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Council on Foreign Relations
New York, N.Y.

HENRY SIEGMAN: Good morning. It is my privilege to preside at this morning’s session, but before I do my presiding, I need to remind you to turn off your cell phones, BlackBerries, and all of these wonderful mechanical things, most of which I am not familiar with, but please turn them off. And I also would like to inform you that this meeting is going to be on the record, which I think is particularly appropriate given the subject this morning about greater personal freedom and democracy in the Middle East. So this is dramatic evidence that there is some change taking place in the region, and that of course is the subject of our conversations this morning.

Our speakers are Abdel Monem Said Aly, who is the director of the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, who is director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. Both, I think, are known to all of you; both play a very important prominent role in their countries, in the region, and in their countries and regional relationships with the U.S. They appear often on their own countries’ television programs—are quoted regularly. They comment on both domestic and international events as they appear and they also are turned to by the American media regularly for their analysis and assessments of what’s happening in the region.

Both also happen to have long relationships with the Council and have been involved with projects that we have worked on jointly. Most Council members know that Khalil Shikaki has for some years now worked with us on the independent Task Force for the strengthening of Palestinian institutions, a subject of course very much related to our theme this morning. And most recently, there has emerged in the region a very interesting, a very promising new project. A consortium of the leading think tanks—Arab think tanks in Arab countries, who are joining with a number of leading European and American think tanks who are acting in a supporting role in order to focus directly on these issues of democracy, reform, change in the Middle East. And I mentioned that you first, again because that has a bearing on the subject we are discussing this morning, but also because the first chair of this new consortium is Dr. Abdel Monem, who heads the secretariat that has been established and headquarters there in Cairo.

So with these brief introductions, let me note that there is a certain timeliness to our discussion this morning, an unexpected timeliness because of the coincidence of the issuance of the third—I think it is the third—Arab Human Development report by the United Nation’s Development Program. It’s a report that from the very beginning, the first—first one that was issued in, I believe, 2002, has attracted wide attention, a great deal of praise certainly in the international community. In the United States, President Bush has referred to it in a very positive way time and again. And the third version, the third phase of this report deals with the most sensitive and important issues of governance, of political reform, of democratization.

And I would like to turn to both of you and ask you to the extent that you can bring in some of the conclusions of this report, but mostly to get your own assessment, your own analysis, to comment on what you see the state of the game at this point. There is a general sense that there are important changes happening in the Arab world today: in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia, in Morocco, and so on. There are some people who point to these changes as auguries of a genuine transformation of a whole new phase in the life of these countries and of the regions. And there are others who say that that is a highly exaggerated assessment; that in fact, in many if not most situations these changes are measures taken by existing reviews in order to shore up or to avoid a weakening of the control they have in their various civil societies.

So let me turn to you and ask you for your general review of the situation today.

ABDEL MONEM SAID ALY: Let me thank you twice. First for inviting me and second for your efforts with [inaudible], which I think it is at this moment much more important than in times before.

Let me explain an answer to your question on the following way: You have to start by looking at Arab countries in particular as living organisms and, you know, if people say you can just—you have bloody governments and then people who reveal these governments and we look for the time we find the people in the streets carrying flags changing regimes, it’s much more than that. I mean, these are societies that—with historical background [inaudible], and it was suffering and sometimes living through a process of change that’s slow sometimes, a bit accelerated sometimes.

That is the starting point. If you look at it this way, then you start looking at what’s new and what is—you know, really will work again [inaudible]. We have three realities that’s new in the region right now. No. 1, we have a change in American policy. I mean the change of American policy in dealing with the region to promote democratization and the top priority is a reality that has to be recalculated within the region itself. There are states using [inaudible] democracy, sometimes as an advice in certain countries. Other countries through political [inaudible] and attached to certain issue like the presence in Lebanon by Syria or working with nuclear issues like in Iran. So American factor is—and Western factor, particularly the EU [European Union] factor, is clearly—[inaudible].

[Inaudible] there are two other internal and important reality. No. 1 is, you know, the growing consensus about democracy. I mean, that no political forces from the right or the left is not talking about democracy today. Traditionally, you know, Marxists on the left consider democracy is just a product of dictatorship or the bourgeoisie or capitalism or whatever. And religious groups will look at an Islamic form of government in which you reinstate the historical reality of the caliphate or something like that. That’s not said anymore. Everybody is using the vocabulary of democracy, elections, balance of the executive and legislative political institutions, and so forth. So there is a growing consensus about the vocabulary of political life.

