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Judith Kipper, director of the Council’s Middle East Forum, says she noticed a “change in tone” during President Bush’s April 11 summit with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, with President Bush pressuring Sharon more than usual on the question of Israeli settlements.

Kipper says, however, that President Bush should go further and articulate in writing the American vision of what a final settlement between the Israelis and Palestinians could look like. This position paper might then be used as the basis of negotiations mediated by the United States. With Sharon now preparing his plan to withdraw Israeli settlers from the Gaza Strip this July, the time is ripe for the Bush administration “to start a second track between now and the end of the summer toward final-status negotiations,” Kipper says.

Kipper was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on April 12, 2005.

On April 11, [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon and President Bush met at the President’s ranch in Crawford, Texas. This is the seventh time they’ve met. Did you detect anything different this time around?

Yes. And it’s a change in tone that I think has been characteristic of the administration since Condi [Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice] took over foreign policy. In the previous six meetings, it was a love-fest, where Sharon got total support for everything Israel was doing. This time there was support and enthusiasm and compliments, but there was also a constant returning by the president, in front of the prime minister, to the outstanding issues, primarily the settlements, and for Israel to keep its word about implementing the road map [which calls on Israel to freeze settlement construction and provides a framework for peace negotiations].

Let’s talk about the Israeli settlement issue. Could you bring us up to date on the current situation?

Well, 70 percent of the settlers live in Male Adumim in the West Bank and in the neighboring settlements, which are right on the green line [the 1949 armistice line that divided Israeli from Arab territory] near Jerusalem. In previous negotiations agreed to by the Palestinians, that 70 percent would have become incorporated into Israel, and the Palestinians would have gotten compensation of equally good land someplace else.

The question about the housing that has been announced for Male Adumim- 3,500 new houses- is that it would cut off Palestinian access to Jerusalem, foreclosing, at least in theory, the possibility of a Palestinian capital in the Arab part of East Jerusalem. I believe Sharon made this announcement for domestic purposes, and that those houses are not intended to be built for several years. Presumably, or hopefully by then, there will be a final settlement. Sharon’s need to appease his right wing, in effect taking care of a very contentious political constituency, directly contradicts American wishes. And as the secretary of state has said, it’s not consistent with American policy. So it’s a balancing act that both sides have to do.

Now, let’s switch for a minute to the Gaza withdrawal, which is supposed to take place in July. Do you foresee that there is going to be a real time of trouble this summer?

I think it could be, and clearly, how the Gaza withdrawal goes- and that’s between the Israeli government and the settlers; it has very little to do with the Palestinians- will be an indication of whether Israel will be able to move forward on evacuating the West Bank and, in particular, the more or less 30 percent of the settler population in parts of the West Bank that will be returned to Palestinians.

If the settlers confront the Israeli army and there is violence, it’s going to be extremely destructive to the peace process and to the Israeli internal political dynamic, which is incredibly fragile. You know, for [Palestinian President] Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] and Sharon, their problem is not each other. Their problem is that each of them is confronted with a very contentious and difficult job of political management in their domestic constituencies. That is true more in the near term than possibly in the long term, because of the Gaza withdrawal and because of the several elections that the Palestinians will be having in the next three months.

How significant is it that, following the Bush-Sharon meeting, Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Ala [Ahmed Qureia] was critical of Bush for not being tough enough on the settlement issue?

Well, again, that’s the Palestinian prime minister speaking to a domestic constituency, because settlement activities since 1967 have always been seen by the Palestinians, the Arabs, and actually, most of the rest of the world, as a symbol of Israel’s ultimate intentions about the land. And when we get down to the basics, this is a dispute of two peoples about land. But I would point out that it was the prime minister who made the criticism and not the president- and that is very important.

Now, Abu Mazen is coming to Washington next month to meet with President Bush. What political problems does he face?

In order to succeed, he has to deliver. And that means he has to improve the daily life of Palestinians, a huge majority of whom are unemployed, and a huge number of whom are actually hungry. Israel’s checkpoints in Palestinian territories have become a major issue because commerce, family life, and daily life cannot take on the appearance of normality as long as Israel maintains as many checkpoints as it has in the towns and on the edge of the towns.

The second problem is that he needs money. From the United States, he has gotten a pledge of $350 million or more, but it’s all very complicated. It’ll take ages, it’ll go to American companies and U.S. aid agencies, and so it does not amount to immediate relief. There is some funding coming from the Arabs, but not enough, because Abu Mazen needs to find ways to create work for many people. The Palestinians need money to pay people for such jobs as painting schools, cleaning streets, building roads, whatever it is, but getting some money in the hands of the huge number of unemployed males.

The third equally important problem is the political problem, because Hamas has been brought into the political tent and has always wanted to become a political factor in Palestinian life. There are three elections coming up. First, the municipal elections, and if Hamas wins these, it’s not terribly serious because maybe they can deliver services in the towns, maybe they can’t. But the legislative elections in July are absolutely critical, because the Palestinian Legislative Council [the parliamentary body of the Palestinian Authority] is a real thing; it’s maybe the most important institution the Palestinians have that is very solid. It’s extremely important that Hamas not win this election, though it will certainly be represented. The third election is for the seats on the Fatah executive committee, within Abu Mazen’s own party. Fatah is corrupt, disorganized, undisciplined, and is a remnant of [former Palestinian Authority President Yasir] Arafat’s poor governance. Abu Mazen has to take control of his own party, and unfortunately, that opportunity comes after the two other elections, municipal and legislative. His domestic political management problem is monumental, as is Sharon’s.

