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Number 4

American Foreign Policy: Regional Perspectives

Proceedings
A Workshop Sponsored by the
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Newport, Rhode Island
13–15 May 2009

Richard M. Lloyd, editor
William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics

Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island
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Introduction

Workshop Focus
The purpose of this workshop is to provide a collegial forum for a small and select group of foreign policy and regional experts to formulate and recommend new directions for American foreign policy for each of the major regions of the world.

Workshop Background
With a new American administration in office, this is an opportune time to assess American foreign policy and to set future directions. What challenges and opportunities will the United States, and its allies and friends, face in the future? What changes should be made to all elements of U.S. foreign policy, including the diplomatic, economic, military, and informational elements? What elements should continue? What are the varying perspectives of nations within the regions concerning U.S. foreign policy? What changes in U.S. foreign policy would they desire? Overall, what new directions for U.S. foreign policy will better support the interests and objectives of the United States, its allies, and its friends?

Workshop Venue and Format
A total of thirty-three individuals participated in this by-invitation-only workshop held at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The college and its staff provide a professional environment to facilitate small group workshops in exploring specific issues.

Seventeen panelists prepared and presented papers on topics of their choice within the subject areas of their respective panels. Following a presentation of the papers, all participants engaged in extensive discussion of the papers and of the focus of the panel. All discussions were conducted under a nonattribution policy.

All papers and summaries of working-group discussions (prepared by each panel moderator) are included in this monograph. The monograph is being widely distributed within the national security community and the general public. The monograph is also available electronically at http://www.usnwc.edu/academics/courses/nsdm/rugerpapers.aspx.

William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics
The Ruger Chair was established to support research and study on the interrelationships between economics and security. A fundamental premise is that without security it is difficult to have economic prosperity and without prosperity it is difficult to have security.
The intent of this Ruger Chair–sponsored workshop is to support individual research, publication, and a continuing dialogue on matters important to national security economics. It is hoped that research done for this workshop will provide participants with the building blocks for further research and publication.
Agenda

American Foreign Policy: Regional Perspectives

A Workshop Sponsored by the
William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island
13–15 May 2009

Wednesday, 13 May 2009
1840 Depart Hotel
1900 Welcome Dinner, Officers’ Club, Naval Station Newport

Thursday, 14 May 2009
0730 Depart Hotel
0745 Welcome Breakfast, Decision Support Center
0830 Opening Remarks

Ambassador (Ret.) Mary Ann Peters, Provost, Naval War College

0845 Panel I: A Global Perspective

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin, Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Dr. Michael T. Klare, Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies, Hampshire College

Moderator: Dr. Thomas R. Fedyszyn, Professor of National Security Affairs, Chair Eurasia Regional Study Group, Naval War College

1015 Break

1030 Panel II: Western Hemisphere

Peter Hakim, President, Inter-American Dialogue

Dr. Shannon K. O’Neil, Douglas Dillon Fellow for Latin America Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

Ambassador (Ret.) Paul D. Taylor, Senior Strategic Researcher, Naval War College
1200 Lunch, RADM Joseph Strasser Dining Room

1330 Panel III: Asia and the Pacific

Dr. Jonathan D. Pollack, Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies, Chair Asia-Pacific Study Group, Naval War College

Dr. Evan S. Medeiros, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

Dr. Emrys Chew, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

Moderator: Dr. John F. Garofano, Professor of Strategy and Policy, Jerome Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security, Naval War College

1500 Break

1515 Panel IV: South Asia

Dr. Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations

Ambassador (Ret.) Teresita C. Schaffer, Director, South Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Moderator: Dr. Timothy D. Hoyt, Professor of Strategy and Policy, Co-chair Indian Ocean Regional Study Group, Naval War College

1645 Adjourn

1650 Return to Hotel

1845 Depart Hotel

1900 Dinner, La Forge Casino Restaurant

Friday, 15 May 2009

0730 Depart Hotel

0745 Breakfast, Decision Support Center
0830  Panel V: The Greater Middle East

  Ambassador (Ret.) David C. Litt, Executive Director, Center for Stabilization and Economic Reconstruction, Institute for Defense Business

  Dr. Marc Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, The Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University