No. 3 factor is that within the most of the voting [inaudible] in the region, there is a genuine rift I will say between those who think that, you know, what’s going on is not sufficient anymore and got to change and change dramatically not only through [inaudible], but also through some [inaudible] and that’s, you know, in a way in a struggle, but that’s a very important factor.

Having this on one side, you have to look at it on the other side as well, and which it will tell you, A, despite the unification of the vocabulary over democracy, beneath it there is competing paradigms about the final goal of political life. You have democrats, of course [inaudible] want freedom of choice for individual, but bureaucrats—and there is a sizable bureaucrats—Egypt got seven million on the government payroll. I mean, that’s one third of the labor force. Most of the Gulf countries got large bureaucracies because that’s where they put their nationals in terms of employment. And the idol of those guys are the state. Then you have the theocrats and those who still want salvation, but salvation through political power, even democratic process. So there is a competing—genuine competing paradigm between all these forces.

No. 2, you have the political demand—the level of political demand, you see. I mean, if you just, you know, look at the demonstrations in Cairo or the demonstrations you find in Lebanon, you will find they are basically [inaudible] based on professions, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], and students. You won’t find massive labor movements, for instance, going out for that, or peasant movements or—in fact, all these—the majority are taking the bystander looking at what’s happening. And we are not yet; so how much what’s happening is sustainable when you look at the [inaudible] demonstrations for instance in Egypt, or you find the opposition in Lebanon vis-a-vis the other political forces and other social—

SIEGMAN: But let me interrupt at this point in order to bring Khalil into the discussion. You referred to the demonstrations in Egypt, which is a new phenomenon although very small numbers of people, I gather, are involved. But some people will say that—are saying that the fact that the Egyptian government—and I don’t want to speak only about Egypt at this point, but we will get to that in a moment—to individual countries: Egypt, Palestine. But critics have said that these phenomena point to a liberalization by various governments, but it does not amount to a sharing of political power. It does not amount to any fundamental change. How do you assess that?

KHALIL SHIKAKI: That is indeed one of the main conclusions of the current development report that—

SIEGMAN: Exactly.

SHIKAKI:—whatever is happening is too little and surely does not affect the competition—political competition in these societies, but there is a significant change in this regard in terms of liberalization is needed. It would allow for greater participation, particularly for women. But the report also is not optimistic; is not optimistic about the ability of the societies themselves, about the regimes themselves, and is not optimistic about the role of the outsiders including United States. Although the report says the U.S. role is positive—indirectly it says that, though. It doesn’t really say it directly—it directly says U.S. role is highly negative and it is this point that I think it is that I want to say a few words about, because I think it sets sort of—for at the moment, U.S. role sets the limits for how much outsider intervention can help or hurt.

Since 9/11, the U.S. policy has changed in significant ways. In one area, it hasn’t changed: it has been and always has been and continue for some time to be pro-Israel. Now, is this relevant? It’s very relevant to democratic forces. Democratic forces does not want to be associated with the United States because of this fundamental point of departure, because the U.S. is perceived as for Israel and not as evenhanded. Every time the U.S. says anything about democracy, it is seen as hypocritical and it is seen from this prism of Israel. The changes, however, were even as devastating, I think. On the one hand, the U.S. has abandoned its previous policy of allowing regional balancing to maintain the stability in the region. The U.S. now is directly, militarily intervening and this, too, is making—and that’s why the report focuses on Iraq and the impact of Iraq—the perception of what’s happening in Iraq on the ability of democrats to be able to mobilize public support.

The U.S. has decided that it will fight terrorism, defining every Islamic group—all the Islamists as part of this terrorism network. In the Palestinian case, for example, Hamas is seen—which has the support of almost one third of population—is seen as a legitimate political action. Yes, it uses violence and terrorism, which many Palestinians agree with or disagree with, but when the United States puts all these groups—lump them all together as terrorist organizations, it in fact pushes them into the arms of [al Qaeda leader Osama] bin Laden and makes the process of democratic transformation for us even more difficult because, if we are not able to integrate Hamas into our political process, how do we bring about democracy? Because if the United States is going to say Hamas is a terrorist organization—although I do recognize there has been changes in the U.S. policy. I remember more than a year—a year and 14 months ago, when I was in Washington talking to people in that administration about the need for Palestinian elections, they used to raise two issues: Hamas and [former Palestinian leader Yasir] Arafat. They have gradually abandoned this demand that Hamas should not be integrated and in fact we’re now seeing the U.S. saying [inaudible] there are other ways, which is a positive development but for—since 9/11 until only recently this has been a very serious impediment for these—for the democrats to find ways in which they can open up their political system.

