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GS: I’m Gillian Sorensen. And it is my pleasure this morning to welcome and to introduce the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, former Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers. It’s also my honor to salute his distinguished predecessor, Mrs. Sadaka Ogata(?), who is here and—(Applause) has a temporary home in New York for a time. We’re so glad about that.

And also to salute and welcome Nan Annan, wife of the Secretary General. Nan, thank you for coming up (Inaudible). (Applause) We also have some of the key staff of Prime Minister Lubbers. And other past and present United Nations people. I’m very glad about that. The organization is well represented.

This is the first time Ruud Lubbers has spoken at the Council in a long time. But he is well known to our members. For his leadership, first as Minister of Economics, and then as Prime Minister of The Netherlands for twelve years, from 1982 to 1994, during which time, The Netherlands played a very active role in the growing unity and union of Europe, during which time its overseas development assistance was among the highest of the industrial nations, and its influence in business, arts and foreign affairs had an impact far beyond the small size of the country.

Prime Minister Luubers takes office as the ninth High Commissioner in the 50th year of the Commission. He was nominated by Kofi Annan and appointed in January to lead the world’s preeminent humanitarian agency, with a staff of 5,000, helping an estimated 22 million refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced people in more than 120 countries.

The Commission has a ratio of staff to refugees of roughly one to 4,200. It has a total 528 NGOs, who serve as essential implementing partners. Its largest operation is, of course, in Afghanistan, but there are more than a million refugees in Eritrea, hundreds of thousands in Sri Lanka, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia, Sierra Leone, and other places. Even for a veteran of longstanding like Mr. Lubbers, this must be a daunting challenge.

And nowhere more so than Afghanistan, where drought, repression, poverty, war, and the approach of brutal winter have sent a flood of refugees on the move, portending a possible catastrophic humanitarian situation.

You can imagine that the political, logistical and managerial challenges of seeking cooperation from member states setting up camps, tents, blankets, water and food, before winter arrives in mid-November, gives great urgency to this task.

No subject could be more timely than the one our speaker will address this morning: The Refugee Crisis in Afghanistan. Would you welcome Prime Minister Lubbers.

(Applause)

RL: Thank you for inviting me and your very kind words. Wonderful morning here. I want to thank all of you for coming. Many friends.

The 11th of September—we’ve said a lot about it already. Only want to start there again, because I have the feeling that this century really started the 11th of September. The new era. And we see it in all sorts of consequences since those tragic events. Now, you invited me here to make a couple of remarks and, more important, to compare notes together.

Let me start as you did, picturing(?) very shortly HCR, as such. That’s right. We are now in 50 years, 51 to be precise. Twenty-two million people. When this all started here, the U.N., (Inaudible) this is a U.N. organization, thought this was for three or, at maximum, five years. But since then, ten times it had to be renewed. Now we are talking these 22 million people. A really global institution.

Most people thought, until recently, very much on the Balkans and Africa. And that’s true. Very big populations. But as we’ve said(?), the largest refugee populations are the Afghans. It’s also useful to realize that, of the 22, eight million are Muslims. This is a proportional, substantial part. By the way, people think that, at least now in Europe, but we have still eight million to our concern in Europe. And I use the word “to our concern”—indeed, it is about refugees, internally displaced persons, and statelessness.

I consider the HCR, this work, as core business for the United Nations. This is something special, because the whole concept of the United Nations goes back to the same time, was based on the ambition to have nations, democracies, all around the globe. And they will be connected in a system—united nations. But now, here we are talking about 22 million people who do not have a government to take care of them. They are, in a way, excluded from the system because of the violence and persecution, victims of conflict.

And it is the U.N. as a system which takes them together, with nations, of course, irresponsibility for that. Fifty years now. Fifty years, also, for the legal basis, the global, the conventional refugees of 1951, ’67 became a prodigal(?) to it. But basically, it’s still the same legal basis. And we organize, now, global consultations to reaffirm that convention, its principles, to compare notes how we practice it, and to see how there are new challenges in modernity which we have to respond to. We’ll have a ministerial conference, the first in 50 years, on the 11th and 12th of December, organized together with the Swiss government, to speak about this.

