Tens of thousands of Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans, many of them unaccompanied minors, have arrived in the United States in recent years, seeking asylum from the region’s skyrocketing violence. Their countries, which form a region known as the Northern Triangle, were rocked by civil wars in the 1980s, leaving a legacy of violence and fragile institutions.
The region remains menaced by corruption, drug trafficking, and gang violence despite tough police and judicial reforms. While the United States has provided the three governments billions of dollars in aid over the past decade, some analysts believe U.S. immigration policies have exacerbated threats to regional security.
How many people have left the Northern Triangle in recent years?
The number of asylum seekers originating from the Northern Triangle reached 110,000 in 2015, a five-fold increase from 2012. Unaccompanied minors accounted for much of this surge [PDF]. Migrants from all three countries cite violence, forced gang recruitment, and extortion, as well as poverty and lack of opportunity, as their reasons for leaving. While Belize, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama have reported a sharp increase in flows from the Northern Triangle since 2008, most migrants are passing through to settle in the United States. In 2015, the latest year for which data is available, as many as 3.4 million people born in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were living in the United States, more than double the estimated 1.5 million people in 2000. About 55 percent of them were undocumented.
Why are so many people fleeing the Northern Triangle?
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras consistently rank among the most violent countries in the world. El Salvador became the world’s most violent country not at war in 2015, when gang-related violence brought its homicide rate to 103 per hundred thousand. It has since fallen by one third. Nevertheless, all three countries have significantly higher homicide rates than neighboring Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama.
Extortion is also rampant. A 2015 investigation by Honduran newspaper La Prensa found that Salvadorans and Hondurans pay an estimated $390 million, $200 million, and $61 million, respectively, in annual extortion fees to organized crime groups. Extortionists primarily target public transportation operators, small businesses, and residents of poor neighborhoods, according to the report, and attacks on people who do not pay contribute to the violence.
What causes the violence?
The nature of the violence is distinct in each country, but the proliferation of gangs, narcotics trafficking, weak rule of law, and official corruption are common threads.
Organized crime is a legacy of decades of war in the region, notes a CFR special report. In El Salvador, fighting between the military-led government and leftist guerrilla groups (1979–92) left as many as seventy-five thousand dead, and Guatemala’s civil war (1960–96) killed as many as two hundred thousand civilians. Honduras did not have a civil war of its own, but nonetheless felt the effects of nearby conflicts; it served as a staging ground for the U.S.-backed Contras, a right-wing rebel group fighting Nicaragua’s Sandinista government during the 1980s.
At war’s end, a large pool of demobilized and unemployed men with easy access to weapons morphed into organized criminal groups, most notably in El Salvador. In Guatemala, groups known as illegal clandestine security apparatuses and clandestine security apparatuses grew out of state intelligence and military forces.
Criminal groups in the Northern Triangle includes transnational criminal organizations, many of which are associated with Mexican drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs); domestic organized-crime groups; transnational gangs, or maras, such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the Eighteenth Street Gang (M-18); and pandillas, or street gangs.
MS-13 and M-18, the region’s largest gangs, are estimated to have as many as eighty-five thousand members [PDF] in total. Both were formed in Los Angeles: M-18 in the 1960s by Mexican youth, and MS-13 in the 1980s by Salvadorans who had fled the civil war. Their presence in Central America grew in the mid-1990s following large-scale deportations from the United States of undocumented immigrants with criminal records. The Federal Bureau of Investigation estimates there are ten thousand MS-13 members in the United States.
Drug trafficking adds to the violence. U.S.-led interdiction efforts in Colombia, Mexico, and the Caribbean have pushed trafficking routes into Central America, and U.S. officials report that 90 percent of documented cocaine flows into the United States now pass through the region. DTOs sometimes partner with maras to transport and distribute narcotics, sparking turf wars. In addition to the drug trade and extortion, criminal groups in the region also profit from kidnapping for ransom and human trafficking and smuggling.
Why has violence persisted?
Weak, underfunded institutions, combined with corruption, have undermined efforts to address gang violence and extortion. Tax revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in the Northern Triangle are among the lowest in Latin America, exacerbating inequality and straining public services. Transparency International, a global anticorruption watchdog, places all three countries in the bottom half of its corruption perceptions rankings. Honduran institutions remain particularly shaky following a 2009 coup—Latin America’s first in nearly two decades—and a contested presidential election in 2017.
As many as 95 percent of crimes go unpunished [PDF] in some areas, and the public has little trust in the police and security forces. (The police and military were accused of widespread human rights abuses during El Salvador’s and Guatemala’s civil wars.) “There has been so much penetration of the state and so much criminal involvement in security forces, it makes it difficult to think about how they would [reform] without some outside intervention,” says Eric Olson, an expert on the region at the Wilson Center.