And the third one has to do with democracy itself: the way they approach the question of democracy. Instead of saying democracy is good for these people because they are entitled to it, it said democracy is good for these people because without it, the U.S. will be hurt because—of course, this is—it’s taken for granted that one seeks one’s own self interest, but when the [inaudible] 9/11 was caused by problems within these societies. It has nothing to do with U.S. foreign policy. It made the transformation of these societies to a more democratic political system as helping serve U.S. interests. How could democrats be willing to share this without opening themselves to criticism from their own societies?

SIEGMAN: Have you anything to add?

ALY: The manifesto that you’re finding in Egypt is three-quarters of it how democracy is very important for Egypt, because it would make it more capable of fighting the United States. I mean, that’s—whether you say that is going to make a distance from the United States or you say it because it is genuine—that’s not the point here. The point here [is] that how in a complex way the role of the United States is playing here.

SHIKAKI: And it raises—just one half a minute—it raises the question about whether the U.S. is really committed to a democratic process or a certain political outcome. When that—again, a year ago when I talked in Washington about the need for Palestinian elections, Washington should know. Why not? Isn’t that good for democracy? [Inaudible] said maybe it’s good for democracy, but it’s bad for U.S. and Israeli interests because this will [inaudible], so it was only—the U.S. will support elections in the Palestinian case only if didn’t hurt American and Israeli interests in that specific case, which means that the commitment of United States to the process of reform and democratization is not necessarily being accepted as a genuine commitment.

SIEGMAN: And yet despite this criticism, I find increasingly a willingness of even those who are the most vocal critics of the U.S. approach to this problem—I find a willingness on their part to concede that without outside intervention, without pressure from the international community and from the United States, and as you pointed out even this latest U.N. report concedes this point—there is a little hope for a constructive transformation of the region. So apparently, despite of this negative U.S. policy is about—what is real motives are in pursuing the reform and democracy agenda, there is also recognition that they are dependant on, to a large extent, on this kind of outside role.

ALY: I just want to make a correction first. You said earlier that demonstration is new to the region. [Inaudible] 1968. You know, I remember that. That was demonstration [inaudible] for different types of causes. So the idea that people go to the street to ask for something was always there.

However, I want to stress something that—you know, American role is there. We are here a part of international relations. We have [a] superpower reacting and dealing with the region. And the word I use has got to be calculated from all the parties and try to use it in different ways. And certainly, in one of them, it is calculated as improvement of a certain party in the Middle East with the United States or worsening of the relationship will depend on how to deal with that particular issue. But you have other ramifications, so it is a complex process with pros and cons. I won’t take it in just the way that role is making that change. It’s not alone, No. 1. No. 2, it has negative side; sometimes counterproductive, which will tell us that what the United States should do to tailor its policies regarding democratization in the region, whether it is through the particular path that it is going through right now or through certain amendments or changes.

SIEGMAN: Well let’s apply this now to more specific cases, of course Egypt—the situation in Egypt and the situation in Palestine is one at the moment we are to be focusing on. What—how would you asses the prospects for democratization and for institutional reforms under the most recent circumstances, the leadership, the election and leadership of [Palestinian Authority President] Abu Mazen [also known as Mahmoud Abbas]; an election, incidentally, that is widely seen as fair and democratic. Where is this likely to go?

SHIKAKI: First, we started working together in 1998 on strengthening Palestinian public institutions. I do not believe that things have been as promising as they are now. There should be no doubt.

SIEGMAN: As a result of our work, right? [Laughter]

SHIKAKI: And Abdel’s work. [Laughter] I think that [laughter]. [Inaudible] Well, look, even when we started in 1998, we recognized then that we are doing all of this for the post—

SIEGMAN: Right.

SHIKAKI:—Arafat; that we will not be able to make any significant progress as long as Arafat controlled the Palestinian political system the way he did. So I will say there is absolutely no doubt that the last six months have been significant in many ways, but of course it wasn’t just Arafat. It was, for example, Washington’s view of Arafat. Washington said no democracy for the Palestinians, no elections, until Arafat dies. That was indirectly what Washington was telling us. And when Arafat died, we had elections and these elections created a new Palestinian leadership.

