The Aftermath of September 11: What's New? What's Not?

November 20, 2001
Council on Foreign Relations

[Note: A transcript of this meeting is unavailable. The discussion is summarized below.]

November 20, 2001

Not for Attribution

Chicago, IL

The Chicago Roundtable held its first session on November 20, 2001 to discuss what’s new and what’s not since September 11 with 30 Council members and other local leaders in Chicago. Henry S. Bienen, President of Northwestern University, Michael H. Moskow, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Vice President of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, led the discussion.

The Chicago Roundtable addressed the following question: What is fundamentally the same and what is fundamentally different, as a result of September 11 in three areas: grand strategy, the U.S. and global economy, and national security?

FINDINGS IN THREE AREAS

I. Grand Strategy

A) What’s the same since September 11?

  • Israeli-Palestinian conflict needs to be resolved if there is any hope of stability in the region.

  • Pakistani-India conflict over Kashmir.

  • Iraq and what to do next.

B) What’s different since September 11?

  • Shift away from unilateralism or altered notion of American unilaterism, i.e. policy toward North Korea, Kyoto, NATO enlargement, NMD, IMF.

  • Shift in definition of national security to focus on physical security and homeland defense—a defense against a decentralized enemy with biological and chemical warfare. National security can no longer be seen through the Soviet prism of geo-strategic terms

II. U.S. and Global Economy

A) What’s the same since September 11?

  • The interconnection of the U.S. economy and global markets with cross border investment and trade. Slow growth in United States affects other economies.

  • U.S. productivity growth and long-term potential remain good.

  • Capital investment and manufacturing sectors remain weak.

B) What’s different since September 11?

  • U.S. economy is weaker, with certain sectors, i.e. airline industry, particularly adversely affected.

  • Heightened degree of uncertainty—for both businesses and consumers.

  • Oil prices are significantly down.

III. National Security

A) What’s the same since September 11?

    Chemical biological warfare (CBW) threat is not new and typically has been connected with state-sponsorship.

  • No evidence that Osama bin Laden possesses nuclear capability, chemical or biological weapons that would result in mass casualties.

B) What’s different since September 11?

  • Chemical biological warfare (CBW) threat may now be in the hands of non-state actors, and terrorism may no longer be at the hands of a nation-state.

  • Possible, but unlikely means of terror include attacks on a civilian nuclear power plant, use of chemical weapons in a large indoor venue or transportation hub, use of viral agents such as smallpox.

AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT IN THREE AREAS

I. Grand Strategy

  • Americans still don’t care about foreign policy, but they are paying more attention to the underlying social and economic root causes that contribute to terrorism.

  • Terror on American soil has resulted in multilateralism, but will the coalition have a context beyond Afghanistan?

  • We have not abandoned unilateralism, just reformulated it. The threat is no longer China or Russia, but the failed states throughout Arab world.

  • No grand strategy, just fear driving our responses. The United States is a country that is afraid.

  • Not issue of grand strategy, but of grand purpose. The larger and more enduring challenge is governance. The problem is how to deal with governance so that new obligations abroad (i.e. the war on terrorism) and issues at home (i.e. unemployment, health care, education, environment) are addressed.

  • Grand strategy must include public diplomacy and how we communicate with the Islamic world and beyond.

  • Confidence in the U.S. government has increased.

II. U.S. and Global Economy

  • We can’t accomplish much if we don’t have a market economy. It gives us the capacity to make a difference with Saudis, Egyptians, and Pakistanis.

  • Missed the great success of the November World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings at Doha.

III. National Security

  • U.S. national interests defined in terms of homeland security resonates with the American people, but Afghanistan will need nation building and economic equality. Nation building requires the staying power of the public.

  • Americans don’t know how to do nation building, and we have gutted all the institutions (USAID, State Department) needed to do it effectively.

  • Americans have more tolerance for delays in airports and infringement of civil liberties if it will ensure their safety.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND KEY QUESTIONS IN THREE AREAS

I. Grand Strategy

A) Recommendations

  • Try again for Arab-Israeli settlement. Tough, but attempt has to be made to shift the debate.

  • Need new Iraq policy since the embargo has failed.

  • Don’t push NATO expansion now or break treaty especially if it risks the relationship with Russia.

  • Show strong American leadership with fragile coalitions and fragile leaders.

  • Reassess Faustian bargain over oil.

B) Key Questions

  • Who are our allies, especially in the campaign on terrorism, and how reliable are they?

  • What does the war on terrorism mean vis à vis forging these relationships?

  • Do we care in strategic terms about NMD and enlarging NATO or about our relationship with Russia? Which is more important?

  • When will China enter into discussions?

  • Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan are major pillars of Middle East policy. How stable are they?

  • What do we want from Iran—a modest rapprochement or fall?

  • What does our new relationship with Russia mean for energy sources in the Caspian?

  • What should our policies be toward the Middle East and Southwest Asia given Americans’ lifestyle, (i.e. driving gas-guzzling SUVs), the domestic politics of energy conservation, and increasing dependence on oil from the region?

  • How do we define and assess risk?

  • Is the Bush administration willing to engage multilaterally? If so, how?

  • How do Muslims feel about terrorism? What can we do about it?

  • Is it possible to win the hearts and minds of Muslims? If so, how?

  • What has the role of foreign aid historically been and what should it be?

  • How should we restructure immigration policy vis à vis Mexico?

II. U.S. and Global Economy

A) Recommendations

  • Push for open trade through negotiation of agreements (i.e. WTO and fast track authority) and links to economic development. Open markets and expanded trade are some of the best ways to increase economic growth, particularly in developing countries.

  • Push for understanding that globalization helps rather than hurts productivity growth and enhances our ability to lead better lives.

  • Understand the impact that additional security is having on our firms.

B) Key Questions

  • What are the security costs and how will the expenditures affect productivity growth?

  • Will Chicago’s Congressional delegation support free trade?

  • What is the role of the IMF and what do we really want from this organization?

  • What should IMF policy vis à vis Russia be?

  • Who are the winners and losers in the globalization process?

  • How does economic development and population growth impact anti-Americanism?

III. National Security

A) Recommendations

  • Protect and prevent the proliferation of WMD in rogue states.

  • Have a proactive foreign policy that prevents non-state actors from acquiring weapons.

  • Reform the intelligence community.

  • Make changes in military strategy and procurement.

B) Key Questions

  • What are the questions we are dealing with now as we focus on homeland security?

  • How should we alter our intelligence collecting and military strategy?

  • What are our capabilities and vulnerabilities?