[{"command":"settings","settings":{"pluralDelimiter":"\u0003","suppressDeprecationErrors":true,"ajaxPageState":{"libraries":"eJwry0wtL9YvA5F6ufkppTmpOmBOfGJWYkV8emqJPowBFc_MS8vMyyxJjS9OLsrPyYFo1YWJ6kJEAdF1Ikc","theme":"cfr_theme","theme_token":null},"ajaxTrustedUrl":[],"views":{"ajax_path":"\/views\/ajax","ajaxViews":{"views_dom_id:c91ea2eea608694fd9423f6a21f40127d0a73e14dee047e7b7aff386bbce96c0":{"view_name":"blog_posts","view_display_id":"block_archived_blog_posts","view_args":"4\/256295\/2010","view_path":"\/custom\/ajax\/archived_blog_posts\/4\/256295\/2010","view_base_path":null,"view_dom_id":"c91ea2eea608694fd9423f6a21f40127d0a73e14dee047e7b7aff386bbce96c0","pager_element":0}}},"viewsAjaxGet":{"blog_posts":"blog_posts"},"user":{"uid":0,"permissionsHash":"e331052eb0a1bc4b2feb3d0cfc1f0f2f6ec5dfd9a50125d1397e4ccee31da7be"}},"merge":true},{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_sgviVl_37H6Ta5Bl-lc7uAkjneU0Dj6JvASOxbgV9L8.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=cfr_theme\u0026include=eJwry0wtL9YvA5F6ufkppTmpOmBOfGJWYkV8emqJPowBFc_MS8vMyyxJjS9OLsrPyYFo1YWJ6kJEAdF1Ikc"}]},{"command":"add_js","selector":"body","data":[{"src":"\/themes\/custom\/cfr_theme\/node_modules\/jquery\/dist\/jquery.min.js?v=3.1.0"},{"src":"\/themes\/custom\/cfr_theme\/node_modules\/jquery-migrate\/dist\/jquery-migrate.min.js?v=3.1.0"},{"src":"\/core\/assets\/vendor\/once\/once.min.js?v=1.0.1"},{"src":"\/core\/misc\/drupalSettingsLoader.js?v=10.2.11"},{"src":"\/core\/misc\/drupal.js?v=10.2.11"},{"src":"\/core\/misc\/drupal.init.js?v=10.2.11"},{"src":"\/core\/assets\/vendor\/tabbable\/index.umd.min.js?v=6.2.0"},{"src":"\/core\/misc\/progress.js?v=10.2.11"},{"src":"\/core\/assets\/vendor\/loadjs\/loadjs.min.js?v=4.2.0"},{"src":"\/core\/misc\/debounce.js?v=10.2.11"},{"src":"\/core\/misc\/announce.js?v=10.2.11"},{"src":"\/core\/misc\/message.js?v=10.2.11"},{"src":"\/core\/misc\/ajax.js?v=10.2.11"},{"src":"\/themes\/contrib\/stable\/js\/ajax.js?v=10.2.11"},{"src":"\/modules\/contrib\/views_ajax_get\/views_ajax_get.js?tcwifo"},{"src":"\/core\/assets\/vendor\/jquery-form\/jquery.form.min.js?v=4.3.0"},{"src":"\/core\/modules\/views\/js\/base.js?v=10.2.11"},{"src":"\/core\/modules\/views\/js\/ajax_view.js?v=10.2.11"},{"src":"\/modules\/contrib\/views_infinite_scroll\/js\/infinite-scroll.js?v=10.2.11"}]},{"command":"insert","method":"html","selector":".blog-series__accordion-item[data-year=\u00222010\u0022] .blog-series__accordion-body","data":"\u003Cdiv class=\u0022views-element-container\u0022\u003E\u003Cdiv class=\u0022js-view-dom-id-c91ea2eea608694fd9423f6a21f40127d0a73e14dee047e7b7aff386bbce96c0\u0022\u003E\n  \n  \n  \n\n  \n  \n  \n\n  \u003Cdiv data-drupal-views-infinite-scroll-content-wrapper class=\u0022views-infinite-scroll-content-wrapper clearfix\u0022\u003E\n\n\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022views-row\u0022\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022views-field views-field-search-api-rendered-item\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan class=\u0022field-content\u0022\u003E\n\n  \n\n\u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large article card-article-large--with-no-image\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__container\u0022\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__content\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__topic-tag\u0022\u003E\n          \u003Ca href=\u0022\/asia\/china\u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__topic-tag-link\u0022\u003E\n            China\n          \u003C\/a\u003E\n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \n                  \u003Ca href=\u0022\/blog\/top-10-asia-events-2010 \u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__link\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__title\u0022\u003E\n            The Top 10 Asia Events of 2010\n                    \u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003C\/a\u003E\n\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__dek clamp-js\u0022 data-clamp-lines=\u00224\u0022\u003EA man looks a screen outside a United Overseas Bank branch in Singapore\u0026#39;s financial district on October 31, 2008. (Vivek Prakash\/Courtesy Reuters)\n\n\u003Cstrong\u003EThe Great Foreign Policy Reveal\n\n\u003C\/strong\u003EChalk up 2010 as the year when Chinese rhetoric met reality. Five years worth of political talk about win-win diplomacy, peaceful rise, and a harmonious society unraveled quickly over the course of the year. China seemed to make all the wrong choices: cybersecurity attacks on multinationals and others, embargoes on rare earths, bullying Southeast Asia, ignoring and then defending North Korean aggression, demanding apologies from Japan and South Korea for Chinese-induced military spats, and the country\u2019s greatest diplomatic embarrassment\u2014attacking (and keeping in prison) Liu Xiaobo, the only Chinese Nobel Prize winner who still wants to live in the country. China\u2019s takeaway from these disastrous diplomatic developments ought to be \u201cactions speak louder than words.