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Speaker: Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group
Interviewer: Barton Gellman, The Washington Post

March 10, 2003
Washington, D.C.

Barton Gellman [BG]: Is my mic live here? All right, I'm going to start the meeting now. Gareth Evans is author of eight books and counting. And in his spare time, you'll remember him as the widely admired foreign minister of Australia for eight years. A long time member of Parliament there. And as he says, a man with a passion both for football and opera, both of which share a certain epic quality of conflict. You could call Gareth Evans a connoisseur of conflict. Or you could even say that's his job. He's now president of the International Crisis Group, which looks to prevent and resolve international violence, not so much by appeal to conscience, but by hardheaded analysis and deal-making. So we're asked today to consider is there an alternative to war in Iraq? (Laughs) We've cut the timing pretty close on this one. (Laughs) If the question becomes actually moot in the next 60 minutes, I'll ask Council staff to slip me a note. So let's just not take the question too literally. On the phone the other day, Mr. Evans used the word quixotic. So I humbly offer my services as Sancho Panza, and why don't we talk about the might have beens and the why they weren'ts and the maybe next times. And seriously, what are the risks, both for the U.S., the U.N., the international system, that we are taking just about right now? Rather than ask for long, formal remarks, which I think aren't quite conducive to the Australian style. Anyway, I'll put a few questions to elicit his major points now. I'll ask a few questions, and then we'll open it to the floor. So I'll begin with Mr. Quixote, why tilt at this windmill, at this late date?

Gareth Evans [GE]: Well, of course, the odds are now overwhelming that we will have a war, the only question being when, who and how messy. I was talking to a senior republican this morning and I said there's a kind of eerie serenity emanating from the White House, which is deeply disconcerting for those many of us, internationally and domestically, who still feel a certain discomfort about the way this thing has been handled. And whether or not the case has been made for going to war, where there are, in fact, any alternatives. I think there is an obligation on the policy community to keep scrutinizing the case for war. To keep looking for alternatives. Right up until the time the first bombs fall. And I say that for, I guess, several reasons. First of all, just first principles. War is always ugly, horrible, it should always be a matter of last resort. And you need to establish that it is a matter of last resort. Secondly, I think the consequences of this particular war are potentially quite disconcerting in the sense that the risk/reward balance is tilted much more on the risk side than for any previous major encounter I can recall in the last 15, 20 years or so. And I think the third reason is simply that there is so much disquiet still evidence in the wider community, both internationally where things are more divided than I can ever previously recall. Where there are very serious issues about United Nations credibility. And, indeed, U.S. leadership credibility up there for resolution. And internally, I have to say in my travels around the U.S. in the last week, which have taken me from Boston to Houston to D.C. to here, that I sense, talking to people across the political spectrum and reading the press and the opinion poll, I mean, I do sense just an extraordinary degree of discomfort that the case for war has just not been fully made. So under those circumstances, I think it is important that we, however quixotic it seems, however irritating it may appear to many people who just want to get on with the next stage of it all, we do have to scrutinize the case and to ask ourselves is this a case that's been well made?

BG: So what is the case? You've argued, I think, that the White House is mixing up at least three different arguments for war. Why don't you go through those? But also, what's wrong with making the case a la carte?

GE: Well, the trouble is that, for each of the three different possible rationales to war, different principles are involved, they need different evidence and they need different arguments to support them. And it just doesn't work if you worry at all about consistency and credibility and effectiveness of argument in these matters, to mix up those principles, that evidence and that argument. The three rationales, I guess, are straightforwardly these. First of all, that Saddam, the present Iraqi regime, is a threat to international peace and security, such as to justify military response. A classic chapter seven definition of legitimate grounds for military intervention. And here, the problems in a nutshell are that it's not, I think, thoroughly established to everybody's satisfaction that Iraq is, in fact, a threat. Threat requires capability, and I think that's pretty well established, at least on the chemical and biological front. But it also requires intent. And here, I think, reporting, the international consensus on this and a large measure of domestic commentary as well, I just don't think that case has been made. Certainly the Al-Qaeda link argument has been very, very fragile indeed, in the way that that's been articulated for, and the evidence that's been produced for it. So you've got a problem in establishing a threat itself, either to the neighborhood or to the wider U.S. and Western community. And you also have a problem, I think, on this leg of the argument, in establishing that even if there was a threat, the military response is the only appropriate one at this stage. And to argue that, you've got to be able to argue for non-containability, non-deterrability, and you also should be able to make a reasonable case that the balance of consequences in terms of a risk and reward, will be such that the whole situation won't conceivably be much worse as a result of going to war. And I'm not sure that on those latter criteria, the case has been well-made. That's on the international threat side. But the second rationale for going to war is simply in order to achieve disarmament of Iraq and the implementation of U.N. resolutions. That may or may not be the same issue as whether or not Iraq constitutes a threat. You can have disarmament as a consolation entirely to be desired, without simultaneously taking the view that Iraq is presently a threat. That's probably the strongest case that there's always been for going to war against Iraq. I myself was writing op-eds a year ago, saying the Europeans have got to stop being wimps about this, they've got to put their money where their mouth is. It is necessary for them to be as tough as nails. A U.N. resolution and the follow-through on this, because the credibility of the U.N. is at stake, and the credibility of the whole disarmament nonproliferation objective is at stake as well. The difficulty about this is not so much with that part of the argument, the principle that's involved, or indeed the question of evidence. It's just basically the way the case for the disarmament has been made. Once you start putting regime change on the table, as your primary objective or at least an objective you won't be satisfied with until it's achieved, you have a situation where that works on a totally counterproductive way against the achievement of the disarmament objective. Both in terms of the way in which the international community will be prepared to go along for the ride with you. They'll keep saying, as they have been, if it's disarmament, okay, every Wednesday. But then it's Ari Fleischer or the President himself talking about regime change. You guys are just not serious. And we want to look at this much more closely. There's that problem. But you've also got the further problem, and that's a critical one. But you've also got the further problem that Saddam himself, obviously will always be worried in his own mind that if he does disarm, then that's still not going to be the end of the story, he's still going to get zapped. And when you've got as much emphasis as being placed on the regime change issue as there was last year. It disappeared for a while, but now it's come back with a full flurry, obviously and particularly in the last few weeks and days, administration's made no bones about it, that this is the objective and they won't be content until it's realized. I mean, you're just whistling Dixie when it comes to actually achieving that particular objective, it's totally counterproductive. So that's the problem there. You've also got an interesting technical problem I'll just mention in passing. You might come back to it. But if the U.S. does push the disarmament resolution to about tomorrow or this week and loses, it will, in fact, lose such legal authority as it already arguably has, under 1441 and the earlier resolutions, for using the disarmament objective as a basis for going to war. I mean, if the Security Council has expressly focused on whether the failure to meet the disarmament objective it has expressly focused on it, and it has decided that, no, that disarmament failure is not grounds for going to war now, it would be impossible, as a matter of international law, to argue that you have some continuing authority in those earlier resolutions to go to war. That's a very self-defeating exercise, let's just drop to one side. The third rationale, and that's been more a rhetorical rationale than a seriously argued sort of legal one, but it's the one based on Saddam's monstrous treatment over the years of his own people. The protection of Iraqis, the protection of his own internal population. And that, of course, was an eminently defensible rationale, certainly morally and to the extent the Security Council went along with it, legally as well in the case of Bosnia, Kosova, Rwanda, all the great (Inaudible) shocking issues of the nineties that we argued so much about. The trouble with trying to mobilize that rationale in the context of Iraq at the moment, is that while still behaving abominably in terms of civil rights violations and treatment of his political opponents and so on, it's very difficult to argue that the last 10 years, in fact, Saddam has behaved in such a way ... genocidally in terms of ethnic cleansing and so on ... such as would justify a military assault against him for reasons of protection of the internal population. You know, the case was very available ten years or more ago. It's simply not so available now. And if you tried to make the case in those terms, you really would be opening up a Pandora's Box of precedents for elsewhere. And the international community is, rightfully, I think, very cautious about that. So, although you can argue that there is a responsibility to protect and at best in the international community as well as governments themselves, and it's very difficult to use that, I think, as a rationale for going to war now, at the moment. So really you're reduced to a disarmament rationale, which is entirely defensible in its own right, but which has been undercut by the way in which the case has been argued and put. Or you're reduced to the most fundamental rationale of all, that in terms of international threat, for which, frankly, the case in the views of the international community, is just not being made at all.