  Dr. Heidi E. Lane, Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy, Greater Middle East Area of Study Coordinator, Naval War College

  Moderator: Dr. Hayat Alvi-Aziz, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval War College

1000  Break

1015  Panel VI: Europe and Russia

  Dr. Sharyl Cross, Professor and Director of Studies, Program in Advanced Security Studies, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

  Dr. R. Craig Nation, Professor of Strategy and Director, Eurasian Studies, U.S. Army War College

  Moderator: Ambassador (Ret.) Mary Ann Peters, Provost, Naval War College

1145  Lunch, RADM Joseph Strasser Dining Room

1300  Panel VII: Africa

  Ambassador (Ret.) Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

  Dr. Peter J. Schraeder, Professor and Graduate Program Director, Department of Political Science, Loyola University, Chicago

  Moderator: Dr. Stephen A. Emerson, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval War College

1430  Concluding Remarks

  Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd, William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics, Naval War College
1445  Adjourn
1500  Depart to Airport

Participants:
Dr. Rocky R. Meade, Colonel General Staff, Headquarters, Jamaica Defense Force
Dr. Hussein Solomon, University of Pretoria, Republic of South Africa
Captain David G. Manero, U.S. Navy, Security Cooperation Programs Division, U.S. European Command
Captain (Sel) Victor M. Ott, U.S. Navy, Regions Branch Head, International Engagement Division N52, OPNAV
Ms. Deborah A. Bolton, State Department Advisor to President, Naval War College
Dr. Christopher R. Jasparro, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs, Africa Area of Study Coordinator, Naval War College
Dr. Terence Roehrig, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval War College
Professor Sean C. Sullivan, Workshop Administrative Assistant, and Assistant Professor, Naval War College
Panel IV
South Asia

Dr. Daniel Markey
Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations

Ambassador (Ret.) Teresita C. Schaffer
Director, South Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Moderator:
Dr. Timothy D. Hoyt
Professor of Strategy and Policy, Co-chair Indian Ocean Regional Study Group, Naval War College
A U.S. Strategy for Pakistan:
Future Directions

Dr. Daniel Markey
Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia
Council on Foreign Relations

Since his election, President Obama has moved quickly to shift the focus of U.S. foreign and defense policy away from Iraq and toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. This shift reflects a long-held view that the terrorists responsible for 9/11 remain firmly entrenched in South Asia and that the war in Iraq represented a distraction from this central threat to American security. Having conducted a major interagency strategic review, endorsed significant troop increases, and requested an expansion of U.S. military and civilian assistance, it is clear that the Obama administration has initially committed itself to a far more aggressive effort in Pakistan and Afghanistan. That said, these initial steps have not locked Washington into a clear or precisely defined set of policies; important pieces of the new U.S. approach still remain in flux, open to interpretation and change.

Looking to the future, the United States will be best served by recognizing (1) that Pakistan, not Afghanistan, poses the paramount challenge to American security; (2) that building a strong partnership with Pakistan while working to transform perceptions of the strategic environment in South Asia holds the greatest potential for sustainable U.S. security; and (3) that even under the best of circumstances, success in the region will take a long time and may prove extremely costly.

Defining the Policy Challenge: Pakistan More than Afghanistan

Pakistan and Afghanistan comprise two facets of the same security environment, a fact acknowledged by the Obama administration in its adoption of the moniker “AfPak” when discussing the region. To reflect the hierarchy of strategic threat the two countries pose to U.S. national security, though, the terminology should in fact be “PakAf.”

Pakistan is a country of 176 million, as compared to Afghanistan’s 33 million. It is the country in which, by nearly all accounts, Taliban and al Qaeda leadership find sanctuary and whose security apparatus has long supported domestic Islamist militant groups as an asymmetric means to achieve strategic equilibrium with India, its neighbor and historical antagonist over the disputed territory of Kashmir. It is a state with a history of alternating authoritarian military and largely ineffectual and corrupt civilian rule. Hollowed-out state institutions, inadequate civilian control over the military, and an unsettled ideological debate about its own strategic interests leave Pakistan unable, and perhaps unwilling, to fulfill Washington’s expectations of it as a partner against Islamist militancy.