\u201d\u00a0 Indeed, recent reports suggest that China is finally exerting some pressure on North Korea. Let\u2019s hope this is the beginning of a trend.\n\n\n\n\u003Cstrong\u003EWe\u2019re Baaaaaaaack\u2026\u003C\/strong\u003E\n\nChinese missteps (see the Great Foreign Policy Reveal above) paved the way for the United States to reengage more significantly in Asia. Without a clear, overarching strategy of its own, the Obama administration was quick to respond to the region\u2019s growing concern over Chinese military and economic assertiveness, as well as Beijing\u2019s reluctance to acknowledge the clear security threat posed by its erstwhile ally North Korea. President Obama, along with Secretaries Clinton and Gates, crisscrossed East, South and Southeast Asia strengthening old ties and establishing new ones. Many Chinese analysts have accused the United States of undermining China\u2019s relations in the region\u003Cstrong\u003E.\u003C\/strong\u003E They have missed the point: U.S. strategy is not the problem; it is China\u2019s own foreign policy that needs to be rescusitated.\n\n\u003Cstrong\u003EKorea crisis\n\nWhile outside analysts struggled to figure out what it all meant, the Korean peninsula moved from one crisis to the next. In March, the South Korean Cheonan warship was sunk, apparently by a North Korean torpedo. The North Koreans revealed a new uranium enrichment facility in November. \u00a0And later that month, the North shelled Yeonpyeong Island. Was all of this calculated strategy, tied to the ascension of Kim Jong Il\u2019s son Kim Jong Un or another example of DPRK brinksmanship in an attempt to bring the United States back to the negotiating table? The only question more vexing is: what is China, North Korea\u2019s only friend, going to do about its recalcitrant neighbor? Despite some public debates about why China supports the North and Wikileaks cables suggesting Beijing could live with a peninsula reunified under the South\u2019s control, the answer seems to be: not much. Beijing has continued to shield the North and called for all sides to return to negotiations.\u003C\/strong\u003E\n\n\u003Cstrong\u003EIndia\u2019s Bumpy Road\n\n\u003C\/strong\u003EPresident Obama arrived in Delhi proclaiming that U.S.-India relations were one of the \u201cdefining partnerships of the 21st century.\u201d While the trip may have been short on major deliverables like the ground-breaking nuclear deal, Obama did promise to support India\u2019s bid for a UN Security Council seat and the two countries agreed to cooperate more closely on maritime, new energy, and cyber issues. The biggest stories, however, were domestic. Unrest worsened in Kashmir and the Naxalite insurgency remained strong. Despite continued strong Indian economic growth, shoddy construction threatened to overshadow the Commonwealth Games (though in the end they went relatively smoothly). Looking ahead, the continuing scandal over the sale of airwaves to cellphone operators may yet derail the ruling Congress Party .\n\n\u003Cstrong\u003EThailand\u2019s Uncertain Future\n\n\u003C\/strong\u003ERed shirt protestors, many from the countryside but also supported by the urban working class, occupied large portions of central Bangkok in opposition to the removal of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and what they saw as the domination of the country by the elites. After several months of negotiations, the government launched a crackdown that resulted in the death of at least 90,  the dispersal of the protestors, the arrest of numerous red shirt leaders, and a state of emergency. While the Prime Minister has promised political reconciliation, controls on the press, universities, and opposition politicians continue. As our colleague Joshua Kurlantzik noted in several blog posts throughout the unrest, deep regional and class divides threaten the country\u2019s economy and democracy: \u201cIf Bangkokians continue to dominate all elite institutions, and there is not a real federalization of political power, expect the anger to build up again.