{"id":3259,"date":"2015-03-19T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2015-03-19T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost\/CouncilOfCouncil\/global-memo\/the-panama-summit-and-the-withering-inter-american-ideal\/"},"modified":"2026-03-28T20:32:12","modified_gmt":"2026-03-28T20:32:12","slug":"the-panama-summit-and-the-withering-inter-american-ideal","status":"publish","type":"global-memo","link":"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/councilofcouncils\/global-memo\/the-panama-summit-and-the-withering-inter-american-ideal\/","title":{"rendered":"The Panama Summit and the Withering Inter-American Ideal"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The general public and the media usually pay scant attention to the Summit of the Americas, perhaps because the process tends to be detached from the citizens\u2019 daily worries and there is little understanding about it. This time, however, will be different. The 2015 Summit of the Americas in Panama on April 10\u201311 will not pass unnoticed because it will witness a historic moment in inter-American relations: the return of Cuba to a hemispheric forum, taking a seat alongside the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beyond its official theme\u2014\u201cProsperity with Equity: The Challenge of Cooperation in the Americas\u201d\u2014the truly important thing about this gathering is that for the first time the whole region will be included. This is the result of at least two processes. On the one hand, the increasing pressure exercised by the Latin American countries in this regard; and, on the other hand, Washington\u2019s decision to initiate a path of normalization of its bilateral relations with Cuba. The former must have contributed to the latter, since in the last ten years the Cuban issue has proved to be incrementally divisive and rarefied the political atmosphere in the continent. In fact, it was central to the \u201cchallenge to cooperation in the Americas,\u201d noted in the summit\u2019s title. So how did the seminal decision of inviting Cuba come about? It is worth analyzing the period leading up to the summit because it reflects more general trends in regional governance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Return of Cuba<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cuba\u2019s participation in the Summit of the Americas can be seen as an additional\u2014and crucial\u2014step in a longer process of reintegrating the country into regional schemes. Indeed, the twenty-first century has seen a rise of Latin American multilateralism whereby these countries created a number of new regional associations with the purpose of promoting political dialogue and intergovernmental cooperation on a vast array of issues, ranging from education to infrastructure building and transparency in defense spending. Cuba rode this wave of regionalism. In 2004 it first participated with Venezuela as a founding member of ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas). Then in 2008 it joined the Rio Group\u2014a multilateral entity created in 1986 with the aim of producing \u201cLatin American solutions to Latin American problems\u201d\u2014twenty-two years after its inception. Finally, Cuba was not only present at the launching of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)\u2014a bloc created as the successor to the Rio Group, notably excluding the United States and Canada\u2014in 2010\u20132011 but it also obtained the pro tempore<\/em> presidency: For a whole year Cuban diplomats represented and spoke on behalf of Latin America in multilateral forums and other international venues. The presence of thirty-three heads of state at CELAC\u2019s second summit held last year in Havana was the culmination of this process. It symbolized a consensus spanning the region from the Rio Bravo (known in the United States as Rio Grande) to its southern tip and sent a strong message: Beyond existing differences or affinities with the island, Cuba should be granted a place at the table.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No doubt this was partly the result of a change in the region\u2019s political climate brought about by the so-called left turn in Latin America coupled with a perceived relative decline of U.S. regional hegemony, particularly in South America. The creation of ALBA and CELAC (but also the Union of South American Nations, known as UNASUR) was inspired\u2014among other things\u2014by the goal of asserting autonomy vis-\u00e0-vis the United States. Cuban membership in those groups, in fact, works as a symbol of these autonomist or anti-hegemonic pretenses; a symbol that some countries decided to push further by demanding that Cuba be included also in the institutional spaces created and sponsored by the United States to engage with the rest of the region, that is, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Summit of the Americas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cCubanization\u201d of the Inter-American Agenda<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indeed, during the Fifth Summit of the Americas held in Trinidad and Tobago in 2009, several presidents called for an end to the exclusion of Cuba from the summit process and the OAS. The host country\u2019s prime minister stated: \u201cThere was a clear consensus that the reintegration of Cuba in the inter-American relations is an essential step toward the building of a more cohesive and integrated Americas.