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Speaker: Garry Kasparov, world chess champion and chairman, Committee 2008: Free Choice
Moderator: Stephen Sestanovich, senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, February 11, 2004
STEPHEN SESTANOVICH: Our guest does need, perhaps for some of you who are familiar only with his background as a chess champion, some introduction as a political figure and commentator. He is the chairman of the recently formed group the Committee 2008: Free Choice and has for many years been a supporter and activist in the democratic movement of Russia and, in his capacity as a contributing editor of The Wall Street Journal, also known to Western audiences as a commentator on Russian political issues. So, welcome.
GARRY KASPAROV: Thanks.
SESTANOVICH: I need to note a couple of things before we begin. Unlike most Council meetings, this session is on the record. Like most Council meetings, this one should not be disturbed by cell phones going off, so let me ask you to turn them off now, if you would.
And I can— let me describe our format briefly. I will— we will have a conversation up here for a few minutes to get our discussion going, and then we'll open the floor for questions from the audience. We'll end promptly at 2:45. Mr. Kasparov has got to get -
STAFF: One forty-five.
SESTANOVICH: One forty-five. Yeah. It would be better if we could make it 2:45, but we can't. We'll end promptly at 1:45, so as to allow you to get to the [United States] State Department.
Let me begin, if I could, by asking you just to describe for us the purposes of and nature of the group that you formed in Moscow recently, the Committee 2008. What's it all about? Who are the members? And what are your goals?
KASPAROV: I have to admit it was quite spontaneous. It was a reaction to the results of the [December 2003 legislative] election or on the results of the election that were presented to us by the government because everybody knew that that was not fair and not honest. In fact, even the European Union report indicated that it was unfair and dishonest, which probably means something really bad in diplomatic language. [Laughter.]
SESTANOVICH: I can confirm that. [Laughter.]
KASPAROV: Yeah. And we also— everybody sensed that it was a collapse of the— sort of what we consider to be classical liberal opposition in Russia, the parties like Yabloko and SPS [Union of Right Forces], led by the prominent leaders that were considered liberals, mostly in the West, not in our country. And we all recognized that this opposition existed, was in the frame that was built in the mid-'90s by [former Russian President Boris] Yeltsin's government and eventually used by [Russian President Vladimir] Putin's regime to dissolve democratic institutions in Russia.
And the committee was formed even not as a political party. We don't have any political ambitions. We don't want to run for an office, just because we believe it's not a priority. The priority in Russia today is to save the institute of the election as a whole, because we all sense that this so-called election in December 2003, the parliamentary election, and the upcoming presidential election in March, where we all know the result, those elections could be, you know, the last elections in modern Russian history, and then we could be reduced to a simple Soviet-type vote, where you have a luxury of approving the candidates presented to you by Kremlin.
It seems to us that the institute of the election and other democratic procedures now are being used by Putin's regime just to cover up its executive wrongdoings. And also, you know, the difference between Russia today and the Soviet Union 25, 30, 40 years ago is quite simple. The Soviet authorities did not have money in the Western banks. So they were less sensitive to the criticism from Washington or London or Brussels. It's totally opposite today. They pretend they are strong, they are independent, they don't care, but at the end of the day, they know they can't stay in power forever, so that's why they have to pay certain attention to the rules adopted in the countries where they keep their money.
So that's why— it's sort of a game, of a balance. Putin cannot ruin completely the democratic institutions of Russia, but he can't afford the democratic procedures to decide who is going to be in power, who is going to be in the government, because a bureaucratic state, what we call Russian nomenklatura, is alien to the concept of democracy, because in a democratic country, you can't, you know, predict the results of the elections— and you also— the entire power construction depends on your ability to carry your message to general public, and also to be a subject of very wide criticism by the opposition press.
So in the nomenklatura state, all these rules do not apply, because the promotion within nomenklatura, promotion within bureaucracy, is a part of the palace intrigues, is a Byzantine politics. So that's why elections, the institute of fair elections is absolutely unacceptable by the nature of that regime.
SESTANOVICH: I think we know where you stand. [Laughter.] But let me see if I can understand better what it is you're going to do. This is a committee that is formed by a lot of people with a lot of experience as democratic supporters, activists, journalists, politicians. What is it you're going to be doing?
KASPAROV: I think today probably it’s the only public organization or organization that unites citizens of Russia that has not been authorized by the Kremlin. I'm talking about, you know, reliable public organization. So that's why we think that our goal is just to start educating Russian people, you know, using all the means that are still available, because we have to deal with a situation where the freedom of press is— was virtually eliminated by Putin's regime. There are very, very few channels of distributing information, even in Moscow, not talking about the rest of our vast country. And also we have to sort of— we have to be a focal point of any potential opposition that could be formed in Russia in the years to come, because the regime is unstable. No matter what you can read here and what is the assessment of the current administration in Washington, the regime is unstable, and it has to balance between different factions, because one of the problems of this regime was that it made a very strong connection [between trying] to stay in power and property rights, which means that they can't lose their power, they can't leave the office, because in today's, Putin's, Russia, leaving the office means, you know, loss of your property, business, estates, and whatever and, potentially, you know, your freedom.