BG: You won't be surprised, there surely will be lots of questions today, so I'll ask the questions later. And so it's best up to you to keep our exchanges brisk. To leave time for them. I asked you a lot of questions, so it wouldn't have been possible. But a quick follow-up on that point. Let's suppose that the White House has made a hash of its public diplomacy. It stipulates that in your last answer. Is there any harm in it? That is to say, alternatively, have they made their best possible case? Can you actually imagine that the Security Council would have knowingly authorized war, given its record over 12 years?

GE: Yes, I can, because I think there was a huge measure of agreement about the basic underlying objectives that are being pursued here. One, that Saddam should be dealt with to the extent that he does constitute a threat to the international community. Two, that the disarmament resolution should be enforced if the U.N. is to retain any credibility. And thirdly, that something should be done to improve the condition of these people. So you are starting with the very positive environment of doing something here. And in terms of allegedly squalid preoccupations of certain Europeans with oil contracts and all the rest of it, in many ways, their case that that was, indeed, the motivation, would have been better advanced by going along for the ride, than standing out against it.

BG: But you knew better than ... (Overlap) ... I was going to say, you know better than most of us not to confuse agreement on ends with agreement on means.

GE: Yes, but what I'm saying is there was basically agreement about ends. And the only disagreement has been about means. And on the particular, I don't think you would have got agreement, I don't think you'll find agreement now on the existence of Iraq as a threat, either to the neighborhood or to the U.S. through the combination of WMD, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and non-state-clear-effective. I don't think you'll find agreement about that at the moment. If at any stage more evidence turned up establishing formal associations with terrorist organizations of the kind that we're worried about, or some additional evidence that goes to the question of intent or non-containability or non-deterrability, the situation might change. But I'm commenting on the present state of the evidence, no, there will not be ... it's not believable that there would have been international consensus on that. On the question, however, of the use of force as the ultimate way of achieving disarmament, I might be naive about this, but I genuinely believe that there was a willingness to go along with that particular ride. And that willingness was embraced in 1441. Which didn't occur in a fit of absence of mind. People knew what the issues were. The U.S. stopped talking about regime change and let Powell get on with the business of negotiating this. A very intelligent and effective exercise of diplomacy was put together. And people were coming to grips with the reality that if these guys don't fess up, swear up, behave appropriately, we are going to have to follow this through. And I think the U.S. is much to be applauded, both for the diplomacy which put this pressure on and also I'm in no doubt about, they should be applauded for having put the military pressure on, too. By putting resources in the region. None of this would have happened without that 800 pound gorilla out there beating its chest, that's absolutely right. But the bottom line is, if the international community is going to go for the ride all the way, they have to have confidence that the U.S. would take yes for an answer. So if these characters did, in fact, start disarming in a credibly way, did in fact demonstrate the kind of cooperation which gave some confidence that this process would occur, then that that would be the end of it. And then people, while keeping a substantial containability presence there and keeping some kind of deterrent role, I think people would have been prepared to believe that this was the way to go.

BG: Would you say that they have heard yes for an answer?