\u201d\n\n\u003Cstrong\u003EChina\u2019s Nobel Dilemma\n\n\u003C\/strong\u003EThe brilliant and modest\u2014not to mention imprisoned\u2014Chinese scholar-turned-activist Liu Xiaobo only gained in stature when he declared his newlyawarded Nobel Peace Prize \u201cfirst and foremost for the Tiananmen martyrs.\u201d Beijing had a clear choice: turn Liu\u2019s win into an opportunity to begin a dialogue on political reform\u2014as Liu himself had suggested \u2014or simply downplay the significance of the award. Yet with a stunning lack of political acumen, Beijing chose a third path, attacking the Nobel Committee as \u201ca bunch of clowns\u201d and proclaiming the award \u201ca western plot.\u201d Efforts to rally other countries behind a boycott of the Nobel ceremony resulted in a coalition of the weak and ugly. It was yet another opportunity lost for Beijing to take the high road; instead China\u2019s leaders managed to exceed everyone\u2019s worst expectations.\n\n\u003Cstrong\u003E \u003C\/strong\u003E\n\n\u003Cstrong\u003EFirst Steps in Burma\/Myanmar?\n\n\u003C\/strong\u003EAcross the border, China\u2019s neighbor Burma\/Myanmar was enduring its own political travails but chose a different course. Long-suffering Burmese Nobel Peace prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi was released after years of living under house arrest, and the country held its first general election in two decades. While no one believes the elections were the real deal, they may pave the way for improvement the next time around. The country is plagued by militarized ethnic conflict, its GDP per capita is among the lowest in the world, and the political system is rife with corruption. Perhaps the \u201cnewly elected\u201d government will try to legitimize itself by tackling these challenges; we\u2019ll have to wait and see.\n\n\u003Cstrong\u003EThe battle over the Internet\n\n\u003C\/strong\u003EGoogle\u2019s January announcement that it had been hacked set the tone for a very contentious year in U.S.-China relations. Soon after the Google bombshell, Secretary Hillary Clinton declared in a widely publicized speech that the United States stood for \u201ca single Internet where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and ideas.\u201d The Chinese responded that its citizens had free access to the Internet, and besides, \u201cThough connected, the Internet of various countries belongs to different sovereignties,\u201d \u2014meaning what we do to control the web is our own business. Controlling the web in China, however, continued to be a challenging game of cat and mouse. The popularity of new platforms\u2014the microblog weibo\u2014and netizens forcing the government to address publicly a prominent case of nepotism (\u201cMy dad is Li Gang\u201d) and the suspicious death of a local activist (Qian Yunhui) all strained the limits of China\u2019s capacity to restrict the flow of information.\n\n\u003Cstrong\u003E2011: Asia Back on Track\n\n\u003C\/strong\u003ELiz\u2019s prediction for 2011: The United States, China, Japan, South Korea, India, and the rest of Asia will work hard to get their collective relationships back on track. No one wants to see the region sink into a perpetually tension-ridden, conflict-prone zone. Yet the \u201chowto\u201d will continue to remain a challenge. For many of the region\u2019s most powerful players, capabilities as well as interests are evolving rapidly, and in some cases with little transparency. They will need to get out ahead of the curve and establish some acceptable rules of the road, not something that has happened easily in the past. Still, 2011 is the Year of the Rabbit\u2014a sign noted for being talented, conservative, and wise. Hopefully we have enough rabbits in the region to get relations back on track.\n\n\u003Cstrong\u003EThe Game Changer?\n\n\u003C\/strong\u003EAdam\u2019s prediction for 2011: For at least a decade, China\u2019s defense spending has increased by double digits. Yet, you could be forgiven for thinking that it is all coming to fruition this week: Chinese officials suggested that they would launch their first aircraft carrier next year; Admiral Robert Willard, the head of Pacific Command, confirmed that the DF-21D (the world\u2019s first long-range, land-based \u201ccarrier killer\u201d ) has reached \u201cinitial operational capability\u201d; and pictures of the J-20, a new stealth type fighter, surfaced on the Internet. Much remains unknown about Chinese intentions and the actual capability of these weapons, but Adam is pretty confident about this prediction for the next year: there will be growing worry about Chinese military power in the Western Pacific, making Liz\u2019s prediction all that more important\u2014leaders in the region are going to have to work extra hard to get Asia back on track.