The killing of Osama bin Laden by United States special forces constitutes a significant victory over global terrorism. But it is a milestone, not a turning point, in what remains an ongoing struggle with no foreseeable end.
The significance of what was accomplished stems in part from Bin Laden's symbolic importance. He has been an icon, representing the ability to strike with success against the US and the West. That icon has now been destroyed.
Another positive consequence is the demonstrated effect of counter-terrorism operations carried out by US soldiers. As a result, some terrorists, one hopes, will decide to become former terrorists – and some young radicals might now think twice before deciding to become terrorists in the first place.
But any celebration needs to be tempered by certain realities. Bin Laden's demise, as welcome as it is, should in no way be equated with the demise of terrorism.
Terrorism is a decentralized phenomenon – in its funding, planning, and execution. Removing Bin Laden does not end the terrorist threat. There are successors, starting with Ayman al-Zawahiri in Al Qaeda, as well as in autonomous groups operating out of Yemen, Somalia, and other countries. So terrorism will continue. Indeed, it could even grow somewhat worse in the short run, as there are sure to be those who will want to show that they can still strike against the West.
The best parallel that I can think of when it comes to understanding terrorism and how to deal with it is disease. There are steps that can and should be taken to attack or neutralize certain types of viruses or bacteria; to reduce vulnerability to infection; and to reduce the consequences of infection if, despite all of our efforts, we become ill. Disease is not something that can be eliminated, but often it can be managed.
There are obvious parallels with terrorism. As we have recently witnessed, terrorists can be attacked and stopped before they can cause harm; individuals and countries can be defended; and societies can take steps to bolster their resilience when they are successfully attacked, as on occasion they inevitably will be. These elements of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy can reduce the threat to manageable, or at least tolerable, levels.
But tolerable is not good enough when it comes to protecting innocent life. We want to do better. The answer is to be found in the realm of prevention. More must be done to interrupt the recruitment of terrorists, thereby reducing the threat before it materializes.
Most terrorists today are young and male. And, while the overwhelming majority of the world's Muslims are not terrorists, many of the world's terrorists are Muslim. It would help enormously in this regard if Arab and Muslim political leaders spoke out against the intentional killing of men, women, and children by anyone or any group for political purposes. There is also a pivotal role here for religious leaders, educators, and parents. Terrorism must be stripped of any legitimacy that it may be viewed as having.
One potential positive development here stems from the political changes that we are seeing in many parts of the Middle East. There is a greater chance than before that young people will become more integrated in their own societies (and less susceptible to the appeal of extremism) if they enjoy greater political and economic opportunity.
Pakistan will most likely prove critical in determining the future prevalence of terrorism. Unfortunately, while it is home to some of the world's most dangerous terrorists, it is decidedly less than a full partner in the struggle against it. Some parts of the Pakistani government are sympathetic to terrorism and unwilling to act against it; other parts simply lack the capacity to act against it effectively.
Capacity is much easier to provide than will. The outside world can and should continue to provide assistance to help Pakistan acquire the strength and skills required to tackle modern-day terrorists.
But no amount of external assistance can compensate for a lack of motivation and commitment. Pakistani leaders must choose once and for all. It is not enough to be a limited partner in the struggle against terror; Pakistan needs to become a full partner.
There will be Pakistanis who protest against the recent American military action, arguing that it violated Pakistan's sovereignty. But sovereignty is not an absolute; it involves obligations as well as rights. Pakistanis must understand that they will forfeit some of those rights if they do not meet their obligation to ensure that their territory is not used to shelter terrorists.
If things do not change, the sort of independent military operation carried out by US soldiers will become less the exception than the rule. This is not nearly as desirable an outcome as Pakistan joining what should be a common international effort. At stake is not only assistance, but Pakistan's own future, for, in the absence of genuine commitment to counter-terrorism, it is only a matter of time before the country falls victim to the infection that it refuses to treat.
Richard N. Haass, formerly Director of Policy Planning in the US State Department, is President of The Council on Foreign Relations.
This article appears in full on CFR.org by permission of its original publisher. It was originally available here.