AGOA: The U.S.-Africa Trade Program

Introduction

The African Growth and Opportunity Act, or AGOA, has been the cornerstone of U.S. efforts to cultivate deeper economic relations with sub-Saharan Africa since 2000. The program offers thirty-two countries preferential access to the U.S. market by eliminating import tariffs. In 2024, more than $8 billion in African exports entered the United States under the program.

Policymakers hoped that AGOA, as the primary U.S. trade policy for the region, would foster economic and political development in Africa, the world’s fastest-growing continent in both economy and population. For many years, the outsized role of crude oil in African export growth raised questions about whether AGOA can diversify the region’s economies and increase its competitiveness in global markets. While crude oil still accounts for 25 percent of AGOA imports today, it has witnessed a significant decline. On the contrary, Americans have increasingly purchased clothing, cars, and cocoa, among other products from African countries.

Despite some positive trends, imports from AGOA countries continue to make up less than 1 percent of all U.S. imports. Meanwhile, African trade relationships with other countries, particularly China, have greatly expanded, adding urgency to debate in the U.S. Congress over whether to renew the program for the fifth time.

Why was AGOA created?

AGOA is a trade preference program established in 2000 as part of broader legislation President Bill Clinton enacted to strengthen U.S. trade ties with Africa and the Caribbean. The act is unilateral, meaning it does not require African countries to lower their own barriers to U.S. goods, though it encourages them to do so. Clinton saw the policy as a way to boost growth and bolster democratic ideals across the continent. He also said it would strengthen the U.S. economy by opening markets with “hundreds of millions of potential consumers” to American producers and help African countries develop and diversify their economies.

The act is an extension of the Generalized System of Preferences, a U.S. trade preference system introduced in 1974 that allows more than one hundred countries, mostly low-income, to export many of their goods to the United States duty-free. AGOA goes even further, offering preferential access to an additional 1,800 products to its 32 current participants. It also mandates the executive branch to increase U.S. development assistance to sub-Saharan African countries in areas including agriculture and HIV/AIDS prevention. It was set to expire in 2008 but has since been renewed four times.

Which countries take part in it?

Only sub-Saharan African countries are eligible to be beneficiaries of AGOA, and the legislation outlines requirements candidates must fulfill, such as making progress towards market-based economies and upholding the rule of law and human rights. Simultaneously, ineligibility criteria provide assurances to potential investors by ensuring that AGOA countries do not nationalize or expropriate property of U.S. citizens and companies, ignore arbitrational awards, or grant preferential treatment to developed economies in a way that would harm the United States.

Of the forty-nine potential beneficiaries in the region, thirty-two countries currently take part. Seventeen countries are ineligible, including Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Somalia formally requested to join AGOA only in 2023, while Sudan has not requested AGOA preferences. Eligibility is reviewed annually through an interagency review process.

While U.S. presidents can terminate countries’ eligibility at their discretion—and have done so, citing reasons such as human rights violations and protectionist policies—AGOA benefits can also be suspended or limited. In 2024, President Joe Biden removed the Central African Republic and Uganda for human rights violations, and Gabon and Niger for failures to protect political pluralism and the rule of law amid coups d’états. Mauritania, meanwhile, regained its status that same year for its “measurable progress on worker rights and eliminating forced labor.”

Participants can also graduate out of AGOA [PDF] if their per capita gross national income reaches a level that the World Bank considers high income. To date, Equatorial Guinea and Seychelles have done so.

How has the program fared?

AGOA received strong bipartisan support early on, with policymakers and trade officials pointing to a spike in U.S. imports of African goods as proof of its success. In the decade after the program began, exports from AGOA countries to the United States nearly tripled, rising from $22 billion to $61 billion in 2010. That year, Rosa Whitaker, a former assistant U.S. trade representative for Africa, called AGOA a “phenomenal success,” saying it had created more than 300,000 jobs on the continent, while the nonprofit African Coalition for Trade estimated in 2012 that up to 1.3 million jobs [PDF] were created indirectly.

Some analysts say the program has also helped several African countries diversify their economies. For example, South Africa ramped up its automotive exports to the United States from $150 million in 2000 to a high of $2.2 billion in 2013. A unique feature of AGOA are rules on apparel and textiles, which have provided significant economic opportunities. A 2023 U.S. International Trade Commission report highlights those rules have allowed many countries to develop their manufacturing capacity in that sector. Apparel production also grew, particularly in East Africa.  The most AGOA-related jobs were generated in this sector, according to the Brookings Institution. Importantly, across beneficiaries, 75 to 90 percent [PDF] of apparel jobs went to impoverished women.

