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Summary Report

Europe and the Future of Global Governance

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The world is in need of global governance to channel an increasingly multipolar international system toward effective common action. No single country can hope to respond to the numerous challenges present on the world stage—the financial crisis, global warming, trade regulation, nuclear proliferation, or instability in the Arab world. At the same time, international forums nominally built to promote collective decision-making are falling short of their mandate. In other words, as the need for more effective and legitimate forms of global governance increases, the willingness or ability of international actors to compromise and agree—the *sine qua non* for effective collective action—appears lacking.

To discuss the current state of international cooperation and analyze Europe’s contribution to global governance, the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) invited members of the Council of Councils (CoC)—a global network of twenty-four foreign policy institutions from established and emerging states—to Rome for a three-day conference hosted by Italy’s Foreign Ministry on September 8–10, 2013. The conference, “Europe and the Future of Global Governance,” marked the first regional meeting of the CoC held in a European Union (EU) member state. Participants were drawn from leading policy think tanks, universities, and research centers from Africa, the Americas, Europe, and Asia allowing for a fruitful exchange of ideas and recommendations among scholars and policymakers.

The conference was held only days after the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in St. Petersburg where world leaders failed to agree on a series of pressing international concerns, in particular the

ongoing Syrian crisis. Participants highlighted that growing divisions among states have led to a worrying shortage of effective global governance on a range of issues. Specific sessions of the conference explored the effects of the eurozone crisis on the EU's contribution to global governance; current developments in international trade—specifically the negotiations for a U.S.-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and a U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the role of regional and international institutions in the Arab uprisings; the contribution the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) may bring to global governance; the multilateral dimensions of the EU's energy policy and quest for energy security; and finally, the future of the G20 as an effective forum for global governance. On the final day of the conference, two keynote addresses were delivered by the governor of the Bank of Italy, Ignazio Visco, and Italy's foreign minister, Emma Bonino.

The Eurozone Crisis and the EU's Role in Global Governance

The current international setting, characterized by increasing levels of interdependence between nations and regions, is witnessing a gradual but profound shift in economic power from the affluent West to the rising East. Five years of economic crisis have had a detrimental effect on the world economy, but the EU—especially since the sovereign debt crisis of 2010—has been particularly hard hit.

The attractiveness of the EU regional model, which before the crisis was almost universally admired, has diminished as the imbalances of the EU's monetary union, and the related incompleteness of the wider integration project, were laid bare by the financial crisis. Conference participants broadly agreed that the economic challenges highlighted a deeper political crisis that exposed the structural weaknesses of the EU model. In particular, the lack of strong leadership to press countries to agree on a roadmap has been problematic. Ultimately, European countries must define a clear framework within which to promote a full political union if the EU is to contribute effectively multilaterally. Participants agreed that Europe's response to the crisis must be more ambitious and lasting.

As a result of the crisis, the EU has become more inward-looking as member states have struggled to get their respective finances in order. Growing divisions among eurozone countries—and in particular between creditor and debtor countries—has been another by-product of the crisis and this, combined with increased budgetary constraints, has weakened the EU's ability to contribute to effective global governance. EU member states have disagreed on almost every major international issue, including implementing responses to the economic crisis, resorting to military action in Libya, voting for Palestinian observer membership at the United Nations (UN), supplying weapons to the Syrian rebels, and on whether or not to support the United States' call for military action against the Assad regime in Damascus following the latter's use of chemical weapons. The inability of the EU to act as a unit on both domestic and international issues has limited the reach and appeal of its soft power and diplomatic influence.

The eurozone is today witnessing some sparse signs of recovery but the EU is still widely regarded as the “weak link” in the global economy. Although heavily criticized, due to an excessive emphasis on fiscal responsibility to the detriment of growth and employment, the EU's response to the crisis has resulted in the creation of new supranational institutions and mechanisms that many scholars would have thought unimaginable a few years ago. These include agreements for an EU-wide

banking union, the “six-pack” measures, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the “fiscal compact” treaty, and the significantly increased authority for the European Central Bank (ECB). These developments indicate that member states have agreed to delegate increased powers to EU institutions, a trend which—as most conference participants agreed—is reflective of an overall understanding that increased integration is the only way for the EU to ensure its economic prosperity.