As it happens, this Palestinian leadership is one that is opening doors for political reform and democratization that are extremely promising. Because it is Abu Mazen who is perceived by the young guard among the—within the Palestinian nationalist movement, that he is seen as a transitional figure the young guards are embracing him. The old guards are also embracing him. They’re the ones who selected him and made him a chairman of this PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization] executive committee and this is the highly critical, because if you look at the Palestinian political structure today, the balance of power, you have the Islamists with almost one third and you have the young guards who are fighting—within the nationalist movement who are fighting the old guard. Now, failure of the nationalists to deal with the old guard could have devastating consequences for the future of liberal democracy in Palestine because it would indeed empower the Islamists.

Now, the Islamists need to be integrated, but the nationalists by the election of Mahmoud Abbas, I think are opening doors for themselves to be able to deal with their fragmentation, to deal with the leadership succession question in such a way as to avoid a lot of the potential negative consequences.

SIEGMAN: But as we see—as we sit here and speak, some of these old internal differences impeding, this hopeful scenario between [Palestinian Prime Minister] Abu Alla [also known as Ahmed Qurei] and Abu Mazen, and specifically on the issue of reforms.

SHIKAKI: Absolutely. The differences within the old guard are going [inaudible]. Abu Mazen has made a shift. During the last couple of weeks he has shifted—he has thrown his weight with the young guard. The minute he did that, he angered a lot of the old guard. Many in the security services, in fact most of [inaudible] around the security services were unhappy with this and most of the members of [inaudible] committee this is [inaudible] heart of the old guard are unhappy, including Abu Alla, who is of course very fearful that if Abu Mazen becomes the [inaudible] of the young guard, all the old guard will be thrown out—thrown out very soon in the July elections.

There are—the emotions [inaudible] is that the minute Abu Mazen thrown his weight with the young guard a lot of things have happened. Security-sector reform are only now possible when he decided to do this. [Inaudible] democratization would in fact now happen only because Abu Mazen has [inaudible] has taken a courageous step and decided that even though he has a lot of concerns about the old guard conspiring behind his back he is going to side with the young guard.

The movement that we are seeing now, whether it’s in security—there is absolutely no doubt that the security situation as such between Palestinians and Israelis is extremely important, because without the ceasefire in place, the ability of Abu Mazen to deal in any effective way with law and order would not have existed now. Why is this important? I can tell you why it’s important from my personal experience. But essentially it says, the intimidation would be reduced because of law and order and the ability or the tolerance of society to defend will also be strengthened.

With these two developments, we will see a much larger space for public debate, disagreement, which is extremely critical in a place where [inaudible] just come and go very, very frequently. With these changes, I think the Palestinians’ case is one that is going to benefit greatly from the process that is happening elsewhere in the Arab world, which will I believe help embolden Palestinians even more to demand more. And I think we’ll have also highly positive consequences of the region as well, whether it’s in Egypt or Lebanon or elsewhere.

SIEGMAN: I wish we have the time to pursue the question, but we don’t. But I still want to go back to the Egyptian situation for one last comment before we open the floor to discussion. But the question of how the peace process, or what I think could more accurately be called the continuing absence of any kind of a peace process—how this is likely to affect even the most transitive scenario regarding the reform issues. But that’s the [inaudible], unless you have a one-sentence comment you’d like to make.

SHIKAKI: I can make one sentence. If the peace process does not move forward, it is so far the fact that the ceasefire has helped tremendously, but if we don’t move forward, the benefactor of all of this is going to be Hamas. And if Hamas wins sufficient votes in the next elections, our ability to continue to pursue liberal democratic reforms in Palestine will be ended.

SIEGMAN: One last exchange—

ALY: One sentence.

SIEGMAN: [Inaudible] you can put in semicolons. The election—the announcement that this time there will be a direct election—the announcement by [Egyptian] President [Hosni] Mubarak that other candidates can run [in the September presidential election]. How significant a change is this? What kinds of—given the fact that the ruling party really controls all of the mechanism that must approve candidates, that must approve election rules and so on, what needs to happen by way of elaboration of this very general principle to make this a meaningful change?

