The Future of the IMF: A Reform Agenda

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The IMF is in something of a funk. IMF warnings are rarely heeded. Voting weights on the IMF board no longer reflect countries’ current economic clout, calling into question its legitimacy as a referee of global problems. Calls for regional institutions to address regional financial problems are growing. A key source of the IMF influence in the 1990s and early years of this decade – its ability to lend out its pot of reserves to countries in need – seems less relevant to a world where many emerging market economies have too many reserves, not too few, and spend too little, not too much. Barry Eichengreen captured the IMF’s current malaise well when he called that IMF a “rudderless ship adrift in sea of liquidity.”

There is no doubt that the IMF needs to evolve along with the global economy. There also should be little doubt that a global economy needs a strong IMF. The policy choices of every country, acting on its own, or the actions of individual market participants, looking out for their own immediate interests, can put international monetary and financial stability at risk. A global institution like the IMF is needed to:

- Identify potentially dangerous imbalances in the global economy early on, and encourage countries to take action to reduce those imbalances. If imbalances do reach dangerous levels, the IMF can help to ensure a coordinated global response to large imbalances, since an effective policy response can require adjustments in both debtor countries (right now, the US) and creditor countries.
- Serve as referee for disputes over exchange rates. The IMF needs to assure that countries do not use their exchange rate policies to prevent necessary adjustments to the global current account; the likely alternative to a global referee is unilateral action, and growing protectionism.
- Coordinate the provision of crisis liquidity – conditioned on necessary policy adjustments -- when the uncoordinated actions of market participants results in liquidity runs that could give rise to costly crises. Crises in major emerging economies can impact the entire world, not just the individual country and its creditors. Plus, by lending when others cannot and thus helping to shape the policies adopted by a debtor in default, the IMF can help to coordinate a sovereign debt restructuring.

So long as the IMF shareholders, management and staff do not shy away from taking on the core problems of the global economy, the IMF will remain at the center of cooperative attempts to address global financial problems.

Most key players in the global economy are likely to conclude that a reformed global institution capable of delivering global solutions is preferable to regional solutions. Countries’ financial defenses are not tested when global growth is strong, global interest rates are unusually low and private capital is flowing to emerging economies, but rather when growth slows, interest rates rise and private capital flows out. The IMF should be taking advantage of this period of calm to update its lending policies. And the resolution of global imbalances requires more, not less, IMF surveillance.

Each of these points is worth exploring in more depth.
Regionalism is an unattractive substitute for reformed global institutions

Asia is threatening to create an Asian Monetary Fund; the U.S. seems to be disillusioned with multilateral institutions, often preferring unilateralism; Europe is turning inward, preoccupied with its own problems. A world where Asian economies work together to take care of financial troubles in Asia, Western Europe protects the accession countries in Eastern Europe and the US unilaterally responds to trouble in Latin America and the strategically important Middle East is not impossible to imagine.

That is a world where global institutions like the IMF would be marginalized. Its remit, in practice if not in theory, would be limited to countries that fall outside the orbit of regional “financial” hegemon. The IMF would set the macroeconomic policy framework for African countries dependent on concessional aid flows from the G-7 and other rich countries, but do little else. The activities of the IMF and World Bank would become harder and harder to distinguish from each other.

This vision has serious problems. Its “architecture” leaves truly global problems unaddressed, at a time when a truly global problem – the so called global imbalances – looms over the world economy. The surpluses that finance the unprecedented US external deficit are found all over the globe -- in Asia, in places with lots of oil, and even in some European countries. Coordinated global efforts to stimulate demand in all surplus regions would make it easier to bring down the US deficit – provided, of course, that the US is also willing to take steps to reduce its need for external financing.

Moreover, relying on regional hegemons and institutions to solve regional financial problems is not without its difficulties. The United States’ first impulse when confronted with a crisis in its backyard – Mexico – was to take care of the problem on its own. But the Clinton Administration’s plan to have the US government guarantee a large Mexican bond issue ran into problems on Capitol Hill. The Clinton administration concluded that it was better to share the burden of crisis lending globally -- and worked hard to build up the IMF’s lending capacity, not the United States’ bilateral lending capacity. Ironically, the Bush Administration, generally no friend of multilateral institutions or standing alliances has through its actions, if not its rhetoric, recognized the wisdom of the multilateral approach. Look at the large IMF loans extended to Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Turkey. Europe’s own institutions for regional cooperation are well developed, but its institutions for extending rescue loans are not. Neither the Commission nor the ECB is set up in ways that would make the financial “bailout” current and future accession countries easy.