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By all accounts, Pakistan’s internal instability has reached historically unprecedented levels. Extremist militants with the professed goal of imposing sharia law throughout Pakistan spread to within sixty miles of the capital in late April before being confronted and driven back by Pakistani security forces. This low point in Pakistani history reflected the inability or unwillingness of the Pakistani state to confront definitively these challenges to its sovereignty. And while few observers fear an immediate threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the geographic proximity of al Qaeda to such weapons of mass destruction drastically raises the strategic stakes for Islamabad, Washington, and the world.

Beyond the daunting immediate threats Pakistan already poses to U.S. security interests is an even more ominous long-term proposition: the next generation of globally linked extremists and terrorists is likely to hail from Pakistan. As of 2006, 59.3 percent of Pakistan’s population was under the age of twenty-four. Because the fertility rate in Pakistan remains high, the “youth bulge” will persist into the coming decades; the percentage of Pakistanis under the age of twenty-four is still projected to be 51.4 percent as of 2030. Combined with the anti-Americanism that already pervades much of Pakistani society, the deficient state of Pakistan’s under-resourced public education system and the paucity of economic opportunities could potentially stir up a cauldron of disaffected young people ripe for indoctrination by Pakistan’s expanding radical Islamist movement.

The purpose of highlighting the present and future threats found in Pakistan is not to diminish the challenges the United States faces across the border in Afghanistan, which remain real and daunting in their own right. It is merely to underscore that, while the threats to U.S. national security exist on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and need to be addressed in tandem, the repercussions of failure in Pakistan are greater because of its size and nuclear status. Moreover, Washington’s ability to influence change in Pakistan is limited by a clear red line imposed by Islamabad that prohibits significant numbers of U.S. military personnel from operating in Pakistan. For these reasons, the Obama administration should prioritize Pakistan as the chief national security challenge in South Asia.

**U.S. Strategic Alternatives**

Fortunately, statements from top U.S. officials suggest that the White House recognizes Pakistan’s paramount importance to U.S. national security, and the unprecedented level of violence within Pakistan throughout early 2009 has helped this proposition gain currency throughout Washington’s foreign policy community. Yet even if this supposition is adopted as fact, the critical and challenging next step remains: identify the best strategy to confront urgent threats while simultaneously addressing the underlying, longer-term challenges.

U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan—whether short or long term—will most likely be met by engaging with and bolstering those individuals, groups, and institutions within Pakistan who are actual or potential allies in the fight against violent Islamist extremism. There is little doubt that working with Pakistani partners will not be easy, in part because Washington and Islamabad do not perceive their strategic interests identically and in part because of a lingering
bilateral mistrust reinforced by a lengthy history of “enlightened alliance.”

And in the end, a strategy of “partnership” may fail—it will no doubt be frustrating and costly—but it is worth attempting if only because the alternatives are even less likely to achieve success. In this context, it is worth examining the shortcomings of two credible alternative strategies: containment and coercion.

**Poor Alternatives: Neither Containment nor Coercion**

If U.S. efforts to win effective cooperation from Pakistani partners fail and the security environment in the region continues on its present trajectory, a strategy of containment—wallowing off the threat posed by terrorists and extremists—may be necessary. But containment is unlikely to be particularly effective or inexpensive over the long term.

Containment made good sense during the Cold War, when the United States faced a strong Soviet state under unified command. Today, the threat from Pakistan comes from strong subnational actors, not the state itself. Given Washington’s inability even to pinpoint the location of top al Qaeda leaders along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, it is clear that containing subnational terrorist groups will be extremely difficult. The complexity of the challenge would be multiplied if the United States is forced to operate without Pakistani cooperation. High-tech U.S. surveillance cannot substitute for human intelligence when it comes to unraveling complicated networks of individuals and groups.

