Insecurity in Syria
This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
CPA Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 13: A Pakistan-based Terrorist Attack on the U.S. Homeland
September 7, 2011This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
CPA Contingency Planning Memo No. 12: Post-Qaddafi Instability in Libya
This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
What are the current missions where the use of preventive force can serve U.S. interests? How might foreseeable changes in the strategic environment increase the imperatives for using force preventively in the future? What do we know about the efficacy and costs of using preventive force against different kinds of adversaries and in different contexts, for example against terrorists , WMD related targets, and potentially for humanitarian missions? Is this likely to change and would these lessons be broadly applicable to other possible applications conceivable in the future?
April 14, 2011This meeting is not for attribution.
What new capabilities or organizational changes are needed to provide effective and timely preventive options for policymakers? What technological advancements, including cyberwarfare, have enlarged the scope of preventive military options? Are there prospective technological/organizational breakthroughs that will make preventive actions more feasible or likely? What are the intelligence and operational requirements of locating, targeting, and attempting to destroy WMD facilities? What are the opportunities for using force against terrorists' infrastructure or state-sponsors? What is the status/relevance of Prompt Global Strike? What are the opportunities and constraints for offensive cyber operations? How can the United States leverage allied intelligence/military capabilities?
April 14, 2011This meeting is not for attribution.
What is the legal legitimacy of preventive force today? Do states agree on what constitutes preventive force? Can there be clear distinctions between anticipatory, preemptive, and preventive uses of force? How has the Iraq War and current operations in the AFPAK region affected debates about legal or political norms governing preventive force and the level of certainty states should have before they act? How do allies and adversaries view U.S. roles and missions for preventive force? What are the authorization and/or oversight roles for Congress?
April 14, 2011This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
This meeting is not for attribution.
CPA Contingency Planning Memo No. 13: A Pakistan-based Terrorist Attack on the U.S. Homeland
This meeting is not for attribution.
For more conflict prevention analysis, visit CFR's Center for Preventive Action.
Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action
In this CSR, coauthored by Paul B. Stares and Micah Zenko sponsored by the Center for Preventive Action, evaluates the U.S. system for foreseeing and heading off crises and assesses in detail current U.S. practices with regard to different types of preventive action. More
Somalia: A New Approach
This report, authored by Bronwyn E. Bruton and sponsored by the Center for Preventive Action, argues that the current U.S. policy of supporting the TFG is unlikely to succeed and ineffective foreign meddling threatens to prolong and worsen the conflict. Instead, the United States should pursue a strategy of "constructive disengagement" while still maintaining support for localized development initiatives and humanitarian assistance. More
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