamist militants. ISI has provided covert but well-documented support to terrorist groups active in Kashmir, including the al-Qaeda affiliate Jaish-e-Mohammed, which investigators linked to the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament and the February 2002 murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. President Pervez Musharraf made promises to stop Kashmiri militants from crossing into the Indian-held sector of Kashmir, but India insists Musharraf has yet to stop the terrorists’ movements.
Pakistan, which had backed al-Qaeda’s Taliban hosts before September 11, abruptly reversed course and threw its lot in with the U.S.-led antiterrorist coalition. Under heavy U.S. pressure, Musharraf condemned the attacks and pledged Pakistan’s “unstinted cooperation” two days later. Pakistan has since become a key U.S. partner in its campaign against al-Qaeda, even as the perpetually turbulent, nuclear-armed Muslim country has teetered on the brink of war with India over the disputed province of Kashmir. Experts say Musharraf, who came to power in a 1999 coup, is under enormous strain: America is demanding that he crack down on Islamist militants; Pakistan’s religious extremists and some intelligence officials are furious at him for abandoning Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers and softening his line on Kashmir; and Pakistan’s main political parties are shunning him because he’s resisting the restoration of democracy.
No. Despite its government’s cooperation with the United States, Pakistan is home to many Islamist extremists, some with links to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Militants have conducted several terrorist attacks on Americans and other Westerners in Pakistan since September 11, including the abduction and murder of Daniel Pearl and the June 2002 car bombing of the U.S. consulate in Karachi, which killed twelve Pakistanis. Thanks to shared Islamist sympathies and ethnic ties, some Pakistanis have also helped Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters fleeing from Afghanistan take refuge throughout Pakistan. U.S. officials are concerned al-Qaeda could regenerate itself in urban areas and in the Northwest Frontier province, a lawless tribal region on the Afghan border inhabited by Pashtuns, the Taliban’s dominant ethnic group.
By becoming a major U.S. partner and staging area for the war in Afghanistan. The United States considers Pakistan one of its most important allies in the “war on terror.” Pakistan granted overflight rights to coalition aircraft, let U.S. forces use two Pakistani airfields, and shared intelligence about suspected terrorists. Pakistan has also worked with the FBI to capture suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives who fled into northern Pakistan—including al-Qaeda operations chief Abu Zubaydah and the alleged September 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Muhammad—and in some cases has committed its own troops to hunt down al-Qaeda holdouts. According to the State Department’s 2004 Country Report, “Pakistan continues to pursue al-Qaeda and its allies aggressively through counterterrorist police measures and large-scale military operations.” Osama bin Laden is widely believed to be hiding in the remote tribal region along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border with his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Musharraf says Pakistani troops had their best chance of capturing bin Laden from May-July 2004, after the army launched an offensive along the border with Afghanistan. But he says the trail has now gone cold.
After the July 2005 London bombings, in which the bombers were of Pakistani decent—and at least one of the suspects visited a Pakistani madrassa—Musharaff outlined a new approach for cracking down on extremism. He has decided to monitor hate sermons from mosques; require that all madrassas be registered and foreign students expelled; clamp down on inflammatory material; and prohibit militant groups from collecting funds. Pakistan also responded to the bombing by detaining more than 200 suspected Islamist militants.
Yes. U.S. soldiers have joined Pakistani troops on raids in the tribal border regions, and the FBI is contributing information and agents to the pursuit of al-Qaeda holdouts. U.S. officials say they need Americans on the ground because the Pakistani military is not doing enough on its own, and Pakistan-watchers say the government remains reluctant to pursue terrorists at home because it fears an internal political backlash. Moreover, Pakistan has not wanted to launch large-scale military operations against al-Qaeda while many of its troops have been amassed along the Indian border due to tensions over Kashmir, a festering conflict that has flared up several times since India and Pakistan gained independence.
It’s a large, frightening distraction, particularly since both Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons. Tensions over Kashmir, which spiked after a December 2001 terrorist attack on India’s parliament, have diverted U.S. and Pakistani resources away from the pursuit of al-Qaeda. Experts say the fate of the disputed Muslim-majority province is fundamental to Pakistan’s national identity and Musharraf’s rule; observers say the general was able to seize power because his predecessor backed down in a 1999 showdown over Kashmir. Meanwhile, India—also an American partner in the antiterrorist coalition—has accused the United States of hypocrisy for working with a Pakistani government that India says continues to support terrorism.
Email
In this POP, Adjunct Fellow Michelle D. Gavin suggests steps the Bush administration could take to promote political and ethnic reconciliation and to restore the viability of Kenya’s governing institutions.
In this paper, Senior Fellow Daniel Markey poses a set of recommendations for the United States to consider in response to Pakistan’s ongoing political crisis.
