home > by publication type > transcripts > Iraq: The Way Forward—A Conversation with Nesreen Barwari [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service, Inc.]
Email
| Speaker: | Nesreen Barwari, Minister of Municipalities and Public Works, Republic of Iraq |
|---|---|
| Presider: | Linda Robinson, Senior Writer, U.S. News and World Report |
February 9, 2006
Council on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC
Council on Foreign Relations
LINDA ROBINSON: I apologize, we’re running a few minutes late here. I’m breaking the Council tradition. I’d like to introduce the Minister of the Municipalities and Public Works of Iraq, Nesreen Barwari. We’re very fortunate to have her here as part of the “Iraq: The Way Forward” series, and I’m pleased to see such a good turnout. I’m particularly interested because the last meeting at which I presided, there were a lot of questions about the infrastructure and services, as well as the governance—both federal and local level governance—and I think we have a person here who can give us the reality check in terms of what Iraq’s current reality is as well as the most urgent priorities in terms of spending and manpower to solve these issues.
Probably everyone here is aware of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings that were just held covering this topic. We heard there from a number of U.S. officials, but I think it’s particularly important to hear from someone who not only lives that day to day reality, but whose current responsibility is to tackle these problems.
Since we have an interview Q&A format here, I’m going to start off with the—what I see as the most pressing questions, but I’d like to open—Minister Barwari and give you a chance to give us kind of a summary portrait of the current situation in terms of—I think we all would like your perception of how the new government formation talks are going—if you can give us insight into that, but also those specific areas under your purview. The local governance issues, where I understand there is a great deal to be done in terms of support to actually stand up those institutions, and then we’ll run through in more detail the infrastructure issues, but if you want to give us your overall impressions. Particularly, if you differ in any respects to what we heard on the—from the official U.S. testimony.
MINISTER NESREEN BARWARI: Well good evening, and thank you for coming and showing this interest on Iraq and Iraq’s future, but also on current issues and challenges that Iraq is going through. Iraqis have managed to keep their word, and has committed themselves to deadlines and has made it through those deadlines: free elections in 11 months, and constitution writing process, and referendum, so we’ve done well at the political process side. Of course, the great challenge would be—is how would we form the new government? Which is as expressed by all the parties that they want to form a unity government, but how each group of Iraq see unity government is sometimes—could be different, but in the end they are committing themselves for a unity government.
So what will make a unity government in Iraq today is a government that is inclusive of all Iraqis’ main groups, not only in term of ethnic background, or religious background, but even ideologies. It should also include different ideologies that are in action in Iraq today, and that will not be such a big challenge because everybody is committed in Iraq for such inclusion. Iraqi leadership, all of them, do realize that the only way for Iraq to go forward is for an inclusive set of—I mean, an inclusive framework for the way the country would be run, and for everybody to be included.
Now, not only the majority group want everybody in so that they get legitimacy, but even the minority group—I mean, I wouldn’t want to call them minority, they are a significant group, I mean each—all Iraqi groups whether Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurds are significant groups, and they are a very important part of Iraqi society and social fabric. But if—it’s only the Arab—I mean, it’s also the Sunni Arabs who want to be active this time, because they do realize that for them to not participate in this government, to not be part of Iraqi political drive—they will lose, their regions will be less, and the country will be moving forward, and other regions will be moving forward while their regions will not.
So we have a very healthy dynamic for the first time, and it is—the balance of—I mean, the numbers of the presentations per each group within the new parliament will balance itself out. The other interesting thing is that even the biggest bloc in the parliament cannot form a government alone. They will need to make coalition with others, and that’s the other interesting, you know, dynamic going on.
So two issues at stake here. First, how to form a unity government, and what will it take to form a unity government? How do each part—how do each group see? What will it take for them to participate and be part? I mean, the Shi’a has of course a perception that as soon as they get most off the—most of the seats or at least the biggest block of seats, then they are entitled for the greatest role in the government, and the greatest number of ministries, while Sunni Arab and maybe Kurds, they don’t think that the only formula for division of the pie, if we could choose that—but mainly—I mean, there are other aspects to this. It’s not only the electoral entitlement, but there are other entitlements and other approaches for this.
Then you have the differences in terms of how would you want to go on with the constitutional review process, and there we have different opinions. Some groups don’t want to—the constitution to be touched, and the new—the group that is coming in on board now, who was not part of the constitution drafting, has some strong positions on certain articles in it, and how to manage those opposing points of view, and how some groups are actually conditioning their participation with constitutional changes.
So all of this is now being talked about in informal ways. So back to the question: how is it going on? There is a lot of informal talk, and like that, and it’s happening in a very friendly, open—I mean, committed way by all groups to talk to each other, to listen to each other. And there are also at the same time some public expression of positions that is in a way—it’s not the final position, because at the end the constitution will have to be amended. If we want a lasting peace in Iraq, then we have to consider everybody’s point of view, but how much change and in which articles—that is yet to be—to come.