Moreover, a strategy of containment against terrorists operating in Pakistan prematurely forfeits the prospect of cultivating an effective partnership with the vast majority of 176 million Pakistanis and their government. Once the United States embarks on a strategy of containment, it may be nearly impossible to reengage Pakistan with the goal of establishing a lasting partnership. Containing Pakistan may also increase the likelihood that an adversarial regime takes power in Islamabad, since Pakistan’s political leaders would have little incentive to seek cooperation with Washington. U.S. tactics of containment would undoubtedly prove unpopular, offering a weak government in Islamabad plenty of reasons to play the anti-American card. Nor is containment flexible enough to address the longer-term threat posed by Pakistan in a more collaborative manner, even if it is successful in mitigating the security threat over the near term; it would need to be a strategy of indefinite duration.

Finally, once implemented, if a containment strategy begins to show signs of failure—if, for instance, there are serious indications that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has become more vulnerable to seizure by terrorists—the United States will face a dilemma similar to the Bush administration’s perception of the situation in prewar Iraq. Yet any U.S. invasion and occupation of Pakistan would almost certainly make Iraq look like child’s play. In short, containment could very well lead the United States down a path to even more difficult and far more costly options.

The second strategic alternative centers on coercion, specifically the use of assistance coupled with the threat of withdrawal of support, or even sanctions, should Pakistan fail to meet U.S. conditions. Various types of coercion strategies regularly come up for consideration in Washington. For instance, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement (PEACE) Act of
2009 legislation put forth by the House Foreign Affairs Committee makes a clear attempt to tie U.S. military assistance to Pakistan’s compliance on several issues, including nuclear proliferation and counterterrorism. The United States should not threaten sanctions unless it is willing to follow through and impose them. But because of Washington’s dependence on Pakistan to achieve its security interests in the region, the threat of sanction is simply not credible. Unfortunately, some members of the U.S. Congress appear not to have come to terms with this credibility gap inherent in a coercive approach to assistance. Nor does stipulating that sanctions can be waived by the president for national security reasons (as is the case in the PEACE Act of 2009) resolve the matter. Instead, such waivers simply transform congressional conditions into toothless annoyances.

The problem with the coercive approach is that it will only compel Pakistani action if the United States has points of leverage—that is, if Pakistanis perceive the need to cooperate with the United States more than vice versa. Today this is simply not the case. Washington has few good instruments to address threats based in Pakistan without the cooperation of Pakistani security forces. Pakistan also remains an essential conduit for U.S. and NATO military supplies en route to Afghanistan, a logistics chain that cannot be easily replaced. But many Pakistanis perceive their security environment much differently. In particular, they do not see U.S. intervention in the region as a stabilizing force, and they continue to see India as Pakistan’s primary threat. While few Pakistanis—especially those in the military—would prefer an outright break with the United States, many do believe that their security threats are manageable without Washington’s assistance. Pakistan has done without America in the past; it might try to walk that path again in the future. Indeed, there are indications that Pakistan’s military and intelligence services are already hedging their bets in anticipation of U.S. abandonment.

Historical precedent is instructive in debunking the utility of coercion toward Pakistan. In 1990, Washington cut off aid to Pakistan as a condition of the Pressler Amendment that took effect when President George H. W. Bush failed to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. The Pressler Amendment was adopted in 1985 and Pakistan’s continued development toward a nuclear capability after that date demonstrates that the threat of American sanctions did not change Pakistani behavior that it deemed in its national interest. More troubling, cutting U.S. assistance severed important opportunities for building relations with Pakistan, including the International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding. Ending IMET was meant to penalize Pakistan but has proved detrimental to American interests as well. Over the course of the 1990s, Pakistani army officers lacked the opportunity to interact professionally with their American counterparts. Without this firsthand exposure to the ways and norms of the U.S. military and American society, a generation of the Pakistani officer corps has been left to its own devices to formulate opinions—typically negative ones—about the United States. In contrast, the previous generations faced no such restrictions. Pakistan’s chief of army staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, for one, graduated from both U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning and the Command and Staff General College at Fort
Leavenworth. At the very least, his prior experiences now offer him an understanding and appreciation for the U.S. military that his junior officers lack.

The revocation of U.S. aid in the 1990s also left a deep and enduring scar in relations between Pakistan and the United States. Pakistanis viewed the invocation of the Pressler Amendment in 1990 as more than a coincidence, coming shortly after the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tactical utility as a conduit of U.S. aid to the anti-Soviet mujahideen ceased. This bilateral trust deficit remains a central roadblock to deeper Pakistani cooperation with the United States. Overcoming it will be essential to shifting Pakistani opinions about the durability of partnership with Washington. Imposing a coercive policy again would simply reinforce a destructive pattern of U.S. engagement with Pakistan.