In addition to new EU institutions, participants discussed the achievements and weaknesses of the Troika arrangement, and the feasibility of this model to address future crises. A speaker noted that the creation of the Troika—a firefighting group composed of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission, and the ECB—was an innovative arrangement, but also deeply flawed because it limited the IMF’s influence to setting the conditions for bailouts.

In sum, though some measures are positive, the timing with which they were approved and the related difficulties in implementing them have increased global uncertainty surrounding the future of the European project. Participants concurred on the urgency to complete and implement a banking union, as this measure will be vital to consolidating Europe’s financial stability and sustaining its recovery.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the Future of International Trade

Much of the optimism that accompanied the founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO) during the heyday of liberal internationalism has gradually dissipated as multilateral agreements to regulate regional and global trade have increasingly been replaced by bilateral and regional treaties. More than five hundred such preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have been approved since the WTO entered into effect in 1996, resulting in severe imbalances in the international supply-and-demand chain for goods and services. This has limited the potential benefits of globalization, particularly in the developing world. Moreover, mistrust and clashing interests between advanced and emerging economies have led to a stalemate in the Doha negotiations and in growing skepticism of the current negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

Several participants argued that the exclusion of major rising economies raises serious questions about the legitimacy and likely effectiveness of both the TTIP and TPP. The lack of transparency in the negotiations was also highlighted as harmful to the process as it ultimately reinforces suspicions among developing countries that the objective of these agreements is to secure the privileged position of developed countries in any new regulatory framework for international trade. CoC participants from Asia, Africa, and Latin America noted that these agreements exclude countries such as Turkey, South Africa, and, above all, China, and expressed reservations about whether their own countries would join such agreements in the event that membership was expanded. They also expressed reservations about the TTIP and TPP serving as blueprints for a global regulatory framework integrated within the WTO. Most participants also agreed that the 2014 targets for agreement on the implementation of both the TTIP and TPP are unlikely to be met by the negotiating parties. Other participants questioned whether the U.S. Congress would approve such agreements in the event that the negotiations are successful.

From a transatlantic perspective, participants agreed that the TTIP would help promote and sustain economic growth on both sides of the Atlantic in times of crisis. The envisioned agreement also has an important political dimension, promising to bolster a fraying transatlantic relationship. There is a need to ensure, however, that benefits of a TTIP agreement also spill over into nonmember economies, and that the prospect of eventual membership for third-world countries be present. Some participants even proposed extending the TTIP to Latin America to create a more legitimate agreement. Other participants remained more skeptical of the likely benefits of TTIP, noting that the negotiations omit consideration of important sectors and industries, such as financial services and chemicals.

Across the developing world, but especially in parts of Asia, the TPP is viewed with much suspicion as a means for the United States to “encircle” China. One delegate described the TPP as the economic component to the U.S. geopolitical pivot to Asia and highlighted China’s competing trade vision, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and China’s preference for acting within the ASEAN Plus Three platform to coordinate regional issues. Some participants, however, offered alternative interpretations of the TPP, namely that it would have a beneficial effect on the region by providing a secure framework for economic cooperation and that it would provide an opportunity to advance China’s cooperation in global rule making. The TPP might even serve as an incentive for China to implement domestic reforms and help the country transition from an export-driven to a consumption-led, market-based economy. However, for this to occur, increased transparency in the negotiations must be possible, as well as clear articulation of the benefits such an agreement could bring to all states in the region and the wider global economy.

Transformations in the Arab World: The Role of Regional and Global Institutions

The sociopolitical transformations brought about by the Arab uprisings in a series of Arab states have significantly altered the geopolitical setting of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties confronting the countries in transition—in particular, Egypt, where the political polarization and the dire economic situation are of critical concern—the old status quo is unlikely to make a comeback. The revival of sectarian tensions, geopolitical competition, and the increased activism of a number of important states represent major geopolitical realities of the MENA region today.