GE: Well, no. Because you're caught in this conundrum. Your response by Saddam is still grudging, is still incomplete. For I think the not entirely non-understandable reason that he believes that even if he does disarm, he's going to get zapped anyway. And this is the problem. I mean, I don't want to put too much total store on this. But once you get into the business of saying, "We are not going to be content with anything other than regime change," and then when you add to that particular cream the cherry on the top of Paul Wolfowitz that this is going to produce a democratic flurry of commitment elsewhere in the region, once you've moved into that kind of rhetoric as your guiding rhetoric. And once you have statement after statement being made by senior administrative spokespersons saying that any given piece of disarmament is not persuasive, and we don't believe that this signals any change of mood intent, it's just very difficult to keep that consensus. I mean, I think pointing to alternatives, if that's what you want to get on to, I mean, the only way of shaping and focusing the debate now, in the way that really will put people to the test again, and overcome the perception here that ... of the kind that you just incorporate in your question, that nothing will ever satisfy the anti-war people, the only way to square that circle, I think, is to go down the road of a deadline with very explicit benchmarks and a very tight deadline, two, three, four weeks according to taste. You've now got out of the Blix, you've got out of the inspectors a pretty clear indication of what those benchmarks might look like. And it's pretty easy, I think, to now articulate a way of testing this once and for all. But if that is to succeed, the U.S. has to, once again, change its rhetoric. And I was in the region just in the last few days, in Jordan and elsewhere, and I have to say that the overwhelming perception that I struck is that people thought that the U.S. had so comprehensively made up its mind that absolutely nothing that was done on the disarmament front would be likely to make a difference. So that if we're really serious about alternatives to war, I think we have to come up with some way of testing that once and for all.

BG: This is why I think I might be skeptical of that. Picture for us a benchmark that could imaginably lead either George Bush to give a thumbs-up or Jacques Chirac to give a thumbs-down.

GE: Well I think the best way of doing this is not to talk in general abstractions, but in specifics. And we now have available to us the cluster document, nearly 200 pages of it, prepared by the inspectors. Which has got page after page of specifics. And let me give you an example of just one or two such specific benchmarks that we could imagine. For example, and this is straight out of the inspector's report, and you could very easily imagine this being put in a U.N. resolution. Take VX gas, for example, this lethal, colorless, odorless nerve agent which worries us all so much. Benchmarks. One, so let's separate bits, not points, I mean, it's shorter. Capable bombs, the Apple, 100 Apple, 100A, CW and BW capable bombs. Benchmarks, one, Iraq should explain their coding system and why an Apple 100 bomb might have been filled with BW. Two, provide credible evidence that the Apple 100 bomb production line has stopped after Sept, 1990. Three, present any remaining Apple 100 and Apple 100A bombs, and relevant molds. Anthrax, another straightforward one. One, benchmark. Present any remaining stocks of anthrax or provide evidence for its destruction. Explain with credible supporting evidence, A, the finding of anthrax in the equipment at the foot and mouth vaccine plant. B, the finding that anthrax is not being produced in 1991. C, the unaccounted-for bacterial growth media. D, a statement that bulk agent was not deployed. Three, provide documentation or other evidence to support its account of unilateral destruction of BW agent in 1991. Now, that's just two examples, there's 27 others for these various clusters of problems. But what I'm saying is that we have already language, which you might want to sharpen further, which is sufficiently precise to be testable objectively. And in a way that would brook very little capacity for negative argument if you were to have inspectors coming back and saying, "Well, the answer to this is X, Y, Z." And I do think it's possible ... I mean, the argument against these, you're not going to get agreement because everybody is so cynical about this, you're not going to get agreement about what the benchmarks should be. And you'll spend weeks negotiating that. And then when it comes to setting a deadline and identifying the crunch date, you won't get agreement then as to whether or not these benchmarks have been satisfied. Well, that's a possible concern. I have to be frank about that. There are people who are going to keep on pursuing these arguments, some of them, to the nth degree. Because they just don't want war. But I think the truth of the matter is, if you hone in on the disarmament objective, identify with very great precision what it is that you actually want explained or want produced, you've got a set of testable propositions which, there's reasonable grounds for believing would lead to a result one way or the other.

BG: You've got this very interesting February 24th report on the ICG web site. I wanted to ask you to summarize your three conceptual alternatives to war (Overlap).

GE: Well, the three alternatives are alternatives to war now, on the basis of evidence thus amassed. And on the basis of U.N. resolution thus passed, without further additions. But the three alternatives are simply, one, a deadline with benchmarks of the kind that we've just been talking about. The pros for which, the values which would be that this would bring the argument squarely back to the disarmament objective. It would give the best chance of the so-called miracle result. Either absolute cooperation or coups or an exile. And would also, of course, give the best chance of reuniting a hopelessly divided Security Council. The problems with it are ones that I've just stated. The degree of difficulty in reaching agreement about these things, and about the objective testing of them. But I think we're a lot closer to agreement following the stuff that's now been put on the record by Blix and ElBaradei in the last few days. The second alternative to going to war now is what one can perhaps call "Containment lite,” which is kind of an extinction of the status quo. Which is variations of the French/German/Russian position as it's so far been articulated. Some upgrading, perhaps in terms of numbers and equipment and so on, of the inspection regime. But essentially just giving the inspectors more time. The argument for that is well, the inspectors are producing results now and can produce more, given more time. And yes, it's messy, it's ambiguous. But at least it beats the hell out of going to war when the risks of going to war and the risks of a divided international community are as great as they are. The problem with that as an alternative is however, that it's not been very well argued for, I have to say, by the French or those in the ride with them. The whole thing is cast only in terms of containment objective. The result of going down this path can only be containment. There's no reason for believing that that'll get us to disarmament. There are huge logistic difficulties of maintaining the status quo so far as the huge build-up of troops that are there in the region at the moment. And there's no clear exit route of any kind that's been met out of this. You've got some discussion from the French about the desirability of some benchmarks. And some guidelines being established, and free weekly tests of this. But I think the French, frankly, have to come up with a much better proposition in order to be themselves persuaded for an alternative approach. The third alternative is one that we spell out in our report, which nobody is really arguing for, but at least is conceptually available. And this is what we call the CDD Plus option. This is stronger containment, pretty much along the line that the French have talked about, but with some extra elements in it as well, including a much more stronger monitoring regime for the external movement of goods and so on, into the country. And a lot more constraints on potential external suppliers of the Iraqis with dangerous material. So stronger containment. Certainly, stronger deterrence. Which means a lot of things in the way in which we spell it out. It doesn't mean keeping all the complete numbers of troops that are there at the moment. But it does involve having a pre-positioning capability on the ground. And it does involve the Security Council agreeing in advance that a series of specific triggers would, in fact, ignite a legitimate military response. And those triggers being any kind of threat by Saddam against his neighbors or anyone else. Any evidence of intended acquisition by Saddam from the North Koreans or anybody else, of nuclear capability or material. Any evidence of supply or intended supply by Saddam of material non-state-terrorist actors. Any kind of serious or significant obstruction of the containment inspection regime. On this particular rationale, the deterrence would be founded upon a pre-agreed list of criteria, that kind which would, in fact, justify military assault. And the third element in the equation, under this CDD thing, is stronger diplomacy. Which means a systematic effort, through a whole bunch of measures involving modification of the sanctions regime and putting human rights ministers on the ground. And support for civil society, support for political opposition and so on. A whole bunch of things designed to achieve, over time, dramatic amelioration of the position of the Iraqi people, modification of the regime, ultimate regime change and ultimate disarmament. So stronger containment, stronger deterrence, stronger diplomacy, CDD Plus. I think that takes to the logical conclusion the kind of position the French and others have been adopting without sort of thinking it through or arguing very credibly. Whether, of course, it's acceptable too, in America that's now committed itself to the extent that it has, and an administration that's committed itself to the extent that it has, to actual regime change, is a very real question. But again, if you keep on coming back to this basic discomfort that everybody is feeling, that the case for the threat has not been made, and the international community is deeply divided. Yes, maybe some of the cynical motive, vulgar motives, the usual stolid motives, perhaps. But also some very serious principles and a reasonable motive. If you take that into account and you look at the problem of consequences that we've got with this particular war, in terms of regional instability ...