So that's why they are heading in the direction of abandoning the institute of the elections and trying to stay in power by using different kind of tricks like, you know, the constitutional changes. And as you're probably all aware, the recent election produced a two-thirds majority or a constitutional majority of Putin's cronies that could change constitution at their convenience at the time when they receive an order from Kremlin.
So our committee’s first goal was to announce our opposition to those plans, and that's important. Then to start promoting our views and even, if appropriate, to challenge legally the results of some elections and demonstrating to the rest of the world the nature, the true colors, of Putin's regime: its disrespect for the written law and for the freedom of press.
SESTANOVICH: You've said that under Putin, Russia has become virtually a police state and that you want to— but that you want to take advantage of and protect rules that not even the Kremlin can break. What makes you think that you're going to have the opportunity, given all the difficulties that you've described, to actually operate freely and have the kind of impact that you want? You know, why should the Kremlin choose to respect the rules that you say they won't, that not even they can break?
KASPAROV: By no means— Committee 2008 is not an insurance company. We have no guarantees. [Chuckles.] Moreover, you know, I think our chances to succeed are, you know, significantly less than 50 percent, you know. But you know, that's a problem, you know, in these kind of situations. Russia is probably effectively a police state, but it's not yet a dictatorship. So it's a negative trend. It's a negative tendency.
If you look at the Russian elections from 1991 to 2003, you could see it's sliding. Even in 1996, where Yeltsin was elected with definite— with certain— used what we call in Russia administrative resources. It was still a fight of two ideas: a communist plan to come back and an anti-communist plan, so just to prevent communists coming back into power. So probably it was not very good idea to run a negative campaign, but at least, you know, Russian people could choose.
While in 2000 and 2003 and 2004, you know, an election seems just to be a formal procedure. So that's why, if we continue this slide or this slipping on this— in this direction, then in 2008 it will be just, you know, us stamping the Kremlin decision.
So that's why we have to do anything at least to stop— not to reverse, I mean, but to stop this process and just to find certain alternatives. And we don't think the Kremlin will listen to us, because we— so far, I guess, we are weak. But you know, I think the opposition will be crystallized in Russia quite soon, because even within the ruling elite, there are factions that do not feel comfortable with Putin's life tenure in the office. You know, [the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of] Yukos [oil] is one example, but there are many other very lucrative targets for KGB guys that are now in power and very hungry.
SESTANOVICH: Since you mentioned property and you mentioned Yukos, let me describe a little clip that ran on the BBC when they were describing the formation of your group. They had— they talked to a bunch of old guys playing chess outside, in the freezing cold. [Scattered laughter.] And one of the people they talked to said, “You know, those liberals, when they were in power in the 1990s, they just let the billionaires get rich illegally.”
We have the impression that for many— much of the Russian population, liberal democracy means— is sort of identified with oligarchs, this sort of freedom of, you know, concentrations of wealth. Are you worried about that perception, and do you think it's a widespread one? And how do you intend to combat it, if it is?
KASPAROV: Absolutely. I think this is one of our prime concerns. That's why I'm talking about education, because unfortunately those who are believed to be reformers and given this label, you know, unequivocally by Western government— it is [Anatoly] Chubais, [Yegor] Gaidar, and others— they formed this image of popular democracy and market economy for millions of Russians. And this image is so negative, because they all saw these people getting rich, you know, the government running the show, and also tying to big businesses, and the opposition forces, the KGB, and those who wanted to build up a different society, they used it very— they used it quite wisely.
So if we're now to analyze the course of the events in Russia from 1993 up to 2004, we could say that the nomenklatura state never disappeared. In fact, it was sort of a rebuilding of nomenklatura, and these so-called liberals, they played a vital role in strengthening it. So this nomenklatura, this bureaucracy, tended to be more adequate. It's more Western-oriented. They learn how to use Western banks, Western financial institutions, even Western phraseology, how to present their case, how to make friends with U.S. presidents or European prime ministers. So they are far more sophisticated— this is not an old-type Soviet nomenklatura that said no. No, they could say yes. They could say maybe. They could say no. But that's— you know, that's— it's a different regime.
So that's why, you know, Putin's regime cannot be simply identified with anything we saw before. And one of the goals of the committee is just even to announce the tender for certain scientific works, for NGOs [non-governmental organizations] in Russia and outside of our country, to present their research on the general subject, what we call practice of Putinism.
But this Putinism was created by these so-called liberals that always said— and that's important to remember— they always said, “Freedom second.” Probably they never heard about the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but for them, freedom was second. They called property first. And now, I think the importance of the Yukos case is that they demonstrated they didn't care about property as well if their position in nomenklatura is threatened.