ROBINSON: Ms. Barwari, I want you to have a chance to give us a summary of your view of whether we’re closer to the beginning, middle, or end in terms of the reconstruction issues, but I neglected my haste to start the meeting to remind everyone this is an on-the-record meeting, as the Minister noted, and if anyone has not turned off their cell phones and paging devices, please do so now.
Would you like to give us an overall comment on where—how your feeling about your progress made to date, and if you have any specific comments vis-a-vis the testimony yesterday, and then we’ll go ahead and delve into the specific components of your portfolio.
BARWARI: Well, first of all I have to be honest, I didn’t see the testimony because I was busy in meetings and side visits. I’ve been visiting some projects here to learn from—some of experience and some of the technologies that are available in industry here, so—but I did read a few this morning, and in checking my e-mails, and in managing my office through e-mail—sending a few e-mails to my deputy minister and staff in Baghdad, I did read an article in the newspaper, so—the New York Times so and that—so that was covering some of that, so I think I understand what went on yesterday. I tried to comment on it, but I go back to your first question, where we are at?
We are at the beginning simply because the level of neglect to infrastructure is beyond anybody’s imagination. It was beyond my imagination when I first joined my job after—in the first government that was formed in September, 2003. When I went down from Kurdistan to Baghdad to take up my—the same position I’m holding now, I was amazed on the level of service coverage and how bad it was. So take that into consideration. How minimal the service provided to the public were, how limited they are, and then level—the—also the destruction that happened through the war, and the looting, and add to it some targeting by insurgents to some of the services, like electricity, telecommunications, oil installation, and sometimes water too.
When you put that together, then we are starting from a very low standard of services. So when you judge where we are today, you have to take that into consideration—how low the services were. And then how much has been invested on it during those two years, and was it enough or not, and how much does it take? So I would say we are in the beginning, but we have—and here I’m going to talk from our—from my experience as a—from the minister of municipality and public works. We run over 600 water and sanitation facilities across the country, and these are providing services to—for—in the water sector, for example, 67 percent of the population are served by the—well they’re—almost all of them are water facilities, or (compact ?) units, or—different facilities that either provide water, pump water, or treat water. Only 67 percent of the people—population of Iraq are served by those pipelines. And only 15 percent of the population in urban centers are served by (proper ?) sanitation coverage.
And now, this is the situation that was before or almost around the wartime. And what happened during the liberation of Iraq is that—I mean, first of all, let’s talk about how credible those data is, because to be honest with you, in Iraq it was before the war, and even now, we are lacking credible baseline data. Like we sometimes do function without knowing the real data, basically because the previous—the Saddam regime was manipulating sometimes data, but also never invested on strategic planning or a survey. Data collection was prohibited. Data collection was something like spying on the system. There was no credible data if we want to start comparing what we have done.
Our data comes from the amount of water that flows—facilities produce and amount of water that is needed by the people based on a formula that we have developed, which is also an overestimated formula. I tell you about my formula. I don’t know what the U.S. use, and was used yesterday—but we basically calculate, per capita, for the citizens in Iraq by 400 liters per day, and this is too much if you take world standards. It varies between 100 to 150, so when I calculate 400 liters per day—by the population that are (citizens ?) of Iraq, then I will need a certain amount of water every day, and I calculate what I am producing in the water treatment plant that is functioning now, and it becomes 67 percent.
But if I calculate what is really an acceptable level of water per day, based on, for example, the UNICEF—if we take UNICEF as an organization that deals with water and sanitation across the country and is in charge of achieving the Millennium Goal of water coverage, they use 150 liters. I know this is too technical and too many numbers for you, but sometimes our problem lies in the planning and the use of the resources that are available for us, like—the available water. It’s—actually it’s a dilemma. If I count how much water has been available, and this is per capita—Iraq will look like we don’t need anymore water. This is the—I’m just giving you some challenging way of looking at it, but the reality is—no, there are areas that are not served by water, and there are areas served by water.
So I think I have confused you with a lot of numbers without answering your question: where are we at? We still are in a lot of need of water. The water sector in Iraq will need an investment of $1 billion a year so that in 12 years I can get to 100 percent coverage of water in rural and urban areas, and so far this money is not being made available to the sector, which means we have a long way to go.
Having said that, what we have been doing of course—taking advantage of all the available resources like—available from the U.S., funding from other donor countries, from lending institutions like the World Bank, and—there has been a lot of projects that are completed in 2004 and 2005, and a lot of projects that will be completed this year. Many more projects that will start this year, so I would think Iraq will need—first of all, Iraq is not getting what is enough for its basic need in term of financial resources.