And, indeed, there is a new situation with refugees, I think for you to compare. We have seen many ways(?) and developments, no time to dwell upon that. But we have, indeed, I think, a new situation. And basic two things. Protection is one thing. We need for the people we protect durable solutions. This is either going home or a local integration into the countries that they have fled to, or resettlement. If those three alternatives are not provided in sufficient number, we see two negative outcomes.

One possibility: people stay for year after year in a refugee camp. This really degrades there, as human beings. This is not good. The second: because there are no possibility for one of the solutions, people simply go on the move. They can do that only illegally. They don’t have the papers. They don’t have the permits. They just start to travel. And they become victims in illegal, very criminal networks in human trafficking. They mix up with other people, not refugees, who for economic reasons have the same desire.

And these things have created a somewhat new situation. I would say crime is on the rise because of a lack of solutions for refugees. And refugees, the real refugees, are punished twice. When they enter in a country, they are considered as phony. “These are not real refugees,” people say. And many politicians do the same. So these gives a somewhat new situation.

Now, in a way, the 11th of September—many aspects. One of them is that the climate for refugees is deteriorating even further. Because it’s so easy said that there’s a connection with crime. And maybe there’s even a connection with terrorists. This is nonsense. But still, you have to explain that it’s nonsense.

In our convention, we exclude criminals, beyond that, terrorists, too, of course. If we have a reasonable assumption to think that somebody is connected to crimes, he is excluded from the protection of our system. Now, we have to practice this more concretely, of course. The Security Council Resolution 1373 is a good one, but still the language, in my opinion, is a bit too vague. So we have to operationalize(?) that further. With defining the exclusion clause precisely. So this is the general picture.

Now a few words about Afghanistan. Maybe after all the (Inaudible) refugee population, and it didn’t start September 11th. You all know it started decades earlier. Twenty years ago, it was the fight, the battle against the Soviets there. Which made the Afghans very popular(?) in the world and also in the neighboring countries, in Pakistan and Iran. Millions went there and they were considered as brothers and sisters.

Ten years later, they started to deteriorate very much. There was the internal civil war, with war lords going on with old(?) cruelties. Again, after people in millions going back to Afghanistan, (Inaudible) had to flee. And then we enter the ’90s and, at some point, still HCR under the chairmanship of Sadaka Ogata(?), two countries there, namely Pakistan and Iran, started to say, “Enough is enough. We are not going to accept Afghans anymore as fresh(?) refugees.”

When I came into office, this had become really a question. Maybe you remember the pictures and the information about (Inaudible). The people were not given sufficient assistance anymore. There was no protection. The whole system was degraded, going down. So we had to formulate a new policy. And I got the Secretary General, who helped me enormously, formulating that, the so-called “two-prong” approach. Which meant, yes, Pakistan and Iran, allow us to register the people there, give them assistance. But we, at the same time, the U.N. family, we’ll do much more in Afghanistan to prevent fresh outflow of people. At some point, even go for returns.

This was nicely set by us. But we could not implement it. Why not? And I’m not talking about this(?) year. Firstly, because the call on a cease fire between the Northern Alliance and Taliban didn’t work. Preparations were already too far for a new round of fighting. It happened that the (Inaudible) that the Taliban regime there, where they were in control, and where we could have done our work, made it impossible to do so.

I think there was a connection with the war, within the Taliban regime itself, the famous Ministry are now formulated, short for Virtues and Vices, got the upper hand in the country. And created an impossible climate to do our work. So when the September 11th, although this is the formal day that we pulled out, with the U.N. family, in fact, our activities were already very crippled. And this is now the next phase in the tragedy.

It started with the assassination of Massoud(?), which obviously was a presence(?). As a presence(?) to the Taliban regime, before it even closed the relationships(?) between them. And then September 11th was the immediate next step. I cannot make a real distinction between the (Inaudible) go.

After that, we at HCR had an emergency. I mean, everybody knew that there was going to be a reaction of the United States. Nobody knew exactly what. We prepared ourselves. We sent teams there. We made assessments, together with other agencies. And we said this might lead to a fresh outflow of one and a half million people. Let’s say, one million to Pakistan and 400,000 to Iran and maybe a 100,000 to the north, to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. It was very difficult to make such a guess. But it was our best guess, at least in terms of being prepared.