So we are fighting now with this perception that was created in the minds of Russians, and we're trying to communicate a simple message. Yes, it was dead wrong. Yes, it didn't work. And yes, many millions of Russians were impoverished. Also, there were certain positive elements of the reforms, but not everybody could enjoy the fruits of this progress.
But on the other hand, it's getting worse now. Our, you know, goal today is just to present this big picture to Russian people to recognize that Putin's regime is even more corrupt than Yeltsin's regime. And the old promises, you know, to fight oligarchs and to make it, you know, to reinstate justice— it's just empty words. What we are observing now, it's what I would call a hostile takeover. They are just taking the most lucrative properties and not turning them back to the state but distributing them among loyal oligarchs. And they're building new oligarchs.
So it's the danger of that, of this regime, as I already mentioned to you a few minutes ago, is that…at Yeltsin's time they knew they could take it and they could invest money and they could, you know, sleep quiet, you know, and continue their work. Today everything depends on your loyalty. And if you don't have grip on power, you could be ousted from your business. And it's not only Yukos story. We have thousands of different Yukos-type stories, you know, from the top to the bottom. The Yukos story's typical for any Russian district, for any Russian town, when the local boss could take over a lucrative business, because he thinks, you know, this man is not— who runs the business— is not loyal to him or could present a threat or could be simply independent.
So that's why we are trying now just to overcome this great difficulty of this long image created in the '90s and to tell Russian people that we're against it, we never supported it, and now we're trying to stop this process.
SESTANOVICH: But are you expecting people to be more worried about the efforts of the Putin state to seize all the little Yukoses in individual districts or to be more worried about the idea that you're still trying to defend property as principle number one?
KASPAROV: No, if we are to form a serious opposition, we have to look in both directions. I mean, we can't concentrate only on property, ignoring freedom or other way around, because I think the support for our movement would come from certain businesses as well. We already have some support, I mean, normally accompanied by a request of anonymity. [Light laughter.] But people feel that something is getting wrong, seriously wrong, and that they— you know, some of them could learn lessons from Soviet history. You know, in [former Soviet dictator Joseph] Stalin's time, they knew that full support of persecution of others didn't save you from, you know, a potential attack. And it's quite similar in Putin's Russia today.
And we are talking about a very general idea, which is to save the institute of elections, which is easy to promote, because the government can't attack this idea publicly. So they pretend they respect the law, and many people still believe that the institution of election must be preserved, one way or another.
And also, we are talking about defending individuals and certain organizations that are in crisis because of the vicious attacks of local authorities.
So it's a quite— you know, it's a quite wide agenda, but let's not forget that we are, you know, less than a month old. You know, the first meeting of the people that signed the petition was held in Moscow on January 12th [2004], and only on January 15th, the committee was formed. So just— we are just four weeks in existence. And we enjoyed, in fact, quite a lot of publicity in Moscow, although the Channel 1 and 2 [of Russian state television] received an immediate order not to talk about us at all. But there were some other, you know, television channels that cautiously presented our cause, always asking not to mention names, Khodorkovsky and Chechnya [chuckles] to let them continue this, the coverage of our committee.
So it's— as you say, it's very tricky. It's balanced. It's— on the one side, you know, it's a police state, and you can't do much. On the other side, there is sort of a fear of the ruling elite that going too far in cracking down democracy and ignoring rule of law may backfire in the West. So that's why this balance is still being preserved, and that's why a lot— a lot— depends on the position of the Western powers and especially the United States.
SESTANOVICH: I wanted to ask you about that before we open up the discussion from the audience. You've written that the formula “Forgive Russia” was one of the worst foreign policy blunders in recent history and that the West shouldn't— and said that the West should not underestimate its influence in Russia.
Can you describe a little— going a little beyond what you've said so far, how you think the West should treat Putin, so as to have the maximum influence of this kind? Should it talk loudly or softly on these questions?
KASPAROV: I think it's not only about talk. It's also—
SESTANOVICH: Okay. What else should it do besides talking?
KASPAROV: It's— no, it's about ability to act, because don't forget Putin is an ex-KGB officer, but as he says, there are no ex-KGB officers. So he belongs to the school of thought of the old Soviet Union that believed in action. It's not that Ronald Reagan publicly said, “evil empire.” They believed him. He said evil empire is a “Star Wars” and the Soviet leaders, this— the Politburo, the aging Politburo, believed him. Take it or leave it, you know, whether he could do it or not, but they believed he would act. And he was acting on certain fronts.
No matter what President Bush says, they don't believe him. That's very simple. So for them, official policy is, “Forgive Russia.” And it's not being reversed. [United States] Secretary [of State Colin] Powell made some tough remarks in Moscow. From our perspective, it was too little and too late. But even those remarks were very short to overcome the official motto, which is “Forgive Russia.”