BG: We'll come back ...

GE: ... and we'll come back to that ... you've got yourself a case for at least seriously thinking about an alternative. Again, as quixotic as it seems at this late stage.

BG: When I look at CDD Plus, the missing D is disarmament in that one. And a French diplomat told me a long time ago ... this is back in '98 ... that what UNSCOM’s failure to prove is that you cannot disarm a country against its will without conquering and occupying it. You won't hear the French saying that now, by the way. It was said then in the context of you're not going to occupy Baghdad, Saddam has some WMD, get used to it. What if it turns out that, inconveniently for France now, that argument was right? That you can't, in fact, disarm Saddam or Iraq without the war, then what? What's that do to your argument?

GE: Well, I understand the argument, and I think it's well made, but only up to a point. I think you can probably achieve total disarmament with total confidence only in the context of regime change. I think you can certainly be confident that there will be no acquisition of a nuclear capability of any kind, provided you continue to run a tough containment, tough deterrent regime of the kind that we are talking about. I don't think you can be totally confident that you will succeed in destroying every last canister of anthrax and the gas, or whatever, that may be buried, or mobile laboratories that may be traveling the country. I don't think you can be totally confident about disarmament in that sense. Absent absolute regime change. And I think to that extent, the critics are right, and that has to be acknowledged. But of course, here you have to ask yourself, I mean, at what price is absolute disarmament to be achieved, if you are confident that you can contain the existing regime and not ensure that anything gets any worse. You can absolutely assure that nothing new is produced of any kind and that no nuclear capability is obtained. And if you can be pretty confident about the quality of your deterrent capability. I mean, if all the troops went home and it became apparent that there was no longer any realistic prospect of anyone getting zapped, however miserably and squalidly they behaved in Iraq, I mean, it would be ... the game would be over. And there'd be no credible argument left for doing anything other than going to war now. But if you take seriously the capacity of the U.S. and its allies to mount a deterrent role, and one way that France and Russia could contribute to that would be themselves to express a willingness to put troops on the ground on the border, to demonstrate their willingness to participate in the military action if any of these criteria I mentioned before were satisfied. That would be a pretty good demonstration that the French and others are not just talking up a storm, but are serious about doing something. What I'm saying is it does come back to, you know, disarmament is an entirely legitimate objective. Disarmament and pursuit of U.N. resolutions and U.N. credibility is an entirely legitimate objective. But at the end of the day, if you can't get international support for that, if you can't get Security Council authorization for achieving that objective by full scale military means, it's reasonable to look for ways of achieving a satisfactory result by less than military ways. And I believe a result that did do effective containability in the short run, and an ongoing basis, did do effective deterrence on an ongoing basis, and also laid down some confident grounds for believing that over time, you could at least get the disarmament objective, along with a few other objectives, then that might be a substantially better result than the one we have at the moment. All these things involve balances. And if there were zero risk involved in going to war now, if it was a Kosovo kind of situation, or frankly, a Rwanda type situation, maybe even a Bosnia type situation, where there were no real anxieties about larger conflagrations, or larger feeding into a global terrorist problem and so on, then a lot of these reservations about the application of the ultimate sanction of military force would be muted. But we've got a very serious situation here at the moment, and very serious international disagreement. And some of which is based on genuine principle.

BG: Let me ask sort of one last question now, and I'll open it to the floor. The sort of media high concept questions, and author at my right. It's historically anomalous to have a pre-eminent power without a global opponent, without prompting the creation of a coalition to hold it in check. Are we seeing the rise of that coalition now on a lasting basis, and is its address in Paris?