ALY: Well, the step that was taken if you measure it for its own [inaudible], it’s not much. There is a balance between, you know, the central power and the rest of—and the political system [is] totally in favor of the central power and the president in particular. However on the other hand, this little step is reviewing and putting into the process, and [a] few things will open the gate for tremendous change in Egypt. No. 1, is [inaudible] a big taboo in Egypt called the constitution into question. You know, starting—Egypt has all the elements of a mature country: a parliament, parties, syndicates, elections, and all that, but none is working properly because the balance [inaudible] constitution is really not right. So revising the constitution is a big step forward.

No. 2, the new step will end forever that Egypt [has] got [to] have a military guy. I mean, it’s now open for every [inaudible]. No. 3, already the process has started. You know, the central power is saying we want an election committee that will be headed—started by this position—by the speaker of parliament, which belongs to the ruling party. However, that proposition was shut down immediately because the dynamics in the country are changing. So if you look at it itself, you see it’s small; however, if we look at the repercussions of it, it’s quite large. And it is—you know, to get back to our Arab research initiative, each country, although you have a need to democracy in most Arab countries or all of them, you need tailored solutions to the specifics of each country, I think. And for the many years I have been calling for constitutional change and that as the core beginning, and in the Egyptian particular case. So, I think it is a positive step and watch out what will come out after, not in terms of actual changes as much how the dynamics of the political process is changing in the country.

SIEGMAN: OK. We now invite your questions and comments, and I remind you to wait for the mike and to identify yourself, and that what you say is for the record. Yes?

QUESTIONER: Thank you. I’m Dennis Jett, University of Florida. I guess I am always struck by discussion of a new American policy in favor of democracy, since it’s news to me that all previous presidents of United States opposed democracy. Therefore, I would like to ask who thinks that the newfound policy in favor of democracy will survive its first collision with reality. Whether when U.S. interests—other U.S. interests come into play, whether democracy will sink to secondary priority.

SIEGMAN: Either of you?

SHIKAKI: I share your concern about the sustainability of U.S. interest in Arab democracy. I—as long as Washington, however, makes—keeps this interesting link in its own mindset that terrorism and lack of democracy go together, then I think we will continue to see Washington’s interest in it, but we’ll also see a certain interest and certain outcomes of that democratic process. I—while I certainly consider this a problem, nonetheless, as Henry said, I still think it is a good thing because Washington is not going to be able to control those dynamics.

Once the dynamics are under way, the problem of our old society’s ability to generate demand and aggregate it and confront their leaders with it is very, very limited. Civil society is very weak and the question at the oppression of the state is very effective and strong. We need outside intervention to shake that [a] little bit; the more we can get that, the better for us in terms of our ability to move things forward even though Washington is going [to] come with tremendous other problems. We need to deal with these additional problems that Washington come to us with and hope that we will influence the direction of U.S. approach, but nonetheless, I still think that it’s essential to have Washington committed, even though we know that is probably not sustainable.

QUESTIONER: [Inaudible] Is it possible to summarize what the expectations are for most politically active Palestinians in terms of what a democracy would be that they are striving for? One here is that they say, well, we want Israeli democracy without the Israelis, which means dozens of splinter parties bargaining and canceling things out. Then they have a Lebanese neighbor with divisions along religious and sort of tribal lines, et cetera. There are not too many other examples nearby, and I wonder if these are impressive to them or whether they have a Swedish theory or something. What did they think they are striving for?

SHIKAKI: Swedish theory is not bad.

SIEGMAN: Did you want—oh [inaudible] to bring you in too.

ALY: I believe very much that the Palestinians will make their own cases. I don’t want to talk instead of Khalil on this, but the experience that we know in the region that each society has a different degree of maturation. The Palestinians are much more homogenous than the Lebanese and they don’t have major tribal divisions or even [inaudible] like Israeli society. So I think we will come up as maturation on very experienced throughout their nationalist struggle in which [inaudible] have a multiplicity of group that—the one thing that we share with the rest of the Arab world will be that kind of list that Islamic [inaudible], in which you have the list of the political community is playing back and forth. I think that they will share with the rest of the Arab societies, but in a more secular, I believe, flavor than the rest.

SHIKAKI: Well, we really don’t know in what direction things will go. We are—for the last year, we have been working with whom we think are likely to be the new leaders in the next couple of decades in Palestinian politics and that is the young guard nationalists. We have been doing a lot of survey research among them, meeting with them, and basically focusing on the top 500 leaders of the young guard. And just recently we have—our last survey among the top 500, asked them a question. The question was, “What kind of political system do you intend to put in place once you displace the old guard?” And we gave them different types: the Syrian/Iraqi kind of nationalist regimes, the Iranian kind of Islamist system with one party, the—and several others, but one that also included—that the options included one that is similar to the one in Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, where different side of kinds of factions are coming from different backgrounds [to] compete for power. Among the 500 top nationalists, 90 percent chose this system—the one that is similar to Israel’s, Lebanon’s, and Turkey. That, of course, is—this is not a kind of the Swedish system, but it’s a—I think it’s an indication that what they have in mind is a highly liberal kind of political system.