I could be wrong, but I believe Khodorkovsky is in jail and Yukos is under attack because of “Forgive Russia.” It's a very clear signal: “You can do whatever you want, as long as you're cooperating with us on other affairs.” I don't know whether Russia is cooperative. I don't know what is the U.S. national gaining from that. I'm not an expert. I still think that the trade is uneven because giving free hand to Putin in Russia to ruin Russian democratic institutions will definitely backfire, and American long-term strategic interests will suffer.
SESTANOVICH: But can I push you a little bit? In light of the balance of interests that the United States has, and in light of the fact that Mr. Putin, just to say the least, doesn't seem to take criticism very well, what's the right way to talk about him? And since, as you say, talk may not be enough, what would acting mean today to have an effect? What would a Reagan-like policy be, if the administration were going to follow one, or some other administration?
KASPAROV: With Reagan in the White House, Khodorkovsky would be free in two weeks, maybe in two hours. Now the first thing, I think, that the West should consider is, why is Russia— the Russian president is attending G-7 [Group of Seven] meetings? Russia is not rich, and it's not a democracy. The Russian so-called membership in G-8— by the way, Russian official press always says G-8, and I guess it's not correct. It's still G-7, with Mr. Putin attending the meetings. I hope I'm right, you know. Maybe they made already all the changes, calling it G-8. So the idea of G-7 was, you know, forming the committee of industrialized democratic nations. And they invited Yeltsin, at a time when Russia seemed to be moving into this direction. And I guess, from my perspective and the perspectives of many others in Russia, it was sort of an advance payment.
[Inaudible]--Putin didn't meet these expectations. So I guess his regular or his temporary membership of G-7 meetings should be reconsidered. And it's announced, I would say that they will react differently. I know there is the conventional wisdom, on both sides of Atlantic, that expelling Putin from these meetings could be alienating and could be very dangerous because they will react vehemently and could do certain stupid things. I have only one argument. They keep their money in the Western banks. So that's why their hands are tied. And they could do many things, but they cannot go too far.
And I guess, you know, they're not only keeping money in the Western banks. I guess at certain intelligence offices here, they even know the bank accounts. So you have a huge leverage over Russia, and I think you should not underestimate it.
SESTANOVICH: Okay. I think we'll try to see if we can generate a question or two— [chuckling]--on the basis of your mild comments to this moment, from the --
KASPAROV: Mild or wild?
SESTANOVICH: [Laughs.] Let me start here, and let me ask you to identify yourselves when you— before you ask your question.
QUESTIONER: Avis Bohlen, retired State Department. I have a sort of double question. One, where do you think Putin wants to be in 10 years? I mean, where is this all heading? And the second one: How will this play out in the near abroad, and what will be the consequences for Western policy in that area?
KASPAROV: Could you, you know, be more specific on your second question, because it's, you know, consequences on the near abroad. You mean CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries, ex-Soviet Union?
QUESTIONER: That's right.
KASPAROV: That is in terms of Russian politics or U.S. politics?
QUESTIONER: Yes. What does— I mean, what does Putin hope to achieve? And where— what pressures will that create on the West? What do you see as some flash points, if you want, there?
KASPAROV: Now, first question. In 10 years time, Putin wants to stay in Kremlin.
QUESTIONER: But beyond that?
KASPAROV: Oh, beyond— okay. It's definitely— I would say that, you know, in 2008, he doesn't want to leave this holy place. I mean Kremlin. And that's why, you know, we formed our committee— to make sure that he's out of business by the end of his official presidential term.
Now as for the consequences for near abroad, it's— as you know, most of the countries that are trying to be independent and just look elsewhere for support, they're the subject of tremendous pressure from Russian government. Some call it a new imperialist policy. And I guess that United States political leverage in these places, you know, helps U.S. to be an active player. So I would say that by protecting the interests of ex-Soviet republics and CIS countries, the U.S. is doing a much better job than actually helping democracy in Russia, while supporting democracy in Russia could be, you know, an ultimate solution for the problems of all countries in the near abroad. I think it's very important to see the outcome of this political fight in Ukraine, because I think if Ukraine moves westward and the pro-Russian groups being taken away from power, from their offices, it may change the balance in what you call near abroad.
But so far, Putin's policies were quite aggressive, and I think Russia will— Putin's Russia will do everything possible to keep its influence in that region. It still pretends, you know, that it's part of the Soviet Union. That's very important, to recognize the fact. They still pretend Moscow is in control. It's a center that should, you know, be— should gravitate, you know, the— all other, quote, unquote, republics.
SESTANOVICH: Yeah?
QUESTIONER: Ariel Cohen, the Heritage Foundation. Mr. Kasparov, you mentioned the attempts by the current leadership to reapportion the property in Russia, and this is very worrisome because those who advocated for the United States to close their eyes and to ignore shutting down of television channels, manipulation of elections, et cetera, were saying, “But look, the economic reform is proceeding.” They pointed out positive events, such as tax reform and things like that. However, if you massively violate property rights by reapportioning the property to, as you said, loyal oligarchs or what have you, that negates, disembowels the argument of an economic reform.Could you be more specific and describe how this reapportioning is working, how and what tools are utilized in order to effect that?