ROBINSON: If I might just ask you on this point, because I think that—and yesterday’s hearing I think may have contributed to this impression that to some degree the effort over there is running to stay in place; that the insurgent attacks have continued to degrade infrastructure once it’s built. And I know there was a GAO report last—not this latest one, but last year that said that there were problems with maintaining the equipment in some of the water and sanitation places, so whether it’s due to inadequacy of training, parts and materials, or so forth. You don’t need to get that technical, but I think people would appreciate an estimate of sort of where did you start and where have you gotten. That’s a substantial figure you’ve just given us of $1 billion a year for the next 12, but could you also sort of outline where you have come on this area?
BARWARI: On terms of—
ROBINSON: The water and sanitation projects. I mean, have you had a net gain in water supply and sanitation supply to the national population?
BARWARI: Of course. I mean, I mentioned 76 percent, which is the current coverage, which was 50 percent during the war. With the damage that happened, it went down to 50 percent. So we got it back to 67 percent and by the time the projects that are planned to be finished this year and next year, we will get up to 75 percent coverage of water in the rural and urban areas. We will have this year—insha’allah—we will complete the over 300 rural water projects that will provide water to people—they never had water in the villages. So there is a—it’s very hard to give all the numbers because I don’t want to get technical, as you said.
There was one issue you mentioned about operation and maintenance. We do get into different understanding of what is the minimum acceptable level of operating style between us and our colleagues, engineers of USA and U.S. Army. And in Baghdad when we sit around the table to plan, actually—and this is very serious because—I mean, we have our own basic requirement for operation and maintenance. And when you sit with some of the U.S. engineers, they have—I mean, the U.S. standard of operation and maintenance in terms of number of operators that need to be put in place, number of hours of operation, number of fuel that need to be made available, number of spare parts and everything, and actually we can never meet that standard at this level today in Iraq, and it doesn’t need to be that sophisticated, so that’s where we get into a problem.
And I know in the U.S. they were sometimes very unhappy because once we received the facility we need to provide for operation and maintenance. And we will provide based on what is available of resources to us by the Iraqi budget. That’s first, but second, what is the minimum acceptable? So we will do it the Iraqi way. We won’t do it the U.S. way. And I hope that could be appreciated because then we get criticism or dissatisfaction by the people who financed it saying that it’s lost investment. No, it’s not lost investment. We cannot run a facility 24 hours because we don’t have as much electricity. Are we going to build electricity for each rehabilitated so that we can—no. And beside, we need to conserve water. I’m not saying it—I think the one example I want to say here to tell you that things are okay, there has been no one demonstration because of lack of Iraq, and Iraqi people are free. They demonstrate against fuel. They demonstrate against insurgency. They demonstrate against political parties. They write against me and about me. I mean, they could have also demonstrated if they were not happy.
I am not saying there are satisfied. There is a lot to be done for them. But there is an acceptable level of service delivery that we are working to improve, and it will take time and money, and that has not been available yet. And that’s why we are pursuing other ways of making that money available.
ROBINSON: We were speaking before the meeting began about the effort to improve services outside of Baghdad as opposed to the previous concentration within the capital. And I know from my own experience early in the war, I was in southern Iraq, I was quite shocked to find such an oil-rich country has such poor services really pretty much throughout the south. I’d like to ask you about the decision to—originally the plan was to go for large-scale infrastructure projects and then that was shifted to smaller scale projects, things that could be quickly brought online to have more immediate impact on more people, and also the diversion of some of the funds to security needs. How in the long term do you see this? Do you think there is going to be a need to finance some of these large-scale projects or what’s your view about the trade-offs and when perhaps that calculus should change?
BARWARI: I have to go back to September, 2003, when the first weeks of my assignment and appointment we start working with embassy consultant on planning for the use of the U.S. supplement. And we have to take some of the blame, the Iraqi side, because it was we who proposed those big projects. This planning exercise was taking place in a very close coordination. It was among the first things that I start doing. And I basically of course would depend and count on my technical people. And this is the way the Iraqi used to think under Saddam, you know. They think big. They think we have oil, let’s plan big. So that was the beginning of—but even though, our plan was diverse. We had big, large project proposed, and we had also supplies, (non ?) construction items like pipes and pumps so that we can renovate and rehabilitate existing network. And we have also supplies of equipment and machinery who could support.
So we had like three components, but basically the networks were for smaller scale and rehabilitation work. But the rest of the projects I’m afraid were big, and it’s basically because we were just after the war. We have no plan. We have no policy papers, no investment plan, none. Saddam Hussein did not invest on one strategic plan. All ministers when they take up their position, they have to start from zero. They have to get—no data, no plan. So in that condition of course we would go for big investment. And it transited, just like how we transit our own planning process, too.