QUESTIONER: Bob Lifton. Let me turn our attention to Egypt, and a couple of questions that are related. First of all, should we be concerned in America from America’s interest if Hosni Mubarak was out of power and some other group came in, you know, what kind of group might come in? So should [the United States] be re-concerned? Secondly, do you see that the democratization process that you point out in Egypt will start after Mubarak’s reign, or is it possible that during the time that he still wants to continue in office that democratization will move him out? And, finally, if it does take after his reign, is [President Hosni Mubarak’s son] Gamal Mubarak going to be an automatic replacement for him, or are there other people who will be on the scene?

ALY: The last one is the easiest one. I [inaudible] that Gamal Mubarak will never be the president of Egypt. That’s No. 1.

SIEGMAN: Does he know? [Laughter]

ALY: No. 2, regarding democratization in Egypt, again Egypt has a process of democratization that is going now for 20 years. It was slow, but the country in terms of two things in both ones. No. 1, the ability of people to affect the making of laws, which is an important condition for any democratization process. No. 2, is increasing an expansion of the public space through the growth of the civil society, the growth of independent and privately owned media from television to broadcasting, the diversification in the level of political parties, although still the government party is still controlling the process.

So the public space under Mubarak will continue to—however, after Mubarak one important thing will happen which is started right now, is relating to the Egyptian constitution, and I think it is very fundamental. How we will look at this in the next couple of years, because here there is no consensus in Egypt over, do we want to amend the constitution or do you want to change the constitution? Amending the constitution is two schools: one who wants to change one or two or three at the maximum articles related basically to how we elect the president and to how many terms and how it will affect his powers. But there are others who want to go into a deep amendment that take at least the discussions of 35 articles; that goes more into the balance between the executive and the legislative.

There is a third school, which I belong [to], that we need a whole new constitution and that needs revision of a few balances that the Egyptian society is not daring yet to discuss: the relationship between state and religion; the relationship between the president or the head of the country and the rest of the political system; the balance between the executive and the legislative; between the center of power and the rest of the country. How much of the constitution will be policy-oriented or just a mechanism of dealings between the ruler and ruled?

All these are basic questions, yet still most of the political forces try to avoid them. People like me in the minority are trying to bring them to the fore. So we have already a very vibrant discussion taking place in the country. So it will make changes in the next few years, if President Mubarak is continuing and in his coming term if he wants, and in all cases, if he is not [inaudible], it will continue. It will be orderly.

You know, I hope that everything will stay that the president will continue in good health at least until we define how the specifics of the constitution regarding the process of succession. As I said, succession now after the amendments will be approved in May is—will be open. There won’t be a necessity to have somebody from the army. Gamal Mubarak will not be any at least Syrian style kind of over succession, although I always said that it would not happen. But at least if it happens at all, it will be on an Indian, [former Indian Prime Minister] Rajiv Gandhi style, not a [Syrian President] Bashar Assad style. But I will exclude it because there are—the whole rules of the game will be changing.

SIEGMAN: Ted?

QUESTIONER: I’m Ted Sorensen [inaudible]. In this country, in our politics, sometimes there will be a problem or an issue where it is said that the parties, or at least one of them, don’t really want to solve it. It’s too useful as a political stick with which to beat the opposition or to arouse the faithful or whatever. Social-Security financing may be one of those problems. In any event, it’s been often said that in most of the Arab states they don’t really want to solve the question of the Palestinians, and particularly the right of return as demonstrated by their inaction on refugees, and that therefore, they like keeping the issue alive as a way of arousing the street or whatever. Is that changing now in this era of change in the Arab world? Can we hope that there will be support among the Arab states for a just solution to the Palestinian right of return and Palestinian problem in general?

SIEGMAN: Khalil?