An Asian regional response to financial troubles in a major Asian economy poses even larger problems. Asia’s potential financial hegemons -- Japan and China – are themselves strategic rivals. Their capacity to act jointly remains untested. Asia likes to complaint about IMF conditionality, but it is not clear that either Japan or China – both traditionally stingy lenders on a bilateral basis – would be prepared to lend $20 billion to an Asian country in distress without strict conditions; yet concerns about regional
solidarity may make imposing tough conditions on one Asian country by another
difficult. Continuing to outsource crisis conditionality to global institutions remains a
better alternative to developing effective regional institutions, as the world needs
institutions able to reach agreement on the hard questions.

**IMF Governance Reform**

All three key regions in the global economy have reason to prefer effective global
financial firefighting to purely regional solutions. And fortunately, the reforms needed to
give the IMF renewed global legitimacy are relatively easy – at least compared to the
reforms needed in the other key post-war international institutions. The needed reforms
do not require changing the fundamental principle of IMF governance, which is one
dollar (one SDR) one vote, not one country one vote or one person one vote. They
simply require shifting the distribution of IMF “chairs” and “shares” so that they reflect
countries current economic clout, not their economic clout in 1950, 1970 or even 1990.
Right now, Europe is clearly overrepresented, and Asia is clearly under represented.\(^2\)
The basic outlines of a solution are well known: Asia’s voting weight needs to be
increased; and both Europe’s voting weight and the number of chairs occupied by
European countries need to be reduced. Even if the Eurozone is not wiling to consolidate
its representation into a single chair, there is no reason, for example, why the Benelux
countries should have two chairs on the board.

The US is not overrepresented, but revitalizing the IMF would clearly be far easier if both
the US and Europe show a bit of flexibility. Europe needs to recognize that it will not
maximize its real power if in maintains an overweight position in an institution that plays
a smaller and smaller global role. And the US needs to recognize that changing the way
the existing pie is divided is politically far harder than divvying up a growing pie in
slightly different way. Letting the IMF’s resources to grow in line with a growing world
economy would make the redistribution of relative quota share from Europe to Asia far
easier.

**IMF should remain prepared for a more unstable world**

The case against a bigger IMF is simple: the IMF currently has as much money as it
needs. That view, however, is short-sighted. Capital is not going to flow from relatively
poor emerging markets to the United States forever. High-savings Asia may be able to
finance its own development – though traditionally, rapidly growing Asian economies
have not also financed the US. But low savings regions like Latin America and Africa
are unlikely to be able to sustain the investment needed for rapid growth without drawing
on the world’s savings. Private flows to emerging markets are already back at their pre-
crisis levels, though right now, that private flow is financing the extraordinary levels of
reserve accumulation in emerging markets, not large current account deficits.

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\(^2\) Europe (including Russia) accounts for 40% of IMF’s voting weight, and holds up to 10 of the 24 seats on
the IMF’s Executive Board (Spain and Mexico rotate sitting on the Board). Japan, China, India and the
rest of East Asia account for only 16% of the IMF’s total vote, and hold only 5 chairs.
But even today, not all emerging markets are in great shape. Some emerging market economies – above all China -- clearly have more reserves than they need. But others -- Brazil, Turkey, Philippines, and Indonesia for example -- do not. All these countries have large stocks of domestic debt and comparatively small reserves, and one of the lessons of recent crises is that if a country’s own citizens lose confidence in their own government’s ability to honor its financial commitments, a crisis soon follows.

We should not forget that IMF lending peaked in 2003 – not in 1998 and the IMF had a larger stock of outstanding loans in mid-2005 than it did in mid-2000. Forecasts that the IMF no longer needs to be ready to lend to countries temporarily short of hard currency are rather premature. The IMF should be using the current lull to draw lessons from this experience and to put in place policies that clarify when it should lend, and when it should not. Neither large bailouts loans to countries (temporarily, one hopes) short of foreign currency nor major sovereign debt restructurings are likely to disappear.

But without the impetus of an actual crisis, pressure to develop a more realistic IMF lending policy has disappeared. The IMF’s major shareholders (The G-7 countries) are in theory committed to trying to get the IMF to go back to its traditional lending limits - limits that have not been upheld in major crises since Mexico. The irony is clear: the G-7 wants to scale back emerging economies ability to borrow reserves from the IMF at a time when emerging economies have concluded that they need far more reserves to navigate through the turbulence created by volatile international capital flows.