How have Northern Triangle countries tried to stop the violence?
In the early 2000s, Northern Triangle governments enacted a series of mano dura, or “heavy hand,” policies that expanded police powers and enacted harsher punishments for gang members. Around the same time, military personnel were deployed [PDF] to carry out police functions.
Though popular [PDF], these policies in most cases failed to reduce crime and could have indirectly led to a growth in gang membership. Mass incarcerations increased the burden on already overcrowded prisons, where gangs, which effectively run many of them, recruited thousands of new members. The U.S. State Department, human rights groups, and journalists have raised concerns about these policies, denouncing prison conditions and police violence against civilians.
In 2012, Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes’s administration helped broker a truce between the MS-13 and M-18 gangs. Homicides fell by more than 40 percent that year. Despite the reduction in violence between the gangs, crimes against civilians, such as extortion, continued unabated, and when the peace deal unraveled in 2014, killings more than doubled. The government of Funes’s successor, President Salvador Sanchez Ceren, granted authorities the right to use force “without any fear of suffering consequences,” leading police to kill eight times as many gang members in 2015 as in 2013. In 2016, these mano dura tactics were given congressional backing with the creation of elite police units with extraordinary leeway to conduct searches and seizures and invoke the military. While El Salvador’s homicide rate has since declined by nearly 25 percent, it remains eleven times higher than that of the United States.
Guatemala saw major gains thanks in part to the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), an independent body created by the United Nations in 2007 to investigate and prosecute criminal groups believed to have infiltrated state institutions. Between 2009 and 2012, impunity levels fell [PDF] from 95 percent to 72 percent, according to CICIG, and in 2015 the tribunal worked with Guatemala’s attorney general on an investigation into a customs corruption scheme that led to the ouster and arrest of President Otto Perez Molina. In a sign of disillusionment with Guatemala’s political class, voters in 2015 elected Jimmy Morales, a comedian with no prior political experience, to the presidency. Two years later, Morales found himself mired in scandal after failing to account for more than $800,000 in campaign financing and attempting to oust the head of the CICIG. While the body remains active, the government has instructed it to “refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the country.”
In Honduras, allegations that members of the ruling National Party embezzled social security funds led protesters to call for the ouster of President Juan Orlando Hernandez in 2015. In response, the Organization of American States established the Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH), a body similar to CICIG that seeks to prevent corruption, reform the criminal justice and electoral systems, and improve public safety. The anticorruption body’s authority was called into question following alleged fraud in Hernandez’ 2017 reelection, prompting several members of MACCIH to resign.
How has the United States responded?
The United States has traditionally addressed violence in Central America by sending aid to the region’s law enforcement agencies, supporting rule-of-law programs, and assisting in counternarcotics and anti-gang operations. Increasingly, U.S. initiatives are also looking to address the region’s broader challenges, including poverty and a lack of competitiveness.
Between the fiscal years 2008 and 2017, the United States gave just over $3 billion through an aid package focused on security and the rule of law called the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), as well as the Alliance for Prosperity (A4P). Created by the Inter-American Development Bank and the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in response to the 2014 influx into the United States of unaccompanied minors, A4P is a five-year plan [PDF] to boost economic growth, promote job creation and training, improve public safety, and strengthen institutions. Northern Triangle leaders have committed $5.4 billion since 2015, with the United States contributing the remaining 20 percent of its annual costs. President Donald J. Trump’s administration has committed to making A4P “a pillar of its broader strategy to combat illegal immigration.” However, some experts say the United States contributes to regional violence with its relatively lax gun laws and its practice of deporting thousands of criminals back to Northern Triangle countries.
In 2016, amid a new rush of arrivals from the region, U.S. authorities began to round up and deport recently arrived immigrants whose asylum claims had been denied. President Barack Obama’s administration said that its aim was to deter would-be migrants. In Trump’s first year in office, anti-immigration rhetoric and increased border security contributed to a decrease in attempted border crossings; 2017 saw a 72 percent drop in apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border of families from the Northern Triangle from the year prior.
At the same time, the administration has taken a hard line against undocumented immigrants within the United States, increasing arrests and deportations. In January 2018, the Trump administration denied Salvadorans an extension of their temporary protected status (TPS), a designation that allows undocumented immigrants from countries that have experienced natural disasters or war the ability to live and work legally in the United States. Originally granted TPS in 2001 following two devastating earthquakes, nearly two hundred thousand Salvadorans face deportation in September 2019. Of them, 61 percent have at least one U.S.-born child. Many fear that some eighty-six thousand Hondurans will be next to lose their temporary protected status.