

Both Sides of the Aisle

A Call for Bipartisan Foreign Policy

Nancy E. Roman

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COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

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FOREWORD

The Tuesday-through-Thursday schedule for members of Congress, coupled with social and technological changes that contribute to a scarcity of time, means that fewer Democrats and Republicans know one another in Washington these days. That means that more often, foreign policy is conceived and hatched on one side of the aisle, without the constructive, honing fire of a truly deliberative process.

In this Council Special Report, Nancy E. Roman, vice president and director of the Council's Washington Program, argues that a deliberative bipartisan process matters because it increases the odds that foreign policy will be perceived as American policy and not just Democratic or Republican policy. This increases the likelihood that policy will remain relatively consistent as administrations change hands. At the same time, it improves the odds of developing better policy as criticisms are considered and addressed.

Both Sides of the Aisle offers some recommendations for Congress, the executive branch, and even state legislatures and courts. The report makes clear that much will depend on individual policymakers and the choices they make. We hope this report will encourage them to engage fully on both sides of the aisle.

Richard N. Haass

President

Council on Foreign Relations

September 2005

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This Council on Foreign Relations project on bipartisanship has been the most rewarding part of my experience at the Council thus far. There are many people to thank. First and foremost, I thank the members of my distinguished advisory board who gave both their time and energy to make the process more than superficial. I learned much from members on both sides of the aisle about the kind of deliberative process that this report calls for.

A special thanks to Carla A. Hills and Kenneth M. Duberstein for their early support for the project; to Jamie S. Gorelick for the generous gift of her time as well as her thoughts on the administration's role in fostering bipartisanship in foreign policy and the critical role of advisory boards; to Lee H. Hamilton for his insights on the dialogue between the Department of State and Congress—particularly vis-à-vis the Panama Canal; to David J. Hoppe for his thoughts on congressional holds; and to Steven E. Biegun for his careful reading and general intelligence. Thanks to Sofia Mancheno for helping to assemble the team.

I test-drove an early draft of the report before a group of senior fellows at the Council, and what you read benefited much from the insights and encouragement of Julia E. Sweig, Stephen R. Sestanovich, Judith Kipper, and Lee Feinstein—not to mention from our own Director of Studies James Lindsay and Council President Richard N. Haass.

I worked hard to make this report as short as possible given the scarcity of time in our lives. Still, even a brief report like this requires a good bit of research to prove what we think we know (sometimes proving what we do not). I am indebted to my assistant Keri A. Nash, who cheerfully and thoroughly dug through countless congressional records, websites, almanacs, and libraries for the information contained herein.

Thanks to Lisa Shields and Anya Schmemann, who knocked themselves out to disseminate widely the ideas in this report. As our fearless leader Richard Haass frequently says, “Ideas matter.”

Nancy E. Roman

INTRODUCTION

People naturally disagree about who is responsible for the partisan tone and tactics in Washington, DC, these days, but most agree on this: It's worse, it's more intense, and it's nastier. And few on either side are enjoying it much.

This report will not pine for a golden age of brotherly love that never existed in Washington. The capital city has always been a partisan place full of rough-and-tumble political brawling. However, this report will suggest it is better to work with all—not half—of our collective foreign policy brain. Today, like at so many significant moments in history, much is unsettled. Policymakers are seeking to understand the Muslim world, anti-Americanism is intensifying, the White House is attempting new policies in the Middle East, and the United States is embroiled in a war testing all those policies. So this is a time for asking questions, not pulling down the blinds. Yet, fewer opportunities exist for the two parties to deliberate on foreign policy issues. The big foreign policy issues, both regional and topical, that currently dominate the agenda—Iraq, Iran, North Korea, China, nuclear proliferation, trade, and immigration—will benefit from a process that engages the wisdom from both sides of the aisle. Such a bipartisan deliberative process matters for several reasons:

- It positions policy as American policy, rather than Republican policy or Democratic policy. As such, it allows that policy to fare better in the international arena, since both allies and rivals see the policy as having ideologically diverse support.
- It means that the party ultimately responsible for the policy will have contemplated potential pitfalls raised both from within its party and from across the aisle.
- It increases the odds of continuity in policy as administrations inevitably change hands.

- It helps to facilitate the legislative process, as a bipartisan process demands stronger communication and relationships between the executive and legislative branches.

The Panama Canal treaties provide an example of what a deliberative process can yield. Albeit with some bumps, the United States won approval for treaties aimed at modernizing the Canal regime and strengthening U.S. relations with Latin America. Democratic President Jimmy Carter worked closely with Congress, consulting with Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) and Senate Minority Leader Howard H. Baker (R-TN) as the treaties were negotiated. On August 12, 1977, he sent a letter to all members of Congress stating that an agreement had been reached. (See Appendix B of this report.) “This is a difficult political question and I need your help during coming weeks,” wrote Carter. The administration was sensitive to the domestic politics that characterized the treaty negotiations as the “Canal Giveaway” and worked with senators to explain the policy goals. In doing so, and in getting senators’ feedback, the treaty was modified and Republicans were a part of that process. That positioned Senators Byrd and Baker to round up support to ratify a treaty that began far short of the two-thirds support necessary in the Senate.

The Republican Reagan administration reached out to Democrats in the House of Representatives when it ran into trouble in its efforts to secure funding for the MX missile. In the House, the White House reached out to then Majority Whip Tom Foley (D-WA), Representative Al Gore (D-TN), Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), and Representative Norman D. Dicks (D-WA). That bipartisan process resulted in the creation of the Scowcroft Commission, which was set up to consider strategic nuclear modernization. The commission recommended that the MX missile be retained and Congress later approved funding for the missile program in accordance with the commission’s recommendations.

Not everyone agrees with the outcome of either the Panama Canal negotiations or the decisions surrounding the MX missile, but both examples reflect a deliberative process that yielded policy based significantly on substance, as well as the inevitable

politics that come with these debates. Those who remember the battles over the Panama Canal treaties or the MX missile certainly will not remember them as placid. They were contentious and at times downright bitter, but there was conversation. There was deliberation. Both parties were involved in the end product.

It is hard to prove that this process matters. Even the best bipartisan deliberation does not guarantee sound policy. The lack of bipartisanship does not prevent it. But policymakers in both parties—certainly the members of the bipartisan advisory board for this report, which includes former and current senior executive branch officials and congressional leaders—agree that the odds of sound policy increase when players from both parties are involved. Moreover, the absence of bipartisanship can often mean a lack of public understanding of the issues involved, as both sides spin the policy. It also makes it easier for policy to be driven by special interests.

What is often referred to as “increased partisanship” in today’s climate might be more accurately referred to as “decreased deliberation and interaction between the parties.” “Bipartisan” is often misused as a synonym for “centrist,” “homogenous,” or even “bland.” To those on the hard left and right it can mean weakened policy. Bipartisan foreign policy need not be any of those things. *Webster’s* defines bipartisan as, “of, relating to, or involving members of two parties.”¹ The debate and deliberation between the parties does not need to be passionless. It does not even have to be polite. Nor does a bipartisan policy process need to reach compromise in every instance. It does however need to happen. Without it, policies—both foreign and domestic—fail to benefit from the honing fire of constructive criticism.