GE: I don't know whether we're seeing it on a lasting basis, but we're certainly seeing something like that emerge. And I think when you sort of scratch your eyes and try and rub your eyes and try and figure out what the hell is going on, and why the French are as strong as they are, and the Russians and the Chinese and others, seem to be coming along for the ride to the extent that they are. And why the Germans, of all people, are also there. I mean, you have to start worrying what is happening here, and you've got to start taking seriously what you're hearing from so many of these other countries, and Europeans themselves, that they're deeply troubled by this new phenomenon of not so much U.S. power as such, but the way this power is being deployed. And the way it's being talked about. I mean, I just think back to ... I don't think it's a function of power as such, objective power. People can live with that as long as they believe that it's being properly and decently exercised. And the atmosphere globally, and I travel globally all the time. I'm on the road, and I'm based in Brussels, but I'm 60 percent traveling. And I talk to people all the time. And after 9/11, I mean, I have to say that what you are reading in the press is absolutely true, that there was a global outpouring of sympathy, understanding, admiration, respect, supportiveness for the U.S. There was a few isolated incidents of, yes, they had it coming. But overwhelmingly, certainly in untraditional allies, certainly in China, certainly in Russia, I mean, you had this belief that something terrible had happened, the U.S. needed to be supported, there needed to be full international cooperation. What is deeply alarming, I think to those of us worried about a global, or even worried about their capacity for U.S. to exercise the kind of moral leadership that we all look to it to do ... what's alarming is the way in which that has dissipated. And so much of it has been just a matter of style. We all know about the handling of various multilateral issues that preceded this one. But the handling of this one has just generated a hugely negative reaction. And no need for me to spell out the details. But negative reaction has now taken the form of, I think, a pretty serious desire to use this particular issue as a way of giving a very clear message that this unbridled, sort of hegemonic instinct, we don't have to listen to anyone, we don't have to take anyone else's anxiety seriously, we make our own decisions about our own security, and we'll straddle the world in doing so ... this message as it's being heard out there, is generating this reaction. That's ... and I think despite whatever other motives the French might have, that is the dominant one for them. And I think increasingly you're now seeing that from the others. I mean, we all thought within Russia, that maybe there was a degree of ambiguity here. That Putin had one position, that Varnof(?) had another, and they were just sort of working it out. But they really strengthened right up. And the only possible explanation, it's not oil contracts in Iraq. They'd be much better off in that front by going along for the ride. I mean, what's strengthened them right up is this anxiety that the U.S. is just gone a bridge too far. And I think the Chinese might well come along for the ride and surprise us all by moving even beyond an abstention to veto, if it becomes necessary. Although that almost certainly won't be, because I don't think the nine votes are there. So this is the problem. And I mean, nobody thought we'd see anything like this occurring for decades. But it's all come with a rush. And I hope that the message is being taken seriously. Because it's a message that is really fixable very, very easily. It's to do with attitude, it's to do with language, it's to do with style, it's to do with approach. It's also to do with substance, but we all know from years of dealing with the U.S. that the waves go up and down. And some administrations are more multilateral and some are more unilateral and some are more isolationist. I mean, everyone's used to dealing within that kind of band. But we seem to be right outside the band now. And national security strategy, and that harness with the language of preemption and the total indifference to ... apparent indifference to constraints is pretty serious stuff. And I think what you're seeing is real out there in terms of an international reaction. And very hard just to put it down as these wimps or these creatures from Venus or whatever, doing their wimpish thing. It's much more complex than that, much more serious.

BG: Let's go to the floor. We always enjoin ourselves to be brief and to identify ourselves. Let's redouble the being brief part that, we'll get lots more questions in. And remember this is on the record today. Speak(?).

Wendy Luers: Foundation for a Civil Society. ICG has a wonderful reputation of not only before the crisis, but after the crisis, of being on the ground and being the eyes and ears for the rest of us. How do you see this situation which you have just described playing out in the post-invasion, post-regime change, if it should come about? How do you see Iran, Jordan, the others in the neighborhood? And how do you see this administration of ours in the United States handling the reconstruction period?

GE: Well, we're producing three major papers, which will be out in the next fortnight or so, addressing the economic and the governments and the humanitarian delivery issues that are likely to arise. And I mean, in short, on the governance front, I mean, the opposition will be as it has been in the past. This is an unbelievably complex (Laughs) situation. And most people haven’t even a rudimentary grasp of. It's not just a matter of Gaul being divided into three parts. Because the Sunnis and the Shiites and finding some institutional way of accommodating those kinds of differences, it's infinitely more fluid and anxiety-provoking than that. So, I mean, the internal situation is not going to be a dawdle. And I don't think anyone, even if the military power that is quick and clean and surgical and all those things that many people hope it will be, including leaderships in the region, the aftermath is very, very tricky indeed. In terms of the neighboring countries. Yes, I mean, the big problem is that Iraq is coming on top of a perceived abdication of responsibility or authority by the U.S. in relation to the Israel-Palestinian issue. And the combination has really made this a much more formidable issue to deal with in terms of regional reactions than it would have been just by itself. (Sigh) And without the experience of recent times consolidating it. I mean, the truth of the matter is, I mean, of course there's not protection for Saddam himself, but there's a hell of a lot of a sense that this is not a war of liberation, it's a war of recolonization. It's not a war to do with democratization, it's a way to deal with the application of ancient (Inaudible) and so on. I'm just reporting the way it's viewed. And we've got people on the ground in half a dozen locations, and they're reporting their heads off and saying this stuff in the street is serious. We've all heard the boy crying wolf about explosive reactions in the street that haven't happened in the past, but hold on to your hats, this could be very, very ugly. And particularly if the war is bloody, protracted and all the rest of it. So there it is. I mean, in Jordan, where I was just in the last week was, I mean, take the situation in southern Jordan, in the City of Man(?), which has had four major outbreaks of violence over the last 15, 18 years. And another one very recently last year. Which, for the first time, actually took an Islamist extremist form. And this is not the old problem within Jordan of Palestinians Jordanians versus other Jordanians, this is Jordanian Jordanians, Bedouins and so on, versus ... and for this to be taking Islamist form, and we know from people on the ground that they're very passionate indeed about the Iraqi issue, that's seen as a talismanic touchstone issue. So I mean, the authorities in Jordan are deeply, deeply worried. That's not stopping their cooperation with the U.S., it's not stopping any of the regional powers' cooperation with the U.S. at the governmental level. But at the street level, the population level, there's deep anxiety. Now, a lot of that will evaporate if it's quick and clean. A lot of it, if there's sensitive, effective, well-managed management of the post-reconstruction of Iraq. But if you have too many administration officials saying to me what one of them did in high places about three months ago, once this war is over, we will own Iraq, if that language ever gets out, (Laughs) and attribute it to anyone that actually sort of matters publicly, you've got yourself real, real problems in the follow-through period. So I mean, I just can't state it more seriously than that. It might be okay if this is managed sensitively, it might be okay if it's managed quickly. But it's a huge risk, it really is.

BG: There was a question just over here?

