Introduction

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) emerged in January 2009 through a union of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda, but jihadist antecedents in the region date back to the early 1990s when thousands of mujahedeen returned home from fighting the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. Headquartered in Yemen, AQAP has proven an ability to mobilize Muslims in the West such as Nidal Malik Hasan, responsible for killing thirteen at the U.S. Army's Fort Hood base in November 2009; Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the 2009 Christmas day bomber; and Faisal Shahzad, who attempted the 2010 Times Square bombing. However, the group's capacity to produce English-language propaganda was significantly degraded in September 2011 with the U.S. drone strike on Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born Yemeni cleric. President Barack Obama has described AQAP as "al-Qaeda's most active operational affiliate," echoing an acknowledgment from U.S. counterterrorism officials that the threat from AQAP has supplanted that of the al-Qaeda core (NYT).

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Months of political unrest in Yemen, including a popular effort to unseat longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh, have strained U.S.-Yemeni counterterrorism cooperation and called into question U.S. policy toward the fragile Gulf state. In May 2011, Washington called for Saleh to step down, but the Obama administration is loath to get drawn into a conflict that includes, in the words of one U.S. official, a "veritable stew" of warring tribal forces and rival military factions (WashPost). In December 2011, Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi announced the formation of a new unity government, which is expected to transfer power from Saleh after three months, but some skeptics question the authenticity of the deal. Meanwhile, the United States continues to expand its controversial campaign of targeted killings, and is constructing a secret network of drone bases (WashPost) in the region to kill top AQAP suspects in Yemen.

A Legacy of Jihad

Yemen has long had "powerful Islamist and jihadist movements" (CNN), notes Fawaz A. Gerges, a professor at London University. "There's a reason why Yemenis in Guantanamo make up the largest core contingent; there's a reason why so many Yemenis have gone to Iraq," adds Barak Barfi, a research fellow with the New America Foundation."There is a fertile radical environment."

In the late 1980s, the Saleh regime helped incubate jihad in what was then North Yemen, welcoming home thousands of nationals who had left to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Many of these jihadists returned to take up arms against the secular, socialist government in then-South Yemen. Some of them were eventually integrated into the Saleh regime, while others were deployed in the post-unification years to battle secessionist forces in the south. These fighters were joined by some Arab veterans of the Afghan war who were denied reentry into their own countries by governments worried about integrating battle-hardened fighters into society. Osama bin Laden was foremost among these veterans advocating for Yemen's central role in global jihad. A corps of jihadists who had trained under bin Laden in Afghanistan formed the militant group known as Islamic Jihad in Yemen (1990-1994), one of several jihadist predecessors to AQAP. Others such groups include the Army of Aden Abyan (1994-1998), and al-Qaeda in Yemen or AQY (1998-2003).

In October 2000, a skiff piloted by two members of AQY exploded several hundred pounds of explosives into the hull of the USS Cole that was moored in the port of Aden, killing seventeen U.S. servicemen. Two years later, another suicide bombing orchestrated by AQY on the French oil tanker M/V Limburg (LATimes) further highlighted the threat to Western interests in the region. Several of the militants involved in the Limburg plot would eventually hold top leadership positions in AQAP.

Following the Cole bombing and the al-Qaeda-led attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration pushed the Saleh government to begin carrying out aggressive counterterrorism operations against AQY, including allowing U.S. Special Forces and intelligence personnel in country to aid the campaign. A U.S. drone strike in 2002, the first such U.S. operation in the region, killed AQY's leader, Abu Ali al-Harithi (BBC); and by the end of 2003 al-Qaeda in Yemen faced a precipitous decline. However, most experts believe Saleh's "commitment to combating extremism is mercurial," notes a Congressional Research Service report. Reports of several instances of militant releases or "escapes" added to speculation that Saleh was playing a double game (Australian).