This Council Special Report is aimed not at one party or another, but at all decision-makers—presidents and congressional leaders alike—with the full acknowledgment that both parties have contributed to the poisonous atmosphere in which we operate.

The Council on Foreign Relations is nonpartisan, not bipartisan, and as such, it is committed to hatching, developing, and nurturing the best ideas without regard to party affiliation or politics. At the same time, the Council serves as a resource for policymakers

¹ Fredrick C. Mish, ed., *Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition* (Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster, Inc., 2002), p. 116.

who operate within a bipartisan—and sometimes partisan—system. As such, we are committed to helping foster discussion between and among policymakers on the grounds that our nation will be best served when we are working together.

Both President George W. Bush and Senator John F. Kerry (D-MA) called for unity in the wake of the November 2004 presidential election. Yet, here we are with tensions rising to an all-time high as Republicans and Democrats squabble over Iraq, Iran, Hurricane Katrina, and federal judges.

Is this level of rancor different from the many other times throughout history when the parties battled royally?

Yes, though politics never really “stopped at the water’s edge.”

In 1919–20, Congress fought over whether the United States should join the League of Nations. In fact, when democratic President Woodrow T. Wilson chose to personally attend the peace talks in Paris, he decided not to include any Republican senators in the American delegation, despite the fact that just a week before Republicans had won control of the Senate and that the Foreign Relations Committee was chaired by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA), who was not a supporter of either the Versailles Peace Treaty or the League of Nations.

From 1938–40, in the midst of World War II, the United States was divided over whether to challenge the Axis powers or preserve American neutrality. This question was not resolved until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

More recently, history was dominated by the Cold War, when the United States and Western Europe, as well as Democrats and Republicans, were united in a desire to contain the Soviet Union. That was a big, broad, and unifying goal, and support for that goal meant it was easier for Republicans serving in Congress under Democratic President John F. Kennedy or Democrats under Republican President Ronald Reagan to cross party lines and embrace the president’s foreign policy agenda. But did politics really “stop at the water’s edge?” Think Vietnam. Think aid to the Nicaraguan Contras or Star Wars, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. What internationalists really remember so fondly when they recall those golden years is a time of shared common goals big enough to overcome political differences. It did not mean that President Kennedy did not lock horns with Republicans prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, or that President Reagan did not go

head-to-head with Democrats over his dogged pursuit of Star Wars. Rather, politics “stopping at the water’s edge” meant both that there were broad goals big enough to unify politicians and that general agreement created a space in which members could occasionally reach across the aisle on other foreign policy issues *when they wanted to*. The parties engaged with one another.

It has not been easy to find a goal as unifying as the policy of containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The three nearest rival policies might be stopping terrorism, spreading democracy, or slowing nuclear proliferation. But in each case, despite a base of support in both major parties, support for the goal lacks an intensity sufficient to overcome differences about the many and disparate ways and means to pursue these laudable goals. So, the United States lacks a goal compelling enough to pull itself together at the same time that it faces changes in society, within government in general, and within Congress in particular—a dynamic that aggravates the trend toward partisanship.

Some would insist that the United States has had plenty of bipartisanship recently—maybe even too much. The resolution authorizing the use of force in Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks passed with only one dissenting vote in the House of Representatives.² The USA Patriot Act of 2001 passed and was extended with overwhelming majorities. Congress has authorized the use of U.S. forces in Iraq and few would cut funding for U.S. troops in Iraq (although some would argue for either a drawdown or an increase in the troop levels). But bipartisan *votes* or politically essential support for the troops must not be confused with a bipartisan *process*. Some of those votes were borne of fear, the fear of failing to support the troops or the president; or the fear of appearing weak on national security at a time of vulnerability for the nation. A fully partisan process may at times produce votes that are quite lopsided—creating an illusion of bipartisanship.

Few recent foreign policy related votes reflecting majority support from both parties have grown from a truly deliberative process. Instead, people in both parties are complaining that they do not know what the other side thinks on critical foreign policy issues. They say there is generally less engagement; ideas are not being honed through

² See <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2001/roll342.xml>.

debate; the tough questions are not being probed. Moreover, both sides have tended to support their party leaders even when they had deep reservations about their leaders' position.

How did this situation evolve? The Council on Foreign Relations is focused on foreign policy, but in contemplating the possible causes of what many in both parties describe as more intense partisanship in both domestic and foreign policy, the roots go deep into the domestic political process.

CONGRESS



The 1812 district was named for Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry, who presided over the partisan warfare on how to redraw legislative districts in 1810.

Redistricting is partly responsible for the polarization in Congress. Congressional districts have long been gerrymandered by both parties to achieve favorable outcomes. But the trends of the past have been accelerated as state legislatures—some dominated by Democrats and others by Republicans—have used creative cartography to protect certain seats, or even certain candidates. Advances in computer technology have made it increasingly easy to surgically cut out a nettlesome pocket of Republicans or Democrats to create districts designed to produce reliably conservative or reliably liberal members of Congress. A survey of congressional district maps finds many that are bizarrely shaped. The oddly shaped outcomes often reflect political motives. Former congressional candidate for the twelfth district in North Carolina, Henry M. “Mickey” Michaux Jr., once quipped, “I love the district because I can drive down I-85 with both car doors open and hit every person in the district.”

North Carolina 12 Congressional District




Source: National Atlas Maps of Congressional Districts. See http://nationalatlas.gov/printable/images/pdf/congdist/NC12_109.pdf.

Redistricting efforts have served to the advantage of incumbents in both parties:

- More than three out of four incumbents who had close races in 2000 ran in a district that was more favorably redrawn in 2002.³
- Among incumbents, twenty districts were moved from being competitive/swing districts in 2000 to generally safe districts for one party in 2002.⁴

District Safety, First Time Incumbents, 2002 Elections




Source: See <http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.asp?cycle=2002>.

³ See <http://www.fairvote.org/?page=715>.

⁴ See <http://www.fairvote.org/?page=715>.

- Of the forty-six incumbents who were elected with less than 55 percent of the vote in 2000, thirty-seven had their districts made safer through redistricting. Only nine districts became less secure for these potentially vulnerable incumbents.⁵
- In Iowa, the only state that requires that districts be drawn neutrally, no incumbent won more than 62 percent of the vote in the five relatively competitive races in the 2002 election cycle.



Source: The Iowa Legislative General Assembly, Iowa 2001in Redistricting Plan, Congressional Maps Only. See <http://www.legis.state.ia.us/Redist/congress.jpg>.

⁵ Some additional statistics from the Center for Voting and Democracy's study: The average victory margin in the U.S. House races was 39 percent, meaning winners on average won more than 69 percent of votes cast in their race; only thirty-eight, less than one in ten races, were won by margins smaller than 10 percent; the landslide index increased to 81 percent, meaning that more than four out of five races were won by more than 20 percent. Since 1960, only 1988 had a higher landslide index; only four out of 386 incumbents lost to non-incumbent challengers. That's the highest reelection rate since 1954; nearly three out of every five seats (254) were held by incumbents who had won their last two elections by "landslide" margins of at least 20 percent. See <http://www.fairvote.org/?page=715>.