But the strange thing is that at the very same time we were sending our people there, I travelled to Europe, to the chair of the Security Council, and to (Inaudible) in Washington, to make a plea for an approach, a reaction, which would not be disproportionately military, but very limited and focused—avoid human misery. So I was organizing for one and a half million, and I was making a plea for the less, the better.

And the third element is that I had to negotiate with these two countries again, Pakistan and Iran. Which I had promised, you remember, the (Inaudible) in Afghanistan was zero and they had promised me to do our activities, but not to accept any fresh refugees. Now, we could come to an agreement, which is then called, in technical words, “temporary protection.”

These people really have to flee. Accept them, but we, HCR, accept that this time they will be located very near to the border. And Iran, even on the border. This is what is happening now. We are preparing, with them together, of course, sites. Not for the one and a half million in these states, but for 300,000 in Pakistan and 100,000 in Iran. This is now well under way.

What’s the practice? The practice is that the borders, though, are formally closed. So for people who want to go out, it’s very difficult. Either they have to take the risk reporting at the border, “Please let me in.” Which has been in very limited numbers. Because the two governments, they think, “We cannot allow it to be too open to the Afghans. Then they will come in masses. We are not prepared for that, and we don’t want it.”

So the alternative is that they go through mountain roads. Very difficult. And not very acceptable, from the protection point of view. The strongest, they make it. Not the weakest and the most vulnerable. So we’re now in a new round of negotiations with the two governments to open up at least a little bit further—not total, but a little bit further—the borders. With our people there to check. Are there enough (Inaudible) who can be allowed to use the main road.

To give you an impression of numbers, it started with, theoretically, zero. Then they came in hundreds. Then in thousands per day. It’s now 2,000 per day. The last four days—and I think, when I am speaking here, probably there will already be 3,000 per day. This is not enormous. But the first 50,000 we passed last week.

How do we go on from here? At the same time, of course, we tried to bring in—I am now talking for the U.N. family as a whole—supplies, food, in Afghanistan. This is by no means zero. But sometimes what people think(?). A lot is going in, but it’s very difficult. How is it possible? The U.N. family had to pull out with its own staff. But all of them, all of us, had substantial national, local staff there. These people are very loyal. We have still contacts with them. Things are going in and we get a lot of information. So the U.N. system is not totally out. It’s based on the activity of Afghans themselves.

Final remark, maybe, because I had promised not to speak too long: how to go from here. There are a few elements here, which have to be distinguished, I guess. First, in my role as High Commissioner for Refugees, it’s pretty clear. Get the sites ready for bigger outflows. Convince the two governments to be more generous, accept the numbers who really are in need, so that we can assist them. Convince the donors not to make only nice speeches about (Inaudible) and possibilities for the future. Give the money now. (Inaudible) And that has, of course, many practical consequences for us.

Plus what I mentioned earlier, to avoid that the post-11th of September is translated in a type of tinophobia(?), in relation to refugees, which is not only the problem there, but worldwide. So far, the HCR prospective, we are doing, and what we are doing with our colleagues in the U.N. family. Then, of course, you think a lot how has it to go in Afghanistan itself further. This is more a political than a humanitarian question. But having said that, I told you already, I went to the Security Council and to Washington because I think the preventive is always the most important. And still, at this moment, what’s the way forward? (Inaudible)

This is mainly political. But let me say this: When I was at the OIC, Organization of Islamic Conference, I stressed very much the responsibility of the world of the Islam in the first place. And secondly, in the context of that, with the support of the world of the Islam, the prime responsibility of the neighboring countries, which is, of course, a Muslim climate and environment. Any particular? Of course, Pakistan and Iran.

I do think that there is, for Pakistan, a responsibility to securitize, to securitize the possibility to assist people there. Also in Afghanistan. It can’t go on too long. The security situation is going down in Afghanistan. And there must be a moment that Pakistan will take its own responsibility there. But of course, in close consultation with Iran, who has the responsibility for the western part of the country. The part, let’s say, for the insiders of Ismah Alkaan(?).