\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__metadata\u0022\u003E\n                              \u003Cspan class=\u0022card-article-large__authors\u0022\u003Eby Elizabeth C. Economy\u003C\/span\u003E\n                  \n        \n                  \u003Cspan class=\u0022card-article-large__date\u0022\u003E December 30, 2010\u003C\/span\u003E\n        \n        \n                          \u003Ca href=\u0022\/blog\/asia-unbound\u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__series\u0022\u003E\n            Asia Unbound\n          \u003C\/a\u003E\n              \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n\n\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022views-row\u0022\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022views-field views-field-search-api-rendered-item\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan class=\u0022field-content\u0022\u003E\n\n  \n\n\u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large article card-article-large--with-no-image\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__container\u0022\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__content\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__topic-tag\u0022\u003E\n          \u003Ca href=\u0022\/asia\/north-korea\u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__topic-tag-link\u0022\u003E\n            North Korea\n          \u003C\/a\u003E\n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \n                  \u003Ca href=\u0022\/blog\/if-north-korea-didnt-have-you-worried-enough \u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__link\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__title\u0022\u003E\n            As If North Korea Didn\u2019t Have you Worried Enough\n                    \u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003C\/a\u003E\n\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__dek clamp-js\u0022 data-clamp-lines=\u00224\u0022\u003EModels of a North Korean Scud-B missile and South Korean Hawk surface-to-air missiles are seen at the Korean War Memorial Museum in Seoul. (Jo Yong hak\/Courtesy Reuters)\n\nI have a new article in the \u003Cem\u003ENew Republic \u003C\/em\u003Eexamining the links between North Korea and a potential nuclear and missile program in Burma. Rumors and reports that Burma wanted to develop missile and nuclear programs have been percolating for years, but recently the problem has been highlighted with more credible reports on the topic by the United Nations, the Democratic Voice of Burma and the Institute for Science and International Security.\n\nWhat is interesting about the possibility of a Burmese nuclear program \u2013 admittedly, still relatively remote at this point \u2013 is how, as with the junta\u2019s recent political maneuvers, it shows that the regime has been able to both keep foreign powers in the dark and effectively manipulate the outside world. In this way, the junta has put the lie to the idea that its leaders are dumb, unsophisticated, or irrational \u2013 they are brutal, but also far savvier and rational than they often appear.\n\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__metadata\u0022\u003E\n                              \u003Cspan class=\u0022card-article-large__authors\u0022\u003Eby                   \u003Ca href=\u0022\/expert\/joshua-kurlantzick\u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__authors-link\u0022\u003EJoshua Kurlantzick\u003C\/a\u003E\n                \u003C\/span\u003E\n                  \n        \n                  \u003Cspan class=\u0022card-article-large__date\u0022\u003E December 22, 2010\u003C\/span\u003E\n        \n        \n                          \u003Ca href=\u0022\/blog\/asia-unbound\u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__series\u0022\u003E\n            Asia Unbound\n          \u003C\/a\u003E\n              \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n\n\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022views-row\u0022\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022views-field