In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Ray Takeyh argues that there is precedent for Congress turning down agreements until a better draft is negotiated as in the case of arms control deals between the United States and the Soviet Union. Given the role Congress plays in ensuring that the United States negotiates the best possible agreement, it should aim to do no less with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Philip Gordon argues that, while the Iran nuclear agreement is not a perfect deal, it is far better than any realistic alternative and Congress should support it.
In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CFR President Richard N. Haass analyses the nuclear deal with Iran and suggests that any vote by Congress to approve the pact should be linked to legislation or a White House statement that makes clear what the United States would do if there were Iranian noncompliance, what would be intolerable in the way of Iran's long-term nuclear growth, and what the U.S. was prepared to do to counter Iranian threats to U.S. interests and friends in the region.
A major concern of the Iran nuclear deal is that it only imposes constraints for 10 years. After that, the “breakout time” needed for Iran to build a bomb may shrink again. President Obama should say that if Iran expands its program to the full extent allowed by the agreement, the United States will consider it a threat to our security and that of our allies. The president should also add that if the threat begins to grow again, Washington is prepared to renounce the agreement—reimposing sanctions, reviewing military options, and urging other states to do the same.
The UN’s nuclear agency has the tools to provide robust monitoring and verification to ensure Iran is moving to restrict its nuclear program but still faces stiff challenges, says expert Thomas Shea.
John F. Kerry discusses the Iran nuclear deal.
The Iran nuclear deal and subsequent UN Security Council resolution do little to bind the United States legally, though policymakers would face political pressure against reinstating sanctions, says CFR's John Bellinger.
"Critics of the Iran nuclear deal say that Congress should reject it. But Philip Gordon, writing in the Washington Post, shows that the alternatives to a negotiated agreement in North Korea, Iraq, and Iran so far have not turned out to be a "better deal."
Is Iran more like North Korea or Libya? That is the question politicians and the public must ask themselves as they consider President Obama's nuclear deal.
At this point in time, given the current Iranian leadership, the state of Iranian public opinion, and Iranian economic conditions, relying on unilateral economic leverage to obtain a better deal is an illusion, argues Miles Kahler. More likely it would drive Iran further in the direction of North Korea—an unrestrained nuclear program and an economically isolated, unreformed regime.
While no agreement is perfect, the scale of imperfection of the Iran nuclear deal is so great that it is imperative to renegotiate a more stringent one, writes CFR’s Ray Takeyh with former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman. To do so, Congress must reject the deal and push the United States and Iran to return to the table.
Talks over Iran’s nuclear program have concluded with a deal that will limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for relief from economic and financial sanctions. Before the sanctions are lifted, Iran must show that it has implemented agreed-upon restrictions, explains CFR Senior Fellow Philip H. Gordon.
The agreement on Iran’s nuclear program announced this week has got pundits everywhere talking about Reagan gambling on Gorbachev and Nixon going to China. President Barack Obama, who has made both comparisons, insists that the deal is not based on hope that Iran will “mellow.” The author Sestanovich analyses what history tells us about reaching out to hostile ideological regimes.
In an article for The Weekly Standard, Elliott Abrams explains that the Obama administration’s hopes of rapprochement and a nuclear agreement with Iran led it to overlook the consequences of empowering the regime in Teheran at the expense of the Iranian people.
In a piece for POLITICO, Philip Gordon argues that the Iran deal the P5+1 negotiated turned out pretty well. And in any case, no one has come up with a better alternative.
Who are the real winners of the Iran nuclear deal? Defense planners in U.S. Central Command and the Pentagon, says Micah Zenko, because “concepts, informal arrangements, and detailed plans that go into defense planning would have all been vastly more difficult, costly, and risky.”
Iran and six nations led by the United States reached a historic agreement on July 14, 2015, that will limit Tehran's nuclear capacity for more than a decade in return for lifting international economic sanctions. Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow Philip Gordon assesses the deal's implications for U.S.-Iran relations and Iran's role in the international community.
In his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ray Takeyh argues that the United States has moved from stopping Iran's nuclear activities to regulating its growth in a landmark accord that has upended fifty years of U.S. non-proliferation policy.
Marten outlines how U.S. policymakers can deter Russian aggression with robust support for NATO, while reassuring Russia of NATO’s defensive intentions.
Segal offers recommendations for cooperation on issues such as encryption, data localization, and cybersecurity.
Knopf argues that the only remaining path for South Sudan is for an international transitional administration to run the country for a finite period.
The definitive account of the secret war in Laos, which forever changed the CIA from a relatively small spying agency into an organization with vast paramilitary powers. More
CFR President Haass argues for an updated global operating system to address challenges from terrorism to climate change. More
Alden provides an enlightening history of the last four decades of U.S. trade policies and a blueprint for how to keep the United States competitive in a globalized economy. More
Learn more about CFR’s mission and its work over the past year in the 2016 Annual Report. The Annual Report spotlights new initiatives, high-profile events, and authoritative scholarship from CFR experts, and includes a message from CFR President Richard N. Haass.
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