And in the north, we have the Northern Alliance. This is the political picture. I really hope that it will move forward, because the bombing is awful for humanitarian people. Doing nothing, and letting the people in prison there in misery is also awful. So we have to find a way forward. I’m convinced that the solution is, as more often in life, to put the people in the center(?). To look at from the perspective of normal, powerless, poor, vulnerable people.

Still thinking that—and being convinced that—Afghans have a capacity themselves to capitalize on the good there and to capitalize on the conviction that it’s about human beings we are doing. The danger of modern technology, I think, is it’s on such a distance that we don’t realize what’s happening on the ground with the people. It’s my job to be with the people. Thank you.

(Applause)

GS: Well, thank you Prime Minister. May I mention to our audience that this meeting is on the record. We do have some press here. And the Council’s usual rules of non-attribution do not apply. And could you wait for the microphone and state your name and affiliation before posing your question? Who would like to put the first question forward? And could I add, the Prime Minister says he would be glad to take questions on this subject he has addressed or on other aspects of the refugee situation. Yes?

W: I’m Sydney Jones of Human Rights Watch. I’d like to know what your and HCR’s position now is on the construction of camps in the northwest frontier province. There have been conflicting reports. And if you can’t construct those camps free of harassment, and wish sufficient guarantees, where will those camps be built for the new arrival? Thank you.

RL: We had enormous problems, to the level, even, when we say that have no cooperation in terms of security, infrastructure, then it’s impossible to our job. And we have to move further into the country, where there are existing refugee camps, as you know. But the last ten days, under this pressure and criticism, the situation is improving. It goes faster and faster. And we have now a number of sites well on the way in preparation.

So I think we are going…we are now about between 100,000 and 200,000, if they would camp in the legal routes. Because the first 50,000 came in more secretively. On their own. And they went to family and relatives. Or they went to their former sites, refugee camps in the countryside. We are (Inaudible) now to get them over a better impression of what’s going on. But answering your question, yes, in the northwestern province, too, we are now on the move. We have not much alternative. And we are realizing that now. Yes.

W: Patricia Wisefagen(?), Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Thank you, Mr. High Commissioner, for beginning with the problem of durable solutions, instead of launching right into the emergency. Because so often we hear only about the emergency and people don’t go any further than that.

My question is, what is the nature of the inter-agency cooperation, collaboration that you alluded to, both now, at the time of the emergency, and if there is some kind of plan or a notion or the beginnings of a plan in process for the future, when one hopes there will be the possibility of a durable solution, and further return to Afghanistan and reconstruction activities. How would you see HCR working with its U.N. cousins?

RL: Simplify it somewhat. If you have to (Inaudible) breakfast. Emergency relief is going fine. It’s part of the organization of the U.N. itself. This relief assistance, emergency relief. It’s well-coordinated. People say, U.N. is not working together. This is absolutely nonsense. They are working quite well together. So this is good. And I might add here, that the capacity of many NGOs is in the same area. It’s for me a wonderful experience to work with so many NGOs who are actively participating. Sometimes they are criticizing UNHCR Which is good, too, I guess.

So answering your question—when it is about emergency relief, we are on our best. Let me try again. And we have obstacles. With the governor in the northwestern province, and many other obstacles. That’s what we do. We’re good in that. When it comes to solutions—and said to simply—we are absolutely weak. Absolutely weak. It was Mrs. Ogata who earlier initiated a discussion on this famous gap.

My experience is that we are weak because there is no connect with the development branch of the U.N. It’s simply not there. So have World Bank, we have IMF, we have reports. But refugees are excluded. They are marginalized. They are considered as miserable people and not part of the development process.

This is also related to politics. I’m a former politician. In politics, how does that come? We think—and rightly so, me too—we need the ownership of developing countries to do development. But there, when they have to divide money and define initiatives, they make the telephone calls to governments and other parties, and they divide the money. And then you see that refugees are excluded.

Refugees are not part of the constituency. They are in remote areas. Often they say, hey, they were security problems in the past, mixing up with armed elements. So they are not very interested to make them part of a development effort. And therefore, the doable solution there are much weaker. So this is simplifying it a little bit. We are good in the emergency. We are not so good in the durable (Inaudible).