But of course there were other priorities and there were political decisions by the U.S. government which I personally was very unhappy with and I expressed my unhappiness because cutting from $4 billion in promise to water and sanitation and have communicated that promise to the public and have counted on it, and it even affected at the time donors’—other donors’ contribution to the sector because they thought this sector is well taken care of by the U.S. I could appreciate the need to shift water because—I mean, money to other—from water to others, but not at that level actually. It was painful.
But what I want to say regarding whether there would be need—yes, there would be a need for big, major water project. And what we are doing is now, we are seeking soft loans, for example, from the Japanese and the World Bank. It basically is going to finance big water project that will be implemented over minimum of three or five years, that will take some time for design and studies and careful planning. But in the meantime, we have to do something to provide for that gap in the water supply. And that’s why we also are investing on expansion of networks, replacement of facilities so that they can pump more water, tankering. We were also using tankering.
And what I wanted to say, that even in our budget we also financed some big projects. We have 13 projects of water and sanitation that are financed by the Iraqi budget to be implemented over the next five years.
So the strategies, I think it’s natural that you—when you start with something and then you get into it, then you—it’s only natural that—even in our—in my daily work, I mean, we review. Now, for example, in the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works—if I just give you a little bit of description—we have five sectors that we deal with in the Ministry—actually, four. Water, sanitation, municipal services that includes solid waste management, and then urban and regional development with the master planning and land allocation and traffic arrangements—everything.
Normally the planning style was that each sector plan for itself, but this year, and starting from the last three months, we changed the style. We’re going to think regional and not sectoral. And we would go to think about cities or municipalities and think of slum upgrade, of urban development, municipal development. That will include improvement on water and sanitation and roads and traffic arrangements and park development, in slum upgrade, so this is how we are moving, so—and to answer your question, the transiting—it’s natural and it’s healthy in a way.
ROBINSON: Good. Well, I’m just going to ask you a couple quick questions now before we throw it open. There is a kind of chicken-and-egg quality to the debate about security versus reconstruction, and I’d like your view on that. Some other questioners may go into greater depth on this issue. But the argument we heard yesterday largely was, can’t make progress on these issues until you have a more secure environment. There’s also a point of view that the more progress you can make, perhaps in some concentrated areas in the Sunni triangle, the more you will sap strength from the insurgency or the base of population, so that it’s actually important to push forward.
What’s your view on that?
BARWARI: I always believe that the two issues are interrelated, and for us to stabilize situation we need to create jobs and improve the situation so we gain public satisfaction and support. And we can’t wait for security before starting any project, and we need to be smart and creative in developing program and managing the two issues. They are two—both of them are related. And I think we need to go back to Ramadi and work because there has been a momentum. These people have now came on board. They want to participate in Iraqi issues. They have been under hardship and target not because we’re targeting them, but because of the nature of the situation. They have expressed their willingness to cooperate with the security institutions so that they clean their areas. They want to develop their areas. They want jobs for their men and families, and they want better services.
Actually, really, all Iraq was not served well. I mean there is an impression that some areas were better served than other areas. Believe me, all areas of Iraq have suffered from neglect and lack of services, so all of them will definitely need—and especially those areas so that we contain the insurgency activity.
ROBINSON: My last question has to do with the overall funding picture, which I think is something that’s critical given that there are clear budget constraints here and in Washington. There’s perhaps a limit to how rapidly the oil revenues are going to grow. I’m sure there’ll be some questions about oil. And I know there’s been a back-and-forth about exactly what the production levels have been, but I think clearly if you draw a line through all the ups and downs it’s been below pre-war production levels—the 2.5 million barrels a day. And what’s your picture? I mean, I know that when we had the deputy secretary of the treasury here before, he indicated that it was important to get the international donors to first make good on their previous pledges before you go out and try to collect new ones. But what’s your view of what’s needed short term, middle term, and where are you going to get it from?
BARWARI: Well, first of all, Iraqi need will grow—will continue to grow because of urbanization, because of population growth, so the figure we will mention about needs to day will definitely grow after 10 years and 15 years. But we are still talking about the need for $60-70 billion to deal with basic services of water, electricity and sanitation and housing and health and education. And that still needs to be made available within the next five years if we want to see real progress.
Iraqi budget continues to be overburdened by other demand for building the security, for covering for daily fuel needs until the oil industry is up and running, and covering internal needs. The subsidy, although we have moved—we have made a progress in that in term of increasing the fuel price fivefold, and this has been at this period of Iraqi transition to be made, and for the public to understand it and accept it. I mean, there is a lot of hope there. Beside, we cut some of the items in the food baskets and we are now experiencing some pilot project in two cities in Iraq, in Dohuk and Samarra where we’re going to cut the (food ?) basket in those two cities and pay some money in the state, as an example, so we’re piloting—I mean, we are testing a lot of things.