However, some experts say U.S.-Africa trade relations remain underdeveloped. After the initial jump in the first decade of the program, peaking at a high of $66 billion in 2008, exports gradually fell close to their 2000 level by the mid-2010s. While exports had only slowly begun to recover, they dipped again in 2024. Diversification has also lagged, both in terms of products and countries. While oil and gas have dominated AGOA exports since 2001, nearly 90 percent of the non-energy U.S. imports from Africa in 2022 came from just five countries: Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, and South Africa. Of these, South Africa contributed the majority of those exports, at more than 56 percent in 2021. Additionally, less than 1 percent of total imports to the United States in 2023 came from sub-Saharan Africa; by comparison, the region made up nearly 4 percent of China’s imports and roughly the same portion of those for the European Union (EU).

The reasons for why U.S.-Africa trade has not grown as much as it was hoped “comes down to challenges with preference utilization among some countries, a lack of national AGOA strategies, and inconsistent application of eligibility requirements,” Inu Manak, CFR senior fellow on trade, told CFR.  

Overcoming administrative hurdles to meet AGOA standards is particularly burdensome for small and medium-sized enterprises, which make up 95 percent of the continent’s business ecosystem, but often lack the capital, technical expertise, and infrastructure necessary to certify compliance even when exporters and firms are aware of potential AGOA benefits. A lack of awareness of AGOA’s benefits and misalignment between an AGOA country’s top products and AGOA-covered goods also present headaches for African firms.

Utilization rates are correlated with overall country participation in AGOA; countries with utilization rates lower than 40 percent exported less than $1 million worth of covered products to the United States and utilization rates were higher in countries with national AGOA strategies in place.

AGOA was not intended to be permanent, but rather “designed as a stepping stone to a more mature trade relationship.” At its inception, AGOA was widely viewed as a first step toward permanent free-trade agreements (FTAs), which would provide additional certainty for investors by locking in trade benefits.

However, Washington has not concluded any FTAs with sub-Saharan African countries. Although it held negotiations [PDF] with the members of the Southern African Customs Union—Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa—those fell through in 2006, in part due to disagreements over intellectual property rights and foreign investment rules. During President Donald Trump’s first term, the United States began drafting an FTA with Kenya, but that deal was set aside under Biden in favor of the U.S.–Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership in 2022, a narrower framework that aimed to improve several areas of economic collaboration, but without discussing market access. Now, in his second term, Trump has focused on reciprocal tariffs rather than free trade agreements with African nations.

What are the criticisms of the program?

Enthusiasm for AGOA among U.S. policymakers has faltered in recent years. In addition to worries about falling exports, there are concerns about Africa’s continued dependence on low-value-added products and natural resources; few beneficiaries have moved into the value-added manufacturing the legislation hoped to spur.

International trade experts Witney Schneidman, Kate McNulty, and Natalie Dicharry point to the dominance of a handful of the program’s participants to argue that both the United States and many of its AGOA counterparts have failed to use the program effectively. Only eighteen AGOA participants have crafted national strategies for taking advantage of the program, they say, signaling that the program’s goal of driving African economic development is falling short.

CFR President Michael Froman, who was U.S. trade representative under President Barack Obama, has said that obstacles, including corruption and poor infrastructure, have hindered the competitiveness of African producers and limited the program’s success. Other experts say the program lacks provisions to help U.S. exporters and investors compete with their counterparts in Europe and elsewhere.

Additionally, AGOA does not include fast-growing sectors such as digital and financial services. In recent years, analysts have called on the United States to push for more private-sector investment to take advantage of the region’s economic growth, which was higher than the global average over the fifteen years after AGOA was implemented. However, sub-Saharan Africa’s recovery from multiple global shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic, has been sluggish compared to other regions, and growth remains muted.

Critics also note that removing countries for human rights abuses does little to help the communities affected. When Ethiopia, previously one of the biggest AGOA beneficiaries, lost its eligibility status in 2022 over conflict in the country’s north, it lost more than one hundred thousand jobs and did not cease hostilities. Experts say these expulsions could push countries to strengthen trade ties with other powers; some Ethiopian business leaders, for instance, have argued in favor of moving closer to China, given Beijing’s no-strings-attached approach to investment.

Recognizing that the U.S. economic relationship with Africa had fallen behind, in 2016, the U.S. Trade Representative issued a report examining how U.S. policy could move beyond AGOA, and outlined six strategic and structural options for the United States to pursue to deepen U.S.-Africa trade and investment ties. Those included: supporting regional economic integration on the continent; creating more stable, reciprocal arrangements; supporting Africa’s export diversification and value added in production; broadening domestic reforms to help economic growth and poverty alleviation; integrating African countries into the global trading system; and raising standards while acknowledging capacity constraints in some countries.

How have other countries approached trade in Africa?

China-Africa trade has soared since 2000, with China surpassing the United States as the largest single trade partner in 2009. Through August 2025, China exported $141 billion in goods and services to the continent while importing only $81 billion—nearly a two-to-one imbalance. Chinese exports are on track to exceed $200 billion for the first time, largely in manufactured goods. Analysts attribute the surge in Chinese sales partly to Trump’s tariffs, which restricted access to the U.S. market. At the same time, Beijing granted zero-tariff treatment to imports from fifty-three African countries, a step some say reinforces its image as a reliable partner for Africa’s growth.