Looking forward, most participants agreed that the Arab world will witness a prolonged period of instability and adjustment, and regional insecurity will decrease the West’s ability to influence events—whether in Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, or in the context of Arab-Israeli peace talks. Long gone are the days when the United States could hope to control regional developments, and the EU’s diminishing resources have also weakened Europe’s soft power in the region. It would be wrong, however, to describe the West’s declining influence in the Arab world as solely a product of the financial crisis or the United States’ pivot to Asia. Also to blame are deeper flaws in the West’s relationship with the MENA region, chief among these being the legacies of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the West’s support for autocratic regimes, and the repeated failures to broker an agreement among Israel, the Palestinians, and their Arab neighbors.

Participants agreed that Europe and the United States should conduct a serious debate about their long-term goals for the region and, in turn, rethink the major instruments and institutions through

which objectives are promoted in the Arab world. Cooperation with regional and extra-regional states will be important to advancing Western interests in the region, and as such, a greater understanding of the interests and priorities of these actors will be necessary to advance multilateral action.

Participants also highlighted that it is wrong to think of the MENA region as somehow detached from the rest of the international system. Just as multipolarity is emerging internationally, aspects of this global power shift are clearly detectable in the Arab world as well. States such as Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, and Brazil are increasing their involvement in the region while developing new interests and strategies independently from the United States and Europe. In addition to these extra-regional powers, states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel are also increasing their activism in regional affairs. The combined effects of these developments are that the Arab world is becoming more complex than before and that no single country can hope to go it alone in the region.

Western powers should consider that bilateral agreements will no longer prove effective in tackling the many unresolved issues that plague the region—from the Syrian conflict, to Iran's contentious nuclear program, to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead, multilateral frameworks, such as the 1991 Madrid Conference on Arab-Israeli peace or the prospective Geneva II summit on Syria, should be supported as the best means to favor international cooperation and collective action on these and other issues in the region. However, the United States and Europe must be under no illusions. In order for such multilateral agreements to be successful, it will no longer be possible to ignore or exclude the prerogatives of certain actors in the region—be they Iranian interests in Syria and the Persian Gulf, or Russian fears of Islamic extremism and Russia's wider ambition to secure and expand its influence in the Arab world.

Turning to the role of regional institutions, participants expressed doubts that such groupings could command legitimacy and act effectively in the MENA region. The legacies of mistrust and division in the Arab world have been reinforced in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, especially in the wake of the Syrian crisis. Regional institutions, such as the Arab League—long criticized for its ineffectiveness—have been hamstrung by internal divisions, including the deepening antagonism between states that support the various political incarnations of the Muslim Brotherhood (Qatar, Turkey, and Tunisia) and those who instead see political Islam as an inherent threat to their own domestic stability (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). Invited experts agreed that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has increased its activism and visibility on regional affairs, even sidelining the Arab League to an extent, but the fact that membership in this organization is limited to the Arab Gulf states prevents the GCC from acting as a legitimate forum for regional coordination.

Turning to North Africa, participants characterized the hostility that still exists between Morocco and Algeria as the primary impediment to regional cooperation in the Southern Mediterranean. The creation of a Maghreb Union would hold important benefits for all countries in North Africa, as well as improve the relationship among these states, the EU, and those countries situated further south, in the Sahel region, where, in the wake of the Mali crisis, the EU has increased its presence.

The BRICS Countries: What Contribution Do They Make to Global Governance?

The BRICS group—composed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and since 2010, South Africa—is a relatively new informal arrangement reflective of the gradual global shift of influence in international affairs. This panel stimulated a lively debate on the role and expectations of the BRICS countries; participants broadly agreed that the interests of these major rising powers must be integrated into the architecture of global governance.

Overall, participants expressed two views on the potential contribution the BRICS countries can have. Some experts considered the group as a challenge to the primacy of Western states in the international system. Others viewed the rise of the BRICS as an opportunity to address and reform international imbalances. Participants agreed that although emerging powers no doubt wish to increase their influence and representation in international institutions, they do not necessarily want to entirely overhaul the existing architecture. Instead, they are primarily exploring ways to reform international institutions from within to promote their views through constructive multilateral negotiations. Such an understanding should in turn alleviate concerns present in the developed world and ultimately reinforce efforts to improve effective means of global governance.