Iowa, 2002 Election Results			
Paul Shomshor (D)	37.8%	Leonard Boswell (D)	53.4%
Steve King (R)	62.2%	Stan Thompson (R)	54.0%
Ann Hutchinson (D)	42.7%	John Norris (D)	43.1%
Jim Nussle (R)	57.2%	Tom Latham (R)	54.8%
Julie Thomas (D)	45.7%		
Jim Leach (R)	52.2%		

Source: 2002 Midterm Elections in Iowa. See <http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/2002jaresults.html>.

The redistricting plan drawn in 2001 has not been in place long enough to allow for any broad conclusions to be drawn about what it might mean for foreign policy voting, but a review of three big foreign policy votes of 2004 finds some flexibility. One of five members of Iowa’s House delegation opposed the resolution to authorize the use of force in Iraq, one opposed a ban on funding for the International Criminal Court, and one opposed Trade Promotion Authority.⁶

Although many states are rethinking the process involved in drawing their congressional maps, not many have adopted Iowa-style districts that are blind to party. Most states still rely on congressional maps that allow for the election of members who occupy the far reaches of the political spectrum, especially as interest groups tend to support either the “most conservative” or the “most liberal” candidates. Those maps are certainly part of the reason for the disappearance of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats. When Republican Representative James Leach (R-IA) went to Congress in 1976, he had several ideological soul mates. He does not today. On the Democratic side of the aisle, “Scoop” Jackson Democrats are nearly extinct.

Deliberation between the parties can and should occur with or without the so-called centrists. If straight-forward maps like Iowa’s have resulted in the election of liberal liberals and conservative conservatives across the nation, the challenge would be to encourage deliberation and debate between those groups just the same. Yet, it is worth noting that centrists have traditionally played a role in helping facilitate those

⁶ Richard E. Barone, *The Almanac of American Politics 2004* (Washington, DC: National Journal, 2004), p. 634.

conversations. Their declining numbers make that challenge more difficult. And those declining numbers are partly the result of gerrymandering.

A second reason for the polarization of the two parties has to do with lifestyle. Fewer members of Congress now make Washington, DC, their permanent home. The trend is for members to spend Tuesday through Thursday in the capital. They race back to their district on a Thursday afternoon and return for legislative business on the following Tuesday. This system makes it easier for members to afford a decent lifestyle, since the cost of living in most congressional districts is lower than in Washington. Also, it keeps members in visual contact with their constituents—a political imperative that evolved after a set of races in the 1980s evicted incumbents who had “lost touch” with their home districts after so many years in the nation’s capital.

This chosen lifestyle comes with costs. When district-to-DC travel was more challenging and more members opted to make their homes in Washington, there was naturally more opportunity to socialize with their peers from both sides of the aisle. It is much harder to vilify an opponent when you get to know his or her spouse and children on the soccer field, on the baseball diamond, or at a neighborhood picnic. Unfortunately, today’s estranged climate has given way to tribal behavior, as each party caucuses alone. Republicans hold their weekly caucus in room HC-5 of the Capitol; Democrats hold their weekly caucus in the Cannon Caucus Room, and seldom shall the twain meet.


Along with lifestyle changes, there are small institutional changes that have reduced the time members spend together. One such example is electronic voting, which was installed in the House in January 1973.⁷ Prior to the electronic voting system, when members used to go to the floor to vote, they had to wait for their name to be called. During that time, they would chat with their peers—Democrats and Republicans alike. Now, members dash to the House chamber, insert their electronic voting card, and exit—often conducting a meeting on the five-minute walk back to their office or committee hearing.

This lifestyle change, coupled with generally shorter political careers by choice, means that members’ relationships tend to be more superficial. Not to exaggerate the

⁷ Jane Bortnick Griffith and Walter J. Oleszek, “Electronic Devices in the House Chamber—A Report to the Subcommittee on Rules & Organizations.” See <http://www.house.gov/rules/e-devices.htm>.

affection between the parties, but there was a time when members would debate and then “sup together.” That time is gone.

A third reason for intensified partisanship is the narrowness of Republican control. Prior to the takeover by the Republicans in 1994, Democrats benefited from rather substantial majorities in Congress, the House in particular. Throughout the 1980s, Democrats enjoyed numerical advantages ranging from a low of fifty seats in 1980–82, to a high of 103 seats in 1982 with 269 Democrats versus 166 Republicans. In the subsequent Congresses, Democrats held 71-seat, 81-seat, 85-seat, 100-seat, and 82-seat majorities over Republicans until the watershed election of 1994 when Republicans took control of Congress in rather dramatic fashion.⁸ Until then, however, it was in the interest of the minority to cooperate with the ruling party as it was hard to imagine anything other than minority status.



Source: See http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/partyDiv.html.

The much tighter margins of control that have existed since 1994 have given Democrats, now in the minority, a reason to hope every two years that they might win back majority status. Republicans have held majorities of only twenty-six, twenty-two, twelve, nine, twenty-five, and thirty-one seats over the past six Congresses, and there are still a number of Democrats who recall the sweet life of majority control.⁹

⁸ See http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/partyDiv.html.


⁹ See http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/partyDiv.html.

On the flipside, this narrow control also makes it imperative for the majority party, now the Republicans, to demand party loyalty. Otherwise, the Republicans have no hope of enacting the most controversial parts of their legislative agenda. Consequently, the whip machine simply cannot allow the level of dissent that Speaker of the House Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill Jr. (D-MA), for example, could afford to endure when he led the House with much larger majorities. So, the narrowness of control sets up a disincentive to compromise on both sides.

A fourth factor aggravating partisanship in Congress is the money chase. This report will not go into depth on this issue here, as others have, but it will note the obvious: It costs much more to win a seat in Congress now than it did thirty years ago or even ten. And, it costs more to keep it. In 1974, a challenger would spend approximately \$100,000 to win a seat, or \$389,498 when adjusted for inflation. In 2002, a challenger would need to spend approximately four times that much, or \$1.6 million to win a seat.¹⁰ This means that members have to spend more time raising money and often have precious little room to defy the interest groups that ante up. It also elevates the significance of money given by so-called 527 groups, which often have narrow agendas and portray one party or the other in black-and-white terms.¹¹

¹⁰ See <http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/cost.asp>.

¹¹ According to the Center for Voting and Democracy, a 527 Group is, “A tax-exempt group organized under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code to raise money for political activities including voter mobilization efforts, issue advocacy, and the like. Currently, the FEC [Federal Election Commission] only requires a 527 group to file regular disclosure reports if it is a political party or political action committee (PAC) that engages in either activities expressly advocating the election or defeat of a federal candidate, or in electioneering communications. Otherwise, it must file either with the government of the state in which it is located or the Internal Revenue Service. Many 527s run by special interest groups raise unlimited ‘soft money,’ which they use for voter mobilization and certain types of issue advocacy, but not for efforts that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a federal candidate or amount to electioneering communications.” See <http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/types.asp>.