Resurrection

In February 2006, twenty-three convicted terrorists escaped from a high-security prison in Sanaa. The jailbreak marked a critical turning point for al-Qaeda in the region, as many of the escapees worked to "resurrect al-Qaeda from the ashes" (PDF) and launch a fresh campaign of attacks against a variety of targets.

In late 2008, a successful crackdown by the Saudi government led remnants of the local al-Qaeda franchise to flee across the border and unite with a resurgent jihad in Yemen. By 2009, the two branches formally merged under the banner of AQAP (BBC). "The merger effectively transformed al-Qaeda from a local chapter to a regional franchise," says Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen, "and moved it one step closer toward becoming a group capable of global action."

AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous other attacks in the region since 2006. These have included the failed August 2009 assassination attempt (NYT) on Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef; an attack on the U.S. embassy in Sanaa in 2008; attacks on Italian and British embassies; suicide bombings (CNN) of Korean tourists in March 2009 and Belgian tourists in January 2008; four oil pipeline bombings; attacks on several oil facilities; and the bombing of a Japanese oil tanker (CBC) in April 2008.

Realizing the strength of AQAP recruitment campaigns, in January 2010, the Obama administration announced it would suspend the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay to Yemen. Yemenis account for 116 of the 779 inmates that have been detained at Guantanamo Bay (NYT)--behind only Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.

An Effective Propaganda

The primary goals of AQAP are consistent with the principles of militant jihad, which aims to purge Muslim countries of Western influence and replace secular "apostate" governments with fundamentalist Islamic regimes operating under sharia law. Associated AQAP objectives include overthrowing the Saleh regime; assassinating Western nationals and their allies, including members of the Saudi royal family; striking at related interests in the region such as embassies and energy concerns; and attacking the United States.

Richard Barrett, a top UN expert on al-Qaeda (al-Jazeera), says AQAP's "main objectives are local," adding that attacking the economic infrastructure in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, can serve dual aims: weakening the West as well as the Saudi government.

AQAP presents itself as the most genuine advocate of Yemeni discontent with the political status quo, despite a diverse constellation of opposition groups. A 2011 report from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, says the group displays an impressive talent for message control, "assimilating broadly popular grievances into a single narrative in which jihad remains the only solution to the country's multiple crises."

But the group has suffered some losses in recent years that might affect its ability to reach out to Muslims in the West, say experts. Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan (LongWarJournal), central to the organization's production of English-language jihadist propaganda, were killed in an October 2011 U.S. drone strike in Yemen.

Leadership and Funding

In a 2010 counterterrorism policy paper, Barfi notes that AQAP is hierarchical (PDF), compartmentalized, and highly decentralized, allowing it to withstand attacks and arrests and still continue to operate. The group has also mastered recruitment through propaganda and media campaigns. A bimonthly AQAP magazine, Sada al-Malahim (the Echo of Battles), is tailored to a Yemeni audience and offers theological explanations and praise for jihadists.

AQAP is often cited as the jihadist franchise ideologically closest to the al-Qaeda core (Stratfor) due to many of its members' history with Osama bin Laden. Nasir al Wuhayshi, the organization's leader, served as bin Laden's chief personal secretary. Wuhayshi was rumored killed in August 2011, but his death remains unconfirmed. Bill Roggio of the Long War Journal reports that under Wuhayshi's orders, AQAP created Ansar al Sharia, the political front for its operations in Yemen. U.S. intelligence officials have also said that, if alive, Wuhayshi would be a "top contender" to assume command of al-Qaeda's global network should its leadership in Pakistan suffer defeat.

It remains difficult to accurately count AQAP's membership--some experts say a few hundred individuals--because attacks are often misattributed for political or logistical reasons. Financing for the al-Qaeda network as a whole, according to U.S. officials, comes from a variety of sources, including bank robberies, kidnappings, drug proceeds, and phony charities. A December 2009 classified memo from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated donors in Saudi Arabia as "the most significant source" of funding to Sunni terrorist groups (NYT), including al-Qaeda.