Audience: Hello, I'm Halla Dezeem(?) with Morgan Stanley. Is there any way at this late stage for America not to go to war without losing huge credibility?

GE: Well (Sigh) that's, of course, the question everybody here is asking. And I can only say that credibility will be lost with whom by stepping back. Won't be lost in Tony Blair. He's desperate for the U.S. to do just that, I mean, in the context of that serious commitment (Inaudible) some sort of strategy of the kind that I outlined. Won't be losing any credibility elsewhere in Europe. Won't be losing any credibility with the Russians, won't be losing any credibility with Chinese, won't be losing any credibility with the Indians, where I was also last week and talking to them. I mean, people would love a demonstration not of American weakness, but of American sort of ability to respond to a situation in a way that's perceived as rational and measured. Now, this could only happen in the context of not just acknowledging defeat and walking away. It could only be walking away in the context of putting in place a kind of containment regime, deterrence regime of the kind that I've described. And being as tough as nails about the implementation of that. And really seriously holding everybody to it. Of course it's a risk to us. But it's a risk in terms of domestic public opinion. You're better judges of that than I am. But what everybody wants to see here is just these basic objectives achieved. And I mean, for it to turn into a sort of a manhood test, a testosterone test, is pretty disconcerting for most people in the rest of the world. And what (Overlap) they're looking for is a capacity to accept yes, pronouncer, or to accept another way of doing this that is far more consonant with the international feeling.

BG: Shouldn't we distinguish loss of approval from loss of credibility? Surely all those players you just named would approve of a pullback, but would they not form conclusions about whether the United States means what it says when it says (Inaudible) use of force?

GE: Well, (Sigh) if they could believe that the United States means what it says when it talks about disarmament, that's one thing. But for the United States to mean what it says when it talks about regime change, if that's the issue, then it's not one that other people have even accepted the basic parameters or the basic premises. So they're just not going to accept going to war for a regime change, and they will accept, I think, going to war for disarmament. That's the significance of the benchmarks approach. That holds the agenda back where there is the potential for international consensus. Now, you might say there'll be difficulties in reaching agreement about those benchmarks, you might say there'll be difficulties, and the cynics will be out to play again in a month's time, or whenever, when it comes to measuring. But when you've got explicit things in the way that I described them before, and I mean, Hans Blix and all the rest, and he can only pirouette on so many dimes when it comes to things as specific as that. I mean, there'd just be far more consensus if there's no, no, no, no, no, no, no, there's all these boxes of nothing ticked. Now we're going to go. There'll be far more consensus than there will be at the moment. And I mean, therein lies the credibility.

BG: Let's go to Jim Hoge, and this one in the back.

Audience: Thank you, Jim Hoge from the Council. If we go to war without a resolution, there's obviously going to be serious rifts in a number of post-Cold War arrangements and institutions, U.N., NATO, transatlantic relationships and so on. What is your guess, can these be repaired, patch-patch-patch, with enough patches? Or are we about to enter into an era in which there's going to be a rather profound change in the arrangements, the procedures, institutions that govern the international community, and most particularly the super power?

GE: Well, I think the latter. I think the U.N. itself is capable of riding this particular bump fairs with so many others in the past. Not least because I think the argument about the U.N.'s credibility is rather finely balanced at the moment with the accredibility that's involved in not going along for the ride. And the credibility that isn't... one side. And I think that will stagger along. Not with much enthusiasm from the U.S., I guess, for the foreseeable future under this administration. But NATO itself, this is serious. And a lot of the other institutional arrangements, I suppose Andus(?) with Australia will be alive and well, given Australia's enthusiasm for the task, not shared by the population or by former government officials, I can tell you. (Laughs) But that's another story. But a lot of the others. I mean, now maybe as so many people in the administration are saying, with varying degrees of insouciance, well, you know, so what? The Cold War is over, a lot of the rationales for having these sorts of arrangements have evaporated, and we live in a different universe. And so what if they seem to evaporate? But I think that's just being a bit too insouciant. Because, I mean, the U.S. is a major beneficiary (Laughs) ... I mean, I've been arguing for ages to the Europeans don't underestimate your bargaining power with the U.S. on NATO. Because those basing facilities and logistic support and all the rest of it, if you want to be a serious global power and project ... it helps gigantically having the whole NATO apparatus working with you and not against you. And so, but in terms of the politics of it, I think don't underestimate the seriousness of this. This is a really fundamental institution breaker and shaker. And the world will be a very different place. I mean, there will be other things that will come out of this as well. I mean, the Europeans' capacity to mount their own coherent foreign policy is being sadly shattered. But I wouldn't be at all surprised if in the aftermath of this, there's a rapid rapprochement in getting this together. I mean, you could see a fundamental change of approach in Britain. I mean, a lot of this is not fully appreciated here. Presidential systems, Congressional systems. People by and large just don't sort of feel the dynamics of those Parliament systems. But I've been in one for 21 years, in politics. And I can tell you, I mean, Tony Blair has got the smell of the mortuary about him in this present environment. It's not just a matter of counting the numbers of ministers who are going to resign and Claire Short’s finally made a position public in the last 24 hours. But it's the complete absence of any belief, in the majority resigned Parliamentary party, I mean, the wider party membership in the wider community, that he's been on the right track. I mean, it's a tragedy in many ways, because I was very strongly supportive of Blair in trying to make this case for irresistible momentum, very supportive of the disarmament objective, very supportive of the troop buildup on the basis of the pressure really had to be put on Saddam. I was very critical of the French and others who were for undermining the effectiveness of that united front. And all of these things are, in many ways, a tragedy. Because there's nothing that Blair wanted than for Saddam to be spooked by this and to move into cooperation mode or whatever. I mean, that's what he wanted. But that hasn't happened. I think you'll see every chance of this resulting, perhaps sooner rather than later, and a fundamental change of position by Britain, a rethinking of what the hell they've been up to in terms of their relationship with the U.S. And maybe a reintegration of the European polity in a wholly different way from most people anticipated. So these are large calls, and you can argue that things can easily take another course. But I mean, I live in Europe, I talk to these people all the time. And I can tell you, the intensity of the feeling on this issue is just (Sigh) ... it's just above and beyond even the basics of the immediate issue itself. It's not just another issue on which there's disagreement. People feel this is kind of watershed that we've reached in the way that the world is organized. And some very clear messages have got to be sent. And they'll follow through. And you won't find a willingness to make the accommodations to keep the institutions alive if people feel that they're just not representing the appropriate balance of interests any longer. I mean, that might be too apocalyptic, but that's the way it's going.