Now, Afghanistan, let me end there again. Yes, (Inaudible). The good thing of the two-prong approach is exactly that, it was good(?). Trying to relate it to things in Afghanistan, in reconstruction and renovation. Even this morning, we tried to be a little bit more optimistic. Left the message that at some point it will be possible to work there again and that we go on, really, with an effort to organize things in a way that people don’t have to flee, but on the contrary, can go back and are participating in the reconstruction and renovation of Afghanistan. I could give you more examples of the challenges there. But the simple answer is, on the one branch, we are good. And on the other branch, we are weak.

M: Winston Lord, from the International Rescue Committee. In describing your mandate, you not only mentioned traditional refugees and asylum-seekers, but the internally displaced. Your authority to deal with this under the U.N. is imprecise, at best. Do you give equal priority to the internally displaced? And do you feel you have the legal and political and financial resources to deal with that problem?

RL: The answer is that IDPs are also people without a government to take care of them. So in that definition, which I practice, they’re just same. This is one. Secondly, HCR is the best-qualified to do it, with IDPs. If the causes of refugees and IDPs are the same. Now sometimes, the flows are mixed up.

So we focus on countries where there is a close link between refugees and IDPs or where refugees, when they go home, cannot go home immediately to the village where they came from, but temporarily are IDPs. Or the other way around. That is, a tendency to flee because of the violence, but still cannot go out of the country. Those are the situations which we are best in. So I’m not saying all IDPs should be the concern of HCR. But those IDPs, in those situations I described, yes HCR. That is one.

There’s another formal problem. The mandate and obligation, if you like, is for refugees. But to that can be added, by the Secretary General, respectively, the General Assembly, areas where they say, “Go there. Consider those people of your concern.” So the political system is there to do that. I have a practical consideration. I think it’s fair that there is funding for those activities. Because it’s not fair to say to people, “We are going to protect and to assist you” if you cannot make this a reality.

So this is a condition I put in a very practical way. IDPs, it has to be defined. So there has to be a political green light from New York. And there has to be funding. But many, many millions IDPs are to our concern. And I see no reason to consider these activities as less important as for refugees. I can give you one tiny example. Columbia. We have a modest coordinating activity there for IDPs. They are doing very good work. And I would weigh that on my list of performers rather high. It’s an IDP operation.

M: Ralph Butchins(?), New York University. Mr. High Commissioner, how many people do you have working on your projects in and around Afghanistan? How many of them are foreign to the area? And what steps are you taking to provide them with security?

RL: When we speak the region, it’s literally the neighboring countries. You know them. If you would say what sort of numbers of HCR people there, I would say a thousand. To give you an impression. How was our ratio in activities? Normally, you might multiply this with three or four, the so-called nationals or locals. Then your question is about the thousand. We have no formal rules not to accept Americans to work there.

But it is true that in our people there, and especially the teams, because…I mean, I was speaking in terms of a thousand, it’s because we brought in a lot from other parts of the HCR family. And watched the schemes we have for that to bring the people there. Good people. Sometimes we try to be a little bit cautious. But frankly speaking, we have no formal rules. We see it case by case. We render our choices. Sometimes we say, okay, better he goes and she doesn’t go. In terms of risk. But it goes me one step too far to say, no, in the northwestern province, you cannot have Americans. We have Americans there, too.

M: (Inaudible)

RL: It’s a fact we have our own security system. We have U.N. and (Inaudible) phases. And discipline. We have our own security officers. There is one. But there in Pakistan, and I give you that example—but the same is for Iran—it’s mainly with the local authorities. When we spoke about the possibility of the northwestern province, the security problem was quite a problem. And there was a tough discussion, up to the level of the President, that they have to provide, the Army, the protection also for our people. That they are doing now.

M: I’m Grover Joseph Reese. I work for the House International Relations Committee in the U.S. Congress. A few days ago, people who were working on the refugee situation around Afghanistan were very concerned about the possibility that all the new camps were going to have to be right near the border. I inferred from your remarks that you might have concluded that this was not an unacceptable arrangement.