There are so many things that are happening in Iraq today. And when I look at the complete picture sitting here in Washington, which allows me that—because when I’m in Baghdad in my ministry I only think water, sanitation, solid waste management. When I look—when I’m here—and by the way, I discovered something. Garbage is very valuable. Yesterday when I visited this, I mean 1 million ton of garbage can produce 8 megawatt of electricity, so I have some good news for Iraq. (Laughter.) It’s a lot of—yes.
The message is that we are working on everything at the same time in Iraq today. And it’s hard for you, for even me—insider—to realize progress, but I am very optimistic that in the next two, three years, if we get this national unity right, if we improve our security, we are going to see progress in everywhere like we never imagined.
ROBINSON: Let’s open this up for questions now. I have the usual reminders. Please wait for the microphone and speak directly into it. Please stand, or I think in this gathering it’s fine to sit, but please state your name and your affiliation and please keep the questions concise so everyone can have a chance. Thank you.
Yes, Arnaud?
QUESTIONER: Ms. Barwari, are you satisfied with the way—I’m sorry—Arnaud de Borchgrave, CSIS. Are you satisfied with the way oil revenue has been spent? Because the stories we hear in Washington is that so far there’s about $38 billion in oil revenue unaccounted for.
BARWARI: Since when? For one year?
QUESTIONER: Since the beginning.
BARWARI: Oh, since the beginning.
QUESTIONER: Since the American invasion.
BARWARI: Shall I answer one by one or—
ROBINSON: Yeah.
BARWARI: Okay, okay. Well, I mean, Iraqi needs are huge and Iraq is a big country. And there is need in every sector, and there are—every ministry is always in short of what it needs. I mean, we never get what we want when we finally do approve the federal budget, so to have money that is unspent—there has been also a situation where many ministries could not implement all of their budget, and that money will go back to the—but it’s there. It’s not lost. As in terms of the number you mentioned unaccounted for, I cannot comment on it, to be honest with you. But there are a lot of observed—I mean, there are the capacity to implement. I mean, sector like—just like my sector. I mean, if there was no other pressing demand like security and oil. We have been buying fuel to cover daily consumption of cars and households, where we have paid $1 billion in two months only to cover the need, so half of the Iraqi budget does go for buying fuel now, now, until we fix our refinery and things. So I don’t think we are—there’s no change for money to get lost. At least I’m talking about now. I don’t know about since the war, and that’s—I wouldn’t comment on the unaccounted.
ROBINSON: Yes, sir?
QUESTIONER: (Off mike.) I have a question about—(off mike). I would assume that—(off mike)—to design some of the construction and—(off mike)—you talked about a switch from very large projects to smaller ones. That would seem—(off mike)—more opportunity for Iraqi companies. (Off mike)—what kind of capability would those companies have—(off mike)—and are they scared off by the insurgency?
BARWARI: Okay, first question: who does the work? Iraqis do the work. Sir, I have 46,000 staff in my ministry who work in 251 municipal offices. They are there. They are the one who implement projects, supervise them, keep the water clean, fix the pipe when it gets broken, collect the garbage, again—I mean, pave the roads. That’s in term of implementation capacity. It exists there.
I talked, again, for our implementation—what we use for implementation. We use our assets, but we also use the Iraqi private sector. And sometime we also contract some work to international or regional companies, who do exist and have offices in Baghdad. I mean, we—when we, for example, announce for any project in our ministry, we get at least 20 to 30 bids of Iraqi companies, Arab companies, Turkish companies, foreign companies, so there is the capacity.
Now, Iraqi does have capacity to implement. Don’t forget, during the—let’s say the sanction period, most of the infrastructure work was done by Iraqis. And even today, even when international companies go and get a bid, they go and contract it to an Iraqi company. Now, we do have implementation capacity, but we don’t have some of the new modern techniques.
You talked about design. Some of our work gets designed by local firms, like universities, like some technical firms. They do exist. But as a mean of encouraging interaction, we normally, in our bids, we do put a line that we will encourage Iraqi companies to have partners with international companies because we want modernization. Iraqi companies and technical people were cut off from any update in modern technology for 30 years, so as a way of opening up the country—and they have been very creative actually. Most Iraqi companies are connected now in one way or another and there is quite partnership there between Iraqi private sector and the international private sector.