The absence of a greater willingness to engage in an honest dialogue about the IMF’s lending role is unfortunate. There are plenty of important issues to resolve. Not only is there a large gap between the amounts the IMF in theory says it will lend and the far larger amounts that it has actually lent in recent crises, but it is also clear that the IMF – in times of crisis – has been pushed to do far more than just lend out reserves to meet short-terms financing needs, the classic role of a lender of final resort. It some cases, the IMF has acted more like a long-term financier of last resort to strategically important countries. Turkey is a prime example – IMF financed a long-term program of fiscal consolidation to let Turkey grow out of a debt problem. Turkey looks to be a success, but it is still not clear to us that the IMF should be in the business of long-term financing for middle-income countries.

The G-7 claim (without much credibility) that IMF should never lend out large sums again. Emerging economies often say the IMF should always lend out large sums to help avoid debt restructuring (or change in its exchange rate regime). Neither is right: a sensible compromise would raise the IMF’s lending limits to reflect country’s need for more borrowed reserves, but also set out stronger expectation that IMF funds would be lent out only for short-term needs.

An IMF structured to lend out large sums, but that only lent those large sums for truly short-term needs would not be in a position to give every emerging market the credit line needed to avoid any debt restructuring. A key lesson from Argentina is that if country starts out with high levels of debt (particularly in conjunction with an overvalued
exchange rate), IMF funds should be used to “soften the blow” from the restructuring, not to finance a futile attempt to avoid any restructuring – and in Argentina’s case, maintain an overvalued exchange rate. After Argentina defaulted, the IMF – in part because it lacked support from the U.S. treasury -- largely abdicated its role as crisis manager, and did not work to set out an economic framework that would guide Argentina’s debt restructuring. The United States wanted to leave economic policy negotiations to Argentina and its private creditors; in practice, this “hands-off” policy meant that Argentina unilaterally decided how much it wanted to adjust, and how much it could pay. The IMF remains needed to perform a debt sustainability analysis and help a debtor in default (or needing a debt restructuring) set out an economic adjustment program that creates the basis for rapid agreement on a debt restructuring and quick economic and financial recovery.³

**Managing the international monetary system**

Right now, the most pressing issues facing the Fund do not center around Fund lending – but rather the Fund’s capacity to encourage countries to take the steps needed to prevent financial vulnerabilities from rising to levels that risk a major crisis. And even more unusually, the biggest risk of a crisis comes not from the emerging world, but rather from the Fund’s biggest shareholder – the United States.

In recent years, innovations in IMF surveillance have largely been motivated by the need to do a better job of identifying potential vulnerabilities in emerging market economies. The Fund is paying more attention to the health of country’s banking systems – as it must if its lending is often used to allow a national central bank to act as a lender of last resort in dollars (or euros) to its local banking system. The Fund has refined its analysis of debt sustainability – as it must if it wants to differentiate between temporary liquidity problems that can be financed with short-term money and deeper solvency problems that cannot be financed. And it is looking more at so called balance sheet vulnerabilities, like the currency mismatches that remain pervasive in many emerging economies.

Now it is hardly the time to stop worrying about these vulnerabilities. One of the advantages of a global institution is that it can learn from the problems of a wide range of countries, and help countries in one part of the globe avoid making the same mistakes countries in another region have already made. Many emerging market economies remain a long way from a truly clean financial bill of health. Large external deficits and growing external debt loads are clearly less of a concern than in the past. But domestic debt levels remain high – and in a globalized world, if a country’s citizens lose confidence in the country’s government or the local banks, they will quickly shift their funds abroad. If global growth slows or if US interest rates rise suddenly, some of these latent vulnerabilities may come to the forefront.

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Increasingly, though, Fund surveillance needs to do more than just strive to identify financial vulnerabilities in emerging markets early enough so that they can be corrected without a crisis. The Fund also needs to identify national policies that act as impediments to the global adjustments needed to bring about an orderly rebalancing of the world economy. The Fund has not hesitated to call on the United States to implement a more ambitious program of fiscal adjustment, one that aims to eliminate the fiscal deficit. The United States, unfortunately, so far has decided not to listen to the Fund’s advice. So far, the Fund has been less willing to identify the policy changes needed in surplus countries. IMF surveillance has been somewhat asymmetric. The IMF has, correctly, argued that the US fiscal adjustment program is insufficiently ambitious, but it has not said anything similar about China’s (tiny) renminbi revaluation.