In—not that we can necessarily do anything about this, but—in things that the United States should be looking for from the government of Pakistan, is more secure camps far form the border high on that list? And if not, if you could have two or things that the United States could press Pakistan to do in the refugee area, what would they be?

RL: The first in that priority list, is to be more generous at the main roads, which are only limited numbers, into the country, which are blocked now, closed borders. And we say there must be a system in people’s report with their problems if they wanted to go out. To be more flexible in allowing people to come in. This is one.

The second, when they come in, yes, it’s acceptable to bring them to sites near the border, which are along the whole border there. So there is not the problem. Maybe the second point is the security point. That you have to securitize it sufficiently. Thirdly, we always saw these camps as first(?) there, but when we have overflow or certain problems, there must be a possibility to bring them deeper in the country.

There are, by the way, refugee sites there. There’s an enormous capacity for refugees in Pakistan. This is the sequence. There is a distinction which, ten days ago, I tried to say that earlier. We were very near a breakdown in our relations with the government of Pakistan. They simply did not come forward with sufficient security, with infrastructure, et cetera. And then we have said, if this is not happening, then our deal is over, because we feel committed. It’s quite something for HCR to accept refugee camps so near to the border, which is also more difficult and risky in terms of security.

But then, they started, let’s say, to give in. To be more positive about it, so the moment I’m standing here, I don’t feel free today to say the Pakistan government is not delivering. They have started to deliver. And we are doing our work. But this is our priority. The next point, the difficult point now is to be more generous at the formal border points. And not to accept that people are obliged to go through mountain parts to enter Pakistan. That’s the main point, now.

W: Linda Perkin, United Nations. Are you finding—you mentioned that you had made appeals at the OIC summit. Are you finding any increased responsiveness among the donors? UNHCR, if I’m not mistaken, has had a real problem between means and need. And I’m wondering whether or not this whole discussion about “drain the swamps” and tried to get at some of the root causes of what’s going on, have been felt in the responsiveness to your need for funds and means?

RL: Yeah. On Afghanistan, we had a very predictive meeting, called the Forum, (Inaudible) Forum. This is an idea already one year old. But we activated it now. And Kenzo Ishima(?) and myself are co-chairing that meeting. This was, this time, not only the traditional donor countries—cash donor countries—so-called “Afghan support group,” but also the neighboring countries, Pakistan, Iran and Tajikistan and so on. Plus what we call the “six-plus-two” countries. That’s a political formula. We brought them together. At that meeting, there was a pledge for, in total, 700 million dollars, which is sufficient for us to do our job. I mean, for the whole of the U.N. family for quite some time. So that is not the problem.

When it comes to translating pledges in real money, there is a problem. And especially for HCR, there is a real problem. That’s not specially Afghanistan that’s structural. There are many countries, donors, who think that HCR is created by God and the angels. And that it is there. It’s there already 50 years, so then they see, okay, we have this, and now we want to do something and humanitarian assistance. And then we see what’s possible, we have a few sympatic(?) NGOs. We have bilateral reasons to do something in a certain way. And, indeed, nice things very often.

But they take that HCR is doing its work, the thousand you are asking, for…automatically, as if that is part of a system, a government which is already there. And there is a funding problem for us, structurally. There is a tendency to underfund HCR. I’m not saying specifically Afghanistan. When there are big crises, it’s coming again. So it’s (Inaudible) thirty mark, because you referred also to OIC. Yes, I ask there, in the Islamic Conference, for two things: money—and they are now doing somewhat, but it’s mainly from the gov(?) coming—they are coming more forward now, which is good.

But the other thing I stressed there is the political. And I want to repeat it here. One cannot say simply—I think that’s dangerous—that the world of the Islam, Islamic Conference, see a problem as Afghanistan. Not as their problem. It is their problem. It’s their problem. In the first place. But we all—I’m now speaking as a Dutchman—we all, all world citizens, always look to the United States as providing the solution. Saying what has to be done.

Now, of course, United States is very powerful. When they take action, when they think action has to be taken. So one can understand this a little bit. But in this particular case, very important case, Afghanistan, the political solution is, in the first place, has to be provided by you. Not from Washington. But by you, in the region, there. So it was not only about cash donor contributions. Although we spoke also about that. Thank you.