Normally when the work is done by Iraqis, it’s less targeted. I mean, take our project. I mean we implement, as I said, 13 big projects, but we have hundreds of projects—small projects in our budget that are implemented by Iraqi companies. And really—touch wood—we had none—no incident that was targeting our work, except one. I mean, to be honest with you, one, and that was in Abu Ghraib. And we know Abu Ghraib is a dangerous area, and we had to stop work. But everywhere we haven’t had any work stopped because of security. So Iraqi—and that’s why we always said it to our American friends, that when you rely on Iraqis, it’s less—I mean, it’s less attractive for targeting, and Iraqi know how to handle the situation. They know how to build the relationship with the local community, get the required security to make the work going on.
ROBINSON: Yes, at the end.
QUESTIONER: David Apgar, corporate executive board. Let me keep the questions on water as opposed to oil. I don’t know why Arnaud is worried about $30-odd billion worth of oil since that’s just one year’s profits of a U.S. oil company these days, but let me ask two questions about water. The first question—a very brief one—would be, I’m not sure I heard what you thought the baseline was at the end of Saddam’s regime. If you had to estimate what percentage of requirements—of water requirements were provided, where now you’re at 67 percent, what would—at the end of Saddam’s regime, what would that percentage be?
And the real question is, to look at—to ask, what are the perhaps two or maybe three largest reasons why you’ve been able to reconstruct and to raise the level of water services provided from something in the 50s to 67 percent? What are the two or three most important success factors which might or might not be something that you can extrapolate?
BARWARI: Okay. Well, I did say that we have no idea—we have no data about pre-war level. I mean, if anybody come with a figure, I personally wouldn’t take it seriously because there was not record of—we didn’t know. And besides, people wouldn’t be able to express their displeasure at the time, so we didn’t know. We didn’t know. We have a figure that was given by the World Bank assessment team in August 2003, but these teams came to Baghdad and collected information and were—actually maybe they did a few site visits, but I wouldn’t—even that figure was not very—and their estimation of pre-war level—after the war, they estimated pre-war level to be 75 percent. And I don’t take it. I don’t believe it.
QUESTIONER: What’s your best guess?
BARWARI: I would think—
QUESTIONER: Just your subjective best guess.
BARWARI: Yes. I think it would be between 50 and 60 percent, to be quite frank with you. What are the—why we managed. First of all, because we rehabilitated. We, from our own money, but also supported by the U.S. and other donor countries who did a lot of rehabilitation work for existing facilities, that increase the production capacity. We have—some of our installations goes back to 1932. We have one facility in Basra that is that old, and it’s still running. Doesn’t that say something about the creativity of Iraqi technician to keep something that is 32—not 32 years, it was productive—produced and installed in 1932. So that’s one thing: increasing the capacity, because a lot of replacement and expansion of production line has been taking place.
The second thing is replacement of pipelines. Much of water was getting lost because of old networks that have an extension of pipelines. And transporting water to communities that never had water because of tankering has also allowed us to give people more water. I think these are the three things that we manage to do that increase coverage.
ROBINSON: Yes, ma’am, at the end.
QUESTIONER: My name is Berivan Yousify from Voice of America. Based on your speech yesterday, you said seven in ten Iraqis said that their lives are going well. But you say now you don’t have data, you don’t have research. Based on what you said ten of seven Iraqis there life is better? And also you said nearly two-thirds expecting things are improving.
BARWARI: Yeah.
QUESTIONER: Like—
BARWARI: Yeah. Well, that was based on a sampling poll that was taken place in Iraq. I mean yesterday’s speech you were at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
QUESTIONER: Right.
BARWARI: And you’re quoting it, and that was not on the record. But no, no—I mean, thank you for—you have all the right to raise the question. No, that was based on a polling station and this is about situation. It’s not about concrete data of water and quantity, but that is a situation of how people feel. People does feel that their life has been better in some areas and in other areas. How to quantify so that you can judge—it’s up to the Iraqis. And some Iraqis are saying in this, and I’m quoting a poll that was taken place by an Iraqi newspaper in Baghdad, that seven of ten do feel that their lives have been better. Now, yes, I’m quoting that, and it could be—if you take it in Ramadi it would be different, but we have to take some standards and an average.
And, I mean, you take freedom for granted here because you’ve enjoyed it every day, but for people of Iraq who never enjoyed freedom, never enjoyed security of being who they are, let’s not talk about personal security, because even I lived in the U.S., I wouldn’t leave after 6:00 p.m. because I wouldn’t feel secure to walk alone. I’m not trying to defend the security situation in Iraq, but when you want to quantify that and use it in the calculation of how life has improved, in comparison to a few hours of electricity that you’re getting less, believe me as an Iraqi, being able to for the first time to be free to be a Kurd or a Shi’a or a Christian, or even speak against the government or assemble or have so many choices of newspaper per day, and having actually better salaries and having that kind of a quality, to quantify it compared to be maybe some of the setbacks that we are having, especially in the personal security. Believe me, as an Iraqi, it goes long way.