A Two-Pillar Strategy
A better long-term strategy to advance U.S. goals in Pakistan should be based on the twin pillars of induced bilateral partnership and the reshaping of Pakistani perceptions of the regional strategic environment. Washington must seek to induce, rather than coerce, allies and partners within Pakistan’s civilian political leadership, military, and wider public. U.S. policy makers must understand that their actions play into an ongoing debate within Pakistani society, in which allies can be won or lost and adversaries can be undermined or empowered. American security and development assistance should be used to strengthen these elements of Pakistani society to better advance the areas where their interests coincide with those of the United States.

Too often lost in the discussion of Pakistan is the fact that the Taliban and other extremist groups do not represent the goals and aspirations of the people, the vast majority of whom would prefer to live in a peaceful, prosperous, and moderate country. Washington should therefore pursue policies that will be perceived in Pakistan as supporting these goals. Along these lines, the United States will find that helping to build a stronger Pakistani civilian administration, capable of delivering law and order, is in both U.S. and Pakistani interests. Similarly, enhancing the educational and economic prospects for millions of young Pakistanis will contribute to U.S. security over the medium to long run. Training and equipping effective counterinsurgency forces within the Pakistani military is also mutually beneficial. In each of these areas, the United States should patiently but persistently seek the most efficient means to deliver its assistance, as waste and corruption will undermine trust on both sides.

But assistance in these areas should not be tied to a rigid set of conditions. Instead, to demonstrate its long-term commitment to partners within Pakistan, Washington should clarify that if resources are misused or fail to produce desired results they should be reprogrammed rather than curtailed. On the civilian side, one way to improve transparency and accountability for the expenditure of U.S. assistance would be to create a multilateral trust fund, possibly administered by the World Bank, which could work with the United States, other donors, and Pakistan’s government and nongovernmental groups to identify, formulate, and implement effective assistance projects. Such a trust fund would also permit Washington to leverage its investments by encouraging contributions from other donors, such as the EU and the Japanese.
As the second pillar of its effort, the United States should work to reshape the strategic environment as understood by Pakistanis. U.S. assistance, military operations, and diplomacy should all be employed to create new incentives that will convince fence-sitters within Pakistan’s political and military leadership of the benefits of working with the United States and the costs inherent to opposing American efforts in the region. In particular, Washington should work to create conditions that diminish political and military uncertainty along Pakistan’s borders. To be clear, this does not mean that the United States should somehow aim to resolve Indo-Pak and Pak-Afghan disputes in Pakistan’s favor. Instead, Washington should make a clear commitment to regional stability, demonstrating that militancy will be defeated decisively in Afghanistan and lending under-the-radar support to a normalization of relations between India and Pakistan.

Transforming the regional security environment is necessary because from a Pakistani perspective, India and Afghanistan represent the essential, linked threats that have long inspired Islamabad’s patronage and support to militant and extremist organizations as a means of asymmetrical power projection. The persistent ambivalence in some Pakistani circles about how to deal with these militant groups is tied to an underlying fear of Indian encirclement. The United States can address pieces of this dynamic by devoting greater, sustained resources to the fight in Afghanistan, thus eliminating the incentives for Pakistan to hedge its bets and support Taliban and other anti-Kabul factions. In other words, by demonstrating a convincing commitment to victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States will show Islamabad it has nothing to gain by active or passive assistance to the Afghan Taliban and related groups because they have no political future in Kabul.

At the same time, the United States should approach both New Delhi and Islamabad to encourage a return to dialogue and normalization of Indo-Pak relations. Washington should clarify to its Pakistani partners that the United States is committed to strategic partnership with a rising democratic India, that this relationship is not intended to threaten Islamabad, but that India’s rising prominence in global politics cannot be held hostage to Pakistani fears. In short, the time has come for Pakistan to reconcile itself to a new strategic reality vis-à-vis India.

