In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 24, 2016, Alyssa Ayres discussed areas of progress and the importance of managing expectations in U.S.-India relations. Drawing on recommendations made by the 2015 CFR Independent Task Force on U.S.-India Relations, Ayres recommended reframing the bilateral relationship as a joint venture instead of as a not-quite alliance, arguing that such a shift would allow for increased cooperation in areas of convergence without letting differences undermine progress.
South Asia is in the midst of a geopolitical transformation wrought by several simultaneous developments: China’s rise, India’s rise, and attempts by the United States to recalibrate its own strategy to address new power dynamics across the arc of Asia from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. CFR's Asia program convened a symposium to discuss the new geopolitics of southern Asia.
Ambassador Robert Blackwill asserts that China’s strategy is to maximize its “comprehensive national power” at the expense of American predominance in Asia, and that Xi Jinping—as China’s most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping—is likely to pursue that strategy aggressively. Blackwill argues for a revised American grand strategy toward Asia that seeks to avoid conflict with Beijing and maintain U.S. primacy in the region.
Republican Party’s Presumptive Nominee for President Donald Trump stated that he would consider ending the U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense and encouraging it to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Sheila A. Smith, senior fellow for Japan studies, argues that such an act would not only be a nightmare scenario for Japan, but would profoundly alter the strategic dynamics that have maintained peace in the Asia-Pacific for generations
Japan hosts the G7 summit at a time of rising strategic tensions in Asia and worrisome global economic trends, but for many the gathering will be sidelined by a U.S. presidential visit to Hiroshima, writes CFR's Sheila Smith.
Sheila A. Smith, senior fellow for Japan studies, analyzes how the United States and Japan together dealt with North Korean fourth nuclear test, China’s increasing military activities in the South China Sea, the long-standing base relocation issue in Okinawa, and the “Trump Shock,” caused by Republican frontrunner Donald Trump’s campaign language toward Japan on trade and on security cooperation.
While tensions continue to rise in the South China Sea and the disputing governments nervously await a decision in the Philippines’ arbitration case against China, an important sideshow has arisen between Japan and Taiwan in the central Philippine Sea.
In testimony before the United States-China Economic and Security Commission on April 27, 2016, Yanzhong Huang discussed China’s 13th Five Year Plan in the context of China’s healthcare system landscape, attempts at reform, and potential opportunities and challenges for collaboration between the United States and China in the healthcare sector.
Sheila A. Smith, senior fellow for Japan studies, identifies three areas of U.S. Asia policy that is particularly important for the next U.S. administration: devising a strategy for managing China’s increasing maritime activism, continued leadership in effective economy governance, and moving beyond the rhetoric of the presidential campaign to reassure allies and partners in Asia of the continued commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes and confidence building and risk reduction across Asia.
In spite of significant differences in views, Beijing and Washington appear committed to not letting cyber issues derail the U.S.-China relationship or interfere with cooperation on other high-profile issues. Among the wide range of issues raised at their recent meeting on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit, Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping reiterated their commitment to last September’s breakthrough cybersecurity agreement.
The more vulnerable Kim Jong Un feels atop a weakening North Korea, the more he seeks a silver bullet to ensure the regime's long-term survival. On May 6, Kim may enjoy a Korean Worker's Party conference that will celebrate his achievements and consolidate his rule. He may even think that his nuclear deterrent has bought time and saved money that can be used to improve North Korea's economy. But the regime's own systemic need to generate instability as a primary means of exerting domestic political control guarantees that the young leader will never have enough nuclear weapons to achieve absolute security, writes Scott Snyder, senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).