And secondly, when you mentioned repeatedly the fact that some Russian leaders may be keeping their funds abroad, only if a criminal action has proven in the court of law you can seize those assets. So would you advocate investigations— maybe such as never happened before, like the Bank of New York [investigations in the 1990s] or something else— would you advocate massive criminal investigations about the sources of some of these Russian funds abroad? Thank you.
KASPAROV: Regarding the economic situation in Russia, I think we all know that the Russian economic depends on energy prices. And if we had different oil prices in 1998— and if I remember correctly, it was $9 a barrel, and just below— for a moment, it was below 10 [dollars] a barrel— and the Russian economy collapsed, I think we'd probably never have heard the name Vladimir Putin, because in 1998, the Russian default actually swept away Yeltsin's inner circle and brought other people into power.
And today Putin's regime enjoys this so-called stability because of immensely high oil prices. And it could support a number of its activities— you know, war in Chechnya and, you know, military buildup, you know, beefing up KGB and other security forces. But I don't feel that Russian economy is growing in the normal sense. So it's still, you know, export-oriented and depends on energy prices.
As for the tax reform, probably, you know, it's very efficient, but we still could see that all the oligarchs, all industrialists, all businessmen, from top to the bottom , they are, you know, they split in two groups: loyal and harmful.
And probably because of this tax reform, you can buy, you know, your immunity from taxes by bringing back to Russia, you know, property x, worth a hundred million dollars. That's probably the way of buying loyalty and showing that you are a good boy, while, you know, as we know, Mr. Khodorkovsky has been investing hundreds of millions of dollars in Russian culture and education, and it was not appreciated, because he did it on his own, not under the order of Kremlin.
So I could rely on the written word about appropriation of properties across Russia, and of course the Yukos case is the most telling one, because the entire power of attorney general's office has been used to topple only one company.
I'm sure that there will be many new accusations built up throughout this case, but so far, we are facing quite an amazing situation. According to the recent papers presented by the attorney general's office and trial papers that are known for Russia and for the world, Yukos was the only company that made no wrongdoings the last three years. There's no single episode in the papers regarding the Yukos activities for the last three years. It is quite amazing. We all know that something may be wrong. Money's being, you know, shifted out of the country. But Yukos probably was not part of that. And the episodes of— all these episodes of that trial are built on the cases of 1990s.
So it's a massive operation, and it's not about reinstating justice. It's about taking it over and shifting this property into the hands of the loyal oligarchs and loyal companies. Yukos oil fields are being confiscated and now transferred into the custody of a company that is being very supportive of Mr. Putin's activities.
So we do not have, you know, the full picture, because a lot of information is being withheld, and Russia is not a free country where you can have an opposition press, you know, or just free press looking around and digging for the facts.
But as for Russian money abroad, I guess there were a number of investigations launched in different places in this country, in Switzerland, in France, in Israel, related to these so-called hidden funds. And I'm not advocating for Western governments to start an immediate, you know— to launch an immediate widespread attack against these allegedly stolen funds. But I think the first step is just to recognize that this is a very important piece, a bargaining chip. It's a leverage that must be used to force Putin's regime into certain political concessions, because I think the key of— the key element of Putin's grip on power is the guarantee for Russian ruling elite that this money will not be touched. So it's that the status quo has been preserved.
SESTANOVICH: Yes? Would you stand up and identify yourself?
QUESTIONER: Ramisi Nosev, RTVI, Russian TV.
SESTANOVICH: Just take the microphone.
QUESTIONER: Ramisi Nosev, RTVI, Russian TV in the United States of America. My question is on Russia. [Continues in Russian.]
KASPAROV: I was reminded that 19 years ago, I had been challenging Soviet sports officials that wanted to stop me of winning of my— winning world championship, world champion's title. And there are some similarities. But 19 years ago, I had been fighting for what I believe was justice, but it was for me. It was for me winning the title. So I defended myself. I had an ability to stand up and to protest.
Today I'm involved in something quite different. I have no personal quarrels with this regime. I didn't have any oil company that was confiscated. I didn't have any media company that was confiscated. I didn't have any business in Russia that was in jeopardy. I haven't even met Mr. Putin in my life.
I just want to live in a free country; that's it. And I believe that I deserve to live in a free country; my son deserves to live in a free country; my family; my relatives and all people in Russia that do not approve, you know, with the reinstatement of KGB in power. So that's very simple. I do not have any personal agenda. I foresee certain negative consequences for my own political— for my own professional career. And I also have to admit that, you know, I was elected chairman of the committee also probably by an accident. You know, it's— they looked around and said, “Who would be— who could run it? Garry, would you like to do it?” I said, “No.” And then they voted unanimously. [Laughter.]
