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Concerning Bush’s rival, Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.), Parmentier says few Europeans know much about him. He says a Kerry victory would change the “atmospherics” and “tone” of U.S. relations with France and other European nations. But it won’t affect French opposition to deploying troops to Iraq. “What I would hope is that the Kerry people would not be stupid enough to come to Paris and ask for troops to Iraq immediately. That would be very bad. There won’t be any French troops,” he says.

Parmentier was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on October 14, 2004.

Do people in Europe care whether President Bush or Senator John Kerry wins the American presidential election?

Yes, people do. There’s no question about that. Bush is extremely unpopular, and the vast majority of Europeans would be delighted if he was defeated.

Why is that?

It started with Bush’s seeming off-handed rejection of the Kyoto treaty, which was seen in Europe as a sign of irresponsibility. In a sense, America was seen to have changed. You know, traditionally, the United States had been quite interested in environmental standards. And all of a sudden, you have a guy who behaves a little strangely, and not very presidential in the European sense of the term. In his demeanor, in particular, the new president seemed to discard scientific knowledge and say that this is an issue of no importance.

Then you had the shock of September 11, when there was an enormous amount of support displayed by Europeans for the United States, a support that was based on a feeling of identification. Unfortunately, this was not how the administration saw the attack. It saw it as an event that “singularized” the United States, not creating an identity with other countries. One could see that immediately when NATO offered the use of Article 5 [mutual defense clause] for the first time in its history in favor of the United States, when obviously the article had been originally designed for the United States to come to the rescue of Europe. The administration, not even politely I would say, discarded the offers of support.

But there was support for the invasion of Afghanistan, wasn’t there?

Absolutely. There was no problem with the invasion of Afghanistan. In fact, the Europeans, especially the French and the British, would have liked to have done more for the United States at the time. It was the off-hand way in which the administration said, “Thank you, but no thank you,” so to speak, that created a certain amount of disappointment in Europe, especially in those countries that were very attached to the NATO alliance. That includes Germany and the Netherlands. Disappointment was really very noticeable.

In the run-up to the war in Iraq, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said he would not support military action in Iraq. And the French seemed opposed also.

At the time, the French were ready to consider participating in a campaign if time enough was given to the [U.N.] weapons inspectors [in Iraq].

Could you elaborate on that?

The issue in late 2002 was, first, whether the U.N. weapons inspectors would be allowed back into Iraq. Eventually they were. The French position was that if Saddam Hussein made it impossible for the inspectors, or if the inspectors told us they could not do their job, or if the inspectors told us there were illegal weapons which were dangerous, then we should go to war.

This begged the issue of allowing the inspectors to do their job for a sufficient number of weeks or months. Indeed, the administration was not particularly interested in the inspectors. The administration went to the United Nations because [Secretary of State] Colin Powell convinced the president that this was the thing to do and, also, because a number of allies felt this way. But clearly the administration was not ready to give the inspectors time to complete their work. You should remember that the United States and France negotiated Resolution 1441 [on Iraq] together. To a very large extent, this was a French-American effort, albeit the text was rather ambiguous.

The French interpretation was that the resolution meant we should be tough, that we should press for the inspectors to do their job. The Americans believed that if Saddam Hussein didn’t give in on everything immediately, we should go to war. There was a big ambiguity. And the French felt a few weeks after the resolution, in late December 2002, that the United States wanted to go to war come-what-may. And this is what brought about the change in the position of French President Jacques Chirac. He wanted to avoid going to war, if that was possible, but was ready to contemplate the need for strong action, including war, if that was necessary. But when he saw that the Americans wanted to go to war in any event, he decided, around the beginning of January 2003, to come closer to the Germans. He met with Schroeder in mid-January. Remember, we were celebrating the 40th anniversary of the French-German treaty at the time. The French position at that time was not the same as that of Germany. The Germans had said they would not support the course of war, even if the United Nations voted for it. This was a deliberate decision by Chirac to come closer to Germany so that Schroeder was not isolated, or not left alone with Russia, which the Germans also wished to avoid. This was a move made because Chirac believed that there was little we could do to postpone the war.

There were negotiations at the United Nations Security Council leading up to the war. Didn’t Chirac ask for “just a few more months?”