views-field-search-api-rendered-item\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan class=\u0022field-content\u0022\u003E\n\n  \n\n\u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large article card-article-large--with-no-image\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__container\u0022\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__content\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__topic-tag\u0022\u003E\n          \u003Ca href=\u0022\/asia\/china\u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__topic-tag-link\u0022\u003E\n            China\n          \u003C\/a\u003E\n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \n                  \u003Ca href=\u0022\/blog\/north-korea-backs \u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__link\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__title\u0022\u003E\n            North Korea \u201cBacks Off\u201d?\n                    \u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003C\/a\u003E\n\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__dek clamp-js\u0022 data-clamp-lines=\u00224\u0022\u003ENorth Korean leader Kim Jong-il walks in front of his youngest son Kim Jong-un as they watch a parade to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers\u0026#39; Party of Korea in Pyongyang. (Kyodo\/Courtesy Reuters)\n\nSo, the\u00a0\u003Cem\u003ENew York Times\u003C\/em\u003E says that North Korea\u2019s failure to respond to yesterday\u2019s South Korean live-fire drills \u201ccould signal [a] new policy\u201d\u2014namely, that Pyongyang, to quote a South Korean analyst cited in the article, may be \u201ctrying to create the mood for dialogue.\u201d\n\nWe\u2019ll see.\u00a0 But, sorry, I just don\u2019t buy it.\n\nWhy didn\u2019t North Korea act after all the bluster? The fact is, North Korea often rains fiery rhetoric on the South. And conflict this time was unlikely because North Korea did not need to strike, having already achieved many of its objectives.\n\nThree explanations, taken together, probably explain what happened yesterday: \u00a0(1) Beijing, humiliated by the 23 November attack, surely used (private) channels to tell Pyongyang to knock it off.\u00a0 (2) Pyongyang, quite simply, did not need to respond to yesterday\u2019s exercise, having already accomplished its objective of humiliating South Korean president Lee Myung-bak and keeping Seoul off balance. \u00a0And (3) North Korea\u2019s threats of future attack remain credible; put differently, yesterday\u2019s non-response would in no way suggest to Seoul or Washington that Pyongyang has \u0022gone soft.\u0022\n\nA statement from the Supreme Command of the Korean People\u2019s Army blustered, but, ultimately, dismissed the affair; Pyongyang, the statement claimed, \u0022[does] not feel any need to retaliate against every\u0022 South Korean action.\n\nThe bottom line, then, remains that North Korea is prone to provocative behavior, in large part for domestic reasons, and will continue to challenge South Korea, in particular. Such provocations seem most unlikely before Chinese president Hu Jintao\u2019s mid-January visit to Washington; on that, Beijing and Pyongyang have probably reached consensus.\u00a0 But, after Hu heads home, I suspect North Korea will again refocus on South Korea, judging its military to be vulnerable.\n\nAfter all, unlike the events of 23 November, Seoul is better prepared for the next North Korean attack. \u00a0The South Korean military has been criticized for performing poorly during the 23 November incident. \u00a0So, Seoul has loosened its rules of engagement, deployed additional assets to the vicinity, and sought to bolster conventional deterrence through military displays, such as today\u2019s live-fire exercise near Yeonpyeong island.\u00a0 Some in South Korea, particularly in the military, are itching for a rematch, and it\u2019s not that hard to see why:\u00a0 they are determined to demonstrate (including to China) that the South will no longer be North Korea\u2019s punching bag.\n\nBut North Korea is unlikely to be so accommodating. \u00a0Pyongyang will continue to make an issue out of the Northern Limit Line (which it does not recognize) but seems more likely to preserve the element of tactical surprise by striking elsewhere, and at a time (and in a manner) of its choosing.\n\nIndeed, this is the central dilemma facing Lee and South Korea:\u00a0 The South has everything to lose from a conflict, so the North benefits more from escalation.