Source: See <http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/cost.asp>.

Televised hearings are a fifth factor contributing to partisanship. Hearings on proposed bills, legislative proposals, and executive branch nominations before Congress have always been public. However, they were not aired on television until 1948, when hearings of the House Armed Services Committee were first broadcast. Later, the Senate Committee on Government Operations’ investigation into alleged Communist infiltration (the McCarthy hearings) generated enough interest to warrant television coverage. And again, in 1973, the Watergate hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities made for compelling television. It was not until 1979, with the creation of C-SPAN, that House floor proceedings and hearings were routinely televised. Today, virtually every hearing is taped by C-SPAN. Therefore, the most obscure hearing will eventually make its way to the small screen, even if it is at 2 a.m.

Televised hearings have advantages. The increased transparency makes it easier for many people, including lobbyists, journalists, voters, and even policymakers to follow issues before Congress, but the transparency has come with institutional costs. Before the advent of C-SPAN, there were actually times during hearings when members of one party acknowledged a good idea on the other side of the aisle. Members were more willing to reveal that they did not understand a certain provision and probe their misunderstanding in a less self-conscious way. Now members are most often grandstanding for the camera,

making speeches instead of inquiries, and there is implicit political pressure to make sure no one allows the other party to look good.

Beyond these root causes of partisanship in Congress, two additional aggravating factors encourage partisanship throughout government. The first is the media, more broadly. Twenty-four-hour cable news stations, coupled with the omnipresence of television, means that most people get their news from television. More people getting their political news from television naturally means more people forming their political opinions based on the impressions they see, rather than on the words they read.

Television thrives on accentuating, and in some cases manufacturing, differences. It is not television's fault; the viewers have shown time and again that they like to watch a good fight. Regardless of what they tell pollsters or even themselves, the channel-surfing often stops on the channels that offer the most contentious debate. This phenomenon surely partly explains why the feisty Fox News Network has watched its ratings soar, while the tamer CNN has lost market share.¹²


So the media, responding to the viewing public's preferences, cover conflict. Moreover, the policymakers and press secretaries who feed these shows have adapted. Newsmakers often show up to an interview intending to make news or lob a quote that they know will incite. Add to that television's format, which only allows for superficial discussion of the issues, and the public comes away with the view that the government—Congress in particular—is profoundly divided. From a capitalist perspective, it makes sense that producers, writers, and editors gravitate toward programs, formats, and presentation devices that sell. Still, these market forces mean the public is exposed to political figures via media outlets that portray them in conflict: Congress versus White House, Democrat versus Republican, challenger versus opponent.

The second aggravating factor that has fed a more partisan atmosphere in Washington is the sheer scarcity of time. Important people—policymakers chief among

¹² According to Siobhan Gorman, Fox Television has surpassed CNN's market share. While Fox commanded a viewership of 806,000 in the average twenty-four-hour period in the 2003–04 television season, CNN's audience was less than 60 percent as large, at 466,000. Siobhan Gorman, "News You Can Choose," *The National Journal*, October 9, 2004. See http://www.nexis.com/research/home?key=1109097466&banner=1&_session=d62b8086-8500-11d9-97c1_8a0c5905aa77.1.3286550262.298753.percent20.0.0&_state=&wchp=dGLbV1b-zSkBB&_md5=5ff4750e3fa3f632386736c0b2b0d215.

them—have always had plenty of demands on their time, but important people are busier today (if not more important) than they were twenty years ago. A few factors accentuate this frustrating trend:

1. **The pure work load on members of Congress has increased over the last twenty years.** By most measures, including hours in session, number of committee meetings, or number of floor votes, the congressional workload has nearly doubled since the 1950s. The average length of bills has increased from two-and-one-half pages in 1947, to nineteen pages in 1995–96.¹³ The number of staff has grown exponentially, too. In the 1950s, there were about 3,300 staff members serving 535 members of Congress.¹⁴ In September 1993, the number had risen to approximately 17,000 (much of this explosion happened post-Watergate). As of 2001, it has tapered down to just above 14,900.¹⁵ Although more staff can execute more tasks, they also generate additional work and further fracture members’ attention by creating new issue areas.



Source: Jane Bortnick Griffith and Walter J. Oleszek, “Electronic Devices in the House Chamber – A Report to the Subcommittee on Rules & Organizations.” See <http://www.house.gov/rules/e-devices.htm>; Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress 2001–2002* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2002). See the Appendix in this report.

¹³ Jane Bortnick Griffith and Walter J. Oleszek, “Electronic Devices in the House Chamber—A Report to the Subcommittee on Rules & Organizations.” See <http://www.house.gov/rules/e-devices.htm>.

¹⁴ Lee H. Hamilton, “Extension of Remarks—September 08, 1993, Speech to Congress,” speech delivered September 8, 1993, to the House of Representatives. See <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r103:E08SE3-318>.

¹⁵ Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress 2001–2002* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2002), p. 126.

2. **Social changes, primarily travel and technology, have increased demands on policymakers' time.** Cheap and relatively easy travel means that more people come to Washington to meet with members of Congress and executive branch officials. E-mail increases both the speed and facility of communication, resulting in an increased number of written communications and meeting requests. We do not have hard data to back this up, but dozens of members of Congress, past and present, confirmed the proposition that the number of meeting requests has grown exponentially. The tyranny of technology has made that considerably worse over the past five years.

3. **The twenty-four/seven media cycle means policymakers must take more time to feed the beast.** Many congressional members and their staff with whom we spoke while writing this report—including members of our advisory panel—referenced the frustrating time demands of the twenty-four-hour news cycle. Members used to have at least until a reporter's 6 p.m. deadline to form an opinion or view, but twenty-four-hour cable news means members no longer have that luxury. They are often pressured to articulate a view before they have enough information to fully form one. The speed of communication and the necessity to meet the demands of mass media are time-consuming and crimp the deliberative process.

The aggregate effect of these social and cultural changes has contributed to a political culture that discourages inter-party deliberation and debate. Democrats and Republicans are secluded in separate foxholes as they develop policy initiatives with little input from those in the opposing party. One or the other will rise up out of the foxhole—sometimes timidly and sometimes brazenly—to reveal their policy forged from the minds on just one side. The other side reflexively shoots without thinking. The job is to diminish and destroy any chance at political success before the guts of the policy are even contemplated. It has become part of the game to have a proffered policy and its sponsor trashed in the media and disparaged in the blogs before it receives any traction. Over time, the political game has overtaken the deliberative policy process, which results in a dumbing-down of policy.