SHIKAKI: I don’t think that we will see movement on the refugees without movement on other issues of the conflict. I don’t think the Arab countries feel that they have sufficient legitimacy—the Arab leaders—that they have sufficient legitimacy to deal with the controversial issue—very, very sensitive controversial issue like the refugees without the issues of the peace process—the other issues of peace process are addressed and that the Palestinians would start this process and that they would give it legitimacy. I think the Arab governments you have in mind are ones that feel their own weaknesses and that they feel that if they really act on that front that this will even weaken further their own legitimacy. And that—and that’s why democracy is good for the peace process because if these leaders feel that they have the legitimacy and that they have public empowerment, then perhaps they will not be as reluctant to deal with controversial issues, even though—some like those—like the ones with regard to refugees.

ALY: I would like to add something. The characterization here in the United States of the Arab-Israeli thing is used by the leader to—it is a—it belongs to the past and certain regimes like of Saddam Hussein and [Libyan leader Muammar] Qaddafi in certain times, but most Arab countries is not the case anymore. Arab countries recognize Israel. Arab countries are making a deal with Israelis, withdrawal for normalization. Already there are peace treaties. There is—and the situation in the Middle East changes dramatically from this picture that belongs actually to the ‘60s.

And the fact that dealing with the conflict was the refugees, Jerusalem piece by piece, is not convincing to the Arab countries, neither the people, nor the rulers. It is a package deal in which the refugee issues will be included. I don’t think anybody in their right mind would think that the refugees will go into Israel, but they understand that will be a part of package deal that [will] settle all things related to borders, to Jerusalem, to the Palestinian state. So unless we discuss the package as a whole dealing with its parts, usually, as Khalil said, leaders will shy away, because they don’t want to be looked at as giving concessions without any return.

SIEGMAN: Well, I think that [is] an interesting example of the change that has occurred that you are—that you just pointed to was the fact that it was Saudi Arabia of all countries that took the initiative in proposing the normalization of relations between the Arab world—itself and the rest of the Arab world with Israel. No one would have imagined that it is the Saudi Kingdom [that] would take the initiative and specifically use language for the refugee formula that left lots of room for compromise short of refugees coming back into Israel. So I think that that event—that particular initiative could only have happened in a broader context where the issue is not—no longer being used in the Arab world as there has been before that. Yes?

QUESTIONER: [Inaudible] Coming back to Egypt, what role will the Muslim League or its various incarnations be allowed to play legitimately? And secondly, usually democratic revolutions take place when regime—[the] oppressive regime is weak, and what are the chances of revolution sweeping Egypt long before your constitutional changes and various institutions can be developed?

ALY: Well, Egypt is not a revolutionary country. You know, we don’t have much revolution in our history. Probably Egypt is the only country in the world that never witnesses the civil war. I don’t know that’s good or bad; people say it’s bad. But—so the possibility of revolution, I don’t see it, because the political community in Egypt is much stronger than what people think outside. Again, the model of the [former Romanian communist leader Nicolae] Ceausescu and the masses does not apply.

There is a lot of room for political participation, and so I don’t think a revolutionary approach is in place. Nobody wants it. I don’t see in the record of any of the opposition, including the [Islamist group] Muslim Brothers and—so the Muslim Brothers here, that’s part of the current debate. If we change the constitution, then we will have to face this one, because in all Egyptian constitutions since 1923, which is the birth of the Egyptian Republic, Islam was the religion of the state. I mean, that was the part of all constitutions, so in opinion of myself, if we have that in the constitution, we should not have religious political parties at all. I mean, that would be something out of the question unless these religious political parties put themselves into some sort of civic and civilian outfit, or if we are going to allow that will happen and be like Turkey or understanding the Islamists, Israel will be like Christian democrats somewhere that in this case we shouldn’t put Islam as a religion of the state in the constitution and that’s part of the debate.

If it’s going to be amendments, I don’t think that the status of the Muslim Brothers will change. That is our solution to that. I mean, there is already some groups got out of the Muslim Brothers and started to make like the [inaudible] Party, for instance making a kind of a civilian party, if you might say. So that will be one way out, but in the immediate future and if the majority continues on the side of only amending the constitution, then I think status will—the status will continue to be the same.

SIEGMAN: Can I ask you, before we move on to some further questions, what significance you attach to the elections, limited as they are, in Saudi Arabia since we mentioned Saudi Arabia? A brief comment from both of you on that.

ALY: Well. [Laughter] If you measure it with the history of Saudi Arabia, I think it is an important—I mean, that’s a country [that] never, never in its history knew an election, even the process of having a ballot box [inaudible] and going there. So it is—at least in terms these things happened in Egypt back in the 19th century for instance. However, also it’s extremely limited, and I will take it as a positive step as much as I see how much linked to another program that tells me that this kind of local elections will be [inaudible] you know, are related to a regional election, related to some sort of a national elections.