\n\nFor that reason, and despite some change in the South\u2019s posture, I suspect this means Seoul will remain pretty risk-averse. The South will likely seek to preserve a \u003Cem\u003Eladder\u003C\/em\u003E of escalation in future responses to North Korean actions.\u00a0 It will aim to respond proportionately; more likely, it will still respond conservatively.\n\nMeanwhile, Washington and Seoul continue to gamble that common sense and Chinese leverage will set limits on further escalation by Pyongyang.\u00a0 But China\u2019s track record of \u0022restraining\u0022 North Korea is strikingly poor.\u00a0 Since 2006, despite supposed Chinese pressure, Pyongyang has tested two nuclear devices, run four missile exercises, torpedoed a South Korean corvette, and shelled a South Korean island.\u00a0 Indeed, China and North Korea have grown closer throughout this period, with the North feting Chinese officials and working to invest Beijing in the political succession to Kim Jong-il\u2019s third son, Kim Jong-un.\n\nIn truth, Pyongyang shows little deference to Chinese preferences.\u00a0 But, as a logical result, the crisis has sharpened Chinese tensions with Washington and Seoul.\u00a0 Like a growing number of issues in US-China relations, this one will produce more rancor than agreement.\u00a0 And, for its part, Seoul remains furious at Beijing\u2019s efforts to shield the North. \u00a0Rhetoric could heat up further in the wake of Seoul\u2019s 18 December detention of Chinese fishermen. \u00a0But, unlike a similar September incident with Japan, Beijing and Seoul have every reason to deescalate.\u00a0 Indeed, unlike all things Japanese, South Korea does not stir the same nationalistic passions in China.\u00a0 Still, a bad taste will linger on both sides, further fueling mutual suspicion.\n\nEven when it does, well, nothing, it\u2019s extraordinary how North Korea still stirs the pot in Northeast Asia at everyone else\u2019s expense.\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__metadata\u0022\u003E\n                              \u003Cspan class=\u0022card-article-large__authors\u0022\u003Eby Evan A. Feigenbaum\u003C\/span\u003E\n                  \n        \n                  \u003Cspan class=\u0022card-article-large__date\u0022\u003E December 21, 2010\u003C\/span\u003E\n        \n        \n                          \u003Ca href=\u0022\/blog\/asia-unbound\u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__series\u0022\u003E\n            Asia Unbound\n          \u003C\/a\u003E\n              \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n\n\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n\n\n\n\t\t  \t  \u003Cli class=\u0022views-row\u0022\u003E\n\t    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022views-field views-field-search-api-rendered-item\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan class=\u0022field-content\u0022\u003E\n\n  \n\n\u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large article card-article-large--with-no-image\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__container\u0022\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__content\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__topic-tag\u0022\u003E\n          \u003Ca href=\u0022\/asia\/china\u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__topic-tag-link\u0022\u003E\n            China\n          \u003C\/a\u003E\n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \n                  \u003Ca href=\u0022\/blog\/inflation-political-too \u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__link\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__title\u0022\u003E\n            Inflation is Political Too ...\n                    \u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003C\/a\u003E\n\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__dek clamp-js\u0022 data-clamp-lines=\u00224\u0022\u003EPeople look at vegetable prices at a local food market in Shanghai. (Carlos Barria\/Courtesy Reuters)\n\nAre there many things in Asia more political than inflation?\u00a0 At a time when governments across the region are wrestling with inflationary pressure, it\u2019s worth asking just how aggressive Asian governments might become and what tools they may pull out of their toolkits to fight it.\n\nOn this episode of CNBC\u2019s \u201cSquawk Box,\u201d I discussed the issues with Martin Soong and Karen Tso.