One participant highlighted the existence of shared concerns between established and rising powers in such areas as technical cooperation, illegal trafficking, maritime security, and sustainable development, while stressing that agreements on these issues may serve to instill trust among the parties and help overcome frictions in other, more controversial issues, such as trade regulation or climate change. The same participant cited increased contribution to UN peacekeeping operations by Brazil, China, and India as evidence of shared interests and their desire to be responsible stakeholders on global governance.

However, a major challenge facing the BRICS will be to reconcile their often diverging national, regional, and global priorities into a common vision. Experts concurred that while the BRICS group does hold certain characteristics in common—in particular a shared belief that the current international system is biased in favor of the developed world—this is where the commonalities end. A closer examination reveals the serious tensions, mistrust, and disagreements among BRICS members themselves, such as the competition between Russia and China for a leadership role within the BRICS, and the opposition of China and Russia to permanent seats on the UN Security Council for Brazil and India.

Finally, several participants noted that too much emphasis is being placed on the BRICS, and that it is unrealistic to expect these five countries alone to contribute to the cause of multilateralism. One speaker reflected on whether a broader set of countries not included in the G8 but also part of the G20 would represent a better, more representative forum through which to advance the cause of global governance. Some participants from the BRICS countries reiterated that the BRICS is still undergoing a learning process and it is too early to measure their effective contributions.

That said, the BRICS have indeed increased their cooperation on a number of significant issues, as evidenced by the fact that the members met on the sidelines of the recent G20 summit in St. Petersburg and produced a separate communiqué. Moreover, plans to create a \$100 billion joint foreign-reserve pool (first announced during the G20 summit in Russia) is further proof of their

willingness to act as a unit while promoting economic and infrastructure development. This announcement builds on plans to establish a BRICS development bank, which may still prove to be an important tool to further enhance trust and coordination among the membership.

Keynote Address: Ignazio Visco, Governor of the Bank of Italy

The second day of the conference opened with a keynote address from the governor of the Bank of Italy, Ignazio Visco, “Exit from the Euro Crisis: Opportunities and Challenges of the Banking Union.”¹ Addressing the participants, Governor Visco stated that Europe’s “recovery is now at hand, but downside risks remain significant.” After five years of economic crisis and a double-dip recession in Europe (until recently, the overall GDP of the EU had contracted for six consecutive quarters), the governor stated that the priority is to restore consumer confidence in the euro.

“The key to success” stated Visco, “will be a shared determination to advance toward a fully fledged European Union” in both the political and economic realms. “If we are to seize the opportunity, we cannot relax our efforts” and “must continue with structural reforms,” he added.

In this context, the governor characterized negotiations for a banking union as a “test of our resolve” in moving toward this goal.

Visco noted that technical measures cannot replace political actions and recalled that the EU had to deal with two main risks: default in some countries and the breakup of the euro. Each country has had to put its respective house in order, but some order has had to be put into the EU as well.

In his speech, Visco pointed out that “between 2010 and 2012, EU countries disbursed some €280 billion in loans to their partners in difficulty, either directly or through the newly established common financing instruments”—the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Italy’s contribution amounted to €43 billion, which, according to official estimates, will rise to more than €60 billion in 2014.

The governor believes that “fiscal adjustment was indispensable in the more economically fragile countries, including Italy, to ward off the risk of losing access to the market, which would have precipitated a deepening of the crisis.” The negative short-term effect on economic activity was the price paid for averting more serious consequences in the long run.

Speaking about the current negotiations for a single banking authority in the eurozone, Visco highlighted three components of this new measure: a single supervisory authority; a supranational authority or commission charged with overseeing the banking union’s activities; and a backstop of funds provided by European banks that will serve as an insurance against the eventual default of certain entities (so that governments will not need to use public funds to bail out private banks).