Legislative-Executive Relations

The intensified political battling has aggravated the relationship between the legislative and executive branches, which is critical to bipartisanship. Presidents of both parties have failed to adequately consult Congress over critical foreign policy issues. The U.S. Constitution mandates the president receive Senate approval of treaties, but most administrations have tried to reach beyond that constitutional mandate to consult with Congress more broadly.¹⁶ It is not easy. There are 535 members of Congress, not to mention thousands of staff, and many of those members are not well-versed on the issues and the critical policy decisions that are made on the fly. In addition, representatives of the Department of State, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies have sometimes devoted too little time and resources toward building relationships with Congress. Instead of sustained contact at the assistant secretary level throughout the agencies of jurisdiction, presidents or their surrogates go to Capitol Hill during emergency situations. For example, President George W. Bush went to the Hill to plead for support for the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Also, President Bush sent his Secretary of State Colin Powell to Capitol Hill to placate members over the inability to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Former President Bill Clinton sent his Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Capitol Hill when members were up in arms about an ill-defined mission in Somalia. This crisis management approach to the foreign policy relationship between the White House and Congress does not serve the country well. Yet, the failure of presidents to consult Congress in any meaningful way makes it even more likely that members of Congress will follow the path of least resistance—allowing domestic issues to dominate their time, minds, and schedules. Moreover, the bitterness that grows out of both Republican and Democratic administrations' failure to consult Congress leads to partisanship in other areas.

In considering how to address this decreased deliberation and interaction between the parties, one confronts the frustrating realization that many, if not most, of the root causes of this intensified partisanship are a result of stubbornness. Despite the challenges of the three-day work week for members of Congress, most of the members and their

¹⁶ See <http://www.house.gov/Constitution/Constitution.html>.

spouses say they prefer it over the old system, where members spent the bulk of their time away from their district and their families. News cycles are continual and media will naturally continue to be driven by the market. The influence of interest groups is difficult to steer. The tyranny of technology is with us.

With so many of these root causes of partisanship intractable, any progress will require heavy lifting. It also becomes clear that progress hinges critically on the human decisions of individual policymakers throughout government, businesses, think tanks, and academia. Progress will require Republicans and Democrats to conclude that deliberation and dialogue across the aisle is important enough to make the time for it. Neither legislation, rules, nor procedural changes alone will suffice to bring about either the deliberation that helps to forge sound policy, or the comity that can flow from those deliberations. Procedural changes, however, may operate at the margins to help foster an atmosphere conducive to bipartisan deliberation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Americans have almost always been unified by foreign policy goals, particularly those articulated at a high level of abstraction. Nearly everyone agrees that we should defend America's security, promote prosperity, fight communism, promote American values, stop terrorism, advance democracy, and reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation. The divisive issues surround how to best advance those goals. Those decisions are defined and made by the president and Congress. Again, human beings in the process matter. If the amount of carping and despair from officials reflects real unhappiness with the bitter atmosphere in Washington, DC, then those human beings will have to be part of the solution.

Executive Branch

1. The president matters most. His decisions—more than any other—set the tone and shape the process. Accordingly, all who will offer themselves as candidates for the presidency in 2008 should begin now to consider ways in which they might help establish a process that engages debate and discussion in foreign policy between the parties.
2. The Constitution gives the executive branch major leeway to lead on foreign policy—and most administrations have used that power to its fullest—often at the cost of damaging their relationship with Congress. Future administrations should devote time and energy to building relationships with Congress and consulting congressional leaders on foreign policy issues on an ongoing basis, not just during times of crisis. This does not mean seeking permission from congressional leaders, but seeking counsel.
 - The president should notify Congress in advance of major foreign policy appointments, including the secretaries of state, defense, and treasury. Administrations would not be required to seek permission from Congress, but

presidents should notify congressional leaders as a matter of courtesy. Doing so would help to facilitate a relationship between those congressional leaders and the administration on foreign policy. It would also increase the odds that congressional leadership from the opposite party would embrace the new cabinet member.

- The president should also seek congressional input on front-burner issues ranging from trade with China to the size of the military. This consultation would take place at the leadership level. Again, it is less about permission, and more about notifying and preparing the way. The rank-and-file member does not expect to be consulted, but he or she will feel better knowing that the leadership has been consulted.
- The president should establish regular monthly meetings with the secretary of state and leaders in Congress, including the Speaker of the House, the House minority leader, the chairs of the House International Relations and Armed Services committees, the Senate majority and minority leaders, and the chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence committees. These meetings would regularize contact and make sure that contact was not only occurring in times of crisis. In a cost-benefit analysis, the time here is worth it. Meetings should be convened as needed with leaders of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committee when trade issues need to be discussed.
- The Department of State should build a deep congressional affairs division with a sufficient number of personnel to help learn the texture and talents of the congressional membership. We do not affix a number because different administrations might require different numbers to build bridges as they embrace different approaches. The assistant secretary of state for congressional affairs needs to be a core member of the secretary's team.

3. Presidents should consider the appointment of qualified people from the opposing party to senior positions at the Department of State, United States Trade Representative, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and within the intelligence community. The best person for the job might come from across the aisle. Occasional cross-party appointments would have the added value of making sure that minority concerns were being brought to the policy table. It would also give the incumbent administration a point person through whom to address those in the party that is out of office.
4. The executive branch should have consultative bodies and encourage the continuation of the long history of boards that provide for discussion. Once established, the president must reach out to a broad and ideologically diverse group to serve on key advisory boards such as the President's Council on Sustainable Development, the President's Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy, the National Security Advisory panel at the CIA, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Defense Policy Board.

For Congress:

1. Committee chairs should consider a monthly lunch meeting without staff or press during which members could discuss some issues without the glare of the lights and special interest groups. Most of the socialization among members now happens in party-only settings. The Republican and Democrat House members caucus on Wednesday mornings at 9 a.m. and the Senate meets in party caucuses on Tuesday afternoons. Members of Congress should get together across party lines in some place other than committee hearings.

2. To help chip away at the scarcity-of-time issue, new members of Congress should be limited to serving on only two committees.¹⁷ This would mean a smaller total number of members per committee. This recommendation, however, would not require a broad reorganization of Congress. Although members like to serve on three and four committees for reasons of both turf and fundraising, none have the time to delve deeply into the issues before that many committees. The lack of time and the increasing number of people and events competing for that time makes it harder to consider policy proposals thoroughly, including making time for inter-party discourse. This two-committees-only requirement would allow members the time to focus on policy more thoroughly.
3. End the practice of killing presidential appointees through holds. Both former President Clinton and the current President Bush have had their nominees stymied via “the hold.” Accordingly, all nominees reported from committee and placed on the executive calendar should be allowed a vote. The Senate tradition of “holds” should not stop action on nominees. The senator placing a hold on a nominee should be told the time when action will take place on that nominee and come to the floor at that time to oppose action on the nominee. No senator should be allowed to delay a vote on a nominee indefinitely.
4. Administrations, both Republican and Democrat, should be able to staff up earlier. Accordingly, assistant secretary and ambassadorial nominations should be handled on a notification basis with hearings as we have now, but a vote should be taken only if a member of Congress wants to introduce a motion to disapprove within sixty days.
5. Many members of Congress are reluctant to travel given the public’s disdain for “junkets.” Close scrutiny of congressional travel has been a good thing and has eliminated most abusive travel. The pendulum, however, should not swing too far

¹⁷ According to House Rules Committee Report, “Organization of the Congress: Final Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress,” the average number of committee assignments per member increased from about three in 1947 to six in 1993. See <http://www.house.gov/rules/jcoc2d.htm>.

in the opposite direction. An overwhelming majority of members in both parties say that their strongest relationships across the aisle were built on bipartisan congressional delegation trips (CODEL), where both members and spouses had a chance to get to know one another more than superficially. Those relationships have served and continue to serve as important points of inter-party communication in the policymaking process. This process should be institutionalized with a ten-day bipartisan congressional delegation trip paid for by the government and supported by congressional leaders.