A Future Haven?

Yemen faces a profound set of political and economic challenges in 2011 that will shape the threat posed by AQAP in the coming years. According to the Congressional Research Service, 43 percent of the country's 23 million people live in poverty. President Saleh, in office for over three decades, remains weak in the tribal areas outside the capital and administers a regime largely dependent on foreign aid. An intermittent insurgency led by Shiite tribesmen from the north and an independence movement in the once-autonomous south beset the central government with a host of security challenges. Limited natural resources (including fresh water), low literacy rates, high unemployment, and rapid population growth put Yemen at great risk of becoming a failed state.

Some analysts fear the recent months of unrest, which included an assassination attempt on Saleh, could throw Yemen into a state of chaos and provide AQAP with an ideal environment in which to recruit and expand operations--a scenario Saleh himself often recites (FT). Writing in Foreign Affairs, British analyst James Spencer refutes this hypothesis, stating Saleh has used the "specter of al-Qaeda" for years to gain political and financial support from the United States and Saudi Arabia. Adding, "Yemen's tribes and AQAP have far more potential points of friction than they do common cause."

However, Ali Soufan, a former FBI agent who investigated the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, told CFR he is concerned that AQAP may be adopting a strategy similar to that of al-Qaeda in Iraq--where jihadists co-opted the grievances of local Sunnis in order to ingratiate themselves. "They are becoming part of the fabric of the society in the south," he says, where there is longstanding animosity with the Saleh government.

The Countering Terrorism Center says that while AQAP may gain greater operational latitude in some parts of the country, other opposition groups, "virtually all of whom enjoy far more support than AQAP" will serve as natural offsets to al-Qaeda and help marginalize their jihadist message.

U.S. Policy in Yemen

The United States had minimal focus on AQAP, and Yemen in general, until the attacks on the USS Cole and the subsequent events of 9/11. In the wake of the failed Christmas Day plot, the Obama administration ordered a major review of U.S. policy toward Yemen that led to a three-fold strategy: focusing on combating AQAP in the short term, increasing development assistance in the long term, and organizing international support for stabilization efforts.

In January 2010, the Obama administration officially designated AQAP a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and several leaders of the organization have subsequently been placed on U.S. State Department sanctions list (UPI). The sanctions attempt to disrupt the network of financial support for terrorists and terrorist organizations.

While the United States has collaborated with Yemen on counterterrorism for a number of years, the Saleh regime's violent crackdown on protestors in 2011 has strained this relationship to the breaking point. Events culminated in May with the U.S. backing of a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative that would see Saleh transfer power within months. Despite the political turmoil associated with regime change, U.S. officials have stated they expect counterterrorism operations in Yemen to continue in a post-Saleh Yemen (AFP). The U.S. campaign of targeted killings of AQAP members is likely to expand with the construction of several secret drone bases in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa.

In a CFR Policy Innovation Memorandum, Gregory Johnsen says, "U.S. policy is adrift," and suggests increased drone strikes are, "at best, a delaying tactic." He advocates conditioning U.S. and GCC economic aid on Saleh's departure; a greater use of soft power, such as public relations campaigns, to undermine AQAP rhetoric; and the establishment of a special international fund to help stabilize the Yemeni economy post-Saleh.

A report (PDF) from the Strategic Studies Institute says the United States should not send major combat units into Yemen to target AQAP, as it would only make things "dramatically worse."

In the long term, Soufan says, "You have to counter the [al-Qaeda] narrative, the ideology." You need to prevent them "from becoming part of opposition society."

The Countering Terrorism Center says no policy will rid the jihadist threat in Yemen entirely, but that "a victory in Yemen (PDF) would transform an intolerably high risk of terror attack against the U.S. homeland into a more manageable one." It notes that reducing the group's threat to the United States in the mid- to long term requires "removing the group's founding leadership."

--Julie Cohn contributed to this report.