The Fund faces two problems in its surveillance of surplus countries. One is at least partly of its own making: the Fund is uncomfortable acting as a referee that calls out inappropriate exchange rate pegs, and, ironically given its mandate, is generally far less comfortable doling out advice on a country’s exchange rate policies than on a country’s fiscal policy. That was true when a country like Argentina intervened heavily to maintain an overvalued exchange rate, and it remains true when countries like China, Malaysia, Russia and Saudi Arabia intervene heavily to keep their currencies from appreciating. Argentina’s steadfast defense of its own exchange rate put its own financial health at risk. China’s steadfast support for the U.S. dollar has not directly put its own financial health at risk – but its current effective peg to the dollar is an impediment to global adjustment. The second is that the Fund’s surveillance of individual countries tends to focus exclusively on that country, and not be integrated into a broader program for encouraging global adjustment. The Fund’s research department publishes periodic assessments of the likely impact of various possible policy steps, but that analysis remains divorced from the Fund’s ongoing dialogue with member countries.

Yet large deficit countries like the US can only reduce their deficits if surplus countries also reduce their surpluses. China’s current account surplus is now rising rapidly, even in the face of a large increase in its oil import bill. There are two broad problems here too. First, many surplus countries -- China and Saudi Arabia – have tied their currency closely to the currency of the world’s biggest deficit country. Second, many of these countries maintain exchange rate pegs that leave their currency undervalued against the dollar – and against all the currencies that have appreciated against the dollar since 2002.

The Fund’s reluctance to go beyond vague calls for greater flexibility, and to identify countries with undervalued currencies, reflects its desire to avoid being a club that beats up on Asia – particularly at a time when Asia is underrepresented inside the Fund. But the alternative to having the IMF act as an umpire that identifies when countries’ exchange rate policies are acting as an impediment to global adjustment is not a continuation of the status quo. Tensions are rising. If the IMF does not act, the US

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4 The Fund’s articles allow a country to pick its own exchange rate regime – every country clearly has the right to peg its exchange rate if it so wants. But that does not mean a country can peg its rate at any level it chooses and not be subject to external criticism. The Fund’s articles clearly give the fund a role in identifying exchange rate policies that are an impediment to effective global adjustment.
eventually will take the law into its own hand and charge China of currency manipulation, and acting as plaintiff, judge and jury in that trial. Such unilateralism would not be a good outcome for the international financial system.

The IMF’s exchange rate surveillance has been too lax. But the IMF still needs to act with care. The IMF should focus on all exchange rates that impede global adjustment – not just those that are most politically salient in the US. If oil prices stay high, as the futures markets now predict, the oil exporters’ dollar pegs are probably as big an impediment to global adjustment as China’s peg. It needs to continuously remind the US that if surplus countries adjust, the US will be forced to adjust too. And the IMF needs to be aware that calling China’s exchange rate regime an impediment to global adjustment may have a larger impact than calling US fiscal deficits an impediment to global adjustment. In fact, the United States big creditors – right now, China, India, Russia and Saudi Arabia -- have not cut back on their financing of the US after the US signaled that it plans to ignore the IMF’s fiscal advice. But the US might well start a process that would lead to much higher tariffs on Chinese goods if China ignores a clear IMF signal that it is pegging to the dollar at too low of a level.

A renewed focus of IMF surveillance on exchange rates, exchange rate regimes and the global balance of payments is not simply a necessary response to currency global imbalances. Looking ahead, it is reasonable to expect large changes in the world’s monetary and exchange rate arrangements over the next few years. Hong Kong is unlikely to combine a de facto monetary union with USA and a political union with China for ever. Asia more generally is likely to find another way to maintain stability in intra-Asian exchange rates other than by linking their currencies, either formally or informally, to the U.S. dollar. Oil exporters would be better served pegging to the Canadian dollar or another “commodity” currency than the American dollar. Africa probably has too many currencies. New monetary unions may form. Some smaller countries may dollarize or euroize. As exchange rate arrangements evolve, the IMF needs to work to make sure national choices are consistent with global interest in financial stability, and countries do not solve national problems by pushing their costs onto the rest of the world.

Conclusion

A globalized world may finance domestic imbalances for longer – but it does not eliminate the risks created by sustained exchange rate misalignments or poor macroeconomic policies. Global imbalances and national financial crises that can spill over into global markets are best addressed by a global institution like the IMF. But the IMF’s ability to act in the global interest hinges on a governance structure that is up to date, and reflects current global realities. A global institution like the IMF can learn from all countries’ experience, and draw on that experience to help assess country’s debt sustainability – as well as to look for weaknesses on national financial systems and balance sheets. But crises in emerging markets will not disappear; the IMF’s ability to lend in a crisis makes it the central institution for crisis resolution. The IMF can work to try to ensure that financial and current account imbalances are addressed rather than
ignored – and that they are addressed by policies that are not destructive of global prosperity. The core insight of Keynes and Dexter-White – a global economy needs global institutions – will continue to stand the test of time.