BG: I see a lot of questions. I'm going to go straight to the back, I'm obliged to find someone (Inaudible) left black here after that, and I'll look around further.

Audience: Darryl Jenkins(?), BDO Seaman(?). Let's look at life from the point of view of Saddam Hussein for a moment. He's sitting over there, he's about to get a tremendous onslaught against him. The 17th of March is a week from today. I can't believe he's going to sit there and do nothing and wait for all this to happen. And I would expect that they'd be kind of surprised over the weekend. What could you anticipate that would be? Further concessions, promises of elections in six months? What can he do that could change the scenario here?

GE: Well (Sigh) ... the calculation, if he's at all rational, in his mind, would if the issue had been about disarmament, disarmament, disarmament, all the way along, and the U.N. resolution's literal terms were what matters and the troop buildup to enforce those terms were what happened, the calculation would have to be as you described it. He'd, having dissimulated for so long and been a grudging cooperator for so long, he would say, the game is up, I either go into exile and find someone to protect me, or I just fully cooperate, just for the purposes of regime survival. I mean, he has to believe that the U.S. is now serious about mounting this assault. The other calculation, though, that will necessarily be going through his mind is that, even if I do give it all up, even if I do the lot, if we find a warehouse full of anthrax tomorrow, if we give 5,000 pages of documentation, we explain what's happened to every ounce of precursor(?), if we do it all, will that make any difference? Will I still get zapped anyway? And this is really the point of everything I've been trying to say about the problem that's been involved in this mixed message. Which was largely sold in the latter part of last year, which is why we got the resolution that we did. Everything was on track, but which has fallen apart. And now the message that will resonate loudest in Saddam's ears and this is not irrationally listening, this is just listening to what's on the airway, the message that will resonate loudest is this guy's got to go. I've made my choice. The U.S. has made its choice. This guy's never going to get serious about disarmament, and his show of willingness to engage in disarmament is only a show. We're going to zap him. Because it's only through regime change, only through getting rid of this guy that we're going to achieve our objective. That's the message, it's unequivocal. It's been, you know, since Ari Fleischer, what is it, five or six weeks ago? At the time, the very time this U.N. resolution, the latest round of it, was coming out. Well, as soon as he started talking about regime change again, as soon as the president started making his big speeches about democracy and all the rest of it flowed from that. The message is just abundantly clear. And this is why, I mean, I won't say where it was, but in the Middle East recently, I had people say the only game left in town is for the U.S. to make an absolutely unequivocal statement, a believable statement that if Saddam disarms or meets certain benchmarks as the way of establishing disarmament, then the U.S. will no longer pursue regime change by forcible means. And I was told at the highest levels in a couple of Middle East countries, this is the only thing we can see that can possibly turn this around. Because in the absence of that, and with all these other messages continuing to flow, I mean, he has to believe that he's going to get zapped. But if he goes into exile, even that he'll be pursued unmercifully. Well, maybe that's a Christian myth. So I mean, that's the problem. And that's why I think I'm trying to be as neutral as I possibly can about all this. My board of directors has insisted that we've got to be neutral because they're fiercely divided, like everybody else in this country. But this is the business of ... I just can't help but hang the hat on that one. I can't help but think this is being very unfortunately handled in terms of that mixed message.

BG: Is there a question here? All right, behind (Inaudible).

Audience: Jeff Milton(?), Arab Banking Corporation. It's a bit of a follow-up from Jim's question. Given the view you have on the future for global institutions, what hope have we in the more important issue of nuclear proliferation containment? North Korea, Iran, et cetera?

GE: Oh, dear. Well (Sigh), I mean, if we're in deep doo-doo on other fronts, we're in even deeper, I'm afraid, when it comes to the proliferation side of the house. I mean, how much of this would have been a dynamic at work anyway, without the stimulus of axis of evil talk, and without the stimulus of regime change talk and action from the U.S., which has led a lot of people to make the North Korean calculation that their best chance of immunity from future assaults is to have an armory big enough to frighten the potential intervener. There's not only all of that that's been at work, and we can all make our own judgments about how influential each of those stimuli have been for that result. But I mean, we're undoubtedly seeing a flurry of potential activity on a much greater scale with Iran and so on, than we've seen before. As a lot of people move to position themselves (sic). I think there's something else that's also seriously contributed to the nuclear proliferation problem, and that's just been the absolute indifference of the present nuclear weapons powers to their obligations and the nonproliferation treaty, and Article VI in particular. I mean, this is really, I think, at the heart of why the Indians did what they did. And Pakistanis inevitably followed. The obligation under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is, of course, for nuclear powers to commit themselves to eventual elimination. Not tomorrow, and a long way away, sure. But eventual. And to talk the talk of elimination and to create at least the psychological possibility in the potential proliferator's minds that the world would not go on being one in which the nuclear haves were in a certain club and everybody else was excluded from it. And in the context of India, and again, I was in India in the last few days talking to some of the key architects to that nuclear policy, it was from any other point of view, a totally irrational choice for the Indians to go down that particular path. With immediately achieved strategic parity with the Pakistanis, for god's sake, when they have massive conventional superiority. The anxiety that was articulated about the Chinese being a nuclear threat to them was, frankly, not credible as grounds for going nuclear. It was the psychological thing. We are just never going to be taken seriously as part of the big boy's club, because the big boy's club, the nuclear club, is committed in perpetuity to a view of the world being divided into the haves and the have-nots. And we're going to be players in that game. And I mean, this is something that's not a central part of a lot of the public debate on this, you get much more discussion about axis of evil and other more immediate stimuli. But I think the failure to take seriously, not only by the U.S., that's equally true of the other existing nuclear heads, has been terribly serious and debilitating in its impact on the larger proliferation objective. And then you combine the nuclear proliferation problem with the problems that exist, I mean, the chemical weapons treaty, which I had a lot to do with negotiating, was a great triumph and a great source of hope and confidence that we could move down, even in these very difficult areas, for inspection regimes and so on. I mean, the biological weapons convention has been notoriously inadequate in terms of its enforcement mechanisms. But for, again, and I have to say this was the U.S. alone, to take the position it did on the recent protocol argument and say, "Not only do we think this inadequate, this draft that's around, but we see no further point in any further negotiations to improve it" it just lifted ... it made a devastating impact on the global proliferation community. So I mean, the sense is out there that it's a free-for-all, and the sense is certainly out there that if you want to buy yourself any protection from the potential reach of this new global force for good (Sigh), you've got to get yourself armed pretty quickly. And I think that's what we're seeing in Iran, and we're certainly seeing it in North Korea.

