Pundits tend to treat terrorism and guerrilla tactics as something new, but nothing could be further from the truth. Although the agendas have changed over the years -- from tribalism, to liberalism and nationalism, to socialism, to jihadist extremism -- guerrilla and terrorist warfare has been ubiquitous throughout history and consistently deadly.

Stephen Hadley and John Podesta accurately describe Washington's policy dilemmas and preferred outcomes in Afghanistan ("The Right Way Out of Afghanistan," July/August 2012).

As the United States prepares to exit Afghanistan, it is focusing too much on security, overlooking the political elements of the transition, write two former senior U.S. officials.

The United States, facing deepening economic and fiscal woes at home, is preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan.

Abandoning counterinsurgency doctrine after Afghanistan would doom the U.S. military to irrelevance and impotence, writes Christopher Sims and Fernando Luján. Not so, says Bing West; like it or not, the United States will be much less ambitious in future wars.

The Afghans will indeed be ready to take over their own security by 2014, writes the former commander of the ISAF Joint Command.

In 2001, fearing ethnic strife, the international community pushed for a strong central government in Kabul.

If the United States is interested in leaving behind a better Afghanistan than the one it found, it needs to take the experiences of past invasions to heart.

Two documentaries on the Afghan war, Restrepo and Armadillo, show how a combination of overwhelming military resources and aggressive counterinsurgency ultimately leads to frustration on the battlefield.

Two documentaries on the Afghan war, Restrepo and Armadillo, show how a combination of overwhelming military resources and aggressive counterinsurgency ultimately leads to frustration on the battlefield.

Richard A. Falkenrath says that with Osama bin Laden gone, life is about to become more complicated for U.S. policymakers trying to combat terrorism.

Al Qaeda is stronger today than when it carried out the 9/11 attacks.

Washington and its allies could still win in Afghanistan if they are given the time they need.

Although it has problems, a de facto partition of Afghanistan, in which Washington pursues nation building in the north and counterterrorism in the south, offers an acceptable fallback.

Americans have growing doubts about the U.S. mission in Afghanistan that U.S. President Barack Obama seems to share. But the United States should and will maintain a major presence in Afghanistan for years to come.

The most realistic and acceptable alternative models of governance in Afghanistan are decentralized democracy and a system of internal mixed sovereignty.

Can Louis XIV's consolidation of power in seventeenth-century France guide the way for state builders in Afghanistan today?

As three new books show, defeating the Taliban will require local, bottom-up efforts -- beginning with a deep understanding of tribal and subtribal politics.

The United States' mission in Afghanistan will not be accomplished until a central government exists there that can control the country's territory.

As the Obama administration prepares to send more troops to Afghanistan, what are the problems U.S. forces will face, and what, if anything, can they do to overcome them?