\u201d Even if the recently elected U.S. President Barack Obama aroused sympathies and promised to launch a new and more positive era of relations with Latin America, he could not escape from listening to recriminations regarding the Cuban embargo and the island\u2019s absence in that and other venues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As pressure mounted, it was decided to take the Cuban issue to the OAS General Assembly. The Permanent Council\u2014a political body of the OAS, composed of the permanent representatives of the member states\u2014created a working group in charge of drafting a resolution on the topic. After a very difficult and strained process of negotiations, in June 2009 the thirty-ninth OAS General Assembly gathered in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, and adopted a resolution that annulled the 1962 decision excluding Cuba from participation in the inter-American system. But this was not the end of the matter. Three years later, the Sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, was again dominated by the Cuban question, to the point that no final declaration was issued due to lack of consensus: In particular the United States and Canada refused to sign a document that called for inviting Cuba to the next gathering. Ecuador and Nicaragua did not attend that summit, citing their solidarity with Cuba, whereas the presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Colombia eloquently called for including the island in this hemispheric forum. The ALBA countries also announced their decision not to take part in future Summits of the Americas without the presence of Cuba. If anything, Cartagena showed that Anglo and Latin America were sharply divided over what to do with Havana. That element alone tainted the whole summit process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contesting U.S.-Led Multilateralism<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

One might think that at least some Latin American countries are engaging in a more general strategy of \u201ccontested multilateralism.\u201d As Julia Morse and Robert Keohane explain, this happens when \u201cstates are dissatisfied with existing institutions\u201d and they \u201cdecide that it is worthwhile either to shift their focus to other institutions or to create new ones.\u201d Clearly, ALBA countries\u2014relying on the ambivalent positions of other important nations such as Brazil and Argentina\u2014are expressing their unhappiness with hemispheric forums that they perceive as vehicles for projecting U.S. hegemony (its power and values) throughout the Americas. This is why they are constantly contesting the OAS and the Summit of the Americas\u2019 procedures, goals, and, ultimately, existence. They try to weaken them financially and politically, continuously threatening their non-participation or even their exit. And the presence of new Latin American regional associations in turn makes the threat more credible than before. In this framework, boycotting the summit on the grounds of Cuba\u2019s exclusion was above all a great tactic to weaken the inter-American multilateral architecture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, after the Panamanian government formally invited Cuba in September 2014, Washington was put for a moment against a wall: If the Obama administration decided not to attend, it would mean the demise of the summit process; if, on the contrary, the United States did participate, but openly objected to Cuba\u2019s presence, it would pay the price of humiliation for not being able to block it. But the December 17, 2014, announcement of a normalization route in the bilateral relations between the two countries was a game changer. Cuban presence in the summit can now be portrayed as a part and parcel of a jointly agreed process of rapprochement and not as a hassle for the United States. Looking at the big picture, one might argue that Cuban membership in fact strengthens the summit process as it tends to contradict the strategy of \u201ccontested multilateralism.\u201d This can only be in Washington\u2019s best interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Would Make the Panama Summit a Success?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although the Latin American political landscape is showing signs of change, at present there is little convergence between the United States and an important portion of Latin American countries. Therefore, true solutions to the hemisphere\u2019s collective problems\u2014such as the economic slowdown, transnational organized crime, and drug-related violence\u2014are not really to be expected. There is, indeed, a multi-thematic agenda tailored to satisfy all countries; however, the truth is that this summit will not be about topics but about the attending personalities. Of course, the Venezuelan crisis will loom large and now Obama will take the heat for the imprudent policy of sanctions against President Nicolas Maduro government officials casted in the hyperbolic legal language of a \u201cnational security threat.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With that in mind, the summit should be considered successful if:<\/p>\n\n\n\n