This CODEL or trip would allow for a crash course on a few regions of central importance to foreign policy of that time. Countries that would be ripe in the current moment, for example, would be China, India, Russia, Brazil, and Belgium (on the issue of the European Union/North Atlantic Treaty Organization). The trip would not only expose members to key foreign policy issues—many of whom have had little or no such exposure prior to coming to Washington—but would also help create the relationships critical to a bipartisan policy process. Extravagant golf trips to Bermuda are not necessary. However, working trips to regions at the center of U.S. foreign policy are helpful and should not be lumped into the category of junket. House and Senate leadership should endorse and support working trips, and these trips should include bipartisan delegations.

6. Congressional hearings are one of Congress's most important policy tools. However, for reasons discussed above, they are often used to make points rather than to gather information, learn, and debate the pros and cons of a particular policy. Committee chairs and ranking minority members should build hearings that are aimed at deliberating policy rather than scoring political points. Again, this recommendation relies very much on individuals.

For state legislatures and certain judicial bodies

About half of the fifty states are reconsidering their process for drawing congressional maps. We encourage this process. Those tasked with drawing congressional districts

should do so without regard to the voting habits of the population. This would likely allow a fuller range of Republicans and Democrats to be elected.

Finally, for everyone: A call for civility in public discourse. Individuals can—and should—take the nasty personal edges off the foreign policy dialogue. Much of this report is aimed at human discourse and urging the smartest minds in each party to consider, sometimes reject, and occasionally draw on ideas from the other side of the aisle. Whether policymakers in the administration and Congress are willing to devote time and energy to building inter-party relationships will depend on whether they believe it will have long-term value in serving American interests. We think it will and we believe they can. We recommend that they do. The Council on Foreign Relations commits itself to assisting in that effort.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

Members of the Bipartisan Advisory Board

Democrats

MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
The Albright Group LLC;
Secretary of State,
Clinton Administration

DONALD A. BAER
Discovery Communications, Inc.;
Assistant to the President
and White House Director of Strategic
Planning and Communication,
Clinton Administration

THOMAS S. FOLEY
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP;
Former Speaker of the House (D-WA);
Former Ambassador to Japan

JAMIE S. GORELICK
WilmerHale;
Deputy Attorney General,
Clinton Administration

LEE H. HAMILTON
Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars;
Former Member of the House
of Representatives (D-IN)

ROBERT G. LIBERATORE
DaimlerChrysler Corporation;
Former Staff Director,
Office of Senate Majority Leader
Robert Byrd (D-WV)

Republicans

TIMOTHY ADAMS
Undersecretary of the Treasury
for International Affairs,
George W. Bush Administration

STEPHEN EDWARD BIEGUN
Ford Motor Company;
Former Assistant for National Security,
Office of Senate Majority Leader
William Frist (R-TN)

ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE JR.
O'Melveny & Myers LLP;
White House Counsel,
Reagan Administration

KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
The Duberstein Group, Inc.;
White House Chief of Staff,
Reagan Administration

CARLA A. HILLS
Hills & Company;
United States Trade Representative,
George H.W. Bush Administration;
Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, Ford Administration

J. DAVID HOPPE
Quinn Gillespie & Associates LLC;
Former Chief of Staff,
Office of Senate Majority Leader
Trent Lott (R-MS)

Democrats (cont.)

THOMAS F. MCLARTY III
Kissinger McLarty Associates;
White House Chief of Staff,
Clinton Administration

TOM MCDONALD
Baker & Hostetler LLP;
Former Ambassador to Zimbabwe

ROBERT A. PASTOR
American University;
Director of the Office of Latin American
and Caribbean Affairs, National Security
Council, Carter Administration

THOMAS R. PICKERING
The Boeing Company;
Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs, Clinton Administration;
Former Ambassador to the Russian
Federation, India, Israel, El Salvador,
Nigeria, and the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan

GENE B. SPERLING
Council on Foreign Relations;
National Economic Adviser,
Clinton Administration

PAULA STERN
The Stern Group, Inc.;
Former Chairwoman,
International Trade Commission

Republicans (cont.)

ARNOLD KANTER
The Scowcroft Group;
Undersecretary of State
for Political Affairs,
George H.W. Bush Administration

ED ROGERS
Barbour Griffith & Rogers LLC;
Deputy Assistant to the President,
George H.W. Bush Administration

VIN WEBER
Clark & Weinstock;
Former Member of the House
of Representatives (R-MN)

CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN
Former Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency,
George W. Bush Administration;
Former Governor of the State
of New Jersey

Independent

FRANK W. SESNO
Former Vice President
and Washington Bureau Chief, CNN

APPENDIX B

Letter from President James Carter to Congress Regarding Panama Canal Treaties¹⁸

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 12, 1977

To The Members of the United States Congress:

As you know, Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz have reached an agreement in principle with the Government of Panama on the Panama Canal Treaty, and have now reviewed the terms with me, the Acting Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was the unanimous conclusion of us all that our national interests will be advanced by the terms of this agreement. The Joint Chiefs have been represented in the negotiations, and give their unqualified support to the terms of the agreement.

I will continue my review of these principles, and I expect to authorize the completion of the formal treaty drafting.

This is a difficult political question, and I need your help during the coming weeks.

I am convinced that the treaties are essential to ensure the continued effective use of the Canal for American commercial and security needs.

You can call us directly with specific questions, but in the meantime I am enclosing for your use a short summary of the agreement in principle.

Sincerely,

Jimmy

¹⁸ See <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/panama/document05.pdf>.

APPENDIX C

Supporting text for President Carter's Letter to Congress¹⁹

Defense and National Security

Under the new treaties the U.S. will be able to guarantee the security and defense of the Panama Canal:

—The U.S. will have the permanent right to defend the neutrality of the Canal from any threat, for an indefinite period;

—U.S. warships will have the permanent right to transit the Canal expeditiously and without conditions, for an indefinite period;

—For the rest of the century, U.S. military forces will have the primary responsibility to protect and defend the Canal; the Government of Panama guarantees the U.S. the right to station troops in Panama and to use all lands and waters necessary for the Canal's defense.

Canal Operations

The United States will maintain control over all lands, waters and installations—including military bases—necessary to manage, operate, and defend the Canal. A new agency of the U.S. Government will operate the Canal. This agency, which replaces the Panama Canal Company, will assure United States control of Canal operations for the rest of the century. The Canal will be open to all shipping on a non-discriminatory basis.

On the effective date of the treaty, Panama will assume general territorial jurisdiction over the present Canal Zone, and may use portions of the area not needed for the operation and defense of the Canal. At the end of 1999, Panama will assume control of the Canal operations.