QUESTIONER: The thing is, I would understand that because maybe I’m Iraqi, but like the other people, based on the report every day we saw on TV interviewing people, talking to experts, everybody said the different things and different ideas. And also, seven out of ten, isn’t that too much? I mean, I wish I—
ROBINSON: I think she’s already given you an answer. If you don’t mind, let’s go on. Yes, sir, in the corner?
QUESTIONER: Allan Wendt. I recognize that electricity may not be in your area of responsibility, but we read about it a lot in the press here. And I for one have never really seen a persuasive explanation of why, as it is alleged, the output of the electrical grid is below what it was before the war. The insurgency is cited and various things like that, but none of it is very persuasive or enlightening for Americans here. Maybe you can shed more light on this problem.
BARWARI: Okay. Well, I’ll talk—we talked about this before. I talk as a citizen just like you who is a beneficiary of electricity supply in Baghdad. And I’ll tell you about the story how it was before we liberate Iraq.
First of all, Saddam never invested on anything new. And I think I made the argument. The newest water facility we have is 1980. So that was the last time Saddam regime put a water facility in Iraq. Same thing apply on electricity, okay. So we do have old and limited number of power stations to supply water. And what was happening is that all these water power supplies, especially during the sanction year, they were diverted to supply only Baghdad. So Baghdad will have 24-hour supply of electricity and the rest of the country may have none or may have very limited. And this would be supplied by stations that are in Basra or in Nasiriyah or in Dibid (ph) or in Mosul because there is a grid, and they can switch. So it used to serve only Baghdad just to keep that setting under control. There was no care for the rest.
Now, after the war what happened—no, of course, there was now a new rearrangement. And that’s why you have the less hours in Baghdad because now everybody else is also getting equal. Now, whether we are not generating what is pre-war level or even more, again, I used to remember those numbers, but because I have to memorize so many water and sanitation numbers, I can’t. But I would just tell you this. The demand has increased so much for electricity, and the investment on increasing the electricity output has not been matching with the demand. And that also is a positive sign because there is so much progress in the economic situation. People are buying so many electric—and we—it’s hard. And of course that’s the responsibility of the government. We need to do some campaign—some public awareness campaign to conserve. Iraqi people are not used to minimize or economize use of electricity or water.
I think, listening to my colleague the electricity minister, they manage to get production of electricity up to 6,000 megawatts in 2004. And I know that their target was that they add 10,000 every year. And I think it need time for their progress to materialize. But 6,000 is already 2,000 more than pre-war level, which was 4,000. So again, if we’re calculating pure number or are we calculating daily supply, and what is enough for Iraqi households today when they have more electric equipment, when we are distributing electricity equally, not like before?
I mean, I hope I—that gave you just some more perspective.
ROBINSON: Yes?
QUESTIONER: Hi. My name is Jeff Kaplan with the Open ePolicy Group at Harvard’s Berkman Center. Two questions. One, the $1 billion per year for 12 years that you mentioned, realistically, how much of that is going to depend on the Iraqi national budget and basically the increase in oil revenues over that time? How much are you really going to be depending on those resources developed within the country and not donor aid?
Second question is, I guess it was the New York Times, but the press has reported about funds going from bureaucracy, perhaps not just the oil bureaucracy but bureaucracy in general, into ending up the insurgency, and sort of there’s a funding circle going there. I know this is a sensitive question, but it’s being reported and so I wanted to ask you your perspective on the municipality side of your portfolio on that problem.
BARWARI: Okay. Now, this $1 billion needs to be invested on the water sector. We hope to get at least half of it from the Iraqi budget, but we have not managed to do that. Over this year and last year, we—our allocation from the Iraqi budget has been only 200 million and—well, 300 for operation and maintenance and salary and investment. We will put aside 200 million for investment, so we’re already getting only 20 percent covered by the Iraqi budget.
When oil revenue grow, we hopefully are going to get double that. I mean, we will seek getting double that number. So we are still short. And that’s a question we are putting to the world and to the—I mean, of course we go and ask, or at least we explore ways of financing, but that is our plan. If we could get 1 million—1 billion, then we will get 100 percent coverage in 12 years. If we don’t get 1 billion, then that means we will take more years. So this is our target planning figure, and we will hope to get different financing through soft loans, matching grants, definitely the Iraqi budget.
Don’t forget, as I’m sure you are also—maybe you are informed, the national—the Iraqi national development strategy has put water and electricity as priorities. And the issue is just the demanding—the bulk of the subsidy is eating up most of the money. So as we move on and moving away from subsidy and stabilizing security where we don’t need to put more billion in it, I may very optimistic that the government of Iraq will decide to put more money on the water. But now, because now there is more—other priorities that other donor countries want covered, like security and oil, that’s where my attempt would be to—when I go and talk to—I mean if—this time, this period, if we could get some support from donor countries and lending banks so that eventually—eventually in five years time we will be financed completely by the Iraqi budget hopefully.