The governor also spoke specifically about Italy’s current financial standing. Starting from the assertion that “the recession has been longer and deeper in Italy than in most other countries,” he confirmed that there are signs that the recession is coming to an end, even though political instability still poses a threat to recovery. Citing figures from the Italian National Institute of Statistics, he said that GDP fell by 2.1 percent in the second quarter of 2013 and family spending fell by 3.2 percent. “The latest indicators, however, are consistent with gradual improvement,” and “the decline in output should come to a halt in the coming months,” the governor added.

The Geopolitics of Energy: The European Case

The panel on energy highlighted significant changes in the dialogue on energy policy and related technologies. Talk of energy scarcity, the rising price of oil, or the possibility of energy-related conflicts was common not too long ago, but today these fears appear to have been replaced by a certain degree of excitement about the impending “energy revolution” of shale oil and gas. Scarcity has therefore been replaced by talk of abundance and the United States—which is spearheading the energy revolution—appears poised to become both energy independent and a major exporter worldwide.

Participants noted that by 2030 the world’s economy is set to double, leading to exponential increases in the demand for energy. Thanks to the shale revolution, U.S. gas prices have fallen to one-third of the average price in Europe and to one-fifth of the price in Asia. The price decrease has had a positive effect on the U.S. economy, stimulating recovery by helping to boost industry and growth. Moreover, the United States is poised to become a major exporter of liquefied shale gas. New licenses have been given to U.S. companies to allow them to export to countries that have not signed foreign trade agreements with Washington. Although most of these exports are expected to go to Asia, Europe also has potential to secure a share.

Turning to Europe’s energy policy, participants highlighted how Europe is losing competitiveness and slowly falling behind its counterparts, for two primary reasons. First, government programs meant to favor green energy are demonstrating an inability to properly integrate and apply new technologies, which in turn is leading to rising maintenance costs. Second, efforts aimed at cutting CO₂ emissions have in fact resulted in a dramatic decrease in the cost of CO₂, neutralizing the many incentives offered by governments in order to promote investment in clean and renewable energy.

Participants warned that without sustained and targeted investment in Europe’s energy sector, prices will continue to increase, leading to serious strains on the economies and social fabric of European countries. Overall, three major challenges facing the EU were highlighted: the economic crisis; the shale gas revolution in the United States; and geopolitical instability in Europe’s neighborhood—both east and south.

The current global shift in power, and the West’s declining influence in world affairs, will figure prominently in developments tied to world energy in the coming decades as competition for resources intensifies. One primary objective that Europe should pursue is to diversify and secure different energy supply lines as a means to limit disruptions or excessive dependence on any one source. In this context, the recent announcement of a Trans-Adriatic Pipeline supplying gas from central Asia to Europe should be welcomed as an important step toward this goal.

Participants agreed that ultimately there is a need to better coordinate the building of energy infrastructure and move toward a single European energy market. This implies that countries must agree to surrender certain aspects of sovereignty in a trade-off for increased efficiency, lower prices, and, ultimately, greater energy security.

The Future of the Group of Twenty

Expressing their disappointment in the St. Petersburg G20 summit communique, conference participants expressed skepticism about the body's ability to command legitimacy and act effectively on a number of global issues. Participants noted that the summit's failure was not only due to the lack of progress on addressing the use of chemical weapons and the ongoing civil war and humanitarian crisis in Syria, but also as a result of the group's inability to address core G20 priorities, including on global finance.

Overall—most participants agreed—there appears to be a marked difference between G20 summits held during times of economic crisis and those that take place when no single international economic issue is making headlines. Experts commented on how the G20 seems more efficient in tackling major economic crises (for example in the wake of the financial crisis) than during times when issues are less urgent. Another weakness participants highlighted was the difficulty in reconciling priorities and interests of the broad membership. The G20 group also includes within it other groupings, such as the G7, the G8, and the BRICS, which tend to stick together on many issues.

Participants also discussed the agenda of the G20 summits. A number of experts expressed frustration with the excessive focus on economic issues within the agenda and called for a greater emphasis on political and strategic issues. One participant proposed having a foreign-ministers track at the summits to establish discourse on pressing global challenges beyond the sphere of economics. (The Mexican government experimented with such an approach, in an informal foreign-ministers summit during its G20 chairmanship; however, not all foreign ministers participated). In response to this proposal, another participant highlighted that this would be risky, as it is first necessary to have broad agreement on an issue before convening such a high-level meeting on the sidelines of the G20.