And the coincidence and timing are terrible. The withdrawal from Gaza comes at the same time as the Palestinian legislative elections, doesn’t it?

It is a coincidence. The timing is just awful because the Gaza withdrawal puts Sharon in a very, very delicate situation domestically in July. The Palestinians, between now and July, have municipal elections, need to deliver economic benefits, and have legislative elections in July. So this coincidence of timing is creating tremendous, tremendous strains.

Let’s talk a bit more about the Israeli internal political scene. Sharon, I guess, is going to go home from Texas and say that he and President Bush got along very well and that he got big presidential support. Some members of the Israeli press will deny this, while others will agree with him. I guess it becomes a washout in a way, doesn’t it?

Well, I think that [Bush and Sharon] have correct relations, and we are allies so, you know, it’s always going to be positive between allies. And I think they probably talked about how Sharon has to push for the housing for Male Adumim [for domestic political reasons] and Bush said, “Well, I’ve got to push for no settlement activity.” I think they probably understand each other’s requirements on that issue.

Do you think Bush really has a strong feeling against settlements, or has he been persuaded by Condi Rice that the Arabs and Europeans need to see some sign from the United States on this question?

Well, I think it’s probably been well-explained to him, and I don’t see any light between him and Condi. I think what she wants to do, she can do; what he wants to do, she’ll work with him to do, and so on. I think that’s the kind of relationship they have. But I think the president understands that settlements are the key issue, and that he, the president of the United States, cannot reach his stated goal of a two-state solution, Israel and Palestine, both democratic and both with contiguous areas, if settlements continue.

What should happen next?

I believe that between now and July, all the steps we’ve talked about are good for confidence-building, make daily life better, and decrease violence. But that’s not the real game. If Bush wants to achieve his goal [of a two-state solution], the United States has an obligation to start a second track between now and the end of the summer toward final-status negotiations.

The way to do that is for the United States to prepare a document that reflects everything they’ve negotiated in the past, introduces American ideas, and is simply a working paper that is published in the press that will be supported by the Quartet [the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations] and the Arabs. It should be given to both sides as, “This is the American idea of what we think you’ve been talking about [in terms of the shape of a final settlement]. We’ve also introduced some of our own ideas. Take a look, see what you like and what you don’t like, and let’s talk about it.”

The talks should be between the Americans and the Palestinians, and between the Americans and the Israelis, before they [the Palestinians and the Israelis] get together. They’ll scream and yell, say it’s being imposed, but they will look at the document and read some things, accept some things, and then you have the beginning of a treaty. As you well remember during Kissinger’s time, he never gave either side a map or a piece of paper from the other side- he re-typed them on his plane as he shuttled between them and had cartographers re-do the maps. [Secretary of State Henry Kissinger worked out two partial agreements between Egypt and Israel in 1974-75, and between Israel and Syria in 1974].

Because they cannot make concessions to each other, the two sides are very much alike. They both have the perception that their very existence, survival, and identity are at stake, and that it’s giving in to make concessions to each other. But they can play the game of making concessions to the United States, provided the United States drafts the document.

If Bush or his administration puts forth a plan, will you need someone like Condi Rice to go back and forth like Kissinger did to see what he or she can get from either side?

Yes, eventually there will have to be a designated person who’s going to do the tough love, the reassuring, the promises, the “I’m making you an offer you can’t refuse.” But a working document prepared by the United States- supported by the Quartet, the whole world, and the Arabs- is very important because all the polls indicate that Israelis and Palestinians, even in the bloodiest days of the intifada, were 60 to 75 percent in favor of what we know of as the past effort at an overall accord, in the waning days of the Clinton administration in 2001. Now the polling has risen to over 80 percent. So what is very important is that there is a Palestinian and Israeli constituency for reconciliation, even if the leaders can’t get there by themselves.

At the moment it seems as if Sharon is saying, “We’ll pull out of Gaza, but as far as future negotiations go, that depends on the Palestinians eliminating all terrorism.” That’s like leaving negotiations to the terrorists.

The world isn’t going to leave him alone to maintain control over the West Bank if the Gaza withdrawal goes well and Israel continues to occupy the West Bank. I think Sharon means what he says, but I think after the Gaza withdrawal, it’ll be inevitable and obvious that the next step has to be taken. As you know, he has real problems aside from having a right wing that he needs to appease. He has the settlers and a weak coalition government. Israeli society is now what I call “a tribal society.” Five groups, each representing 20 percent of the electorate: secular Ashkenazis, most of whom support the Labor Party; Ashkenazi religious parties; Sephardic Jews; Israeli Arabs; and Russians. It’s an ironic moment in history for them to be each about one-fifth of the Israeli electorate. There is no dialogue, no tolerance, and no understanding about a formula for coexistence between them.