And I have no personal agenda, and I have no personal interest at all. I'm still an active chess player. I have a big tournament that starts in a week’s time now, in Spain. And I hope I could continue for at least a few more years to be a player and also a commentator. And I'm going to do more lectures. I'm involved in a lot of charitable activities in this country; they're trying to promote chess in schools. But at the same time, you know, we all reached a certain point where you have to make a decision, and I sensed— I believed, I felt, after this December election, that I was reduced to a simple choice: either to protest and stand up, or to emigrate. So far I want to live in Moscow.
SESTANOVICH: You mentioned the December elections. What is the approach of your group to next month’s [presidential] election?
KASPAROV: This issue was a splitting one, because we had different opinions. And there was, you know, a traditional proposal just to vote against all the candidates, and then, with the introduction of Irina Khakamada [deputy speaker of the Russian parliament Duma, and co-chair of the SPS], there was a strong call to support her as the only liberal candidate in the field. But I belong to a different group that believes that there's only one way to promote the goals of the committee, which is to boycott the election. We do not have any chance of changing this course of the events, and we have to send a message across.
I don't know what would be the final vote. It's quite a big issue. But the committee agreed that it would discuss it, it would— there would be arguments, you know, flying, you know, here and there, but at the end of the day, there will be one decision. Committee will speak in one voice. And you know, if I'm voted down with some of my supporters, you know, I have to go and vote for Khakamada.
But I believe— I could explain my position, which I'm arguing at the meetings of the committee. It's 2008, and we have to do the best to promote this long-term goal. And we cannot be associated with the election, which is still part of the old environment.
And in this environment, it's not only about counting— and very often, two plus two makes five in Russia. When you look at these bulletins, I mean, you could see it. Every sixth bulletin of the last election just, you know, gives you different numbers of number of bulletins distributed and number of people voted. Just a simple analysis, you know. So you— out of 14,000 bulletins investigated, two-and-a-half thousand had this inconsistency. So— and 14,000 polling stations I'm talking about, not only— only 14,000 polling stations.
And I feel that we have to start from the scratch and to present this new reality, because even before we go to the polling stations, there is a television, and we know that Putin has refused to participate in debates. He refused to use the free time on television, because he's everywhere. All news, they start with Putin, they— you know, they continue with Putin, they end with Putin. So it's— how can you promote any ideas, any criticism in such an atmosphere? And we all know that Chechnya is banned. This is something you can't talk on Russian television. Yukos you can't talk about in Russian television. And there are many other aspects that are very sensitive for President Putin. So they should be also disregarded and erased.
I'm in favor of boycott, but I hope the committee will share my position. But it may be one of two. Either we decide to support Khakamada, if she says something very relevant, if her campaign helps to accomplish our long-term goals, but I'm, unfortunately, I'm a little pessimistic about Khakamada's ability to present a very, very critical view on Putin's regime.
SESTANOVICH: Yeah?
QUESTIONER: Sunil Desai with the Council on Foreign Relations. Mr. Kasparov, I'd like to ask you how you think strategic military issues will affect the politics that you've described, and specifically, the evolving NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]-EU [European Union] military relationship, the addition of countries, formerly Warsaw Pact countries to NATO, and the movement of U.S. forces to other places in Europe much closer to Russia?
KASPAROV: I guess four years ago or even, you know, in the mid-'90s up to 2000, that was a big issue in U.S. That was a big concern of Clinton administration. It was also a big concern of Bush administration, you know, in first months in the office. So how Russia would react on NATO enlargement and what Russia can do to stop it? We know the answer: nothing.
Now Baltic states are being now received by NATO and European Union. So it's— there's no earthquake. You know, it's— you know, we live in Russia, and we don't feel it. So there is sort of a political hysteria, but I don't think anything will happen if Ukraine joins NATO. So [there is] this sudden political reality which is being accepted by Russian elite, even if they say otherwise in public.
So I guess there is very little illusion about Russian ability to resist the logical development, such as EU enlargement or NATO's movement eastward. And I think that, you know, you should always contemplate the real ability to act and sort of political hoopla that is being used to energize, you know, some public trends inside the country.
I don't believe that, you know, the strategic military issues will play any, any role, because we all know that the Russian army— and as a Russian citizen, I should be sad about it— the Russian army is incapable of fighting any war, and the Chechen war demonstrates it. Claudia? Yeah?
QUESTIONER: Hi. Claudia Rosett with The Wall Street Journal's OpinionJournal. If you're going from here to the State Department, maybe the answer lies in the future, but could you tell us, as far as you can, what kind of reception your committee has been getting from the U.S. government? Thank you.
KASPAROV: So far, I can't comment on that. The fact I'm just— I'm being received by certain officials, [which] you know, gives us a hope that at least they would like to listen.
But you know, we could indicate there is a little split in the opinions between the State Department, which is— suddenly it's more hawkish on Russia than NSC [National Security Council]--suddenly. [Chuckles.] But so far, so far, it's all, it's just all talk, because “Forgive Russia” is official U.S. policy. And Russia isn't— I don't know whether it's ally, a friend, whatever.