Economic Factors

Difficult financial negotiations have produced a fair and equitable package, which will not involve any Congressional appropriations. Panama will receive exclusively from Canal revenues:

—a share in tolls - 30 cents per Panama Canal ton;

—\$10 million per year from toll revenues;

¹⁹ See <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/panama/document05.pdf>.

—up to an additional \$10 million per year only if Canal traffic and revenues permit.

In addition, the United States has pledged its best efforts, outside the treaty, to arrange for an economic program of loans, loan guarantees and credits:

—up to \$200 million in Export-Import Bank credits;

—up to \$75 million in AID housing guarantees;

—a \$20 million Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) loan guarantee.

This 5-year package will contain standard "Buy American" provisions that will greatly benefit U.S. businesses which invest in and sell goods and services to Panama.

Rights of U.S. Employees

All U.S. civilians currently employed in the Canal can continue in United States Government jobs until retirement. They will enjoy the rights and guarantees extended to all U.S. Government employees overseas.

New Sea Level Canal

The agreement envisions the possibility of building a new sea level canal. The U.S. and Panama will jointly study its feasibility. If they agree that such a canal is desirable, they will negotiate the terms for its construction.

Treaties

There will be two treaties: (1) a treaty guaranteeing the permanent neutrality of the Canal, and (2) a basic treaty governing the operation and defense of the Canal through December 31, 1999.

APPENDIX D

Table 1. House Workload, 80th–106th Congresses, 1947–2000²⁰

Congress	Bills introduced	Average no. of bills introduced per member	Bills passed	Ratio: bills passed to bills introduced	Recorded Votes	Time in session (days)	Time in session (hours)	Hours/day in session	Comm., subcomm. meetings
80th (1947–48)	7,611	17.5	1,739	0.228	159	254	1,224	4.8	n.a.
81st (1949–50)	10,502	24.1	2,482	0.236	275	345	1,501	4.4	n.a.
82nd (1951–52)	9,065	20.8	2,008	0.222	181	274	1,163	4.2	n.a.
83rd (1953–54)	10,875	25	2,129	0.196	147	240	1,033	4.3	n.a.
84th (1955–56)	13,875	30.3	2,360	0.179	147	230	937	4.1	3,210
85th (1957–58)	14,850	33.5	2,064	0.142	193	276	1,147	4.2	3,750
86th (1959–60)	14,112	32.4	1,636	0.116	180	265	1,039	3.9	3,059
87th (1961–62)	14,328	32.9	1,927	0.134	240	304	1,227	4	3,402
88th (1963–64)	14,022	32.2	1,267	0.09	232	334	1,251	3.7	3,596
89th (1965–66)	19,874	45.7	1,565	0.079	394	336	1,547	4.6	4,367
90th (1967–68)	22,060	50.7	1,213	0.055	478	328	1,595	4.9	4,386
91st (1969–70)	21,436	49.3	1,130	0.053	443	350	1,613	4.6	5,066
92nd (1971–72)	18,561	42.7	970	0.052	649	298	1,429	4.8	5,114
93rd (1973–74)	18,872	43.4	923	0.049	1,078	318	1,487	4.7	5,888
94th (1975–76)	16,982	39	968	0.057	1,273	311	1,788	5.7	6,975
95th (1977–78)	15,587	35.8	1,027	0.066	1,554	323	1,898	5.9	7,896
96th (1979–80)	9,103	20.9	929	0.102	1,276	326	1,876	5.8	7,033
97th (1981–82)	8,094	18.6	704	0.087	812	303	1,420	4.7	6,078
98th (1983–84)	7,105	16.3	978	0.137	906	266	1,705	6.4	5,661
99th (1985–86)	6,499	14.9	973	0.15	890	281	1,794	6.4	5,661
100th (1987–88)	6,263	14.4	1,061	0.169	939	298	1,659	5.6	5,388
101st (1989–90)	6,683	15.4	968	0.145	915	281	1,688	6	5,305
102nd (1991–92)	7,771	17.9	932	0.12	932	277	1,795	6.5	5,152
103rd (1993–94)	6,647	15.3	749	0.113	1,122	265	1,887	7.1	4,304
104th (1995–96)	4,542	10.4	611	0.134	1,340	289	2,444	8.5	3,796
105th (1997–98)	5,014	11.5	710	0.142	1,187	251	2,001	8	3,624
106th (1999–2000)	5,815	13.4	957	0.165	1,214	272	2,179	8	3,347

²⁰ Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress 2001–2002* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2002), p. 146.

Table 2. Senate Workload, 80th–106th Congresses, 1947–2000²¹

Congress	Bills Introduced	Average no. of bills introduced per member	Bills passed	Ratio: bills passed to bills introduced	Recorded votes	Time in session (days)	Time in session (hours)	Hours/day in session	Comm., subcomm. meetings
80th (1947–48)	3,186	33.2	1,670	0.524	248	257	1,462	5.7	n.a
81st (1949–50)	4,486	46.7	2,362	0.527	455	389	2,410	6.2	n.a
82nd (1951–52)	3,665	38.2	1,849	0.505	331	287	1,648	5.7	n.a
83rd (1953–54)	4,077	42.5	22,231	0.547	270	294	1,962	6.7	n.a
84th (1955–56)	4,518	47.1	2,550	0.564	224	224	1,362	6.1	2,607
85th (1957–58)	4,535	47.2	2,202	0.486	313	271	1,876	6.9	2,748
86th (1959–60)	4,149	42.3	1,680	0.405	422	280	2,199	7.9	2,271
87th (1961–62)	4,048	40.5	1,953	0.482	434	323	2,164	6.7	2,532
88th (1963–64)	3,457	34.6	1,341	0.388	541	375	2,395	6.4	2,493
89th (1965–66)	4,129	41.3	1,636	0.396	497	345	1,814	5.3	2,889
90th (1967–68)	4,400	44	1,376	0.313	595	358	1,961	5.5	2,892
91st (1969–70)	4,867	48.7	1,271	0.261	667	384	2,352	6.1	3,264
92nd (1971–72)	4,408	44.1	1,035	0.235	955	348	2,294	6.6	3,559
93rd (1973–74)	4,524	45.2	1,115	0.246	1,138	334	2,028	6.1	4,067
94th (1975–76)	4,114	41.1	1,038	0.252	1,290	320	2,210	6.9	4,265
95th (1977–78)	3,800	38	1,070	0.282	1,151	337	2,510	7.4	3,960
96th (1979–80)	3,480	34.8	977	0.281	1,043	333	2,324	7	3,790
97th (1981–82)	3,396	34	803	0.236	966	312	2,158	6.9	3,236
98th (1983–84)	3,454	34.5	939	0.271	673	281	1,951	6.9	2,471
99th (1985–86)	3,386	33.9	940	0.278	740	313	2,531	8.1	2,373
100th (1987–88)	3,325	33.3	1,002	0.301	799	307	2,342	7.6	2,493
101st (1989–90)	3,669	36.7	980	0.267	638	274	2,254	8.2	2,340
102nd (1991–92)	4,245	42.5	947	0.223	550	287	2,291	8	2,039
103rd (1993–94)	3,177	31.8	682	0.215	724	291	2,513	8.6	2,043
104th (1995–96)	2,266	22.7	518	0.229	919	343	2,876	8.4	1,601
105th (1997–98)	2,718	27.2	586	0.216	622	296	2,188	7.4	1,954
106th (1999–2000)	3,343	33.4	819	0.245	672	303	2,202	7.3	1,862

²¹ Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress 2001–2002* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2002), p. 147.