W: Thank you. I’m Rachel O’Reilly, the Refugee Policy Director at Human Rights Watch. You alluded that there’s almost a new world order, post-September 11th, and that, in general, this meant (Inaudible) implications for refugees. I’m wondering in particular what precedents you see being set by this situation. Particularly, about the whole issue of border closures and the failure, so far, of first country asylum.

And particularly, I’m concerned about the decision by Iran to establish camps on the Afghan side of the border, rather than allowing refugees into Iran. And the agreement that you alluded to, that was actually made pre-September 11th, that both neighboring countries would not take in any new arrivals. And I’m wondering whether you’re concerned about the precedent this sets for other refugee crises in situations elsewhere, where countries are faced with similar security and resource problems, and the need to defend a concept of first country asylum. Thank you.

RL: Let me start with the good news. Just yesterday, Iran has accepted that it is impossible, what they said earlier, that a number of refugee camps has to be in Afghanistan. So they are accommodating us, we’re working together now. At what they call “zero point,” but just at the side of Iran. But not on the territory of Afghanistan. This was too optimistic.

There is still, however, one substantial site for them, but that’s in the Northern Alliance, in the north, which they want to provide to, with the requisite(?) of food and shelter, et cetera. That (Inaudible) I find very good, because you hear it in the name, it is of course a Muslim organization. And I think those types of organizations have to activated in this crisis. It’s now that Iran is doing that. This is good (Inaudible).

Secondly, the first part of your question, do you see consequences. I come back to Iran, and there on the border and all that. Yes, I see consequences, and sometimes it’s scary(?). We have to be very alert. I prefer not to mention the specific country, but we had a European country, which was very proud to report to us that they had decided to put all Afghans in a separate refugee camp.

And we said immediately, “Don’t do that!” They said, “That’s a good idea. Because Afghans…it’s a very special group now in the world. So we better put them in a special camp.” And we refused that. And we could repair that. So that got…therefore, I’m not mentioning the government anymore, of that particular country. But this is just an—

(END OF SIDE A)

RL: When they are listed, Afghans or others, or groups, we have to be fair, we have to select out, screen out, possible terrorists and criminals. But it is another thing, of course, to say that a government unilaterally can say, “We declare what are the criminals and the possible terrorists in this world.” So we need mechanisms to be very specific on this exclusion systematic.

And here, I’d like to be practical. It’s the responsibility of a government to be tough on these questions. It’s our responsibility then, to say, “Okay, if you have made this sort of pre-selection, let’s have a close look individually.” There has to be a procedure, from there on, to check on that (Inaudible).

The third is related to an earlier question (Inaudible). The key point—but it’s more the broader picture, it’s not only the actual situation—the picture is that we need solutions for refugees. That’s the key point. And here, maybe, we have to improve our own quality standards a little bit. Because we became used to think only in terms of protection. To bring people in deep in the country as possible. Keep them there. And provide them with assistance. And here, there was a close working together with many NGOs, too. In this same attitude. The best we can do is protection, not returnees, but protection.

I think that’s a bit risky. We should look into the questions. Give good protection, but also possibilities that people can go home. And in that context, I find the approach of Pakistan and Iran not only negative. There should be an attitude. And then they are co-responsible to provide the security situation in Afghanistan, so that people, at some point, can go home again.

So this is…I give you this answer, in all fairness, because I think the theory—the only thing we have to do is to bring the people as far out as possible and to keep them there as long as possible—is not a good attitude. We have to provide solutions for people. If possible, make them return. Thank you.

M: Mr. High Commissioner, it is a pleasure to hear you call yourself “former politician.” The transition from politics to humanitarianism is itself a challenge. And we wish you well. My question: You launched the idea of a humanitarian coalition not long ago, including the six neighboring states of land-locked Afghanistan. What is the status of this coalition? In particular, have you started taking measures in China, in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, identifying sites for refugees, preparing them for the influx now that they’re independent?