Conference participants disagreed about whether G20 summit agendas should focus solely on a series of clearly defined and realistically achievable issues, or rather should include a wide range of topics. Participants who favored the latter option argued that a wider range of topics could increase opportunities for “grand bargains” through the linking of disparate issues to arrive at collective decisions. In contrast, a more focused agenda would run the risk of leaving little room for agreement if participating states failed to bridge their differences.

Turning to stakeholder participation at G20 summits, one participant expressed her belief that, far from being a meeting of twenty countries, these summits are actually more like G40 meetings given that participation is also extended to regional organizations, nongovernmental institutions, international financial institutions, and often, other countries. This makes agreement even harder to achieve and creates a propensity for confusion and disorganization.

Participants also discussed concrete proposals for G20 reform. These included issuing a simplified and shorter communique following G20 summits, to improve visibility of those specific issues covered during the conference and highlight the concrete decisions made by world leaders. Such a concise statement could still be accompanied by a longer, more technical annex. One participant called specifically for a two page “decision paper” that would raise awareness and improve communication about the summit. A second proposal would establish a small permanent

secretariat charged with ensuring a degree of consistency in the G20 agenda, as well as continuity across hosts.

Finally, most participants agreed that in the current climate of uncertainty that characterizes the global arena, global governance is in great demand. Participants' views varied about the potential for the G20 to act as an effective venue for these collective efforts. Overall, however, participants did agree on one major risk: that repeated failures of G20 leaders to agree on collective action is translating into a growing popular disillusionment toward multilateral action and global governance. A success story is therefore needed to restore confidence in the capabilities of multilateral frameworks to "get the job done."

Keynote Address: Emma Bonino, Foreign Minister of Italy

Italian Foreign Minister Emma Bonino delivered a passionate keynote speech calling for greater, more ambitious, and legitimate forms of global governance.² The minister highlighted Europe's potential to contribute to multilateral solutions, given its history and its ability to effectively—albeit imperfectly—combine values such as democracy, accountability, and diversity.

During her address, Bonino denounced the weak and inadequate state of global governance and stressed that Europe is not living up to its expectations. While acknowledging that the eurozone crisis has negatively affected the EU's image abroad and laid bare the weaknesses of the European project, the minister stressed, "we must continue down the road of greater institutional integration because this is the only alternative to unilateralists and nationalists." The ultimate objective must be a complete political union, concluded the foreign minister.

While acknowledging that many European member states do not share her vision of further integration, Minister Bonino stressed that under her leadership Italy will not only maintain its commitments toward Europe but also continue to press member states to stay true to the original ideals underpinning the European project. "There are those who view the European Union solely as a single market, those who are in favor of a closer political union on an intergovernmental basis, and those who advocate a federalist union," added Bonino. "I am for a 'light' federal Europe, because I don't see any other system that can effectively ensure democracy, accountability, and diversity." What is needed is a federal Europe with clear competencies in areas such as foreign and defense policy, but also civil rights: "Such a Europe would carry more weight on the international scene and contribute more effectively to global governance in an ever more multipolar and interdependent world," added the foreign minister. "A 'light' federal Europe would aim to resemble the United States' federal system," said the minister as she highlighted her vision of a "United States of Europe."

Turning to recent developments in the Syrian conflict, and in particular to Russia's proposal to place Bashar al-Assad's chemical weapons under international control, Minister Bonino stressed how this proposal has created a window of opportunity for diplomatic action, one that must be supported by Europe as a means to avoid a counterproductive and inconclusive military intervention in Syria. While specifying that she first needs to receive the full details of the Russian plan before Italy can express its formal position, the minister stressed that the time frame for diplomatic action was limited due to the upcoming annual UN General Assembly meeting in late September.

Endnotes

1. A full transcript of the address is available here at http://www.iai.it/pdf/Visco_130910.pdf; for a video recording, see, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lmRcDXMZ5Xw>.
2. A video recording of Minister Bonino's speech is available online at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Z36oNcezck>.