Yes, the French offered to the Americans on two occasions that they drop the United Nations process and stop seeking a so-called second resolution, and France would say “tut, tut” when the Americans went to war but at least would not have to take a very strong official position against. France is a permanent member of the Security Council. Therefore, if there is a discussion at the Council, we have to take a position. So there was no escaping it. This was offered twice and was refused twice.

Because the British wanted the second resolution?

Yes, exactly. This was the way to save [British Prime Minister] Tony Blair politically. That didn’t persuade many people in Paris that this was the right thing to do.

Is the hostility toward Bush similar to that shown to President Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s over the Vietnam War? They are both Texans.

No. We’re in a different international system. At the time of Vietnam, it was in the interests of the Americans as well as the Europeans that the Vietnam issue not spread into other issues that could lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. That was the major issue that was uniting us. Division between the United States and Europe was too costly to contemplate then. That doesn’t apply today. Therefore, the constraints on our behavior on both sides of the Atlantic are far less. I might add that I think the hostility now toward Bush is worse than it was toward President Ronald Reagan. There is no place in Europe where Bush is popular, including Britain.

What about in Eastern European countries that have sent troops to Iraq?

He’s a little more popular, but not much more. In fact, the trend hasn’t been good. In Poland, the United States used to be popular. But now, you have the visa issue, the fact that the Poles feel they are being overlooked [because they are required to have visas to travel to the United States]. So the situation has deteriorated.

What about John Kerry? He has some French family connections and speaks French.

I don’t think that matters. People don’t concentrate on Kerry. No one basically knows who Kerry is. It is just getting rid of Bush.

What effect would a Kerry victory have?

The atmospherics would change. The tone would change. The French would like to show they are helpful and all that. What I would hope is that the Kerry people would not be stupid enough to come to Paris and ask for troops to Iraq immediately. That would be very bad. There won’t be any French troops.

No troops for Kerry?

No. There might be ways to fudge this. The French would probably agree to increase their strength in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, in order to allow the Americans to send more troops to Iraq. That’s to be helpful. But sending troops to Iraq, no.

One of Kerry’s key arguments is that, if he is elected, he will be able to do more with the alliance.

But doing more with the alliance doesn’t necessarily mean more troops on the ground in Iraq.

Public opinion in Europe is that resolutely anti-war?

Yes. But on the other hand, it would be disastrous if the United States failed. But the feeling that this was a mistake to start with is very strong.

Is there gloating in Europe at the “big guy” being stuck in Iraq?

You know, when you are the “big guy,” you are the recipient of criticism. That’s inevitable. On the other hand, I don’t think there is much gloating over the fact that things are not going well in Iraq. We realize we will be the first to pay the price if Iraq becomes a terrorist haven.

Then why is there not more support for the United States, besides NATO’s agreeing to train Iraqi forces.

Training is possible. But sending troops on the ground, no. Remember that President Chirac’s formative experience was the war in Algeria. He entered the war as a young officer, convinced that Algeria was French, and left convinced this was an untenable situation. And torture has very bad connotations in France, because of mistreatment of Algerians during the war. So, [the abuses of inmates at] Abu Ghraib [prison] did not help.

How are U.S.-French relations otherwise? Have tensions over the war permeated all relations?

Not really. There are quite a few things on which we work well. The military-to-military relations are excellent. We work very well in Afghanistan. We were able to mount something in Haiti, where the French play a very important role, which alleviates the Americans’ burden. Counterterrorism works very well, to the point that one of our great supporters when we had tense relations in Washington was Attorney General John Ashcroft, because the Justice Department recognizes that cooperation with the French on counterterrorism is very important. On tactical matters, the French and Americans, as ever, work very well.

Would you say we are at the lowest point in U.S.-French relations since the end of World War II?

No, I would say it was worse last year. The problem now is that things have changed. Traditionally, the French have had a problem with the political leadership and elite in Washington. There was Francophobia in Congress, for instance. But the feeling among the general population was rather good. Now things have changed. In the elite, a number of people recognize that, after all, the French were not that wrong over Iraq. On the other hand, if you take broad public opinion, the standing of France has gone down, even though a majority wants continued good relations. Some people believe that France is not behaving as an ally.