Table 3. Congressional Staff, 1971–2001²²

	1979	1981	1983	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993	1995	1997	1999	2001
House												
Committee staff	2,027	1,917	2,068	2,146	2,136	2,267	2,321	2,147	1,266	1,276	1,267	1,201
Personal staff	7,067	7,487	7,606	7,528	7,584	7,569	7,278	7,400	7,186	7,282	7,216	7,209
Leadership staff	162	127	135	144	138	133	149	132	134	126	179	166
Officers of the House, staff	1,487	1,686	1,728	1,818	1,845	1,215	1,293	1,194	1,327	1,146	974	892
<i>Subtotal House</i>	<i>10,743</i>	<i>11,217</i>	<i>11,537</i>	<i>11,636</i>	<i>11,703</i>	<i>11,184</i>	<i>11,041</i>	<i>10,878</i>	<i>9,913</i>	<i>9,830</i>	<i>9,636</i>	<i>8,758</i>
Senate												
Committee staff	1,410	1,150	1,176	1,178	1,207	1,116	1,154	994	796	1,216	910	889
Personal staff	3,593	3,945	4,059	4,097	4,075	3,837	4,294	4,138	4,247	4,410	4,272	3,994
Leadership staff	91	106	120	118	103	105	125	132	126	148	219	221
Officers of the House, staff	828	878	948	976	904	962	1,092	1,165	994	958	990	950
<i>Subtotal House</i>	<i>5,922</i>	<i>6,079</i>	<i>6,303</i>	<i>6,369</i>	<i>6,289</i>	<i>5,984</i>	<i>6,665</i>	<i>6,429</i>	<i>6,163</i>	<i>6,732</i>	<i>6,391</i>	<i>6,054</i>
Joint Committee staffs	138	126	123	131	132	138	145	145	108	120	104	94
Support agencies												
General Accounting Office	5,303	5,182	4,960	5,042	5,016	5,063	5,054	4,958	4,342	3,500	3,275	3,155
Congressional Research Service	847	849	853	860	860	860	831	835	742	726	703	722
Congressional Budget Office	207	218	211	222	226	226	226	230	214	232	232	228
Office of Technology Assessment	145	130	130	143	143	143	143	143	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Subtotal, support agencies</i>	<i>6,502</i>	<i>6,379</i>	<i>6,154</i>	<i>6,267</i>	<i>6,245</i>	<i>6,292</i>	<i>6,154</i>	<i>6,166</i>	<i>5,302</i>	<i>4,458</i>	<i>4,210</i>	<i>4,105</i>
Miscellaneous												
Architect	2,296	1,986	2,061	2,073	2,412	2,088	2,099	2,060	2,151	1,854	2,012	2,012
Capitol Police	1,167	1,163	1,148	1,227	1,250	1,259	1,265	1,159	1,076	1,076	1,251	1,215
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>3,463</i>	<i>3,149</i>	<i>3,209</i>	<i>3,300</i>	<i>3,662</i>	<i>3,347</i>	<i>3,364</i>	<i>3,219</i>	<i>3,227</i>	<i>2,930</i>	<i>3,263</i>	<i>3,227</i>
Total	26,768	26,950	27,329	27,703	28,031	26,945	27,469	26,837	24,713	24,070	23,604	22,238

²² Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress 2001–2002* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2002), p. 126.

Table 4. House Incumbents Retired, Defeated, or Reelected, 1946 – 2000²³

Year	Retired ^a	Total seeking reelection	Defeated in primaries	Defeated in general election	Total reelected	% of those seeking reelection	Reelected as % of House membership
1946	32	398	18	52	328	82.4	75.4
1948	29	400	15	68	317	79.3	72.9
1950	29	400	6	32	362	90.5	83.2
1952	42	389	9	26	354	91.0	81.4
1954	24	407	6	22	379	93.1	87.1
1956	21	411	6	16	389	94.6	89.4
1958	33	396	3	37	356	89.9	81.8
1960	26	405	5	25	375	92.6	86.2
1962	24	402	12	22	368	91.5	81.8
1964	33	397	8	45	344	86.6	79.1
1966	22	411	8	41	362	88.1	83.2
1968	23	409	4	9	396	96.8	91.0
1970	29	401	10	12	379	94.5	87.1
1972	40	393	11	13	365	93.6	83.9
1974	43	391	8	40	343	87.7	78.9
1976	47	384	3	13	368	95.8	84.6
1978	49	382	5	19	358	93.7	82.3
1980	34	398	6	31	361	90.7	83.0
1982	40	393	10	29	354	90.1	81.4
1984	22	411	3	16	392	95.4	90.1
1986	40	394	3	6	385	97.7	88.5
1988	23	409	1	6	402	98.3	92.4
1990	27	406	1	15	390	96.0	89.7
1992	65	368	19	24	325	88.3	74.7
1994	48	387	4	34	349	90.2	80.0
1996	49	384	2	21	361	94.0	83.0
1998	33	402	1	6	395	98.3	90.1
2000	22	403	3	6	394	97.8	90.1

a. This entry does not include persons who died or resigned before election.

²³ Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress 2001–2002* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2002), p. 69.

Table 5. Senate Incumbents Retired, Defeated, or Reelected, 1946–2000²⁴

Year	Retired ^a	Total seeking reelection	Defeated in primaries	Defeated in general election	Total reelected	Reelected as % of those seeking reelection
1946	9	30	6	7	17	56.7
1948	8	25	2	8	15	60.0
1950	4	32	5	5	22	68.8
1952	4	31	2	9	20	64.5
1954	6	32	2	6	24	75.0
1956	6	29	0	4	25	86.2
1958	6	28	0	10	18	64.3
1960	5	29	0	1	28	96.6
1962	4	35	1	5	29	82.9
1964	2	33	1	4	28	84.8
1966	3	32	3	1	28	87.5
1968	6	28	4	4	20	71.4
1970	4	31	1	6	24	77.4
1972	6	27	2	5	20	74.1
1974	7	27	2	2	23	85.2
1976	8	25	0	9	16	64.0
1978	10	25	3	7	15	60.0
1980	5	29	4	9	16	55.2
1982	3	30	0	2	28	93.3
1984	4	29	0	3	26	89.6
1986	6	28	0	9	21	75.0
1988	6	27	0	4	23	85.2
1990	3	32	0	1	31	96.9
1992	7	28	1	4	23	82.1
1994	9	26	0	2	24	92.3
1996	13	21	1 ^b	1	19	90.5
1998	5	29	0	3	26	89.7
2000	5	29	0	6	23	79.3
a. This entry does not include persons who died or resigned before the election.						
b. Sheila Fraham, appointed to fill Robert Dole's term, is counted as an incumbent in Kansas's "B" seat.						

²⁴ Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress 2001–2002* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2002), p. 69.

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