Recognizing that the United States will never have the leverage required to impose a resolution to the blood-drenched dispute between India and Pakistan, Washington should still make an effort to mitigate causes of insecurity. The Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2009 and the subsequent uptick in tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi should have impressed the new Obama administration with the urgent need to keep a lid on cross-border tensions. Washington should encourage both sides to return to their “composite dialogue” that was a casualty of the Mumbai attacks. That dialogue would also benefit from including discussions of Afghanistan, since Pakistanis bitterly complain about extensive—and threatening—Indian intelligence operations in Afghanistan. While the United States should not seek to adjudicate this dispute, it might play a helpful role in the sharing and verification of intelligence as a means of building confidence on both sides.
Overall, this twin-pillar strategy for Pakistan focuses on long-term goals. U.S. efforts may not yield rapid progress even with $1.5 billion per year in civilian aid to Pakistan and sixty-thousand or more U.S. troops on the ground in Afghanistan. They will require patience, especially in a three-to-five-year timeframe. But, in contrast to the lack of sustainability of containment and impracticality of coercion without leverage, this strategy attempts to bridge the near-term and longer-term security challenges posed by Pakistan. In addition to meeting the urgent challenges of today, a strategy of inducement will help Washington confront the looming challenge that Pakistan will pose over the next generation.

**Implementing a Twin-Pillar Strategy: First Steps**

The broad contours of a twin-pillar approach to Pakistan are outlined above, but in order to move from strategy to implementation, there are three specific areas where the White House can and should take quick action.

First, with respect to meeting the urgent security challenges posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups based within Pakistan, the United States will need to continue forceful intelligence and military operations in Afghanistan and along the Pakistani border, some of which may be unpopular among Pakistanis. But in conducting these operations, the U.S. military should work in ways that will do the least possible to jeopardize prospects for longer-term partnership. In particular, it should be understood that accelerated or geographically expanded use of Predator-type drones on Pakistani territory under present political conditions would be counterproductive. Drone strikes have served as a useful tactical disruption for a small number of targets, but they are unpopular in the current Pakistani political climate and raise costs for the U.S.-Pakistani partnership. In addition, drones are now—by some accounts—losing their tactical utility, as top terrorist leaders relocate outside the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and into Pakistan’s settled areas. This migration could contribute to instability and terrorism in places like Karachi or southern Punjab.

Second, in order to build capable Pakistani partners and to confront urgent security challenges, Washington must make rapid and extensive investments in critical institutions in Pakistan’s security sphere, especially the police, paramilitaries, and army. To be most flexible and effective, these investments may require new funding mechanisms that circumvent the normal bureaucracy and red tape that often impose lengthy delays. On the civilian side, it will be impossible to formulate and implement smart assistance programs unless the State Department and USAID expand the scale of their operations inside Pakistan. But in order to enable the movement of civilian officers within Pakistan’s difficult security environment, new facilities, procedures, and personnel will also be required.

Finally, when it comes to conducting its diplomatic efforts, U.S. policy makers must understand that statements that undermine confidence among Pakistanis in the stability of their state or the U.S. commitment to partnership are harmful to American interests. It is important for the Obama administration to voice U.S. concerns about the threats it perceives in Pakistan, including the
extension of the Taliban’s writ in the North-West Frontier Province. But it is also important that the administration’s warnings should not, in themselves, contribute to a brain drain or capital flight among the educated Pakistani elite that would further undermine stability in Pakistan.

Urgent Action Needed

Of course, these steps represent only the very beginning of a much longer, exceedingly complicated, and costly process. This process should begin quickly: the challenges posed by Pakistan are vast and will not be met through half measures or passivity. Further delays could prove fatal: the many forces undermining Pakistan’s stability are now ascendant if they are not yet dominant. The United States can reverse this momentum, not by seeking to contain the threat from a distance or by leveling coercive threats, but by cultivating and empowering a wide range of Pakistani partners.

Notes

The author wishes to thank Daniel Simons for his assistance with this paper.

4. Pakistan’s continued relationships with certain militant organizations along the Afghan border (especially the Haqqani network) and in Punjab (Lashkar-e-Taiba) appear to be a part of this hedging strategy.