And a linked question to that is, 85 percent of your present case load is border people, people who have come from not very far. Now, in the camps that you are administering now—let’s call them camps—what specific measures have you foreseen to avoid a Goma(?) type situation, particularly in a land where life without guns is not conceivable?

RL: These are a number of questions. First, maybe, to the people. It’s not true that those who are coming are only from the border areas. No, no. The picture is, in Afghanistan, one is fleeing the cities, knowing that the borders are closed and very difficult to come across the other side of the border. The large majority are fleeing the cities, are going into the countryside and into the mountains. Into the mountains in the center of Afghanistan. So that’s the first.

Secondly, people are coming earlier to us, and also now, when they come, they take the risk and the difficulty because they think there is no other way out. They come not only from the border areas. They can also come on the interface between the Northern Alliance, for example. And from Hazayat(?). Because the situation is there so difficult, the level of food is that much lower as else in the country. So it’s a bit more complex, I would say, the situation.

The second question, and as far as your first question, is about this word “coalition.” Yes, it’s true. When we called upon this Forum event(?), I invited them to see them as a humanitarian coalition. And to set an agenda with the people in the center. Human beings, in terms of assistance, in terms of finding solutions in Afghanistan. The political aspect. And to mobilize them to do so. And they took that challenge. And I think this is very positive. Now, I have to be at one (Inaudible), although this is (Inaudible) impress as maybe a little bit risky, what I’m going to say now.

I’ve learned that you have to be cautious with words. In some parts of the world, the word “coalition” is not very popular at all. In the world of the…I found out speaking (Inaudible) oh, I see, already the first hours I was there, that the word “coalition” there is related very much to American thinking. The United States is always building coalitions. But that’s America with a number of others. So they are not so positive about the word coalition.

But the interesting thing is that the surrounding countries, Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, had not that problem, not at all. So they found humanitarian coalition a good concept. But this is more about language. The idea there, of course, is that, indeed, the surrounding countries provide the assistance and feel committed to find solutions. Not only that, but beyond that, the renovation and the rehabilitation of Afghanistan. Where, by the way, I consider, when we are that far that security is provided, U.N. has to fulfill (Inaudible) role.

W: (Not miked) I’d like to take the chairman’s privilege of posing the last question. And it relates to a broader issue. You referred to the (Inaudible) NGOs that you would (Inaudible). I’d like to know how you can subsequently(?) claim those numbers to a common standard. And how do you know that they meet your standards, coming from so many different backgrounds and (Inaudible) organizations? And finally, we know that you have lost some of your staff on the front lines. Are there new precautions for their security and their safety? We know that the blue shirt or the blue arm band in itself is not a perfect protection (Inaudible).

RL: Security, yes, we had too many experiences, negative experiences. So we are upgrading ourselves in terms of security. Each organization within the U.N. family and the U.N. family as such. It’s partly a question of personal behavior. It’s partly a question of good logistics, that you have the communication, et cetera. This is very key. That’s the second. And the third, of course, is that you have a U.N. good systems. So we are trying to improve that. Having said that, this is dangerous work. If it is dangerous in a country, normally you see the military. When it is very dangerous, you see us.

Then the NGO question, what you said. Yeah, I think HCR has, by the way, together with NGOs, to set standards of protection, quality standards. And we had to attain(?) some views on that. I think that’s important. I have no…I see no problem there. NGAs, for me, are a treasure, possibility of creativity. Creativity and availability to get things done. To do things.

NGOs have a different capacity. They do this. And I like them most when they do that. They do things better than we can do, often, because we are a bit too bureaucratic already. They have another role, and that’s the role of NGOs to criticize those who are in power. Some people even think that HCR is in power. No, we are very powerless, but they consider us one of the possibilities to criticize. So this the other aspect of NGOs, which is good, too. That’s the representation of civil society which says to the bosses, the authority figures, “You’re not doing well.” I think this blend is good.

My only appeal to the NGOs was in Geneva, in our yearly meeting. Consider HCR as a needed organization for yourself. You cannot do without work without the existence of HCR. So we need a well-funded HCR, well-established. And from there on, I would say, HCR can do its work only in working together with that many NGOs. And I’m not scared about the many(?). I don’t see a problem at all. It’s a great family. Thank you.