But I have to admit, as a professional player who should look at the reality, even if it's harsh reality, so far, Mr. Putin has very little reason to worry about U.S. reaction. There's the sort of self-delusion in Washington that appeasing Russia could reap some future benefits.
I wonder whether Russian cooperation was so important. I guess that Russia was behind all the crises generated by axis of evil. In Iraq, Iran and North Korea, I would question a positive role of Putin's administration. And in fact, you know, it's— if you look at the wider picture, you know, I would add probably [Pakistan] President [Pervez] Musharraf to this equation. There are certain leaders in the world that are perceived by the current U.S. administration as a part of the solution, ignoring the fact that they are also part of the problem. But because by the moment when the problem has disappeared or there is an ultimate solution— [inaudible]--who are no longer relevant. So they thrive by helping the U.S. to find a partial solution of the problem. As long as this problem exists, their grip on power is unquestioned, and the U.S. is happily including them in the circle of allies.
SESTANOVICH: Yeah. Way in the back.
QUESTIONER: Georgie Anne Geyer, Universal Press Syndicate. Mr. Kasparov, I'd like to, as a journalist, ask you: How do you translate your genius at chess and the kinds of moves you make and the kinds of judgments you make into journalism or political journalism? Do they translate, or are they totally different?
KASPAROV: If you are able to analyze any position, it should be helpful. And I'm good at analyzing the big picture. Probably I'm not as good in analyzing details. So that's why, in my articles and in my political presentations, I always try to grasp the big picture and to present my views on the strategic development.
And I think that the— as a professional player, I feel that the current problem that we are experiencing, you know, worldwide and also in this country— that there are too many managers and too little, virtually too few visionaries. And the managerial instinct is always to split the problem in something that you can manage.
So it's always nice to talk about war on terror, but you know, then you have to manage it as a global war and just not to split it in the segments and then try to deal with them, just losing the big picture in the meantime.
So I hope that, you know, applying certain chess techniques, certain analytical skills, you know, I could have a better vision, because it's not about mathematics. It's not about two plus two. It's more about, you know, gambling. It's political casino. You're looking for three out of 11 and not two out of 11. So there are always probabilities. You're dealing with so many unknowns, so many subjective factors. And you can just sense that that's the right way to go. You can apply your intuition, your imagination, your ability to calculate and to compare what I call incompatibles. Like in chess, we're talking about material and talking about quality and also about time. So those things, you know, are not necessarily compatible in normal terms. But in life we also should look at this big picture and try to see what we can gain by sacrificing certain material here or material values by gaining qualities or being faster, so winning some time. So I guess, you know, I could use my chess analytical skills to make some predictions.
SESTANOVICH: Yeah? Here.
QUESTIONER: Ed Burger, the Eurasian Medical Education Program. You mentioned one suggestion for U.S. posture, U.S. action, or Western action with regard to Russia, which was to question the membership in the G-7. Are there some other things that we should be thinking about in terms of our posture towards Russia at this writing?
KASPAROV: One step at a time. Yeah, I think—
SESTANOVICH: Got to look ahead to the next move.
KASPAROV: Yeah. No, I think it's— no, I think it's fundamentally important to communicate the simple message. It's not talk. The action may follow. That's very, very important. For this Soviet-type mentality or KGB-type of mentality, that will be the moment of truth— if they recognize that the action may follow. It's not just a telephone call that, you know, has no consequences. So whatever is to be done is just to sort of restate this cohesion of talk and action that existed here in this city 20 years ago.
SESTANOVICH: We're going to be running out of time here, so I'd like if you could keep your questions very brief.
QUESTIONER: Paul Starobin with the Atlantic Monthly and National Journal. Well, two questions. Do you see Putin as --
SESTANOVICH: Why don't you ask one, if I could ask you to— ask your big, your most important one.
QUESTIONER: Do you see Putin as genuinely popular in his society? And if so, isn't there kind of a danger of just a resurgent Russian nationalism if the West begins to act in the way that you suggest?
KASPAROV: I don't know. I don't know because I don't think you can trust opinion polls in a country like Russia. Yes, according to opinion polls he's very popular. And the Western papers are happy to make these quotes— 70 percent, 75 percent. But then, when you start looking, you know, at other questions, at other opinion polls, analyzing his performance, it's all below 50 percent. War in Chechnya, support below 40 percent. Economy, 45 percent, roughly. Crime rate, you know, he has about one-third of approval.
So I feel that, you know, there's a sort of generic fear in Russia— yknow, it still reigns from the old Soviet time— where people can't be sincere answering questions about a general secretary, a president or a local boss, they got scared, while they feel more open to talk about other issues.