\u00a0 The answer, I think, is that they could become very aggressive, but that we\u2019re not likely to see a uniform response across the region.\n\nTwo years of expansionary monetary policies, government initiatives to limit currency appreciation, and food shortages from difficult harvests in 2010 have boosted inflationary pressure across Asia.\u00a0 Some countries, such as Pakistan, have particular cause for concern because Islamabad\u2019s widening fiscal deficit has forced the government to borrow heavily from the state bank, creating expectations that inflation there may reach 15% in 2011.\n\nThere are plenty of inflation-fighting tools in the Asian kitbag\u2014rate hikes, currency interventions, and the sorts of measures we\u2019re now seeing in China, which include price caps and the release of grain reserves.\n\nBut one question, of course, will be how Asian governments and central banks balance inflation fighting with a deeply held desire to sustain growth amid the global downturn.\n\nA second question will be just how much that debate comes to reflect political overtones and considerations. After all, it\u2019s worth remembering that, in Asia, inflation isn\u2019t a subject only for macroeconomists.\u00a0 It is a deeply and intrinsically political business.\n\nAs I blogged on India here in July, debates have increasingly shifted to the\u00a0\u003Cem\u003Echallenges \u003C\/em\u003Eto growth, not least inflation, rather than, say, India\u2019s growth rate per se.\u00a0 Inflation isn\u2019t just an economic issue in India;\u00a0it\u2019s politically explosive because it touches consumer prices, particularly the prices of foodstuffs, oils, and cooking fuels, in a country with a large population of poor voters.\u00a0 And inflation is a growing challenge;\u00a0inflation figures have been over 10 per cent this year and\u00a0food inflation has been higher still.\n\nLikewise in China.\u00a0 Over the long term, prices \u003Cem\u003Ewill\u003C\/em\u003E go up if the state successfully implements the agenda at the heart of its ambitious 12th Five Year Plan.\u00a0 That plan aims to boost household incomes, and to shift capital allocation from the corporate sector to households by, for example, tinkering with energy prices. This is a tall order and will face obstacles aplenty, including resistance from entrenched interests in China\u2019s powerful corporate sector. \u00a0But right here, right now, an immediate problem is that inflation takes money out of individual and family pockets.\u00a0 And, as we all know, angry citizens, especially urban and white collar citizens, make China\u2019s leaders very uncomfortable.\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__metadata\u0022\u003E\n                              \u003Cspan class=\u0022card-article-large__authors\u0022\u003Eby Evan A. Feigenbaum\u003C\/span\u003E\n                  \n        \n                  \u003Cspan class=\u0022card-article-large__date\u0022\u003E December 17, 2010\u003C\/span\u003E\n        \n        \n                          \u003Ca href=\u0022\/blog\/asia-unbound\u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__series\u0022\u003E\n            Asia Unbound\n          \u003C\/a\u003E\n              \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n\n\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n\t  \u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\t  \t  \u003Cli class=\u0022views-row\u0022\u003E\n\t    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022views-field views-field-search-api-rendered-item\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan class=\u0022field-content\u0022\u003E\n\n  \n\n\u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large article card-article-large--with-no-image\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__container\u0022\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__content\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__topic-tag\u0022\u003E\n          \u003Ca href=\u0022\/asia\/china\u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__topic-tag-link\u0022\u003E\n            China\n          \u003C\/a\u003E\n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \n                  \u003Ca href=\u0022\/blog\/wouldnt-hold-my-breadth-ipr-protection-china \u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__link\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__title\u0022\u003E\n            Wouldn\u2019t hold my breadth for IPR protection in China\n                    \u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003C\/a\u003E\n\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__dek clamp-js\u0022 data-clamp-lines=\u00224\u0022\u003EU.S. