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Despite a near-universal skepticism about prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, President Clinton’s meetings with Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Chairman Yasser Arafat in New York are likely to lead to a successful outcome before the end of the year.
This prediction flies in the face of the failure of the recent Camp David talks, as well as of Barak’s loss of domestic political support, which has left him with a minority government unlikely to survive much beyond the reconvening of Israel’s Knesset (parliament) at the end of October. But Barak’s political weakness, far from precluding further efforts to reach agreement with the Palestinians, virtually compels him to do so.
Barak believes—correctly, in my view—that the only way to save his government is to produce a peace agreement and to make that agreement the central issue of new elections. It is his intention to bypass a deeply hostile Knesset, the source of his political troubles, and turn directly to the voters, who in last year’s election, gave him an overwhelming mandate to complete the peace process.
Barak’s remarkable persistence is motivated by more than political expediency, though. Far more important is his deep conviction that Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians must be brought to a close, not only because Israel’s continued control of the lives of 3 million Palestinians into the 21st Century is inconceivable but also because he believes peace and neighborly relations are far more important to Israel’s long-term security than additional territory.
The latest polls indicate that Israeli voters, a majority of whom support Barak’s peace efforts all along, do not approve of all of Barak’s most recent proposals to the Palestinians, particularly with respect to Jerusalem. But the same polls indicate that many of those who disapprove of his proposals still want him to continue the negotiations with Arafat.
Understandably, most Israelis would like to retain as much territory in the West Bank and as much of Jerusalem as possible. But most would not reject a historic opportunity to formally end their conflict with the Palestinians and the surrounding Arab world, even if it meant a peace agreement with provisions to which they object. That is what Barak is counting on.
Arafat, too, is driven to complete the peace process as much by his weakness as by his strengths. The unilateral Palestinian independence that he has threatened to proclaim was a viable option in May 1999, when the five-year transitional period provided for by the Oslo agreement ended. But even then, a unilateral declaration had huge disadvantages, for it would have left Palestinians with only about 40 to 50 percent of the West Bank, a state too geographically fragmented to survive. Yet the alternative that was offered at the time by Binyamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon was even less attractive; accepting it would have meant formally conceding half of the West Bank to Israel.
At the Camp David talks, the choices facing Arafat changed dramatically. Palestinians now know that the alternative to unilaterally declared independence is a Palestinian state in approximately 90 percent of the West Bank and Gaza, open borders with Egypt and Jordan, a sovereign presence in certain parts of Jerusalem, including parts of the Old City and—most important for the survivability of the new Palestinian state—large financial assistance from the international community, assistance that will not be forthcoming if the peace process is seen by the international community as having failed because of Arafat’s intransigence. (This is one of the lessons Arafat learned during his lightning world tour immediately after the failure of Camp David.) Remaining differences on Jerusalem and the refugees can be bridged. Arafat knows that the issue of sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif will have to be deferred or resolved through some "creative" ambiguity.
Arab countries, and most particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, can play a critical role in minimizing the risks Arafat will face should he sign a peace agreement with Barak. Their public support of such a decision by Arafat in the face of the inevitable savage criticism from many Arab quarters can mean the difference between success and failure.
Arab heads of state have demanded that Israel take risks for peace, knowing full well that for Israel, the risks are existential ones. Barak has taken up their challenge. If, at this critical moment, leading Arab countries refuse to reciprocate by providing Arafat with the political safety net he will need, simply because they fear taking risks whatever, then no one will again be able to take seriously their proclaimed interest in peace with their Jewish neighbors or, for that matter, their proclaimed concern for the Palestinians.