So, is Putin really popular? There's only one chance for us to find it out: Let him run fair election. Let him be part of national debate. Let him be criticized, and let us talk about Chechnya, about crime rate, about his own oligarchs that are doing, you know, a terrible job for the country by stealing right, left and the center. So let us talk about it.
Today in Russia, you know, you have to rely on sources that, you know, cannot be trusted because of the political situation inside the country. So that's why my answer is, “I don't know.” But so far, I don't feel that his popularity is near the numbers that are being presented here.
SESTANOVICH: Well, okay. Go ahead.
QUESTIONER: [Inaudible] - retired Foreign Service. One is impressed with this battle of what we often speak of a small group of Westernized intellectuals in a society that has not generally supported their views. One has the same impression that perhaps the same picture is repeating itself. How do you propose to reach out? For example, the Communist Party has been marginalized, but it is still a— has a large base in the country, and in many ways it represents a proletarian base, if you will, of dissatisfied people. Are you— is there some way that you plan to reach out to the periphery, the “glush” in the country? And how do you propose to do that, if your message is in fact going to change the national outlook over time?
KASPAROV: Russia is not the most developed country in the world, but it has an Internet, just, you know, to— well, you know, Russia is all making progress, and we have more and more Westernized people. We are not just, you know, an insignificant minority in the country. It's a country of 150 million people, but I would say that we can talk about 10 to 20 million people, which is the minority, but probably the most potent minority in the country that is sharing our views, not necessarily, you know, the views on the same candidates, but definitely our views on the election and democracy as a whole. So that's why we're trying to be very general. We don't want to promote certain political views and come up with our, you know, very strict ideological agenda. It's more about preserving democratic institutions.
And the numbers I gave to you, 10 to 20 million, I think those are the minimum numbers of people who could be supportive of our general goals of having a fair election in 2008. And with the growth rate of Russian Internet, that could give us a very, very good access to the most sophisticated audience, although we are working, aggressively working now in reaching “glush,” in reaching other parts of Russia. And there are many now regional papers. It's quite amazing, you know. In regional paper, you can criticize Putin; you cannot criticize the mayor. [Laughter.] So it's quite funny.
So there is no ultimate solution. We are working. We are just four weeks old, but we are already working. We made already certain arrangements. And we are amazed by the response. We are amazed by the interest that is being raised across the country.
Today was, by the way, quite an important milestone in Russia: the first time, definitely in our country, there was the TV report via Internet. And the first guest that attended the show is a famous Russian writer, who is also a member of— my very good friend and a member of the committee, Viktor Shenderovich. And he received— you know, before actually the program started, he received 350 questions; 200 of them were about the committee.
So we're moving. You know, we can't guarantee progress. As I said, we're not an insurance company. But we have a good sense that it's not hopeless, you know? We have certain hopes. And we think that, you know, in— not years, in months to come, you know, I will present you a better picture.
SESTANOVICH: A very, very short last question.
QUESTIONER: My name is Katherine— [inaudible]--and I'm a member from the U.S. Committee for the U.N. Development Program. I was in Novosibirsk for the December elections and saw some of the problems when you have such a vast country. But I wanted to ask— Georgia, just your comments. You haven't mentioned it at all. Has your committee been formally asked to give an opinion on that, or what are your thoughts?
KASPAROV: We're just four weeks old, you know. [Laughs.] We have enough problems in Russia. And you know-
SESTANOVICH: They just had a democratic election. Let them support you, right? [Laughs.]
KASPAROV: Exactly, yes. They had a democratic election. You know, they had this sort of velvet revolution. And that's now up to Georgian people to decide their destiny. So we hope that we may find ourselves in a similar position at once, but we have too many problems in our country. [Laughs.]
SESTANOVICH: I'm afraid we have to call this meeting to a close. I want to thank our speaker and thank the audience for a lively discussion. One good thing about having a name like Committee 2008 is that you've got many years for us to record your— [laughter]--for us to record your progress before we can say that you failed and are out of date. So I hope between now and then we can have you back for many discussions.
KASPAROV: The final joke— because when we were sitting down, you know, talking about the name of the committee, and, you know, the original idea was that somebody came up was named like Committee to Defend Constitution. Then the comment was that, okay, we have a similar department in KGB; we shouldn't, you know— [laugher]--make the same. And then somebody says, “Why don't we call ourselves Anti-Putin?” Now, for a few minutes, you know, it was a relaxation period, for a few minutes we joked about it, and then we came up with Free Choice 2008. Two days later there was one so-called Russian political observer that probably is, you know, associated with KGB, and this came out, saying, “The committee named Anti-Putin was formed.” And then I was asked by a Russian TV program, “So why the name Anti-Putin?” And it all came into play: “So what's happened? You know, it's 2008— why did everybody call you Anti-Putin?”
I said, “It's probably because all such meetings in Russia are recorded, but the security that recorded it, they had no sense of humor.” [Laughter.]
SESTANOVICH: Thank you again. We hope to see you again before 2008. [Applause.]
KASPAROV: Thank you.
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