China also maintains special trade and economic cooperation zones in several sub-Saharan countries, and has provided more than $150 billion in development loans to the continent since 2000. Additionally, all but a handful of sub-Saharan countries are part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Analysts have raised concerns, however, over the high levels of debt that some African countries have taken on as a result of Chinese financing. But an economic slump and growing political tensions have caused some of China’s financial flows to ebb, and the International Monetary Fund has warned that Africa’s dependence on China could lead to economic vulnerabilities. 

The EU, another major trade partner, has signed economic agreements with regional blocs in western, eastern, and southern Africa in which both sides offer preferential treatment on tariffs for certain goods. It also has trade partnerships with more than a dozen individual countries, including Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, and negotiations of other regional deals are underway. Since the African Union’s 2019 launch of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), a trade bloc consisting of nearly every African country, the EU has touted plans to eventually reach a continent-to-continent free trade agreement. Some analysts, however, say that bringing such a deal to fruition would require the bloc to remedy its asymmetrical trade relationships with African partners by evening the playing field and opening more of its protected markets.

Other countries in Asia, such as India, Japan, and South Korea, have expanded their presence in sub-Saharan Africa as well. India’s trade with the region saw a twenty-five-fold increase from 2000 to 2023, reaching $82 billion, alongside surges in private investment in telecommunications, information technology, and energy.

What is the future of AGOA?

Congress last renewed AGOA in 2015. The program’s fate, especially given the recent shift towards a high-tariff trade policy, is unclear, experts say. 

The Biden administration called on Congress to modernize the existing program, but failed to take any meaningful steps until June 2024, when then USTR Katherine Tai released a report that she touted as “a starting point” for discussions to update the program, leaving little time for action in Biden’s remaining months in office. Under Trump, both the administration and Congress have also given AGOA little attention, with current USTR Jamieson Greer calling the preference program “a giveaway.”

Trump’s reciprocal tariffs have also dampened AGOA’s effectiveness. On April 2, 2025, Trump announced sweeping tariffs, including a baseline 10 percent duty on all U.S. imports, and higher “reciprocal tariffs” on more than ninety countries. South Africa and Nigeria, the top two exporters of AGOA products to the United States, faced tariff rates of 30 percent and 14 percent, respectively, effectively negating AGOA’s duty-free treatment. Lesotho was originally hit with the highest tariff rate, at 50 percent, before being modified in August 2025 to 15 percent. However, the original announcement generated both panic and confusion, leading to layoffs and uncertainty in Lesotho’s apparel sector. Estimating the impact of lapsing AGOA benefits in 2018, the World Bank found that Lesotho would suffer a 1 percent drop in income and a 16 percent drop in exports of apparel and textiles.

Trump framed these actions as part of an effort to achieve “economic independence,” citing perceived unfair trade practices and persistent U.S. trade deficits. The United States had a $13.2 billion deficit with AGOA countries in 2023—a small part of the overall U.S. trade deficit, which stood at $773.4 billion. However, imbalances with AGOA partners primarily reflect structural differences, leading experts to argue that letting the act expire would do little to fix the trade balance. Furthermore, “since the average GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa is $1,561, it is hard to imagine how those countries can consume more from the United States unless their incomes can grow through additional export opportunities,” Manak said. “Reducing their exports will ultimately lead them to consume less and do little to address the trade deficit.”

The AfCFTA could play a major role in AGOA’s path forward, described by some as “one of the most significant developments to have taken place on the continent since AGOA was last renewed in 2015.” Proponents say the agreement, signed by all of the African Union’s fifty-five member states except Eritrea, will boost regional trade by forming a single market and creating millions of jobs across the continent.

In light of this, some analysts have suggested that Washington should use AfCFTA as the foundation for talks to create a new strategic economic partnership rather than renewing AGOA. Others have called for incremental reforms, such as proposals with bipartisan support in the Senate to adjust AGOA’s rules of origin to include inputs from North African AfCFTA countries,  extend AGOA benefits until 2041, streamline the eligibility process, leverage intra-African supply chains, and provide support for enhanced utilization of preferences.

The 2023 AGOA Forum, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, exemplified the debate over AGOA’s future and the tensions between the United States and its African partners; U.S. lawmakers, frustrated with South Africa over its alleged ties with Russia amid the war in Ukraine, unsuccessfully lobbied to move the summit location. Some say that South Africa’s continued AGOA eligibility could complicate the reauthorization process. Other challenges include concerns over labor, environmental protections, and the scope of the program.

Supporters of the program, meanwhile, say it is crucial to U.S. efforts to remain competitive with other global powers, such as China and Russia. They warn that allowing AGOA to lapse could undermine U.S. minerals diplomacy in Africa, where China and emerging middle powers, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, are expanding their influence—and where five AGOA beneficiaries collectively hold around fifty high-grade rare earths deposits. At the same time, domestic critics see opportunity for reform in AGOA’s next decade, including more market access for U.S. exporters and greater diplomatic support for U.S. priorities.