Instead of continuing their endless battling, the United States and Pakistan should acknowledge that their interests simply do not converge enough to make them strong partners. Giving up the fiction of an alliance would free up Washington to explore new ways of achieving its goals in South Asia. And it would allow Islamabad to finally pursue its regional ambitions -- which would either succeed once and for all or, more likely, teach Pakistani officials the limitations of their country's power.

Pundits tend to treat terrorism and guerrilla tactics as something new, but nothing could be further from the truth. Although the agendas have changed over the years -- from tribalism, to liberalism and nationalism, to socialism, to jihadist extremism -- guerrilla and terrorist warfare has been ubiquitous throughout history and consistently deadly.

Stephen Hadley and John Podesta accurately describe Washington's policy dilemmas and preferred outcomes in Afghanistan ("The Right Way Out of Afghanistan," July/August 2012).

As the United States prepares to exit Afghanistan, it is focusing too much on security, overlooking the political elements of the transition, write two former senior U.S. officials.

Just a few years ago, India seemed on the brink of becoming the world's next great power. Today, its future appears less certain.

Two recent books reveal the ugly underbelly of India's success story. A vast gulf has opened up between the rich and the poor, corruption suffuses every aspect of life, and the country's political leaders lack the vision needed to turn this would-be world power into an actual one.

The United States has tried cracking down on Pakistan before. It did not work then, and it will not work now, writes Alexander Evans. The difference, counters Stephen Krasner, is that this time the United States has real leverage.

The United States, facing deepening economic and fiscal woes at home, is preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan.

Abandoning counterinsurgency doctrine after Afghanistan would doom the U.S. military to irrelevance and impotence, writes Christopher Sims and Fernando Luján. Not so, says Bing West; like it or not, the United States will be much less ambitious in future wars.

The United States gives Pakistan billions of dollars in aid each year. Pakistan returns the favor by harboring terrorists, spreading anti-Americanism, and selling nuclear technology abroad. Washington must tell Islamabad to start cooperating or lose its aid and face outright isolation.

Evan A. Feigenbaum argues that China will not simply bail out Pakistan with loans, investment, and aid, as those watching the deterioration of U.S.-Pakistani relations seem to expect. Rather, China will pursue profits, security, and geopolitical advantage regardless of Islamabad's preferences.

The Afghans will indeed be ready to take over their own security by 2014, writes the former commander of the ISAF Joint Command.

In 2001, fearing ethnic strife, the international community pushed for a strong central government in Kabul.

If the United States is interested in leaving behind a better Afghanistan than the one it found, it needs to take the experiences of past invasions to heart.

Two documentaries on the Afghan war, Restrepo and Armadillo, show how a combination of overwhelming military resources and aggressive counterinsurgency ultimately leads to frustration on the battlefield.

Two documentaries on the Afghan war, Restrepo and Armadillo, show how a combination of overwhelming military resources and aggressive counterinsurgency ultimately leads to frustration on the battlefield.

Since taking office, the Obama administration has ramped up the U.S. drone program in Pakistan.

Pakistan is unlikely to collapse anytime soon, but the imbalance of power between its civilian and military branches needs to be addressed if it is to become an effective modern state.

Richard A. Falkenrath says that with Osama bin Laden gone, life is about to become more complicated for U.S. policymakers trying to combat terrorism.

India is planning to buy $100 billion worth of new weapons over the next ten years.