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke (L) shakes hands with China\u0026#39;s Vice Premier Wang Qishan in Hangzhou October 29, 2009. (Eugene Hoshiko\/Courtesy Reuters)\n\nThe two-day meeting of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade ended with the Chinese promising to crack down on software piracy and prevent other violations of intellectual property rights. \u00a0I hope they do, but I\u2019ll believe it when I see it.\n\nThe good news. \u00a0The Chinese government will spend more on legal software and it will try to track the use of software in state-owned enterprises. \u00a0Vice Premier Wang Qishan is said to have agreed to personally oversee a public campaign against intellectual property rights theft. \u00a0In addition, Chinese officials once again tried to reassure their American counterparts that earlier policy documents suggesting that the government would only buy products patented or trademarked in China were just drafts and that new rules would be more flexible.\n\n\n\nThe New York Times points to Wang\u2019s involvement as a hopeful sign.\u00a0 Wang is the Vice Premier in charge of economic affairs, and the article suggests that \u0022difficult changes are sometimes made only when a senior official publicly takes responsibility for them.\u0022\u00a0 While this is true in the larger bureaucratic sense, it has not been the case with the difficult issue of intellectual property rights.\u00a0 I go into some of the history in Advantage, but this is not the first time a Vice Premier has been tasked with cracking the problem.\u00a0 In 2003, Beijing created the Leading Group on intellectual property rights, a high-level group to coordinate enforcement under the direction of Vice Premier Wu Yi. The appointment of Wu Yi, a woman dubbed the \u201ciron lady\u201d by the media and widely respected for her ability to get things done in the Chinese bureaucracy, signaled the importance the central leadership attached to the issue.\u00a0 Seven years ago.\u00a0 In 2008, Wang himself wrote an op-ed for the \u003Cem\u003EWall Street Journal\u003C\/em\u003E entitled: \u201cNo More Chinese Knock-Offs.\u201d\n\nTasking Wang is necessary but not sufficient since the problem is systemic as well as bureaucratic.\u00a0 As Anne Stevenson Yang and Ken DeWoskin argued about five years ago in the Far Eastern Economic Review, the failure to protect IPR is the result of the government\u2019s continued control of the economy and the drive for indigenous innovation.  State funds are given to companies and scientists to develop already proven technologies.  In essence, companies are paid by the government to  copy.\n\nNone of this has changed, and in fact has possibly gotten worse.\u00a0 So while I am happy to hear Chinese Vice Premiers say they are ready to tackle the problem, I am going to hold off making any final judgments until I see some change on the ground.\n\nPhoto Courtesy of \u003Cem\u003EAFP\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022card-article-large__metadata\u0022\u003E\n                              \u003Cspan class=\u0022card-article-large__authors\u0022\u003Eby                   \u003Ca href=\u0022\/expert\/adam-segal\u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__authors-link\u0022\u003EAdam Segal\u003C\/a\u003E\n                \u003C\/span\u003E\n                  \n        \n                  \u003Cspan class=\u0022card-article-large__date\u0022\u003E December 17, 2010\u003C\/span\u003E\n        \n        \n                          \u003Ca href=\u0022\/blog\/asia-unbound\u0022 class=\u0022card-article-large__series\u0022\u003E\n            Asia Unbound\n          \u003C\/a\u003E\n              \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n\n\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n\t  \u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \n\u003Cul class=\u0022js-pager__items pager\u0022 data-drupal-views-infinite-scroll-pager\u003E\n  \u003Cli class=\u0022pager__item\u0022\u003E\n    \u003Ca class=\u0022button\u0022 href=\u0022?page=1\u0022 title=\u0022Load more items\u0022 rel=\u0022next\u0022\u003ELoad More\u003C\/a\u003E\n  \u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n\n  \n  \n\n  \n  \n\u003C\/div\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n","settings":null}]