ROBINSON: Do you want to address quickly the question about—
BARWARI: Oh.
ROBINSON: —the diversion to (insurgency ?)?
BARWARI: Oh, yes, yes, yes, definitely. Now, if I say I don’t think so I will look very unrealistic, because you have obviously piece of information. But if I think of all the work we are doing and where we are doing it, we’re doing it in places that are—there are no insurgency. I mean yes, there are certain areas like Mosul and Diyala, because frankly we have not been able to do anything in Ramadi because of the situation, so we decide to not do anything because of fear of that. Not only because it will be taken, it just won’t be spent or could be wasted or there could be corruption, so we just don’t implement project there.
We normally—security is an important factor in us, so whenever there is an enabling environment and secure we invest our money there. So if you take the southern part of Iraq where there is no insurgency, then it’s not possible that money goes there. I know that most ministries avoid working in areas, or at least stop working, even when they start a project—when there is security problem, we stop doing the project. Having said that, there are ways, and there might be—there might have been ways. I tell you very simple—not simple, it’s a significant in our case in Abu Ghraib why we stopped working, because there was threat to our contracted companies and staff and there were attempts to pull back our subcontractors by the insurgency demanding that the subcontractor, for him to be allowed to work he should pay money. And the subcontractors came and talked to us, and we just stopped them. We did not want to finance the insurgency operation.
What I’m saying, I wouldn’t say that it doesn’t exist completely, but I would 90 percent it wouldn’t be right, and it’s not happening.
ROBINSON: Well, we have reached the end of our time. And I just would like to thank you on behalf of all of us for coming and speaking with us, Minister Barwari, and also I think for all of the Iraqi officials who come here to talk. We realize you are operating in a very high threat situation and we wish you the best for your continued safety as you do your job. Thank you.
BARWARI: Thank you. (Applause.)
(C) COPYRIGHT 2006, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE.
NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED.
UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION.
FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON’S OFFICIAL DUTIES.
FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL JACK GRAEME AT 202-347-1400.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.
To order Task Force reports, Council Special Reports, and Critical Policy Choices, please call, fax, or order online from our distributor, the Brookings Institution Press: phone +1.800.537.5487, fax +1.410.516.6998.
For information on other reports that are not for sale, or for general publications information, please call +1.212.434.9516 or email publications@cfr.org.
Start-Up Nation addresses the trillion-dollar question: How is it that Israel—a country of 7.1 million, only sixty years old, surrounded by enemies— produces more start-up companies than large, peaceful, and stable nations like Japan, China, India, Korea, Canada, and the UK? With the insights of geopolitical experts and investors, the authors examine this nation’s adversity-driven culture to answer this question and offer prescriptions for a global economy on the rebound.
In Forces of Fortune, Vali Nasr presents a paradigm-changing revelation that will transform the understanding of the Muslim world at large. He reveals that there is a vital but unseen rising force in the Islamic world—a new business-minded middle class—that is building a vibrant new Muslim world economy and that holds the key to winning the cold war against Iran and extremists.
In Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know, Julia E. Sweig presents a remarkably accessible portrait of Cuba's unique place on the world stage over the past fifty years, including its internal politics, its often fraught relationship with the United States, and its shifting relationship with the global community.
Complete list of CFR Books
The report of this bipartisan Task Force of distinguished leaders and experts represents a strong consensus on the importance of repairing America's immigration policy. It makes the case that maintaining America's political and economic leadership depends on attracting talented and hard-working immigrants, and on securing the country's borders in a smart, effective, and humane way.
This report finds that nuclear weapons will remain a fundamental element of U.S. national security in the near term, and makes recommendations on how to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. deterrent nuclear force, prevent nuclear terrorism, and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
About Independent Task Forces at CFR
Complete list of Task Force reports
Identifying international threats and acting on them may be the most difficult job for U.S. policymakers. This report
provides an actionable road map for managing international threats before they erupt into crises and makes a strong case that preventive action is not a luxury but a necessity.
For more than a decade, the United States has mostly watched from the sidelines as Asian countries organize themselves into an alphabet soup of new multilateral groups. In this report, the authors review the relationship between pan-Asian and trans-Pacific institutions and suggest policy guidelines for a new U.S. approach to this new Asian landscape.
Complete list of Council Special Reports
To request permission to reprint or reuse CFR material, please fill out this permissions request form (PDF), referring to the instructions on page 1.
Copyright 2009 by the Council on Foreign Relations. All Rights Reserved.