BG: There's time for just one more answer. Why don't we stack up a couple of questions, and hand them all over? George(?), you had one, you still want to?

BG: Okay, sorry. Yes, Paula?

Audience: I would love to stand, but my crutch is on the other side of the room. I don't know that you can answer this in a minute-and-a-half, which I guess is what you have left. But what impact do you think a war with Iraq would have on the Israeli-Palestinian situation?

BG: And someone else there, Ron?

Audience: Hi, Ron Silver. If you can, I'd like to ask your thoughts from a slightly different perspective. There seems to be an unspoken premise that peace is always morally and practically preferable to war. Jacques Chirac says war is always a failure. It may be in the case of France, I'm no one to judge. But my question is this ... (Audience Noise) ... it suggests different moral options and practical options here. So I'm asking you, peace at what price? At what risk? Peace for how long? Peace on whose terms? So I guess what I'm asking you is for you to speculate on the risks of not going to war.

BG: The last one's just your neighbor there.

Audience: John Lichtblau. Do you see Iraq's oil production and potential playing a role in the U.S. and in the French positions right now, regarding the policies they've adopted, since Iraq is one of the two or three largest oil producers in the world? Thank you.

BG: Yeah, go ahead.

GE: Okay, well, in reverse order, on the subject of oil, no I don't think that is the major consideration. Others, I don't think it's a serious motivator for mainstream U.S. policy. It's a residual factor, it's a five percent sort of a factor in the mind of quite a few people. I don't think it's bigger than that for the U.S. The arguments cut both ways, anyway. And similarly, in terms of the commercial oil interests of the Russians and the French and so on, they'd be far better off, as I said before, coming along for a regime change ride in terms of maximizing those interests than they would be holding out against it. So whatever the demonstrators and conspiracy theorists around the place say, I really don't think that's a serious part of the explanation as compared with all the others. On the Israeli-Palestinian thing that Paula raised, I really think they're in separate boxes, completely separate boxes. I don't think it will help move forward the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem to clear the ground no Iraq. I mean, it might in terms of clearing the desks of some policy people in Washington who seem unwilling or unable to deal with more than one problem at a time. But in terms of actually creating greater incentives for Sharon to be more forthcoming, to create a sense in the Palestinian's minds that if they're not more cooperative and forthcoming, they'll get zapped, too. I mean, any of those alleged transmission belts, frankly are about as flimsy as the transmission belt argument for translating democratization in Iraq to a sweeping change of heart, mind in the region as a whole. I mean, I think it's an absolutely desolate situation in Israel, the Palestinians at the moment. It's a huge misplacement of priorities in terms of the war on terror, to be focusing on Iraq. Rather than that. You've only got to scratch anybody anywhere in the rest of the world, you don't always have to take these things at face value. But really, I mean, in terms of what engages their passions, it's that. In turn, and the combination of that in Iraq has been significant. But it's that that's the passionate trigger issue. There's only one way forward on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and that's road map plus. I mean, an absolute willingness to identify on the part of the U.S. and the other internationals, a blueprint which brings the political end game back to the front, doesn't make it hostage to the security and institutional reform issues, gives people hope from the Palestinian side that there's a future, gives hope on the Israeli side, other than in (Inaudible) that there's a future. And just let them get on with it, with the international pressure. And there's a lot more to be said about that, but I'm frankly, I think it's an excuse, not an explanation.

GE: And peace and war, (Sigh) let me get absolutely clear. I don't take the view that there's no such thing as a just war. I mean, I thought war in Bosnia was eminently defensible. War in Kosovo, eminently defensible. War in Rwanda, if only it had happened, eminently defensible. War in Iraq in '91, eminently defensible. I was Australian foreign minister at the time, and I was leading the cheer squad, you know, for that. Because breach of the international rules, unequivocal, critical need. And I was very dismissive of the negative voices there, I just didn't think the case was made. But those medieval theologians had something going for them. And similarly for the non-Christian versions of it in the rest of the world, when they talk about the just war criteria. I mean, there has to be a just cause. There has to be right intention, there has to be last resort, there has to be proportionality in delivery, there has to be right authority. And there really does have to be a balance of consequences that can give you some ground for confidence that going to war will produce more beneficial results than not going to war. Now here, I mean, it's possible to argue, depending on where you're coming from, that the results would be more beneficial in going to war now. In terms of the position of Iraq's own people, and certainly in terms of the confidence the rest of the world could have, the U.S. in particular, that there's never going to be any risk coming out of Iraq again. But (Sigh) the negative consequences, on the other side of the equation, the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction, which all the intelligence agencies, including here, are saying it's far greater in the context of going to war than not going to war. The risk of regional destabilization, which we've talked about. And the risk of giving global comfort and nourishment to the very forces that we're all most worried about, non-state terrorist forces. All of those consequences, stick up. Now, that doesn't mean you can just walk away from Iraq and let it go on doing its ugly thing and go back to the situation we had in the late nineties, where all bets were off, all pressures and constraints were off. That is absolutely not an option. The only possible non-war option is this containment, deterrence and diplomacy designed for ultimate regime change disarmament. Prob