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What exactly would it mean to wage a war on Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist network? Al Qaeda isn't a country with a defined geography, a uniformed military, or a physical political infrastructure. As a result, while many have called for war, few have been able to explain what such a war might look like. Indeed, one of today's great frustrations is coming to grips with this amorphous adversary.

If the U.S. concludes that bin Laden's Al Qaeda is responsible for last week's attacks, it would be difficult, but quite feasible, for the U.S. to wage a war against the network. The goal should be to destroy Al Qaeda as a functioning organization that is capable of attacking the U.S. or threatening U.S. interests. An important secondary goal will be to convince or compel other nations either to join in this task or to make it possible for the U.S. to do so itself. The U.S. strategy in such a war should consist of four broad efforts:

-- Define the sides. In nearly every war the U.S. has fought it has sought allies, and this effort has always served it well. This time should be no different. America should actively canvas its allies around the globe for those who are willing to take up arms with it in this effort. So far, the Bush administration appears to have this effort well in hand.

However, the U.S. also needs to call bin Laden's supporters on the carpet. It should make very clear that unless the Afghan government turns over bin Laden and every other member of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan within a reasonable amount of time (72 hours to 96 hours seems about right) Afghanistan will be considered at war with the U.S.

If the Taliban turns down the first such ultimatum, perhaps the most important step the U.S. could take would be to furnish large-scale arms, training and other support to the Northern Alliance, the Taliban's principal foe in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance is the last force stopping the Taliban from taking complete control over Afghanistan, and with U.S. assistance it might be able to cause considerable pain to the Taliban.

Beyond this, the U.S. needs to make clear that those states that support or protect either Al Qaeda personnel or Afghanistan will also be considered to be at war with the U.S. Since the list of the Taliban's admirers is short, we are mainly talking about Pakistan, whose shaky military dictatorship has close ties to the Taliban, and where bin Laden enjoys popular support. Islamabad will be under strong pressure to do as little as possible, so the administration will have to hold Pakistan's feet to the fire with a meaningful combination of economic and political assistance, on the one hand, and on the other a list of dire credible consequences if it fails to cooperate.

-- Roll out an intelligence campaign. Critical it will be to wage a covert operations campaign against the Al Qaeda network itself, which consists of thousands of personnel and hundreds of global safe houses, weapons factories and other facilities. Nations either harboring elements of Al Qaeda or turning a blind eye toward Al Qaeda activities on their soil must arrest the organization's personnel, seize their facilities and confiscate their assets.

The U.S. should be prepared to impose sanctions on those countries that refuse to do so. Such sanctions must have real teeth, and might include denying national airlines the right to land in the U.S., seizing or freezing assets, and severing economic and diplomatic relations.

In addition, the U.S. should work to disrupt and deceive Al Qaeda's high technology and long-distancecommunications network. It should look to capture Al Qaeda operatives identified in foreign countries and bring them back to the U.S. to stand trial. Alternatively, the U.S. could kill them.

There is no U.S. law prohibiting assassination, only an executive order that could be reversed. Past history has given good reasons for the existence of this executive order and the U.S. should think long and hard about whether it is opening a Pandora's box. But it should also consider that effectively waging war against a shadowy organization like Al Qaeda might require new weapons.

-- Take direct military action. Direct military action may prove to be less central in waging such a campaign than determined diplomacy and far-reaching intelligence operations, but it should still play an important role. Assuming the Taliban chooses not to hand over bin Laden and his associates, the U.S. should conduct direct military operations against Afghanistan and Al Qaeda facilities there. An entire range of terrorist facilities, from trainingcamps to weapons dumps, barracks to recruiting centers, should be targeted.

The U.S. forces should kill bin Laden's people. In the past, the U.S. has demonstrated an unwillingness to inflict casualties -- even military casualties. This time, its goal should be to maximize casualties; trained personnel are bin Laden's crucial asset.

Although Afghanistan's extreme backwardness will constrain targeting, there is still a range of relatively high-value assets that could be struck to coerce the Taliban to turn over bin Laden and his minions. They include the Taliban's defense and intelligence ministries, remnants of the Taliban's air force, key garrisons, weapons dumps, motor transport pools, communications nodes and other military bases.

Ideally, a combination of manned aircraft, cruise missiles and special-forces operations might be used in a sustained campaign to destroy the Al Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan, hunt down Al Qaeda personnel there, and destroy Taliban military capabilities. Direct support might be provided to the military operations of the Northern Alliance. However, it will be extremely difficult to mount airstrikes or special-forces operations in Afghanistan without the use of Pakistani airspace and bases -- another reason why Pakistan's cooperation will be crucial.

-- Step up security at home. Al Qaeda has demonstrated an ability to target and kill Americans. More will have to be done, especially at home, to protect U.S. facilities and personnel. This will include putting sky marshals on planes and security officers on trains and other forms of mass transportation, increasing security at public venues, and intensifying inspections of ships wishing to dock in U.S. ports.

Fighting a war against Al Qaeda will not be easy. Bin Laden is a new kind of foe. The commitment of significant U.S. resources and political capital will be required. It will undoubtedly entail further loss of American lives. Fighting a war might mean making important sacrifices on other issues of importance to Americans: Will the Russians demand concessions on North Atlantic Treaty Organization enlargement or missile defense in return for taking an active role in the fight? What will be required to bring Pakistan on board?

The U.S. should be ready to confront these kinds of decisions. But if it committed and willing to make the sacrifice, the nebulous nature of its foe should not be an impediment to waging a successful war against Al Qaeda and its accomplices.

Mr. Pollack is the deputy director for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was formerly a director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the U.S. National Security Council.