Certainly, many of their conditions that are brought into the process are extremely silly. I mean, to have on the very local level half of people elected and another half is selected, that’s not the exercise that I will count on in terms of educating the public. I will need to have more on terms of a political program for reform than this step to be more optimistic than I am.

SIEGMAN: Is that likely to happen—a broadening of this very limited process?

SHIKAKI: I doubt it. I really—

SIEGMAN: You doubt it?

SHIKAKI: Yes, I think that it’s—I see why some will see the elections as [inaudible] as the start of something, but I think for the most part, it is seen, and I think it is, a very cosmetic step and I think it hurts the chances for further democratization, because it sends a numbing signal and it makes people very suspicious of and very cynical about the whole process of reform. If this is reform, the public is going to—if this is reform, they must be joking. So the credibility is all [inaudible] process would be negatively affected if we were to really take this as a serious political reform.

SIEGMAN: Malcolm? Wait for the—

QUESTIONER: Khalil, this is a question for you. I’m [inaudible]. The question is related to the democracy in Palestine and why all the time when we talk about applying democracy that the rule of majority is going to come over and Hamas is going to win? Isn’t there certain limits to the rule of majority versus the right of minority? Freedom of the speech, rights of women—why don’t you elaborate a little bit about what is in the agenda of Abu Mazen in terms of constitutional changes to bring the whole society away from what is flashing all over the Middle East—that, when democracy is going to come, the religious leaders they are going to take over, which is not true.

SHIKAKI: First of all, if I said that the Islamists will win, then I am—I apologize. I certainly don’t think the Islamists will win; not in the short term. Islamists will do very well if we fail to address the concerns of the public. The Palestinian public is highly traditional and is not fundamentalist in any way, shape, or form, and is not Islamist in any way, shape, or form. Hamas gains strength not because of its Islamist ideology, but because of its fight against occupation. This is where [the] power of Hamas comes. But recently, Hamas has been empowered even further because it is able to project an image of integrity and incorruptibility while the nationalists are perceived—overwhelming majority of the public perceive the Palestinian Authority and the nationalists as corrupt, and it is this—if we are able, therefore, to deal with the corruption of the nationalists—if we are able to deal with the peace process so that violence is no longer needed or perceived as needed by the Palestinians, Hamas becomes a very marginal political group.

So it is absolutely—it is—one shouldn’t view Hamas in any way, shape, or form as a threat to democracy or to liberal democracy or a threat to Palestinian-Israeli peace. Solve corruption, solve the—and address the concerns of the public about the Israeli occupation and Hamas is automatically marginalized.

SIEGMAN: Yes. We have time for a very short question.

QUESTIONER: [Inaudible] Katz. Early in Israel independence, [former Israeli Prime Minister David] Ben Gurion had a shootout with an armed group at the [inaudible]. I understand there was some changes in the security leadership in Palestine. What possibility is there to bring armed militias under unitary control?

SHIKAKI: There is a discussion of that right now. Abu Mazen is talking to the Islamists about Hamas and the young guard, Islamic Jihad, everybody who has a militia—an armed militia about the post-elections. Once the elections for the parliament take place in July and a government is established, that there will be no more militias—certainly no more armed militias—and that militias would be welcome to be integrated into the Palestinian security services as part of the phased process of demobilization. In general, this seems to be acceptable, but of course the Islamists are counting on winning enough seats to be able to veto their only parliament. So [a] lot depends, of course, on what happens in those elections and whether the nationalists will be able to have enough votes in the parliament to be able to disarm all the militias and unify all the Palestinian security services.

This seems to be Abu Mazen’s plan. Whether he will manage to implement it, I don’t know. A lot depends, of course, on what happens from now until then in the peace process. If we do not see progress in the peace process and we go back to violence, then everything could go back to the way it has been during the last four or five years.

SIEGMAN: Well [inaudible] short of the kind of revolution that George asked about earlier. We have a difficult and long road still ahead of us, and it’s good to know that people like yourself will be involved in that task.

SHIKAKI: Like yourself [inaudible].

SIEGMAN: I am sorry?

SHIKAKI: Like yourself, too.

SIEGMAN: Thank you. And thank you for joining us this morning. [Applause]

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